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F i n a n c e  f o r  D e v e l o p m e n t :  
I s s u e s  a n d  T r e n d s
A ccess to finance is a crucial determinant of the development process in 
emerging market economies. Although it may seem obvious now, this 
view was not always widely accepted. The tendency in development economics 
during most of the postwar era was to focus on the “real” sector of the econ­
omy— namely, industrialization, technology transfer, and the international 
exchange of goods— with the financial sector relegated to the sidelines. Insofar 
as finance formed part of the constellation of priority topics, it centered on 
international finance, in the form of foreign direct investment, bilateral and 
multilateral aid, and international commercial bank loans.
Over the last decade, a large body of literature has highlighted the role of the 
domestic financial system in developing economies. Three topics have been of 
particular interest. The first centers on financial crises: why they erupt, how to 
prevent them, and how to foster financial stability. A second topic is the link 
between finance and growth. While the long-standing debate on the causal rela­
tionship between finance and growth continues, the current empirical literature 
clearly argues that finance should be considered the independent variable— and 
thus of interest to policymakers. A third issue, much less studied than thè other 
two, concerns access to finance. The questions researchers are asking include 
who can obtain finance, at what cost, and how access affects the potential of 
small and medium-sized firms to contribute to economic growth and a more 
equal distribution of income and wealth.
2 Introduction
Recent interest in financial crises began with the Mexican debacle of 
1994—95, which has been called the first financial crisis of the twenty-first cen­
tury.1 That is, it did not match the traditional pattern whereby crises were the 
result of loose macroeconomic policy or poor management of individual banks. 
New theoretical approaches were introduced, but it was not until the Asian cri­
sis of 1997—98 that they attracted much attention. Among the new elements 
was a switch in focus from the behavior of the current account of the balance of 
payments to the capital account and from flows to stocks. Another dominant 
theme was the role of external factors, especially international capital flows, in 
causing problems for countries that had made major strides in liberalizing their 
economies in line with formulas promoted by the international financial institu­
tions. Ironically, successful economies have turned out to be the most vulnerable.
Crises and stability are not the only concerns of experts and policymakers, 
however. Governmental authorities have two potentially contradictory roles to 
play in dealing with the financial sector. On the one hand, they must try to 
maintain the stability of the system as a whole. This requires establishing broad 
guidelines for the behavior of individual institutions, including limits on the 
amounts and types of credit that they can offer and requirements for capital and 
liquidity. On the other hand, todays governments are also expected to promote 
growth. In the financial realm, this involves providing incentives so that finan­
cial institutions will channel investment funds to productive enterprises. Since 
such loans embody varying types and amounts of risk, they must be balanced 
against the need for stability at both the micro- and macroeconomic levels.
Another role that governments are expected to play in modern economies is 
to correct market failures that may lead to gross distortions in the distribution of 
income and wealth. The tax system has traditionally been the instrument of 
choice for carrying out this task, but finance can be useful too. The trade-off 
mentioned above also comes into play here. If too much emphasis is put on sta­
bility, banks will not lend to productive enterprises in general and will certainly 
avoid dealing with more risky small and medium-sized firms (SMEs). Unwill­
ingness on the part of banks to lend to SMEs is especially problematic since the 
capital markets and international finance are the exclusive domain of larger, 
more established firms. Access to finance for SMEs is relevant not only because 
of the effect on income distribution, but also for its important impact on job 
creation: in virtually all economies, SMEs are the major source of employment.
The trade-offs among stability, growth, and access exist in all countries, but 
they pose a particularly daunting challenge for developing nations. There are a 
number of reasons for the greater difficulty. The financial systems themselves are 
more fragile in developing countries, and governments lack the instruments and 
institutions, as well as the trained personnel, that are typically found in indus­
trial nations. At the same time, high growth rates are more necessary in develop-
1. C a m d e ssu s  (1 9 9 5 ) .
ing countries to begin to provide their populations with an adequate standard of 
living, and inequality is likely to be more prevalent. Finally, international 
attempts to provide help and guidance on financial issues may actually increase 
problems for developing countries, as has been argued with respect to the new 
guidelines established by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
The trend toward financial liberalization and international integration has 
further complicated the task of financial management for all, but again it has 
posed special problems for developing countries. As a result of liberalization, 
developing countries lost the instruments— however imperfect they were— that 
they had previously used to maintain financial stability. The transition to a more 
open system frequently took place so rapidly that substitutes could not be cre­
ated in time; the industrial countries established strong systems of regulation 
and supervision over decades, not months. In addition, the small scale of most 
developing countries’ financial systems made them particularly vulnerable to the 
large, volatile flows of international capital that have characterized the global 
markets in recent years. While these flows can help to relieve the foreign 
exchange constraint that has typically limited growth in developing countries, 
they can also undermine stability and result in major crises with profound 
implications for macroeconomic performance and serious negative effects on 
both growth and equity.
Finance w ith in  a N e w  D e velop m e nt M o d e l in  L a tin  A m e rica
We examine these issues with respect to Latin America in the decade and a half 
beginning around 1990. This time frame is a critically important one for Latin 
America because it witnessed an acceleration of the move toward an open, 
market-based development model in place of one that relied heavily on the state 
and was semiclosed with respect to foreign trade and capital flows. The financial 
sector was a key part of the transformation, and it changed dramatically as a 
consequence.2 Since most other economies, including those of East Asia, have 
also been moving toward greater reliance on the market in financial and nonfi- 
nancial areas, this time period increases the relevance o f the book’s findings 
beyond the Latin American region itself.
During most of the postwar period, Latin American countries followed some 
version of the so-called import-substitution industrialization (ISI) model. The 
ISI approach featured a dominant role of the state in the economy, including 
extensive regulation of prices, a high share o f GDP made up of government 
expenditure, control of credit, regulation of labor markets, and direct ownership
2. This section is taken from Stallings and Peres (2000). T hat book includes an extensive review 
of the literature on economic reform in Latin America up to 2000. Notable works published since 
then include a new quantitative regional overview (Lora and Panizza, 2002) and several compara­
tive country-oriented studies of the political economy o f reform (for example, Snyder, 2001; Teich-
man, 2001; Weyland, 2002).
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of key industries. At the same time, barriers limited Latin America’s interactions 
with the rest of the world economy. Trade protection was pervasive through 
taxes on exports and high tariffs or quotas (or both) on imports. Financial inte­
gration was also restricted via controls on foreign exchange transactions by citi­
zens, limits on foreign capital inflows and their sectoral destination, and restric­
tions on capital outflows including remittance of profits and interest.
The authorities began to rethink these policies after following them for sev­
eral decades. The reasons varied over time. For the earliest cases in the 1970s 
(Argentina, Chile, Uruguay), new ideological currents arose with the return of 
newly minted Ph.D.s from the United States. A second wave followed in the 
1980s (Bolivia, Costa Rica, Mexico), when countries were heavily influenced by 
the debt crisis, the accompanying role of the international financial institutions, 
and new conservative leadership in the industrial countries. The 1990s were the 
key decade, however, as the pioneering countries moved further along the path 
toward the market and most of the rest of the region joined them, encouraged 
in part by the positive examples of neighbors, especially Chile, and the disap­
pearance of the socialist bloc in Europe. Nonetheless, ideological and interna­
tional factors also continued to play a role in governmental decisionmaking.
The reform package was made up of a number of separate but related poli­
cies. Price controls were reduced or eliminated, import restrictions were lifted, 
state-owned firms were privatized, tax rates were lowered and shifted from 
income to consumption, and labor regulations were made more flexible. 
Another important component of the reforms centered on the financial system. 
In this sphere, two changes are often conflated that are really separate policies. 
One is the deregulation of domestic financial activities, for example, freeing 
interest rates on loans and deposits, lowering reserve requirements, ending 
directed credit, and making it easier for new firms to enter the market. The 
other is the liberalization of international financial transactions, including the 
elimination of controls on capital flows, the end of regulation on offshore bor­
rowing by financial and nonfinancial firms, and the suppression of multiple 
exchange rates.
Financial liberalization has been arguably the most controversial of all the 
structural reforms. While government decisions to lower tariffs, sell state-owned 
enterprises, or increase labor market flexibility have certainly encountered oppo­
sition, it has typically been concentrated in certain groups that face losses as a 
result of the changes. Financial liberalization, by contrast, has a far broader 
impact across all sectors of the economy. In addition, the financial sector is gener­
ally regarded as the most fragile part of the economy, subject to dramatic swings 
stemming from changes in economic or political variables or even shifts in mar­
ket psychology. Nonetheless, domestic financial liberalization is second only to 
trade liberalization in terms of its implementation record, and it has advanced 
more (relative to its starting point) than any other reform in the Latin American
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Figure 1-1. Economic Reforms in Latin America, 1990—2000a
Index (0—100)
Sources: ECLAC (2001, p. 47), based on Morley, Machado, and Pettinato (1999). 
a. Indexes range from 0 (complete government control) to 100 (no government intervention). 
They are normalized according to the following formula: lit = (Max -  IRJI(Max -  Min), where 4 -  
index value for country z, year p, Irit = raw value of reform measure, country z, year P-, MAX = maxi­
mum value of reform measure for all countries, all years; MIN = minimum value of reform meas­
ure for all countries, all years.
region; see figure 1-1. Moreover, although opposition to the reforms has gener­
ally increased since the late 1990s, when growth rates began to fall after the Asian 
crisis, the reversion of domestic financial liberalization has been limited.
L a tin  A m ericas Financial Sector To d a y: Stylized Facts
Financial liberalization greatly changed the characteristics of the financial sector 
in Latin America. In particular, the liberalization process created new rules by 
which the system operates. The new rules, in turn, led to a number of additional 
changes, such as ownership in the sector and the nature of the government’s 
role. Other dimensions, however, displayed far less variation. Indeed, many 
characteristics— especially the shallowness of the financial system as a whole and 
the failure to develop a capital market segment— remained surprisingly similar 
to the prereform period; proponents had argued that financial liberalization 
would produce more dramatic and extensive advances. Combining the differ­
ences and similarities, we can portray the financial sector today in terms of six 
stylized facts.
First, Latin America’s financial systems remain bank based, meaning that 
bank credit is more important than other forms of finance such as the flotation
6 Introduction
o f bonds or stock market offerings. Nonetheless, bank credit as a share of GDP 
is very low in comparison with industrial economies or other developing coun­
tries, and it has grown slowly since the early 1990s. O n average across the 
region, bank credit represented only 41 percent of GDP in 2003; the figure was 
96 percent in East Asia and 94 percent in the Group of Seven (G-7) countries. 
Another characteristic that sets Latin America apart is the low share of total 
bank credit that goes to private borrowers rather than the public sector (22 per­
cent versus 82 percent in East Asia). Short maturities also characterize bank 
credit, especially from private sector banks, so that firms must continually roll 
over credit or find other ways to finance investment.3
Second, trends in bank behavior have been highly volatile in recent years, 
and crises have become more frequent in the wake of financial liberalization. 
Moreover, a link has developed between banking and currency crises, leading to 
the emergence of so-called twin crises. World Bank data show that Latin Ameri­
can countries had the highest average number of financial crises in the last three 
decades, at 1.25 per country. Former Soviet bloc countries and sub-Saharan 
Africa followed with 0.89 and 0.83, respectively. East Asia had only 0.38 crises 
per country, which approaches the 0.21 level of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). Latin American countries were also 
the most likely to have recurrent crises: 35 percent of the countries in the region 
suffered two or more crises, compared with 8 percent in East Asia and none in 
the OECD.4
Third, bank ownership has changed in two main ways. Many public sector 
banks have been privatized, with some being sold to local individuals or firms 
and some to foreigners. In the process, the share of foreign ownership in the 
banking sector has increased; even banks that were initially privatized through 
sale to local owners have often been bought by foreigners at a later stage. Recent 
BIS data, which compare ownership patterns for 1990 and 2002, indicate that 
the share of assets in government-owned banks in the six largest Latin American 
countries fell from 46 to 22 percent. Domestic private ownership also fell dur­
ing this period (from 47 to 32 percent), leaving foreign owners as the major 
group that gained market share (from 7 to 47 percent). East Asia also saw a rise 
in foreign ownership, but government ownership rose simultaneously in 
response to the Asian crisis of 1997—98. Reprivatization is ongoing in East Asia, 
however, with an important share of assets being purchased by foreigners, so 
these trends are likely to change in the near future.5
3. Data for Latin America and East Asia are from table 5-2; for the G-7 economies they are cal­
culated from IMF, International F inancial Statistics Yearbook. For countries included in Latin Amer­
ica and East Asia, see section on methodology below. See also Garcia-Herrero and others (2002); 
Liso and others (2002); IDB (2004) on the general characteristics o f Latin American banks.
4. Data are from IDB (2004, p. 30). See also Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) for a comparison 
of crises in Latin America and East Asia. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) introduce the concept of 
twin crises.
5. See table 3-2. For earlier comparative analysis, see Litan, Masson, and Pomerleano (2001); 
foreign bank strategies in Latin America are analyzed in ECLAC (2003, part III).
Fourth, capital markets, the other major source of formal sector finance, 
remain incipient in most countries of the region. Bonds outstanding represented 
only 37 percent of GDP in 2003, while stock market capitalization was 34 per­
cent. Comparable figures for East Asia were 60 percent and 80 percent, and for 
the G-7 they were 141 percent and 100 percent, respectively. On the positive 
side, Latin American markets grew substantially in the 1990s, albeit with two 
caveats. First, with respect to bond markets, the large majority of funds in Latin 
America are going to the public sector; private sector finance represents only 8 
percent of GDP (37 percent in East Asia). Second, on the stock market side, 
capitalization figures greatly overestimate their importance in Latin American 
economies. New issues (primary markets) have virtually dried up, representing 
only around 2 percent of GDP in recent years. In addition, the number of listed 
firms fell between 1990 and 2003. In both markets, liquidity is low as most 
stocks and many bonds are not traded; this fact discourages entry into the mar­
kets since investors cannot exit if they wish.6
Fifth, because of the characteristics just described, the financial sector—  
including both banks and capital markets— has made less of a contribution to 
economic growth in Latin America than is possible and desirable. A good deal 
of evidence purports to show that finance is an important determinant of 
growth in all countries, although analysts disagree on the channels.7 Our focus 
in this book is on finance for investment. Investment as a share of GDP is very 
low in Latin America compared to the high-growth economies of East Asia; the 
average figures for the period 1990-2003 were 20 percent and 35 percent, 
respectively.8 While many factors play a role in explaining low investment rates, 
evidence from several sources suggests that finance is a particular constraint in 
the Latin American case, which is logical given the shallow financial markets in 
the region.9 Another important factor in the finance-investment relationship is 
the maturity structure of finance and the lack of a long-term segment in most 
countries of Latin America today. Indeed, the higher investment ratios in the 
early postwar period may have been partially due to the availability of long-term 
government finance. In indirect terms, finance for consumption and mortgages 
is in its infancy, so demand from these sources is failing to stimulate further 
investment.
6. Data on bonds outstanding and stock market capitalization for Latin America and East Asia 
are from tables 5-3 and 5-4. G-7 figures are from Standard and Poor’s (2005) and the BIS website 
(www.bis.org/statistics/qcsv/anxl6a.csv). New issues are from Mathiesen and others (2004). Litan, 
Pomerleano, and Sundararajan (2003) provide information on capital markets in developing coun­
tries; World Bank (2004c) analyzes Latin American capital markets.
7. The most up-to-date review of the literature on finance and growth is Levine (2004); see also 
World Bank (2001, part II). On how the channels of influence may differ depending on the level 
of development o f a particular economy, see Rioja and Valev (2004a, 2004b).
8. Data are from World Bank, W orld D evelopm ent Indicators (online).
9. See, for example, IDB (2001, chapter 2); Kantis, Ishido, and Komori (2001); Batra, Kauf- 
mann, and Stone (2003). On Latin America in particular, see Pollack and García (2004).
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Sixth, access to finance remains severely limited throughout most o f the 
Latin American region, an issue that is closely related to finance and growth. 
The deficiency in finance for consumers and prospective homeowners is seg­
mented by income group, with lower income earners being especially penalized. 
Likewise, small and medium-sized enterprises have significant difficulties in 
obtaining finance. Both bond and stock markets are clearly limited to the largest 
firms in any given country, so bank finance is the sole alternative to self-finance 
for smaller firms.10 The only comparable data on access to finance across Latin 
American countries are from the World Bank’s World Business Environment 
Survey, which shows that SMEs generally face substantially greater problems 
than large firms in obtaining access to finance. The difficulties, however, vary by 
country. For example, only 25-30 percent of small firms in Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, and Venezuela report that finance is a major obstacle, while over 50 
percent do so in Argentina, Mexico, and Peru. Individual country data, dis­
cussed in chapters 6 through 8 of this book, explain some of the reasons for the 
intraregional differences. Interregional variation is also important: East Asian 
firms are much less likely than Latin American firms to cite finance as a major 
obstacle to their operations, since they have access to much deeper financial 
markets.11
Substantive and M ethodological C o n trib u tio n s
The book aims to explain these characteristics of the financial sector in Latin 
American countries. It is the first book-length study of the financial sector as a 
whole in the region, including banks as well as capital markets. We argue that 
both components of Latin America’s financial system are weak in comparison 
with East Asia, which we use as a benchmark. In our search for explanations, we 
make both substantive and methodological contributions to the debates on 
finance for development that are taking place in the academy as well as the pol­
icy world.
In substantive terms, we differ from the new, but increasingly dominant, 
trend in the literature to place the blame for Latin America’s weak financial mar­
kets on public banks, overregulation, and a refusal to acknowledge that small 
size makes full-scale integration with international financial markets the best 
policy option.12 While we agree that most public banks have been poorly man­
aged, that heavy-handed and inept regulation and supervision can undermine 
markets, and that small size is a hindrance, we argue that the solutions need not 
be total privatization, substitution of private monitoring for public supervision,
10. This is also true o f access to the international financial markets, in that only a handful of 
very large, well-known firms can raise money there.
11. World Bank website (info.worIdbank.org/governance/wbes).
12. Chapters 2 through 5 provide extensive literature reviews that document the new views and 
contrast them with traditional approaches.
and complete integration with international capital markets. More pragmatic 
solutions need to be considered that take into account the particular circum­
stances— political as well as economic— in individual countries.
W ith regard to public banks, a substantial amount of privatization has 
already taken place, as development and commercial banks have been closed, 
sold, or merged with private domestic or foreign institutions. Nonetheless, a sig­
nificant number remain, and the question is what to do with them. One answer 
is to move toward full privatization as quickly as possible, and in some cases this 
may be the only answer. For example, the Governor of Bolivia’s central bank has 
argued that it was impossible for Bolivia’s public banks to be improved suffi­
ciently, such that the best solution was to eliminate them—which was done.13 
At the same time, there are circumstances in which democratic political deci­
sions have been made to the effect that privatization is not acceptable. Costa 
Rica is an example here. What can be done under these circumstances?
Our evidence, as explained in chapter 3, suggests that strong institutions may 
be able to overcome many of the typical problems with public banks. Cleaning 
their balance sheets, putting competent professionals in charge, and requiring 
them to compete without special advantages is an alternative to privatization 
where citizens have decided that they want the public sector to maintain control 
of certain spheres of the economy. Discussions of exactly this type took place in 
Costa Rica in the mid-1990s.14 Similar decisions seem to have been made to 
maintain Brazil’s National Bank for Economic and Social Development 
(BNDES) and Banco do Brasil and Chile’s BancoEstado as public institutions, 
and similar steps have been taken to require them to operate in an efficient 
manner. The literature warns of rent seeking, corruption, and a possible contra­
diction between the economic and social functions of public banks. Our argu­
ment is not that public banks should return to the position of power they held 
in most Latin American countries in the early postwar years. Rather, if citizens 
so desire, and a strong institutional context can be created, public banks can do 
a reasonable job in terms of efficiency and in carrying out certain social func­
tions.15 We also find that weak institutions can undermine otherwise efficient 
banking institutions.
On regulation and supervision, an important public role clearly needs to be 
maintained. As discussed in chapter 4, we find (weak) evidence that corroborates 
the studies by private monitoring advocates with respect to a negative relation­
ship between government-based supervision and bank performance. Likewise, we 
find a positive relationship between performance and private monitoring indica­
tors. At the same time, we also find evidence of the procyclical tendencies that are
13. Morales (2005).
14. Personal interview with a former Costa Rican official.
15. The Bolivian example is useful in this sense. In an extremely poor country, with weak insti­
tutions and few skilled personnel, a solution a la Costa Rica, Chile, and Brazil may indeed be 
impossible.
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the justification for prudential regulation and supervision. The disagreement is 
not about the empirical relationships, but the conclusion that private monitoring 
can adequately deal with the problems of stability that plague financial institu­
tions as a result of collective action problems. We see private monitoring and 
public regulation and supervision as complements, not substitutes, and we join 
in the call for greater transparency, more public information, director liability, 
and outside audits to become part of a government-based system of prudential 
regulation and supervision. Our evidence suggests, however, that it would be a 
serious mistake to rely exclusively on private initiative.
Finally, on the issue of international integration, we again find space for a 
middle ground that others do not seem to see. For very small economies, such as 
those in Central America or the Caribbean, vibrant domestic capital markets are 
probably not feasible, just as economies of scale make it impossible to support 
certain nonfinancial sectors. Nevertheless, participation in international finan­
cial markets is not the only alternative. While a few large borrowers can access 
such resources, participation in the international markets is an illusion for the 
vast majority of firms— even large firms in a local context. We propose that 
attention be paid to a regional option in those cases, especially where other 
regional integration agreements already exist. Regional financial markets are not 
easy to construct, but East Asian governments have been moving in this direc­
tion, and Latin America’s regional development banks provide an important 
resource for supporting the necessary infrastructure. Flexibility is needed with 
respect to possible solutions to the size problem.
In summary, we are not opposed to the new calls for a greater private role (in 
bank ownership and in regulation and supervision) and greater openness (with 
respect to participation in international financial markets). We propose, how­
ever, that more emphasis be placed on the context in which domestic financial 
markets operate. By strengthening the macroeconomic and institutional context 
in individual countries, as well as establishing rules for cautious financial inte­
gration at the international and the regional levels, more space is created to take 
account of local conditions and preferences. This, in turn, increases the chances 
of making proposals that are relevant to policymakers. Another aspect of the 
focus on context is the role of governments in creating, completing, and 
strengthening markets in which the private sector can operate. It is too often 
forgotten in the new literature that private initiative depends on the context.16 
We develop these ideas more fully in the remainder of the book.
Beyond discussions of the structure of financial markets and their gover­
nance, we also want to propose that more attention be paid to two problems
16. We refer to what some call market-enhancing policies, often seen as an intermediate position 
between laissez-faire capitalism and a government-centered version. See Aoki, Kim, and Okuno- 
Fujiwara (1997); in particular, the chapter by Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (1997) discusses 
the link between finance and market-enhancing policies.
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that are prevalent throughout the region in terms of existing financial systems. 
One is the need for a long-term segment, which will support investment and 
help to raise Latin America’s very low rates of capital formation and thus sup­
port faster economic growth. We point to a number of experiences that may 
offer models of how to proceed and make some recommendations on possible 
steps, but our main aim is to put the issue on the agenda. A second problem 
that also requires more attention than it has received is how to expand access to 
financial markets for micro, small, and medium-sized firms. In most countries, 
the government and a small group of very large firms have no financial con­
straints in that they can move at will among international markets, domestic 
capital markets, local banks, and nonbank finance. Their smaller counterparts 
have much greater difficulties, and under current circumstances they have too 
few options in the formal financial system. Again, a number of experiences may 
be adaptable across countries, and we hope to stimulate more discussion of this 
issue since it has important social and economic ramifications.
Most of the literature that we have discussed in the previous paragraphs is 
based on large-sample regression studies combining cases from both industrial 
and developing countries. These studies offer important insights and ways to 
test hypotheses, but we are troubled by the inclusion of countries with widely 
divergent levels of development without partitioning the sample to see if rela­
tionships are due to this factor. A number of recent studies show that the finan­
cial behavior of the two groups of countries differs substantially. In addition, 
large-sample studies always require the use of highly simplified measures of very 
complex realities that cannot take adequate account of qualitative distinctions. 
We argue that these are serious problems, which require an effort at compensa­
tion if we are to draw the proper lessons for policymaking.
Our way of dealing with these methodological problems— and an important 
contribution of the book—is to work at several levels of analysis and to use sev­
eral methodologies. Our principal approach is small-sample comparative analy­
sis of a dozen countries from Latin America and East Asia, but we also look at 
three country case studies in a comparative perspective. Another approach is to 
engage in theoretically informed case studies of single countries; a number are 
cited in the chapters that follow. Economic historians are in the best position to 
exploit within-country time series data, which can produce results that comple­
ment those from cross-country studies of large or small samples.
Our main comparative referent is East Asia, which we argue is the developing 
region with the greatest similarities to Latin America and the one that has the 
most lessons to offer Latin America. Table 1-1 contrasts some o f the most 
important macroeconomic and financial indicators of the two regions. Latin 
America clearly lags behind on all of them, although the region has much more 
experience with managing crises, a point that proved to be of interest to East 
Asia after the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98.
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Table 1-1. Latin America and East Asia: Economic Indicators, 1965—2003
Indicator Latin America East Asia
GDP growth rates 




Export growth rat?  



















Sources: World Bank (1992) for GDP growth, export growth, savings, and inflation, 1965—90; World 
Bank, W orld  D evelopm en t Indicators (online) for GDP growth, export growth, and savings, 1990-2003; 
IMF, In tern a tio n a l F in a n c ia l Statistics Yearbook for inflation, 1990-2003; table 5-1 for financial depth.
a. Merchandise exports only for 1965—90; goods and services for 1990-2003.
b. Gross domestic savings as share of GDP.
c. Bank credit plus bonds outstanding plus stock market capitalization as share of GDP
d. Consumer price index.
W ithin the two regions, we disaggregate to a number of cases that share an 
important set of characteristics; this is the middle-income group that is fre- 
quendy referred to as emerging market economies. Given data problems, the par­
ticular set of countries varies somewhat from chapter to chapter, but we try to 
keep a core group intact. In Latin America, we focus on Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. In Asia, the cases are Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. Table 1-2 
shows the population and per capita GDP for these countries. In Latin America, 
population ranges from 16 million to 177 million, and per capita GDP from 
$4,900 to $11,500. For East Asia, the range is 4 million to 215 million and 
$3,400 to $24,500, respectively. On average, East Asia’s population slightly
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Table 1-2. Latin America and East Asia: Population and Per Capita GDP, 2003
Region and country Population (millions) GDP per capitrt
L a t in  A m e ric a b 61 .4 7,951
A rg e n tin a 3 8 .4 11 ,58 6
B ra z il 176 .6 7 ,7 6 7
C h ile 15.8 10 ,20 6
C o lo m b ia 4 4 .4 6 ,7 8 4
M e x ic o 102.3 9 ,1 3 6
Peru 27.1 5 ,2 6 7
V enezue la 25 .5 4 ,9 0 9
East A s iab 6 5 .4 12 ,96 4
In d o n e s ia 2 1 4 .5 3 ,3 6 4
Korea 47 .9 17 ,90 8
M a la ys ia 24 .8 9 ,6 9 6
P h ilip p in e s 81.5 4 ,321
S ingapore 4 .2 24 ,48 1
T a iw a n 2 2 .6 2 3 ,4 0 0
T h a ila n d 6 2 .0 7 ,5 8 0
Sources: World Bank, W orld Development Indicators (online); Republic of China (2004) for Taiwan.
a. Dollars (purchasing power parity).
b. Unweighted average.
exceeds that of Latin America, while the per capita GDP differential is much 
larger.
In the chapters on changes in the financial system, we make use of quantita­
tive data sets that have been gathered by others, putting them into comparable 
form to the extent possible to be able to describe and explain the differences 
between and within regions. In the chapters on the impact of the changes, we 
switch to country case studies of Chile, Mexico, and Brazil. These three not only 
have the most sophisticated financial systems in Latin America, but they also 
show three rather different approaches to finance— based on different owner­
ship patterns— in the new market-oriented era. By combining quantitative and 
qualitative methods, we provide both a broad comparative overview and a 
nuanced analysis of the interaction of individual characteristics and global 
trends.
The dependent variables differ in the two parts of the book. In the initial 
chapters, we are trying to explain the characteristics and changes in Latin Amer­
ica’s financial sector and how it differs from that of the more successful East 
Asian region. In the later chapters, we want to understand the financial sector’s 
contributions to economic success in Latin America itself, where success is 
defined as a combination of stability, economic growth, and equity. These are 
broad and ambitious goals, but they are necessary to discover the extent to 
which the financial sector is pulling its weight in the economic development 
process and what steps can be taken to improve its performance.
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O v e rv ie w  o f the B o o k
The rest of the hook is divided into two substantive parts, followed by a 
policy-oriented conclusion. Part I consists of four chapters that analyze 
changes in the financial sector over the past fifteen years. Chapter 2 starts with 
the financial liberalization process. It looks at how much liberalization has 
taken place in Latin America in comparison with other regions, the relation­
ship between financial liberalization and crisis, and the characteristics of the 
rescue operations if a crisis occurs. The main findings are that Latin America 
has liberalized its domestic financial sector extensively, but in an unusually 
volatile way. Domestic liberalization was accompanied by international liber­
alization, while macroeconomic stability and prudential regulation lagged 
behind. Institutions also tended to be weak, which was a disadvantage; good 
policies require good institutions, and these take time to develop. The combi­
nation helped to promote twin banking and currency crises, which were 
extremely expensive to resolve— in terms of both opportunity costs for gov­
ernment revenues and other costs such as lost GDP, high real interest rates, 
and falling asset prices. These negative consequences lasted for many years 
after the crises themselves had subsided. Looking at these facts, we conclude 
that a gradual approach to liberalization should be pursued to give the author­
ities time to develop an adequate policy and institutional environment in 
which to cope with the new challenges.
Chapter 3 begins an examination of three other trends that were associated 
with financial liberalization and crisis. The focus of this chapter is on changes in 
ownership of the banking sector. We confirm the generally accepted trend 
toward less public and more foreign ownership, but we find that substantial het­
erogeneity still exists. Looking at banking systems within countries, rather than 
individual banks across countries, we find that East Asia behaves as the new lit­
erature predicts; foreign-dominated banking systems perform best, public sys­
tems worst, and private domestic systems in the middle. The situation in Latin 
America is more complex: foreign-dominated banking systems behaved less well 
than predicted, but public systems performed better. To explain these anomalies, 
we turn to the role of institutions. Incorporating institutional variables rein­
forces the results from East Asia and enables us to account for the unexpected 
findings in Latin America. We conclude that with strong institutions, public 
banks can perform reasonably well, while weak institutions can undermine the 
operations of even world-class foreign banks.
Chapter 4 examines another aspect of the governments role in the financial 
sector. Regulation and supervision were loosened as part of the financial liberal­
ization process, and banks frequently took advantage of the laxity to behave in 
ways that led to crises. In the postcrisis period, new, more sophisticated systems 
of prudential regulation and supervision were introduced. It has recently been
argued, however, that the new rules are stifling financial development and that 
private monitoring is a preferable approach. Our findings suggest that private 
monitoring can be a useful supplement to government-based regulation, but the 
problems of procyclicality that characterize the financial sector require that gov­
ernments provide stability as a public good. We also emphasize the interrelation­
ship of macroeconomics and banking regulation and examine the increased role 
played by international actors in setting rules on regulation and supervision. In 
this context, an important agenda item for the coming years is the impact of the 
new BIS agreement on the financial systems of developing countries.
Chapter 5 turns from banks to the capital markets, the other key element of 
the financial system. While neither banks nor capital markets have been shown 
to be superior to the other as a source of finance, evidence is growing about the 
advantages of having both. Latin American bond and stock markets, however, 
are weak in comparison to their East Asian counterparts, with the possible 
exceptions of Chile and Brazil. Our findings suggest several reasons for the dis­
crepancy: better macroeconomic performance in East Asia, stronger institutions 
in East Asia, and the availability of U.S. capital markets as an alternative to 
domestic markets for large firms in Latin America. Nonetheless, Latin American 
governments have recently begun to promote domestic capital markets with 
some success. One method is to create institutional investors, especially through 
the privatization of pension funds. Others include mandating greater trans­
parency and accountability in the financial sector as a whole and strengthening 
corporate governance in nonfmancial enterprises. A worrisome issue is new evi­
dence on possible negative interactions between domestic and international 
financial systems.
Part II of the book shifts from regional analysis of changes in the financial 
system to case studies of how the changes manifested themselves in individual 
countries and their impact in terms of growth, investment, and access to 
finance. Chapter 6 begins with the Chilean case. In the mid-1970s, Chile 
became the first country in Latin America to embark on a sustained program of 
financial liberalization. After a serious crisis in the early 1980s, the country was 
a pioneer in revamping its regulatory and supervisory systems. Since 1990, the 
Chilean financial sector has been the most successful in the region in terms of 
depth, efficiency, and stability. These characteristics, in turn, have contributed 
to a virtuous circle with the highest rates of investment and growth in Latin 
America. The financial sector model is a combination of domestic and foreign 
banks; in addition, a single, well-managed public sector bank pursues both 
social and economic goals. Capital market depth exceeds that of any neighbor­
ing country. Reasons for the good performance include the bank clean-up in the 
1980s, a stable macroeconomic and institutional environment, and a gradual 
international reopening after the crisis. Capital market deepening has depended 
heavily on demand by institutional investors. Despite good performance, challenges
Finance for Development: Issues and Trends 15
16 Introduction
remain: increasing long-term finance and liquidity and expanding access for 
small and medium-sized firms are among the principal ones.
Chapter 7 focuses on Mexico. Mexico’s financial reforms began a decade after 
those in Chile and were followed by a major crisis in 1994—95. As a result, the 
Mexican government also reformed its banking laws and institutions. It not 
only reprivatized the banks taken over during the crisis, but eventually sold 
almost all domestic banks to foreigners; nearly 85 percent of bank assets are now 
controlled by foreign institutions. While this ownership structure offers poten­
tial opportunities, they have yet to be realized. Capital markets are weak, 
although the government has been promoting them in the last few years. The 
main problem with Mexico’s banks, both foreign and domestic, is that they are 
not lending to the private sector, especially to private firms. Credit as a share of 
GDP is extraordinarily low, even in comparison with other countries in the 
region. This drought in the credit markets has not been a problem for the largest 
corporations, which can obtain funds internationally, but it has created serious 
difficulties for the large majority of firms. Despite an upswing since 2003, the 
negative implications for investment and growth are clear. Reviving bank credit 
is clearly Mexico’s biggest challenge; closely related is the need to improve the 
country’s institutions and expand access to finance for households and small 
firms.
Chapter 8 turns to Brazil, whose financial sector presents some interesting 
contrasts to those of Chile and Mexico. First, Brazil also liberalized its financial 
sector, but to a lesser extent than the other two countries. It still retains several 
very large and powerful public banks. The other major players are private 
domestic banks. Foreign competition, while increasing, is less important than in 
Chile or Mexico. Second, rather than waiting for a financial crisis to erupt, the 
Brazilian government cleaned up the banking system and revamped its laws and 
institutions after some serious problems emerged following a successful macro- 
economic stabilization program in the mid-1990s. Third, Brazil has a long his­
tory of promoting capital markets, and it has some of the largest, most sophisti­
cated markets among developing countries. Nonetheless, problems also remain 
in Brazil. Credit is scarce because banks prefer to hold government bonds rather 
than lend, and interest rates and spreads are extraordinarily high as a result of 
continuing macroeconomic problems. Not surprisingly, investment has been 
low and growth has been volatile. In addition, access to finance is limited, 
despite new programs in this area by the public banks.
Part III concludes with a summary of findings and a set of policy recommen­
dations. The recommendations address the most important challenges facing 
the Latin American region if banks and capital markets are to be strengthened 
so that they can play a greater role in supporting economic development. The 
overall message is that emphasis should be placed on changing the environment
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in which the markets operate, with particular focus on macroeconomic stability, 
institutional development, and links with the international economy. In addi­
tion, market-enhancing policies must be developed to resolve the two major 
problems we have identified: the lack of long-term finance for investment and 
the scarcity of finance for small and medium-sized firms. Both need to be 
resolved if the Latin American region is to overcome the low growth rates of 
recent years and the long-term heritage of inequality.

C h a n g e s  i n  L a t i n  A m e r i c a s  
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F i n a n c i a l  L i b e r a l i z a t i o n ,  
C r i s i s ,  a n d  t h e  A f t e r m a t h
F inancial liberalization in the past two decades has profoundly transformed 
financial systems in developing economies around the world. Broadly 
speaking, these changes have occurred in three stages, although differences are 
found across countries and perhaps across regions. First, liberalization changed 
the rules under which financial sectors operate. Whereas previously govern­
ments had a strong influence on the volume, price, and destination of loans, pri­
vate sector institutions now make such decisions on their own. This shift has 
had important implications for investment and growth, as well as for who has 
access to finance. Second, in many cases financial liberalization was followed by 
financial crisis. These crises required rescue programs absorbing large amounts 
of fiscal revenues and resulted in steep losses of output and social dislocations. 
Third, the resolution of the crises further changed the characteristics of financial 
systems. They brought governments back into the picture, although in a differ­
ent capacity than in the past, and they brought about significant changes in the 
ownership of financial institutions.
Given the magnitude of these transformations, any study of the financial sec­
tor in the current period must begin with a clear understanding of the liberaliza­
tion process, both the new opportunities it creates and the new challenges it 
poses. This chapter thus provides essential background for the rest of the book. 
We define liberalization as domestic financial deregulation and demonstrate that 
the major Latin American countries have made deep changes— deeper than
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those in East Asia, which is our main benchmark. We then test several hypothe­
ses about when liberalization will be followed by crisis. Our results indicate that 
the policies accompanying liberalization— namely, macroeconomic manage­
ment, capital account opening, and regulation and supervision— are the main 
determinants of whether a crisis will occur. Institutions are also important 
because they influence governments’ ability to carry out sound policies, but 
institutions take a long time to nurture. Finally, we provide evidence of the dev­
astating impact of financial crises, including the long-lasting nature of their 
damage to affected economies. Given the importance of institutions and policies 
for avoiding crises, we conclude that gradual liberalization has the best chance of 
a positive outcome.
The chapter is organized in five sections. The first presents our framework 
and hypotheses for studying liberalization. The second examines statistics on 
financial liberalization in developing countries, with particular emphasis on 
Latin America and East Asia. Section three turns to the relationship between lib­
eralization and crisis; it looks at both the theoretical literature and empirical evi­
dence to understand how liberalization and crisis are linked. Section four ana­
lyzes short-term rescue mechanisms, their fiscal and other costs, and their degree 
of success. (Longer-term aspects of the rescue programs are considered in later 
chapters.) The final section concludes.
Financial Liberalization; Literature and Hypotheses
In the early postwar period in most developing countries, domestic financial sys­
tems were dominated by the banking industry. Banks were tightly controlled by 
economic authorities, either because of concern about financial stability or 
because banks were an important instrument of development strategy. Rent seek­
ing was also a frequent motivation. Controls were of various types. First, interest 
rates on both deposits and loans were set by the government. The real rates were 
often negative, at least ex post, as inflation exceeded nominal rates. Second, 
reserve requirements were very high, so the commercial banks had little freedom 
to expand their portfolios. Third, governments issued administrative directives 
for the allocation of a substantial share of commercial bank credit. Fourth, gov­
ernments either prohibited banks from engaging in international lending and 
borrowing or limited the volume and uses of such funds. Finally, government- 
owned banks were responsible for a large amount of the lending that took place, 
often intermediating between external sources of credit and local borrowers. 
Together, these characteristics were referred to as financial repression.
Proponents of reform saw financial repression as leading to low savings rates, 
since depositors received low or negative interest on their funds; low monetiza­
tion of the economies; limited access to credit, especially for small and medium­
sized firms; and credit directed to borrowers on the basis of political connec­
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tions, rather than the profitability of their projects. Financial liberalization 
would remove these burdens, they argued, enabling countries to mobilize 
increased volumes of resources, deploy them more efficiently, and thus acceler­
ate investment, productivity, and growth.1
Opponents of liberalization were much more cautious. Even those who 
agreed with the criticisms of financial repression worried that the proposed solu­
tion could be worse than the problems it was meant to resolve. One concern was 
that the mechanisms already in place to mobilize resources— however flawed 
they might be—would be replaced by speculative forces that would result in cri­
sis, chaos, and economic decline. These problems would be magnified if domes­
tic liberalization were accompanied by external financial liberalization, such that 
large, volatile capital flows could overwhelm weak local banks. Another concern 
was that long-term finance would disappear in a liberalized system, and access 
to finance would be limited to a small group of large firms and wealthy house­
holds.2
We argue in this chapter that both positions embody some elements of truth. 
The outcomes depend heavily on the way liberalization policies are imple­
mented, the other policies that accompany them, and the institutional frame­
work in which the changes take place.3 The outcomes also depend on the inter­
national context for liberalization, but that is beyond the control of the 
developing countries themselves.
We begin by defining what we mean by financial liberalization. The term is 
used in different ways in the literature, which helps explain some of the confu­
sion and disagreement. For our purposes, financial liberalization refers to the 
partial or complete elimination of government-imposed restrictions on domestic 
financial behavior, so that economic agents can make their own decisions with 
regard to the volume, price, timing, and purpose of financial transactions. Two 
elements of this definition are of particular note. First, the definition does not 
imply that complete liberalization is involved; rather, the emphasis is on the 
direction of change. Put another way, we do not conceive of the process as a 
dichotomous choice of repression or liberalization, but as a range of possible 
points on a spectrum. Second, we do not include international financial liberal­
ization as part of the definition per se. The two usually go together in practice,
1. The early arguments along these lines were made by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973). 
The classic review of the literature is Fry (1995). More recent reviews include Caprio, Honohan, 
and Stiglitz (2001); Demirgiig-Kunt and Detragiache (2005).
2. Fry (1995) reviews half a dozen types o f  critiques o f the McKinnon-Shaw thesis. Major 
examples include neostructuralists, such as Taylor (1983), and market failure approaches, such as 
Stiglitz (1994). For an updated version of Stiglitz’s argument, see Caprio, Honohan, and Stiglitz 
(2001, chap. 2). On Latin America in particular, see Ffrench-Davis (2005).
3. An interesting complementary approach is found in Lee (2003), who argues that the litera­
ture on financial liberalization went through three phases: deregulation per se; the need for macro- 
economic stability and dealing with imperfect financial markets; and the identification of institu­
tional preconditions.
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Table 2-1. Relationship between Financial Liberalization and Outcomes
Dim ensions Positive outcom es N egative outcom es
Implementation Gradual and extensive Rapid and complete
Other economic policies 
Macroeconomic Prices and real economy stable Instability in one or both
International Partial liberalization Complete liberalization
Regulatory Tight regulation/supervision Loose regulation/supervision
Institutions Strong Weak
as components of a more generalized move toward greater reliance on the mar­
ket. We find it useful, however, to consider international liberalization as one of 
the policies that might accompany domestic financial liberalization.
Based on this definition, we present a framework for analyzing the liberaliza­
tion process, which includes the variables mentioned: implementation, accom­
panying policies, and institutional context. Table 2-1 summarizes a simple 
model of financial liberalization, according to these dimensions. The broadest 
question is whether the liberalization process is successful, where success (as 
defined in the introductory chapter) includes financial stability, increased rates 
of growth, and broader access to finance by lower-income households and small 
enterprises. Whereas the book as a whole addresses all three goals, in this chap­
ter we concentrate on the first, asking under what conditions liberalization will 
have a positive outcome (stability) versus a negative one (crisis).
W ith regard to implementation, the key distinction involves speed and 
extent. Policies accompanying liberalization center on three components: 
macroeconomic policy (the approach to price stability, deficits, exchange rates, 
and real economic stability), international financial policy (the extent and 
sequencing of capital account opening), and regulation and supervision (adher­
ence to international standards). The strengthening— or creation— of institu­
tions includes the legal framework and protection of contracts, as well as gov­
ernment organs (such as central banks, regulatory and supervisory agencies, and 
the judicial system). The international political-economic context in which 
domestic financial liberalization takes place also influences the outcome, but 
developing countries cannot control this factor, so we do not include it in our 
scheme.
Our hypotheses, as spelled out in table 2-1, are that success in financial liber­
alization is optimized by (1) a gradual process of liberalization that eventually 
leaves decisions to private sector actors (if public sector banks continue, they 
should be run on a transparent and efficient basis with clear objectives); (2) a 
policy combination of macroeconomic stability with a competitive exchange 
rate, partial opening of the capital account following domestic liberalization, 
and prudential regulation preceding liberalization; and (3) an institutional 
framework with a strong legal system and competent operating agencies. In the
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discussion that follows, we test these hypotheses qualitatively by examining 
experiences in individual countries.
The follow-up to financial liberalization and crisis, if one occurs, is a rescue 
package and institutional change. These processes have generally been less con­
troversial than financial liberalization itself. Most experts have been quite prag­
matic about the prescription of rescue policies, and most governments have used 
some combination of market-based and government-managed programs. 
Nonetheless, the debate continues on the extent to which governments should 
rescue ailing institutions. Moral hazard is a particular concern, but the use of 
public moneys to bail out private actors has also been a political issue in some 
cases.4
Despite differences of opinion on these several issues, a commonly accepted 
set of stylized facts can be identified with respect to the empirical process of 
financial liberalization, crisis, and rescue in recent years. Financial liberalization 
occurred in most developing countries. It was frequently undertaken without an 
adequate regulatory environment in place. Newly liberated banks increased 
loans very rapidly without proper credit analysis or provisions for losses; moral 
hazard and adverse selection were frequent problems. In the extreme, banks 
took advantage of loose regulation by engaging in fraudulent activities. Unless 
authorities acted expeditiously and effectively, crisis resulted, possibly facilitated 
by a volatile economy and policies that stimulated large capital inflows. To pre­
vent a systemic meltdown, governments intervened to rescue the banks— even if 
such intervention ran counter to their ideological predilections. Short-run poli­
cies included takeover of insolvent institutions, recapitalization, purchase of 
nonperforming loans, and support for debtors. Longer-term policies involved 
divestiture of intervened banks, which often resulted in increased foreign owner­
ship, and an improved system of regulation and supervision. W hether this 
sequence led to a strong performance by the recovering financial system 
depended on the details of policy design and implementation.
Financial Liberalization: E m p irica l Trends
Financial liberalization has been a broad-based process in recent decades, involv­
ing developed as well as developing countries. Several data sets are available that 
enable us to compare Latin America with other regions, as well as to compare 
countries within Latin America. Using a cross-regional sample makes it possible 
to assess whether Latin America’s financial liberalization had unique characteris­
tics or whether the worldwide process has been basically the same everywhere.
4. For examples of a pragmatic, mixed approach versus one that argues for a particular alterna­
tive, see Calomiris, Klingebiel, and Laeven (2004) and Honohan and Klingebiel (2003), respec­
tively.
The most useful for our purposes is a World Bank data set that includes 
OECD countries, Latin America, and East Asia during the period 1973-2002.5 
The overall index is composed of three subindexes: domestic financial liberaliza­
tion (our definition), international liberalization, and stock market liberaliza­
tion. Each subindex, in turn, is made up of several indicators. Domestic finan­
cial liberalization includes eliminating regulations on deposit and lending 
interest rates, allocation of credit, and foreign currency deposits. International 
liberalization is measured by the end of regulations on offshore borrowing by 
financial and nonfmancial institutions, multiple exchange rate markets, and 
controls on capital outflows. Stock market liberalization is gauged by the aboli­
tion o f regulations on foreign acquisition o f shares in the domestic stock 
exchange, repatriation of capital, and repatriation of interest and dividends. All 
of the indexes vary between 1.0 and 3.0, with larger numbers indicating greater 
liberalization.6
The L ibe ra liza tion  Index in  In te rn a tio n a l Comparison
Figure 2-1 plots the monthly variation of the overall index for the three groups 
of countries. It shows that the OECD countries already had substantially more 
liberalized financial markets than the other two regions at the beginning of the 
period, and—with the exception of a brief period in the mid-1970s— they 
advanced steadily until the early 1990s.7 At that time, they reached the most lib­
eralized position possible on the index and stayed there throughout the follow­
ing years. The East Asian countries followed a similar path, but they began at a 
much lower point and had yet to reach full liberalization in 2002. The region 
attained its highest point (2.7 on the index) in the mid-1990s and continued at 
that level except for a slight drop around the time of the Asian financial crisis. 
That reversal was remarkably small, considering the tremendously negative 
impact of the crisis in the Asian countries.
In some ways, Latin America lies between the OECD and Asia. It began in 
an intermediate position in 1973 and ended between the other two in 2002. In 
the intervening years, however, Latin America demonstrated distinctive charac­
teristics. First, the initial increase in the 1970s was very rapid; indeed, the Latin 
American index actually exceeded that of the OECD countries for a brief period
5. Only fourteen OECD countries are included: Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. OECD members Mexico and Korea are included with their respective regions. The seven 
Latin American countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. 
The East Asian cases are Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and 
Thailand. We have excluded Hong Kong, since its entrepot status gives it atypical characteristics.
6. The index is described in Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003). The numerical data are found at 
the following website: siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/financial_liberalization_ 
index.xls.
7. The small decline in the OECD index was due to the influence of Denmark, Italy, and espe­
cially Portugal, all o f which had activist governments in the mid-1970s.
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Figure 2-1. Financial Liberalization Index, by Region, 1973—2002*
Index (1 —3)
Source: World Bank website (siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/financial_liberaliza- 
tion_index.xls).
a. See text for definition of index. OECD countries include Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. Latin America includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and 
Venezuela. East Asia includes Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand.
in the mid-1970s. This rise was followed by a sharp and extended reversal dur­
ing the debt crisis of the 1980s, in contrast to the much milder reaction in the 
Asian region in the 1990s. Only in 1988 did the liberalization process begin 
anew, and for the next several years the speed surpassed any period in any other 
region. From 1994 to 2002, there was again a good deal of stop-go movement. 
In other words, Latin America as a region pursued a much more volatile liberal­
ization path than East Asia or the OECD.8
Since our definition of financial liberalization concentrates on domestic 
processes, we examine that component of the index separately for the same three 
regions (see figure 2-2). The pattern for the OECD and East Asian countries 
mirrors trends already seen in figure 2-1, while domestic liberalization in Latin 
America shows even greater volatility than was found in the overall index. In the 
1970s, domestic financial markets in Latin America were significantly more 
open than in the OECD region. That gap ended with the debt crisis, however, 
when Latin American governments reversed their policy stance. By the 1990s, 
Latin America had joined the OECD countries at the highest level of liberaliza-
8. This finding is consistent with other characterizations o f Latin America as an extremely 
volatile region on many indicators (see, for example, IDB, 1995).
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Figure 2-2. Domestic Financial Liberalization Lndex, by Region, 1973—2002a
Index (1—3)
Source: World Bank website (siteresources.worIdbank.org/DEC/Resources/fmancial_liberaliza- 
tion_ index.xls).
a. See figure 2-1 for lists o f countries included; see text for definition of index.
tion, with the exception of limited reversals in the period around the Mexican 
crisis in 1995 and later in Argentina in 2001-02. East Asia remained slightly 
less open than Latin America and the OECD until 1995, as it did on the 
broader index.
The L ibe ra liza tion  Index in  L a t in  Am erica a n d  East Asia
Figure 2-3 disaggregates the components of the index for Latin America. The 
overall index and the domestic financial component are the same trends pre­
sented above; data for liberalization of the capital account of the balance of pay­
ments and the stock market are added. As the figure shows, the domestic finan­
cial sector was the leading edge of liberalization, almost always exceeding the 
overall index. The capital account displayed the greatest volatility: it began as 
the most liberalized part of the index, fell to complete closure in the late 1980s, 
became completely liberalized in the later 1990s, and then fell off again. Stock 
markets were liberalized more slowly and smoothly.
In general, the seven Latin American countries for which data are available 
followed the volatile path displayed by the region as a whole. The main excep­
tion was Colombia, as shown in table 2-2, which presents individual country 
data for the overall index. Aside from a few months in 1986, Colombia followed
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Figure 2-3. Latin America: Components o f Financial Liberalization Index, 
1973-20021
Index (1 — 3)
Source: World Bank website (siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/financial_liberaliza- 
tion_ index.xls).
a. FL is the full financial liberalization index; DF is the domestic financial liberalization index; 
SM is the stock market liberalization index; KA is the capital account liberalization index. See text 
for definitions.
a gradual strategy of financial opening throughout the 1973-2002 period, and 
it was the only one of the seven that did not have full financial opening by 
2002. Chile also followed a less volatile path than its neighbors. After reaching 
an index level of 2.0 in 1980, on the eve of its major financial crisis, the index 
dropped back to 1.0 for a single year, and then gradually reopened to reach 3.0 
in the late 1990s.
The domestic component of the financial liberalization index paralleled that 
of the overall index. Again, Colombia was the most stable reformer, reaching 
full liberalization in 1981 and remaining at that level with only a brief, very par­
tial reversal in 1986. Chile reached full liberalization earlier, in 1976, but had a 
more drawn-out retrenchment in the 1980s. The remaining five countries had 
much more volatile histories with domestic liberalization.9 The other informa­
tion in the World Bank index that is especially useful for our purposes concerns 
trends in international financial liberalization (capital account opening) and its 
relationship to domestic financial liberalization. In Brazil, Chile, and Colombia,
9. Calculated from the disaggregated data for the index; see note 6 (in this chapter) for access 
information.
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Table 2-2. Latin America: Financial Liberalization Index, 1973—20021
Year Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru Venezuela
1973 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.7 1.7 1.7
1974 1.0 1.3 1.3 1.1 2.0 1.7 1.7
1975 1.0 1.3 1.6 1.3 2.0 1.7 1.7
1976 1.3 2.0 1.7 1.3 2.0 1.7 1.7
1977 2.3 2.0 1.7 1.3 2.0 1.7 2.3
1978 2.4 2.0 1.7 1.3 2.0 1.7 2.3
1979 2.7 1.3 1.9 1.3 2.0 1.7 2.3
1980 2.7 1.3 2.0 1.4 2.0 1.7 2.3
1981 2.7 1.3 2.0 1.7 2.0 1.7 2.6
1982 1.6 1.3 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.3 3.0
1983 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.7 1.0 1.3 2.4
1984 1.0 1.3 1.3 1.7 1.0 1.3 1.7
1985 1.0 1.3 1.7 1.7 1.0 1.3 1.7
1986 1.0 1.3 1.7 1.3 1.0 1.3 1.7
1987 1.2 1.3 2.0 1.7 1.0 1.0 1.7
1988 1.7 1.7 2.0 1.7 1.1 1.0 1.0
1989 2.4 2.0 2.0 1.7 1.9 1.0 2.2
1990 3.0 2.3 2.5 1.7 2.0 1.0 3.0
1991 3.0 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.3 3.0
1992 3.0 2.7 2.7 2.3 3.0 3.0 3.0
1993 3.0 2.7 2.7 2.3 3.0 3.0 2.7
1994 3.0 2.3 2.7 2.3 3.0 3.0 1.4
1995 3.0 2.6 2.7 2.3 3.0 3.0 1.4
1996 3.0 2.7 2.7 2.3 3.0 3.0 2.7
1997 3.0 2.7 2.7 2.3 3.0 3.0 3.0
1998 3.0 2.7 2.8 2.4 3.0 3.0 3.0
1999 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.0
2000 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.0
2001 2.7 3.0 3.0 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.0
2002 1.1 3.0 3.0 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.0
Source: World Bank website (siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/financial_Iiberalization, 
index.xls).
a. For definition of index, see text.
capital account opening lagged domestic financial trends during m ost o f  the 
1973-2002 period. For these three countries, full capital account opening 
occurred only in the late 1990s. In Argentina and Peru, trends in domestic and 
international policy were quite similar, while international policy was more 
open than domestic policy in Mexico and Venezuela. The majority o f the coun­
tries thus deviated from our expectation that the two processes would move at 
more or less the same pace. In the case o f Mexico and Venezuela, the closer eco­
nomic relationships with the United States and the influence o f the oil markets 
are probably major explanatory factors. For Brazil, Chile, and Colom bia, the
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Table 2-3. East Asia: Financial Liberalization Index, 1973—2002a
Year Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Taiwan Thailand
1973 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.0
1974 1.0 1.0 1.7 1.0 1.0 1.0
1975 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.0
1976 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.3 1.0 1.0
1977 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.3 1.0 1.0
1978 1.7 1.0 1.4 1.3 1.0 1.0
1979 1.7 1.0 1.9 1.3 1.0 1.3
1980 1.7 1.0 2.0 1.3 1.0 1.3
1981 1.7 1.0 2.0 1.5 1.0 1.3
1982 1.7 1.0 2.0 1.7 1.0 1.0
1983 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.7 1.0 1.0
1984 2.0 1.0 2.3 1.7 1.1 1.0
1985 2.0 1.0 2.3 1.7 1.3 1.0
1986 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.9 1.3 1.0
1987 2.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.0
1988 2.4 1.3 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.3
1989 2.8 1.3 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.0
1990 3.0 1.3 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.0
1991 2.4 1.7 2.6 2.0 2.3 2.0
1992 2.3 1.7 2.7 2.0 2.3 2.9
1993 2.3 2.0 2.7 2.0 2.3 3.0
1994 2.3 2.0 2.6 2.7 2.3 3.0
1995 2.3 2.3 3.0 2.7 2.3 2.9
1996 2.3 2.7 3.0 2.7 2.3 2.7
1997 2.3 2.7 3.0 2.7 2.7 2.4
1998 2.3 2.7 2.1 2.7 2.9 3.0
1999 2.3 2.3 2.0 2.7 3.0 3.0
2000 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.7 3.0 3.0
2001 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.7 3.0 3.0
2002 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.7 3.0 3.0
Source: World Bank website (siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/financial_liberalization 
index.xls).
a. For definition of index, see text.
pattern reflects the attem pt to maintain control over macroeconomic and finan­
cial policy through restricted international opening.10
Individual East Asian countries also demonstrated differences among them ­
selves and w ith Latin America, as shown in table 2-3. Overall, the East Asian 
countries were less inclined toward financial liberalization than their Latin 
American counterparts. By 2002, only two countries— Taiwan and Thailand—  
were completely open according to the W orld Bank index for overall financial 
liberalization, and even they arrived at this position only in the late 1990s. In
10. While this policy preference in Chile is well known in recent times, it is interesting to find 
it in the early years of the military government as well.
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Figure 2-4. East Asia: Components o f Financial Liberalization Index, 1973—20021
Index (1-3)
Source: World Bank website (siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/financial_liberaliza- 
tion_index.xls).
a. FL is the full financial liberalization index; DF is the domestic financial liberalization index; 
SM is the stock market liberalization index; KA is the capital account liberalization index. See text 
for definitions.
terms o f  the liberalization process, the Philippines and Taiwan implemented a 
gradual, sm ooth opening; so did Korea, except for a reversal following the 
1997-98 crisis. Malaysia and Thailand were especially prone to reversals, which 
occurred at various points, including the crisis, as governments tried to manage 
the liberalization process. Indonesia opened more rapidly than its neighbors, but 
then quickly reversed course even before the crisis struck.
Unlike in Latin America, domestic financial liberalization was a laggard in 
East Asia until the mid-1980s (see figure 2-4). By the late 1980s, four countries 
were still completely closed as far as domestic indicators were concerned; all lib­
eralization had taken place in the capital account or the stock market. By the 
mid-1990s, however, all had index scores o f 3.0 for domestic liberalization, and 
these scores did not change during the crisis. It was the capital account that was 
partially or completely closed in the latter period.11 The data suggest a more cau­
tious attitude toward financial liberalization than was found in Latin America.
To summarize, Latin America was similar to East Asia and the O E C D  in that 
financial liberalization was a policy choice prevalent in all three groups o f coun­
tries in 1973-2002. Nonetheless, Latin America was distinctive in that the
11. Calculated from disaggregated data for the index; see note 6 (in this chapter) for access 
information.
region demonstrated substantially greater volatility in the liberalization process 
that did its counterparts elsewhere. This volatility spanned the entire period cov­
ered by the World Bank index, but it was especially pronounced during the debt 
crisis o f  the 1980s, when all countries reversed their liberalization policies. No 
similar policy change was found in Asia in the 1990s; only a very brief and mild 
reversal occurred in a few countries (Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand). Latin 
America was also more positively disposed toward liberalization than its Asian 
counterparts. Com parisons am ong Latin American countries suggest some 
interesting differences. Colombia and Chile showed less volatility than the oth­
ers; together w ith Brazil, they were also reluctant to open the capital account 
com pletely until the last few years o f  the sample period. A rgentina, Mexico, 
Peru, and Venezuela experienced sharper and more frequent policy reversals 
than the other three, and international liberalization accompanied or even led 
domestic liberalization. The next section examines whether these differences are 
related to the presence or absence o f crises in the region.
Financial Liberalization and Crisis
The Asian financial crisis and the earlier Mexican experience spawned a large lit­
erature on new causes of crisis. Moreover, although Camdessus referred to Mex­
ico as the first crisis o f the twenty-first century, the case displays close similari­
ties to the Chilean crisis o f 1981-83 .12 The analysis o f new causes began with 
the argument that the recent crises were not examples of the old macroeconomic 
syndrome seen throughout the postwar period, whereby a large fiscal deficit and 
loose m onetary policy led to a devaluation tha t had negative impacts on the 
economy and thus on bank loan portfolios.13 N or were they the result o f  micro- 
econom ic problems in particular banks, leading to panics that spread to the 
banking system as a whole and sometimes underm ined the currency as a result 
o f rescue policies. Rather, new relationships had begun to appear.
New Explanations for Crises
W hile m ost economists agreed tha t som ething new was happening, they dif­
fered on the key elements o f  the new paradigm. Two separate approaches 
emerged initially: one concentrated on domestic characteristics, while the other 
focused on international factors and contagion. Over time, some degree o f con­
sensus developed to the effect that both domestic and international processes 
were involved, perhaps in a necessary-sufficient relationship.
12. Camdessus (1995). See Edwards (1996) on the comparison between Chile and Mexico.
13. It is common to speak of two generations of such models. The first focused on government 
attempts to defend the currency, followed by a speculative attack after reserves fell to some critical 
level (for example, Krugman, 1979). The second was more complex: a speculative attack could 
result from either a predicted deterioration of economic fundamentals or a self-fulfilling prophecy 
(for example, Obstfeld, 1986).
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The domestically oriented approach argued that structural and policy distor­
tions in the countries concerned were the m ain causes o f  the crises— even if  
market overreaction and herding made them more severe than would otherwise 
have been the case. The early version o f this approach, put forth by the Interna­
tional M onetary Fund (IMF) w ith respect to the Asian crisis, focused on four 
alleged problem s.14 First was overinvestment relative to dom estic savings, 
which— given the lack o f fiscal deficits— was the counterpart o f  large current 
account deficits and increasing (short-term) foreign capital inflows.15 Second 
were deficiencies in m acroeconom ic m anagem ent, m ainly pegging exchange 
rates to the dollar but also ignoring some underlying dem and pressures. Third 
were financial sector weaknesses, including inadequate regulation and supervi­
sion, poor corporate governance, lack o f  transparency, and im prudent lending. 
Fourth was the in ternational environm ent, bu t the focus was on trade and 
declining competitiveness rather than financial flows and contagion.
O ne o f the m ost influential academic analyses following the domestic 
approach was that o f  Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini, who centered their argu­
m ent on three m anifestations o f  mqijil hazard.16 At the corporate level, firms 
made unwise investments with the supposition that they would be bailed out if 
they got into serious difficulties. At the financial level, banks borrowed exces­
sively abroad and lent excessively at home, enabling unprofitable investment to 
continue. A lthough the financial sector was characterized by weak regulation 
and supervision, low capital adequacy, nonmarket criteria for project selection, 
and outright corruption, the close bank-corporation-governm ent nexus again 
set up the expectation that no bank would be allowed to fail. The international 
dimension o f moral hazard involved foreign banks lending in ways that resem­
bled their local counterparts, assuming that they would be rescued by local gov­
ernm ents or the IM F if  the need arose. These internal weaknesses made the 
countries vulnerable to a reversal o f capital inflows.
The other approach to explaining the crises agreed that these domestic weak­
nesses were present, but pointed out that they had existed for a long time, yet 
the crisis countries had nonetheless been highly successful. Understanding the 
reasons for the crises was argued to require a focus on new relationships with the 
international financial markets. In particular, the liberalization o f the capital 
account o f the balance o f payments in developing countries had enabled banks
14. IMF (1997). Successive issues of the World Economic Outlook, after this first reaction in the 
early months of the crisis, reflected the increasing convergence of opinions across the initial 
domestic-international divide.
15. In the 1997 analysis, the IMF pointed out that in Mexico the issue was overconsumption, 
not overinvestment (IMF, 1997, pp. 10-11). The same could also be said for the other Latin Amer­
ican countries, where savings and investment have always been far lower than in East Asia.
16. Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998a, 1998b). The popularized version of the moral haz­
ard argument centers on the concept of crony capitalism. See, for example, Kang (2001) on Asia 
and Haber (2002) on Latin America.
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and corporations to borrow  large am ounts o f  capital from abroad, bu t these 
same flows could easily be reversed if a political, economic, or even psychologi­
cal shock occurred. These outflows, or “sudden stops,” were the main sources of 
the crises.17 This argument was frequently accompanied by a sharp criticism o f 
the international financial institutions— especially the International M onetary 
Fund— both for prom oting capital account opening and for the conditionality 
on their rescue packages, which were said to have exacerbated the crises.18
Radelet and Sachs provide a technical version o f this argum ent, centering 
their analysis on “the intrinsic instability o f  international lending,” or what they 
call self-fulfilling crises.19 Lenders initially were eager to pour large amounts of 
money into countries that were seen as good risks because o f  rapid growth and 
other positive features. A shock o f  whatever kind could generate sudden 
demands for repayment, however, which turned into a panic as each creditor 
tried to get out first. In such cases, individual creditors acted rationally, but the 
collective outcom e led to costly crises that were not necessary. Central to the 
argument is the distinction between illiquidity and insolvency. A liquidity crisis 
occurs when a solvent, bu t illiquid, borrower is unable to  obtain fresh funds 
from the international markets because o f collective action problems. Such a sit­
uation creates m ultiple equilibria. O ne equilibrium  is where loans are rolled 
over by most or all lenders, the solvent borrower continues to carry out its busi­
ness activities, and the lenders receive their payments as scheduled. A quite dif­
ferent equilibrium involves a panic among lenders, where no one is willing to 
roll over loans; this is often term ed herd behavior. T he situation is unstable 
because it is possible to shift from one equilibrium to the other almost instanta­
neously, on the basis o f  changing market psychology.20
One of the problems with both approaches— in addition to the tendency to 
focus on one explanation or the other, rather than  the relationship between 
them — is the blurring o f banking and currency crises. T he literature on so- 
called twin crises addresses this distinction. Kaminsky and Reinhart, together 
with others who have built on their pathbreaking work, stress the need to sepa­
rate the two types o f  crisis since they are related, bu t different.21 In historical 
terms, Kaminsky and Reinhart find many currency crises but few banking crises 
before financial liberalization ended the tightly controlled financial systems in 
developing countries. In the 1980s and 1990s, by contrast, both were frequent. 
The general pattern was for banking crises to precede currency crises, being set 
off by financial liberalization, credit booms, and excess liquidity. A banking crisis
17. See Calvo (1998) for an elaboration of the term sudden stops.
18. See, for example, Stiglitz (2002, chap. 4). A critical, but more measured, approach to the 
role o f international financial institutions can be found in Dooley and Frankel (2002, chaps. 10 
and 11).
19. Radelet and Sachs (1998).
20. See Masson (1999) for a discussion of multiple equilibria.
21. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999).
undermined the currency, leading to devaluations that, in turn, exacerbated the 
banking problems. T he peak o f  a banking crisis generally followed a currency 
crisis.
O ther analyses o f twin crises emphasize the relationship with financial liber­
alization even more. Glick and H utchinson, using a much larger sample than 
Kaminsky and Reinhart, come to the conclusion that twin crises are limited to 
financially liberalized, emerging m arket economies; only in that group were 
robust results obtained.22 DemirgiR-Kunt and Detragiache also find that finan­
cial liberalization increases the likelihood o f bank crises, even after they control 
for various macroeconomic factors. At the same time, their results indicate that 
strong institutions (such as respect for rule o f law, a low level o f corruption, and 
good contract enforcement) are a mitigating factor. They consider this a reason 
for a gradual approach to financial liberalization, since institutions cannot be 
built rapidly.23 M ehrez and Kaufm ann arrive at com plem entary conclusions, 
stressing that lack o f transparency increases the probability o f  a crisis following 
financial liberalization.24
Financial Crises in Latin America and East Asia
Latin American countries have suffered m any financial crises in the postwar 
period. The vast majority were either currency crises detonated by excess domes­
tic demand or banking crises set off by problems in individual institutions that 
spread to the system as a whole. After the start o f the economic reform process, 
which prominently featured both domestic financial liberalization and opening 
o f  the capital account, the region witnessed three dram atic twin crises o f  the 
“new” type. One reaches back to the early 1980s, and it is no coincidence that it 
took place in Chile, which was the first country to undertake sustained eco­
nom ic reforms beginning in the 1970s. The second was Mexico in 1994-95, 
accompanied by spillover effects in Argentina. The third example again took 
place in Argentina, beginning in 2001,25
In East Asia, currency and banking crises were much less frequent and milder 
when they occurred. Indeed, the deep crises o f 1997-98 were almost uniformly 
described as unexpected, and the governments were unprepared to respond ade­
quately— in contrast w ith their Latin American counterparts, which had much 
more experience, even if  they had been dealing with different types o f crisis in 
the past. We discuss the Latin American cases in detail in later chapters; here, we 
summarize the main points to see how these cases fit the theoretical propositions 
in the literature. We also want to see how the Latin American crises were similar
22. Glick and Hutchinson (2001).
23. Demirgii^-Kunt and Detragiache (1998a).
24. Mehrez and Kaufmann (2000).
25. Many other banking crises have occurred in Latin America in recent years, but they have 
typically been due to problems in individual banks that spread to other institutions.
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Latin Americaf 3.0 2.6 -1 .4 -4 .0 149.2 10.5
Argentina 2001 3.0 3.0 -2 .4 -3 .2 112.6 -7 .2
Brazil 1999s 3.0 2.0 - i n -4 .3 70.2 4.9
Chile 1981 3.0 2.0 5.4 -7.1 82.0 36.8
Colombia 1998 3.0 2.0 -3 .7 -4 .9 58.7 8.2
Mexico 1994 3.0 3.0 0.0 -7 .0 610.5 26.9
Peru 1994-998 3.0 3.0 0.7 -5 .9 76.5 23.0
Venezuela 1994 3.0 3.0 -2 .3 4.3 34.2 -19.0
East Asiaf 3.0 2.0 -0 .5 -2.5 167.9 17.0
Indonesia 1997 3.0 1.0 -0 .7 -2 .3 198.1 15.1
Korea 1997 3.0 2.0 -1 .5 -1 .6 262.8 13.8
Malaysia 1997 3.0 3.0 2.4 -5 .9 71.9 21.0
Philippines 1997s 3.0 2.0 0.1 -5 .3 162.3 30.8
Taiwan 1997s 3.0 2.0 -1 .6 2.4 n.a. 7.7
Thailand 1997 3.0 2.0 -1 .9 -2 .0 144.5 13.5
Sources: World Bank website (siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/financial_liberalization_ 
index.xls) for liberalization index; IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook (2004, lines 80, 78ald 
and 22d) for fiscal deficit, current account, credit; World Bank (2004a) for short-term debt; ADB (2004) 
for Taiwan data.
n.a. Not available
a. Year when crisis started.
b. One year prior to crisis; Mexico data for 1994 and Asian countries for 1997 (because crisis occurred 
near end of year).
c. Fiscal deficit and current account as share of GDP; one year prior to crisis.
d. Short-term debt as share of reserves; one year prior to crisis.
e. Change in credit to private sector; three years prior to crisis.
f. Unweighted average of countries shown in table.
g. Date when crisis might have been expected.
to, and different from, those in East Asia. Table 2-4 provides data to help in the 
comparison. It includes a num ber o f variables that have been associated w ith 
financial crises.
We begin w ith Chile as the earliest o f  the tw in crises in our sample. The 
Chilean crisis derived in large part from an extreme version o f financial liberal­
ization, reflecting the antigovernment ideology o f the military regime that took 
power in 1973. State-owned banks were quickly sold off to (subsidized) private 
buyers, extensive controls on the financial sector were abolished, and the capital 
account was partially opened. At the same time, macroeconomic policy used the 
exchange rate as a nom inal anchor to cut inflation, and capital inflows offset 
large current account deficits in the face o f fiscal surpluses. Banks took advan­
tage o f the unregulated conditions to pum p up loans, including many to related
borrowers, and ignored potential losses. A severe banking crisis erupted in 1981. 
The following year, the situation was complicated by a balance-of-payments cri­
sis, leading to a devaluation o f the fixed exchange rate that worsened the bank­
ing crisis. The latter was marked by the insolvency o f the majority o f the private 
national banks and finance houses, which were taken over or liquidated by the 
Superintendent o f Banking. By mid-1982, the crisis had become a systemic one, 
extending to many o f the largest corporations, which also ended up in govern­
m ent hands.26
The Mexican crisis thirteen years later was extraordinarily similar. Indeed, 
experts asked how Mexico could have failed to heed the lessons from a relatively 
recent case in its own region.27 Mexico also moved from an environm ent o f 
state-owned banks and strong financial repression to a private-sector- 
dom inated, loosely regulated financial system in the space o f  a few years from 
the late 1980s to the early 1990s. The credit boom was very similar, as were the 
insider lending and the failure to make adequate provisions for possible losses. 
A lthough Mexico did no t have a fixed exchange rate, the currency was infor­
mally linked to the dollar in the context o f a tripartite agreement designed to 
lower inflation. Again like Chile, there was no significant budget deficit, but the 
large volume o f capital inflows served to finance large current account deficits, 
driven by an overvalued peso. A first dissimilarity was a superficial one— the 
currency crisis broke first, in Decem ber 1994, and the devaluation brought 
down the banks. Nonetheless, m any o f the banks had been insolvent earlier, 
although their condition was hidden by lax government accounting standards.28 
More importantly, Mexico’s international relationships were far more favorable 
than  Chile’s had been a decade earlier: Mexico joined the O E C D  and the 
NAFTA agreement w ent into effect just m onths before the crisis struck. The 
external dimensions o f  the Mexican crisis were thus mitigated by a large loan 
from the U.S. Treasury and the IMF, while Chile had had to deal with its prob­
lems on its own.29
T he third twin crisis in the Latin American region occurred in Argentina. 
Ironically, Argentina in the mid-1990s appeared to be a good example o f a crisis 
that was overcome by prom pt and effective government action. C aught in the 
tidal wave o f the Mexican collapse, and constrained because its currency board 
system prevented the central bank from functioning as a lender o f last resort, the 
country suffered a run on its banks, which lost 12 percent of their deposits in 
four m onths. T he run  was stopped by a large loan from the IM F and W orld 
Bank, together with a local “patriotic bond” purchased by the banks and large 
corporations. The authorities beefed up the system o f regulation and supervi­
sion and negotiated a contingent credit line with foreign banks, which consti­
26. See chapter 6 for references.
27. See, for example, Edwards (1996).
28. See the discussion of different definitions of nonperforming loans in Haber (2005).
29. For references on Mexico, see chapter 7.
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tuted a proxy lender o f last resort. Growth resumed, and the banks more than 
regained the deposits they had lost. In terms o f capital adequacy ratios, Argen­
tine banks were among the most solid in the world, although other indicators 
were less positive.
The picture turned bleak again toward the end of the decade, however, owing 
to a com bination o f international shocks and internal political and economic 
factors. A large and growing current account deficit resulted from the overval­
ued exchange rate, and a severe recession after 1998 underm ined fiscal revenues 
and the banks’ portfolios. The currency board prevented the central bank from 
providing liquidity (although other mechanisms compensated to some extent). 
N otw ithstanding a brief respite following the election o f a new president and 
another IM F package, conditions deteriorated sharply in 2001. A “voluntary” 
debt restructuring was carried out to help relieve fiscal pressures, but by the end 
o f the year the government froze all bank deposits to avoid devaluing the cur­
rency. In part because o f opposition to this move, m onths o f  political chaos 
resulted. Early 2002 saw a large devaluation and the end of the currency board, 
together with a default on the country’s foreign debt obligations. The unique 
factor in the Argentine case, in contrast to Chile or Mexico, was that the gov­
ernm ent targeted the banks to pay m uch o f the cost o f  the crisis. To protect 
debtors, bank assets and liabilities were converted to local currency at different 
exchange rates, leaving the banks insolvent. The government’s default on its own 
obligations, a large part of which were held by the banks, deepened the latter’s 
problems.30
Although Latin America and East Asia appeared to share similar characteris­
tics o f financial repression in the past, significant differences separated the two 
regions. In particular, East Asia’s banking systems were an integral part o f  a 
development strategy that produced the highest growth rates in the world over 
the thirty-five-year period from 1960 to 1995.31 For most o f that time, however, 
East Asia’s banks had very little autonom y to make loan decisions; rather, gov­
ernmental authorities provided funds and directed their use to promote particu­
lar industries and firms. This meant that regulation and supervision were weak 
if they existed, central banks were under the control o f finance ministries, and 
banks lacked skills at credit evaluation. The differences that existed across coun­
tries were less im portant than the similarities from the perspective o f an East 
Asia-Latin America comparison.32
30. On Argentina, see Kiguel (2001); de la Torre, Levy-Yeyati, and Schmukler (2003); Fanelli
(2003); Daseking and others (2004); Diaz Bonilla and others (2004).
31. For a summary, see World Bank (1993). Alternative interpretations are found in Amsden 
(1994); Fishlow and others (1994); Stiglitz and Yusuf (2001).
32. The most important differences were between the Northeast Asian countries (Korea and 
Taiwan, as well as Japan) and those in Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand). The former were much more closed and state-dominated, while the latter were more 
open and more dependent on the private sector, including foreign capital.
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By the m id- to late 1980s, however, banking systems in East Asia were 
already beginning to change. This was partly due to structural shifts in their 
own economies, bu t it also reflected the fact that the East Asian countries had 
become major players in world markets and the industrial countries complained 
that their banks, provided unJair.advanfages. A review of table 2-3 shows that all 
six economies— Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand in Southeast 
Asia and Korea and Taiwan in N ortheast Asia— became more open in this 
period, regardless o f the level o f openness that prevailed previously. The former 
group started the liberalization process m uch earlier than the latter, bu t all six 
pushed forward in the five years between 1983 and 1987. The particular pattern 
o f  liberalization varied, however, as we discuss below.
O f  the six, four became engulfed in dramatic financial crises a decade later.33 
To the external world, the events appeared to begin suddenly in July 1997, 
when Thailand was forced to devalue the baht. In reality, the problems began 
m uch earlier, and financial liberalization again set the stage as it had in Latin 
America. After suffering financial instability in the early 1980s, Thailand recov­
ered and grew at an average rate o f 9 percent between 1987 and 1996. T he 
country implemented many structural reforms in this decade, including a com­
prehensive domestic financial liberalization and the opening o f  the capital 
account. The proper institu tional safeguards were no t in place before the 
changes took place, however. This combination led to a credit boom, which was 
stimulated by capital inflows that averaged over 9 percent o f  G D P during the 
period and which translated into very high investment in the productive sectors 
and a hike in asset prices. By the mid-1990s, the negative consequences o f  the 
boom — plus adverse international conditions— were beginning to appear: 
exports slowed, the current account deficit rose, stock market prices fell, several 
corporations ran into difficulties, and the portfolios o f banks and finance com­
panies deteriorated. T he governm ent tried various stopgap measures, bu t it 
could not use a high interest rate policy because o f the weakness o f the financial 
sector. The authorities ultimately floated the baht, which quickly depreciated, 
exacerbating the untenable position o f  the banks.34
O ne country’s problems turned  into a regionwide crisis when contagion 
spread from Thailand to three o f its neighbors during the second half o f 1997, 
bu t internal weaknesses had already built up in other Asian economies. The 
other Southeast Asian countries that were severely damaged by the crisis—  
Indonesia and Malaysia— shared some characteristics with Thailand, although 
Malaysia pursued a more heterodox policy stance both before and after the cri­
sis. Indonesia carried out its domestic financial liberalization in two stages, in
33. Useful overviews of the East Asian crises are found in Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1999); 
Lee (2003).
34. On Thailand’s financial crisis, see Vajragupta and Vichyanond (1999); Alba, Hernández, 
and Klingebiel (2001); Nidhiprabha (2003); and Warr (2004).
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1983 and 1988, as the result o f declines in the price o f oil, a key export. An 
im portant consequence was a rapid rise in the num ber of banks and the volume 
o f credit, as well as the displacement o f the state banks from their previously 
dom inant position. Indonesian authorities tried to improve regulations in step 
w ith the liberalization, bu t these were no t enforced. In addition, substantial 
related lending took place, and banks were subjected to political pressures from 
groups near the Suharto government. At the macroeconomic level, government 
policies both allowed private sector agents to borrow abroad and encouraged 
them  to do so through high domestic interest rates and obstacles to particular 
types o f domestic finance. Capital inflows— frequently short-term flows— led to 
an overvalued exchange rate and an enlarged current account deficit. Contagion 
from Thailand came both through pressure on the currency and the refusal o f 
foreign banks to roll over loans.35 The main differences in the Malaysian case 
were a more gradual financial liberalization process and the continuation  o f 
more controls even in the late 1990s. The level o f technical expertise at the cen­
tral bank and the regulatory agencies was also higher than elsewhere in South­
east Asia. Together, these factors meant that Malaysia’s level o f vulnerability was 
lower in comparison with its neighbors.36
T he country whose crisis constituted the biggest surprise to outsiders and 
insiders alike was Korea, which had become a m ajor econom ic powerhouse, 
especially in terms o f its export capacity. Partly as a result o f its economic posi­
tion, Korea was under pressure to liberalize its financial system, and it began to 
do so in the late 1980s. The plan was to carry out the liberalization gradually to 
avoid the k ind o f vulnerabilities that others had encountered. In the early 
1990s, however, Korea began negotiations to join the O EC D , which led to an 
acceleration o f both internal and external reforms. As is now generally acknowl­
edged, the sequencing o f the liberalization process was poorly planned, and a 
very large short-term  debt was built up through borrowing by both financial 
and nonfinancial firms. These processes provided the conditions for contagion 
to spread from Southeast Asia to w hat appeared to be one o f  the strongest 
economies in the world.37
Analysis of Financial Liberalization and Crises
This brief survey, together with the literature based on broader samples o f coun­
tries and using quantitative methods, demonstrates the close link between finan­
cial liberalization and twin crises. Moreover, a look back at table 2-4 confirms 
that the twin crises in our study were o f the new type. T hat is, they took place
35. Indonesia’s crisis is discussed in Ghosh and Pangescu (1999); Nasbtion (1999, 2002); 
Pangestu and Habir (2002).
36. On Malaysia, see Jomo (2001); Dornbusch (2002); Kaplan andiLodrik (2002); Chin and 
Jomo (2003). For a comparison of the experiences of Indonesia and Mala^ra^see Nasution (1998).
37. On Korea, see Hahm (1999); Cho (2002); Coe and Kim (2002); Ahn and Cha (2004).
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when fiscal and monetary indicators were in relative balance, although a num ­
ber o f  other problem s were certainly present, especially current account 
deficits.38 We finish this section by returning to the hypotheses presented earlier 
to determine whether the variables cited there can help specify the nature of the 
relationship between financial liberalization and crises. We also bring in cases 
where crises did not occur or where they were o f a different type than the new 
twin crises to help clarify our argument.
O f  the th irteen Latin American and East Asian countries included in the 
W orld Bank indexes, seven suffered financial problems that belong to the cate­
gory o f new twin crises.39 In each case, financial liberalization appears to have set 
off a process that led to a crisis. Three sets o f variables were proposed in table
2-1 to disaggregate the concept o f financial liberalization and to help explain the 
juxtaposition o f liberalization and crisis. They were the speed, extent, and 
sequencing o f domestic financial deregulation, the policies that accompanied 
the latter, and the institutions to support the new system.
Reviewing the evidence, the first set o f variables seems less im portant than 
the others. All thirteen cases, including both crisis and noncrisis countries, had 
completely opened their domestic financial systems in the period immediately 
preceding the crises. Moreover, whether they opened gradually or abruptly does 
no t appear to be a crucial factor in distinguishing am ong cases. Some that 
opened very rapidly suffered crises (for example, Argentina and Chile), while 
others did not (such as Peru). In terms of sequencing, the relationship between 
external and internal opening— together w ith the presence or absence o f  ade­
quate regulation and supervision— was more im portant than the sequencing of 
dimensions of internal opening.
T he central differences across cases were determ ined by the policies that 
accompanied domestic financial liberalization. The key macroeconomic variable 
turned out to be the exchange rate. If  the rate was fixed, whether formally or 
informally, it tended toward overvaluation and thus current account deficits, 
especially in the presence o f an open capital account. Policy toward the capital 
account, in turn, was also crucial, most importantly with respect to the rules on 
short-term  inflows; foreign direct investment and official loans were m uch less 
disruptive. The most explosive com bination was an abrupt opening to short­
term flows when domestic liberalization was taking place simultaneously or had 
occurred in the recent past. U nder these conditions, there was a pent-up
38. In this sense, we agree with Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), who insist that not everything 
was done well in these countries, such that more was at issue than an undeserved speculative attack. 
Some disagreement has arisen with respect to current account deficits, in particular. For example, 
in the period preceding the Mexican crisis, the finance minister argued that the deficit existed 
because investors wanted to put money into Mexico and it was thus a positive sign rather than a 
danger. Needless to say, others disagreed strongly.
39. The World Bank indexes actually cover fourteen countries, but as mentioned earlier, we 
excluded Hong Kong because of its particular characteristics as an entrepot.
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dem and for external finance, while _damesttc.,£nanaaL institutions had -little or 
no experience in the in ternational.m arkets. final ly, adequate regulation and 
supervision were rarely in place before domestic financial liberalization, leading 
to the familiar phenomenon o f a lending boom w ithout concern for losses. The 
typical pattern was for the strengthening o f  regulation and supervision to be 
part o f postcrisis cleanup rather than precrisis preventive strategy.
The th ird  set o f variables was relevant because good policies could not be 
designed and implemented w ithout adequate institutions in place. At the broad­
est level, adherence to the rule o f law and the existence o f a judicial system that 
protects private property provide an appropriate environment o f expectations, as 
well as the mechanisms to enforce the law so that banks follow prudent lending 
practices. More concrete examples of im portant institutions on the public sector 
side include central banks that are free of intense political pressure on monetary 
policy and regulatory and supervisory agencies that can set and enforce rules. 
O n the private side, commercial banks must have both the skills and the incen­
tives to carry out thorough credit analysis o f  potential borrowers and to make 
lending decisions on the basis o f project potential rather than insider connec­
tions. Credit bureaus and rating agencies provide useful back-up support to the 
banks in the lending process.40
W hat about the countries that did not suffer twin crises? Can they shed any 
light on the relationship between financial liberalization and crises? Six o f the 
thirteen cases— Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela in Latin America, plus 
the Philippines and Taiwan in East Asia— did not encounter twin crises o f the 
new type, although most had serious problems with their banks. These cases can 
be divided into three categories: potential twin crisis situations, where govern­
ments acted preventively; less developed economies that did not attract much 
short-term capital; and economies that had other kinds of banking problems.
The prime exemplars of the first category are Brazil in Latin America and the 
Philippines in East Asia. W hen the Mexican crisis occurred, Brazils banks were 
already weak because o f the hyperinflation the country had suffered and the 
adjustm ent they had to make after the successful 1994 stabilization program. 
The disappearance o f  inflationary gains as a source o f profit led Brazil’s private 
banks to expand credit, especially to consumers. In the presence of a high inter­
est rate policy and rising unemployment, the credit boom  led to a rise in non­
performing loans. Public banks faced special difficulties as a result o f their lim­
ited capacity to restructure their portfolios and their high operational costs. The 
key point is that the Brazilian authorities did not wait for a full-blown crisis to 
erupt, but took the initiative to reduce the num ber o f  banks, restructure those 
that were in difficulty bu t could be saved, recapitalize the system in general, 
allow foreign banks to enter the market, expand the powers o f bank regulators,
40. See similar results in Demirgiig-Kunt and Detragiache (1998a).
and increase requirements for capital adequacy and transparency. Proof o f  the 
effectiveness o f the measures was the lack o f a serious banking crisis in the face 
o f  the January 1999 devaluation.41 In the case o f  the Philippines, the govern­
m ent also took preventive action under the Aquino and Ramos governments. 
Balance sheets were cleaned after the abuses o f the Marcos period, and pruden­
tial regulations were strengthened in terms o f capitalization requirements, audit­
ing requirements, loan loss provisions, and limits on related lending.42
T he Philippines also fits into the second category o f  countries that m ight 
well have developed twin crises, but did not because they did not receive much 
short-term  capital inflow. Both the Philippines and Peru had liberalized their 
dom estic financial systems and opened their capital accounts (in the case o f 
Peru, the financial reforms were some o f the m ost radical in the world). 
Nonetheless, these two countries suffered few problems in relative terms, in part 
because they were perceived as less attractive investment sites than their more 
successful neighbors in Asia and Latin America, respectively. For example, much 
more o f their foreign debt was owed to official creditors than was the case with 
their regional counterparts. Peru also had a large quantity o f reserves to back up 
its debt (and one o f the few floating exchange rates in emerging markets in the 
1990s).43
T he third category— countries w ith other types o f crises— also comprises 
cases in both East Asia and Latin America. Taiwan escaped the 1997 crisis that 
ravaged the rest o f East Asia, in large part because o f  its huge foreign exchange 
reserves and perhaps its slower liberalization, bu t it nonetheless had serious 
banking problems. T he difference w ith respect to its neighbors is tha t these 
problems had no external detonator. They resulted from the bursting o f  asset 
bubbles in real estate and the stock market, together w ith problems in the old 
public banking sector, which led to low profitability and a high share o f nonper­
form ing loans.44 O n  the Latin American side, C olom bia and Venezuela had 
crises that were reminiscent o f older-style financial problems. Both had large fis­
cal deficits and crises that spread from particular banks (Banco Latino in 
Venezuela) or particular segments o f  the financial sector (cooperatives and sav­
ings and loan institutions in Colombia).45
In summary, these examples o f countries that did not suffer the new type o f 
twin crisis show that government policy can make a difference in crisis preven­
tion. O ne lesson centers on improving regulation and supervision before a twin 
crisis breaks (as in the cases o f  Brazil and the Philippines). A nother concerns
41. For references, see chapter 8.
42. On the financial problems in the Philippines, see Hutchcroft (1999); Montes (1999); 
Gochoco-Bautista (2003).
43. Given Peru’s lack of a crisis, literature is scarce; see IMF (1998b, 2004d).
44. On Taiwan, see Yang and Shea (1999); Chow and Gill (2000); Montgomery (2002, 2003).
45. On Venezuela, see García-Herrero (1997); de Krivoy (2000). On Colombia, see Uribe and 
Vargas (2002).
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debt m anagem ent and the need to avoid large short-term  foreign debts (for 
example, Taiwan, w ith little debt o f  any kind, and Peru and the Philippines, 
with emphasis on long-term debt from official lenders). Ironically, a num ber of 
the countries that escaped crisis did so because they were perceived to be less 
attractive than their neighbors, whether for economic or political reasons. Suc­
cessful countries must be particularly aware o f the pitfalls that their very success 
can generate.
Rescue Programs: Costs a n d  Outcomes
Rescue programs typically consist o f  both short- and long-term elements. The 
latter, which involve structural change as well as new institutions and policy 
directions, are the subject o f the next three chapters. Here we concentrate on the 
immediate response, including the characteristics and costs o f  the rescue pro­
grams. We also examine the outcomes five years after the crises in our sample (or 
the latest available observations) to see to w hether the rescue operations were 
successful. Success is defined by a country’s performance on three economic 
variables: the G D P growth rate, the investm ent-to-GDP ratio, and the credit- 
to-G D P ratio.
Several taxonomies o f short-term rescue measures are discussed in the litera­
ture. We focus on the provision o f liquidity, recapitalization, the removal of 
nonperforming loans from bank balance sheets, and the temporary takeover or 
the closing o f insolvent institutions. In ascending order o f  interventionism , 
these are the most common measures among the cases we are examining. Their 
purpose is to deal with the immediate hemorrhaging of the financial institutions 
through restoration o f confidence in the banking system. It is also to keep credit 
flowing by improving bank balance sheets. W hether these short-term goals are 
achieved depends on the severity o f the crisis and the context in which it takes 
place (for example, the overall level o f  confidence in the government, support 
from  international actors, the behavior o f other economic variables, and the 
ability o f  existing institutions to function in tum ultuous times). Measures are 
also generally taken to help debtors. W hile these are intim ately connected to 
support for creditors, they are beyond the scope o f our analysis.47
T he need for liquidity can involve either domestic or foreign currency. The 
former is simply an extrapolation o f the norm al function o f  a central bank as 
lender o f last resort. The microeconomic difficulty in a crisis situation is decid­
ing whether a particular bank is solvent but illiquid, and thus a candidate for
46. See Ffrench-Davis (2001) for a discussion of the special problems of successful countries.
47. Measures to help debtors can either help or hurt creditors. In Argentina, for example, a 
more favorable exchange rate was applied to bank liabilities than to assets, leaving the banks insol­
vent. On measures to help debtors, including corporate restructuring and its relation to bank 
restructuring, see Collyns and Kincaid (2003, chap. 5); Hoelscher and Quintyn (2003, chap. 7).
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support, or whether it is insolvent, in which case other measures are called for. 
T he m acroeconomic problem  is the trade-off between providing sufficient 
liquidity to satisfy the banks’ needs versus providing so m uch that it increases 
inflation and undermines the value o f the currency— and helps provoke a twin 
crisis, as discussed earlier. The situation is more complex if the need for liquidity 
concerns foreign exchange, since it requires the use o f the (always limited) stock 
of international reserves. The ability to call on international assistance is crucial 
under these circumstances. If  the central bank cannot provide liquidity in the 
case o f  local currency or if  international help is not available (or is not consid­
ered desirable) in the case o f  foreign currency, then nonm arket solutions are 
likely to be used, such as a deposit freeze or capital controls. This was what hap­
pened in A rgentina and Malaysia, respectively, in comparison w ith the other 
crises we have examined.
Recapitalization goes beyond the temporary need for greater liquidity to deal 
with the solvency o f an institution. Today, a m inim um  capital-asset ratio o f 8 
percent for internationally active banks is m andated by the Bank for Interna­
tional Settlements; some country regulators dem and an even higher ratio. I f  a 
bank falls below the required level, the least interventionist solution is for the 
government to require recapitalization. Recapitalization can come through mar­
ket operations, whereby current shareholders provide additional capital or banks 
issue new shares. Alternatively, if  this is impossible, the government can provide 
temporary assistance. Often a combination is used. In Mexico, for example, for 
each two pesos the government pu t in, the banks had to contribute one peso.
Further support can be provided through the removal o f nonperforming loans 
from bank balance sheets. A broad array of techniques has been tried, some more 
successful than others. In principle, individual banks or groups o f banks can set 
up such an arrangement; Thailand took this route in the early months o f its cri­
sis. A more common approach involves a government-controlled asset manage­
m ent company, such as those set up in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and eventu­
ally in Thailand. Mexico’s deposit insurance agency performed a similar function, 
as did Chile’s central bank. Argentina’s solution remains to be determined. The 
incentives em bodied in the particular arrangements are very im portant in 
whether they lead the banks to resume lending. Many experts believe such incen­
tives were not provided in the Mexican case, where credit as a share o f G DP fell 
until recently, whereas they were in Chile, where credit began to expand earlier in 
the process. In Asia, Korea has been more like Chile, whereas Thailand and 
Indonesia have been more similar to Mexico.
Finally, in the most extreme situations, a government agency can take control 
o f banks or even close them. Depending on the treatment o f depositors, the lat­
ter can be very expensive. Also, if  it is done poorly, closing banks may make 
crises worse (as happened in Indonesia). If  banks are hopelessly insolvent, how­
ever, keeping them  open may be the worst decision. W ith  potentially viable
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Latin America6 26.4 -10.2 38.4 -54.0 41.6
Argentina 2002 n.a. -11 .0 44.6 -54.7 40.3
Chile 1982 33.5 -13.4 46.0 n.a. 31.2
Mexico 1995 19.3 -6 .2 24.7 -53.3 53.3
East Asia8 28.6 -9 .5 11.9 -70.4 47.2
Indonesia 1998 52.3 -13.1 3.3 -78.5 79.4
Korea 1998 23.1 -6 .7 21.6 -45.9 7.2
Malaysia 1998 4.0h -7 .4 5.3 -79.9 5.0
Thailand 1998 34.8 -10.8 17.2 -1 1 A 10.7
Sources: Hoelscher and Quintyn (2003, p. 41) for fiscal cost; Collyns and Kinkaid (2003, pp. 27, 30) 
for GDP loss; Claessens, Klingebiel, and Laeven (2003, p. 150) for interest rates, except Argentina and 
Chile, which were calculated from IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook (2001, 2004); 
Claessens, Klingebiel, and Laeven (2003, p. 3) for asset prices, except Argentina, which was calculated 
from Standard and Poor's (2005); Collyns and Kinkaid (2003, pp. 29, 31) for inflation, except 
Argentina, which was calculated from IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook (2004).
n.a. Not available.
a. Peak year of crisis.
b. Net fiscal cost as share of GDP.
c. Decline in GDP in first year of crisis.
d. Peak real money market rate during crisis year.
e. Largest monthly drop in real stock market index during crisis year relative to January of previous 
year.
f. Cumulative consumer price index for 12 months beginning 1 month prior to crisis.
g. Unweighted average of countries shown in table.
h. Honohan and Klingebiel (2003)—an alternative source on fiscal cost, whose data are generally sim­
ilar to the source used here—have a very different figure for Malaysia (16.4 percent).
banks, temporary government intervention provides an opportunity to restruc­
ture and recapitalize them  before reprivatizing them  at a later stage. The goal is 
usually to keep the banks functioning (the “open bank” solution) as part o f the 
goal o f maintaining credit, but a management change is almost sure to occur. In 
our cases, all governments closed or merged banks, such that the num ber o f 
financial institutions fell substantially in comparison w ith the precrisis period. 
In addition, all governments took over some or most banks and later began to 
reprivatize them.
These various types of support— together with assistance for both household 
and corporate debtors— are likely to be extremely costly to the countries 
involved. The most commonly cited costs are fiscal outlays. As shown in table
2-5, these range from 4 percent o f G D P to 52 percent in the cases we are exam­
ining. The median was 28 percent, w ith Latin America and East Asia showing 
very similar levels. A lthough not included in the table, the countries w ithout 
twin crises had substantially lower costs. Several studies try  to determine why
fiscal costs vary across cases.48 Here we are mainly interested in underlining the 
magnitude of lost opportunities— since the government funds that go into bank 
rescues cannot be used for other activities, w hether public sector investm ent 
projects or social services— and asking how Latin America fared in comparison 
with East Asia.
T he costs are no t lim ited to absorption o f governm ent revenues. O thers 
include lost GDP, increased government debt, lack o f credit, weakened firms, 
and perhaps high inflation.49 Moreover, rescues frequently involve an income 
transfer to the wealthiest groups in society, which can be debilitating to a gov­
ernm ent in political terms, and poverty is likely to be negatively affected, which 
also has political as well as social and economic costs.50 Table 2-5 provides indi­
cators o f some o f these other costs. G D P losses in the worst year o f the crises 
averaged nearly 10 percent, while interest rates and inflation rose substantially 
and asset prices plum m eted. The main differences between Latin America and 
East Asia on these other measures were much higher real interest rates in the for­
mer and a steeper fall in asset prices in the latter.
A final point to keep in m ind is that crises are not usually resolved quickly. 
O n  the contrary, the effects o f  a serious crisis will last for years.51 A lthough 
measuring the lingering im pact o f  a crisis is very difficult, table 2-6 provides 
some tentative estimates by looking at the variables mentioned earlier— that is, 
G D P growth, investm ent, and credit to the private sector— in the five years 
after a crisis. GDP, corrected to elim inate the recovery portion  o f postcrisis 
growth, was substantially lower in the five years after the crisis than in the com­
parable period before. The regional data for both Latin America and East Asia 
show that corrected growth rates fell more than two-thirds, on average. The only 
exception was Mexico, whose large devaluation enabled it to increase its exports 
to an average o f 14 percent per year between 1995 and 2000; this m eant that 
the decline in growth was smaller than in other countries.52
In the case o f the investment ratio, the East Asian countries suffered declines 
between the five years just before the crisis and the five-year postcrisis period. 
The im pact was smaller in Latin America, perhaps because investm ent ratios 
were already at such low levels in the latter. W ith respect to credit to the private
48. Honohan and Klingebiel (2003), for example, argue that accommodating policies lead to 
higher fiscal costs, while Claessens, Klingebiel, and Laeven (2004) stress the role of institutions in 
determining the cost of crises.
49. Recent evidence of the independent negative effects of banking crises on GDP (as opposed 
to the effects of a general economic downturn) is provided by Dell’Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan 
(2005), who compare sectors that are more and less dependent on external finance. Their finding 
that the former are especially hard hit is taken to mean that crises per se are causing loss of GDP.
50. On poverty and crises, see Cline (2002); Baldacci, de Mello, Inchauste (2004).
51. Other analyses of crisis duration find faster recovery, especially with respect to GDP 
growth. One of the reasons is that the studies do not correct for recovery, thus conflating recovery 
and growth. See, for example, DemirgiR-Kunt, Detragiache, and Gupta (2000).
52. Calculated from the ECLAC website (www.eclac.cl/estadisticas).
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Table 2-6. Latin America and East Asia: Performance Five Years before
















Latin America*1 4.8 1.5 20.3 20.7 38.7 27.7
Argentina1 2002 2.6 -2 .0 16.0 15.0 24.0 11.0
Chile 1982 7.9 2.9 23.0 23.0 53.0 54.0
Mexico 1995 3.9 3.5 22.0 24.0 39.0 18.0
East Asia*1 7.8 2.5 38.4 23.1 114.5 93.3
Indonesia 1998 7.6 0.6 31.6 16.0 61.0 24.0
Korea 1998 7.1 4.2 38.2 29.4 73.0 104.0
Malaysia 1998 8.7 2.8 42.0 21.8 158.0 142.0
Thailand 1998 7.9 2.2 41.7 25.2 166.0 103.0
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (online).
a. Peak year of crisis.
b. Average growth rate five years before crisis.
c. Average growth rate five years after crisis (subtracting crisis decline to correct for recovery).
d. Average ratio of investment to GDP five years before crisis.
e. Average ratio of investment to GDP five years after crisis.
f. Average ratio of credit to private sector to GDP five years before crisis.
g. Average ratio of credit to private sector to GDP five years after crisis.
h. Unweighted average of countries shown in table.
i. Only one year after crisis (2003).
sector, the ratio generally tended to remain much lower five years after the crisis 
than in the prior peak. There were, however, two exceptions. Chile and Korea, 
the two countries that arguably did the best job of responding to their respective 
financial crises, saw credit as a share o f G D P increase, although the postcrisis 
figures for Chile are artificially high because o f  accounting procedures con­
nected with the crisis resolution.53
Conclusions
Financial liberalization has transform ed the financial sector in developed and 
developing countries alike in recent decades. These changes have been especially 
significant in Latin America and East Asia because o f the extent to which gov­
ernmental authorities intervened in financial decisionmaking in the preliberal­
ization period. In both regions, the financial system had been a key tool for gov­
ernm ents in their attem pts to industrialize their economies and to determine 
who should have access to credit. Financial liberalization changed this approach 
in profound ways that are still being understood.
53. The same was true for Mexico, but the drop in credit in Mexico was so large that even the 
accounting inflation did not lead to positive figures.
A first change concerned the actors who make decisions about bank credit. 
O n  the most superficial level, this involved a transfer of authority from govern­
m ent bureaucrats to private sector bankers. In reality, the shift was more com­
plex. The government has no t totally withdrawn, although its new role varies 
from country to country. In most cases, some public sector financial institutions 
remain, although they are usually run according to rules similar to those o f the 
private sector. Moreover, the government continues to regulate the financial sec­
tor, as in the rest o f the world, but its tools are different now. In particular, gov­
ernments use prudential techniques rather than top-down directives. Govern­
m ent supervision o f banks may also be com plem ented by private m onitoring 
(through disclosure, external ratings, external audits, and so on).
A related change concerned the basis for making decisions. Again, a superfi­
cial characterization is that profit maximization at the individual institutional 
level has replaced the use o f finance as an element of national development strat­
egy. There is tru th  to this view, bu t other goals were always present, and they 
continue to be relevant today. For example, market share remains a concern of 
many banks, even when this interferes with profit maximization. Likewise, pro­
viding help for friends, family, and other insiders can rival the interests o f a bank 
qua institution. Family-owned banks are particularly prone to such motivations, 
although this ownership form is becoming less common.
Finally, these changes have had im portant im plications for the economy. 
C redit for consum ption is increasing at the expense o f investm ent; this shift 
stems partly from the decreasing role o f public sector banks, bu t less directed 
credit is also required from private banks. Specific allocations o f credit for agri­
culture, industry, and small firms are declining in favor o f  credit to the service 
sector and to larger firms. Interest rates are determined by the market, and real 
rates tend to be higher than in the past; maturities may also be shorter. All of 
these factors mean that governments must rethink the tools they have available 
for managing their respective economies.
In addition to these im portant changes in the rules of the game, financial lib­
eralization has also frequently been associated w ith financial crises. As we have 
shown, financial crises are very expensive. Fiscal costs have been as high as 50 
percent o f  G D P in the case o f  tw in (banking and currency) crises, w ith clear 
opportun ity  costs in terms o f  the funds used for rescue operations. Losses o f 
GDP, interest rate hikes, declines in asset prices, and other problems magnify 
the costs far beyond the usual focus on fiscal outlays. Another point is that these 
costs are not all paid in a single year: our data show that lower G D P growth, 
investment, and credit still prevailed half a decade after the crises. The evidence 
also indicates that crises are especially costly to the poor, which is a serious issue 
in developing countries.
T he message is no t that financial liberalization should be avoided. M any 
aspects o f financial liberalization are now widely accepted in both Latin America
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and East Asia. Rather, greater care is needed w ith respect to the policies that 
accompany domestic financial liberalization, such as m acroeconom ic policy, 
opening o f the capital account, and regulation and supervision. The institutions 
that enable these policies to be implemented adequately need time to be created 
and strengthened, which argues for a gradual approach to financial liberaliza­
tion— and probably any other major structural changes.
In the next several chapters, we discuss the longer-term results o f  financial 
crises and overall trends in the financial sector o f developing countries. These 
include changes in ownership, especially the increase in foreign ownership o f 
banks; an improvement in the quality of regulation and supervision o f the bank­
ing sector; and the diversification away from almost exclusive reliance on banking 
toward expanding capital markets. All three o f  these trends offer advantages—  
although foreign ownership is more controversial than the other two— but they 
could come about without the huge costs o f a financial crisis. This should be the 
goal of developing countries, both the public and private sectors.
1
C h a n g e s  i n  O w n e r s h ip :  
P u b l i c ,  P r i v a t e ,  a n d  F o r e ig n  B a n k s
B ank ownership in emerging market economies has been transform ed by 
financial liberalization. Two main policy changes have driven the process: 
the market share o f public sector banks has been reduced, and the share o f for­
eign banks has been allowed to increase. As a secondary consequence, private 
domestically owned banks have generally lost market share. This outcom e—- 
which is still evolving and varies across regions and countries— came about in 
two stages. As part o f  the liberalization process itself, state-owned banks were 
sold to the private sector, both domestic and foreign. If  a crisis occurred, how­
ever, governments often saw themselves forced to renationalize many banks, fol­
lowed by another round of privatizations. The second trend, toward more for­
eign ownership, came about in both stages. Foreign banks sometimes took part 
in the original privatizations, but more frequently they waited till the second 
round. Foreigners also bought out local private owners through mergers and 
acquisitions.
W hy is ownership important? Do different ownership structures lead to dif­
ferent economic, social, or political outcomes? W ho benefits and who loses from 
public versus private domestic versus foreign ownership o f banks? Like financial 
liberalization itself, these are highly controversial, ideologically charged ques­
tions, and the thrust o f opinion has changed substantially in recent years. In the 
early postwar period, public banks were considered to be a positive force for 
development, and foreign banks were seen as pilfering resources from develop­
ing countries. The reverse is now the dom inant view.
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O ur contribution to these debates is based on a comparative analysis o f bank 
ownership in Latin America and East Asia. W hile we confirm  the generally 
accepted trend toward less public and more foreign ownership, we find that sub­
stantial heterogeneity still exists. Looking at banking systems w ithin countries, 
rather than individual banks across countries, we find that East Asia behaves as 
the new literature predicts: foreign-dominated banking systems perform best, 
public systems worst, and private domestic systems in the middle. The situation 
in Latin America is more complex: foreign-dominated banking systems behave 
less well than predicted, but public systems perform  better. To explain these 
anomalies, we turn to the literature on institutions. Incorporating institutional 
variables reinforces the results from East Asia and enables us to account for the 
unexpected findings in Latin America. We conclude that w ith strong institu­
tions, public banks can perform reasonably well, while weak institutions can 
undermine the operations o f even world-class foreign banks.
The chapter is organized in five sections. The first reviews the literature on 
ownership, institu tional environm ent, and perform ance and presents two 
hypotheses to be evaluated. The second examines data on trends in ownership 
over the past fifteen years, paying special attention to Latin America and East 
Asia. The third section analyzes evidence on the performance o f different own­
ership patterns w ith respect to efficiency and stability, while the fourth studies 
the impact o f institutions on performance. The final section concludes.
Bank Ownership, Performance, and Institutions: 
Literature and Hypotheses
T he overall goal o f  this section is to suggest hypotheses about the im pact o f 
ownership patterns on the performance o f banking systems, but we m ust start 
with the com ponent parts as they are discussed in the literature: public sector 
banks and foreign banks. Very little has been w ritten about either private 
dom estic banks or the advantages o f  different mixes o f  ownership. We con­
tribute in this direction and also discuss the impact o f the institutional environ­
ment in which the different types of banking systems operate.
Public Sector Banks
O pinion  about public sector banks has changed significantly in the last two 
decades, moving in conjunction w ith views about the public sector role in the 
economy o f developing countries more generally. During much o f the postwar 
period, state-owned banks were considered an im portant com ponent o f  devel­
opm ent strategies, in particular strategies geared toward industrialization. This 
was the case in both Latin America and East Asia.1
1. There has been some misinterpretation of the historical rationale for state-owned banks. Fol­
lowing La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002), various authors cite some of the leading
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Economists o f the influential structuralist school in Latin America saw state- 
owned development banks as necessary to provide finance for investm ent by 
both public and private enterprises in the growing industrial sector, since private 
sector banks were unwilling to offer long-term loans.2 Based on this view, banks 
such as Nacional Financiera (Nafin) in Mexico and the National Development 
Corporation (Corfo) in Chile were established as early as the 1930s to interme­
diate between sources of international finance and local firms. Brazil s National 
Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) followed in the 1950s.3 
In the developing countries o f East Asia, state control o f  banks came about 
through the influence o f  the Japanese economic model, in which public control 
was a key element. The clearest intellectual advocacy in the western literature of 
a state role in that region came fairly recently in attempts to explain East Asia’s 
extraordinarily high growth rates. Authors such as Amsden and Wade extol the 
virtues of state ownership or control o f banks, and even the W orld Bank’s East 
Asian Miracle has some positive things to say about governm ent control o f  
finance, although limiting its partial endorsement to Japan, Korea, and Taiwan.4
The World Bank study identifies three targets for state-controlled credit: spe­
cific industries or firms that are considered crucial for investment and growth 
and that produce externalities for the rest o f the economy; certain types o f firms 
that are believed to need support, such as exporters or small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs); and social objectives, such as the expansion of health care 
and housing or the extension o f financial services to rural areas. Like the Latin 
American structuralists, Amsden and Wade concentrate on the first set o f  objec­
tives, providing various examples in Korea and Taiwan, respectively, where 
directed credit stimulated investment. Amsden also highlights Korea’s ability to 
discipline firms that did not perform adequately so as to avoid the heavy losses 
that have characterized most state-owned financial institutions; the W orld Bank 
echoes her analysis with respect to this point.
Beyond prom oting growth, other justifications for state ownership of banks 
include support for governments’ stability and equity goals. Private banks are 
frequently considered to be procyclical, increasing credit in good times and 
withdrawing it when the economy sours. In the extreme, this behavior can lead 
to financial crises. Public banks, in turn, are argued to be both able and willing
development economists of the postwar period—Lewis, Myrdal, and Gerschenkron—as advocates 
of public sector banks in developing countries. In reality, these early economists were discussing the 
need for a strong state role in general. Moreover, all were talking about socialist economies: Lewis 
(1950) was writing about a central planning model; Myrdal (1968) was referring to South Asian 
countries, which he characterized as socialist; and Gerschenkron (1962) was analyzing Russia, both 
before and after the Bolshevik Revolution. They gave little emphasis to banks, except for Ger- 
schenkrons discussion of private banks in Western Europe.
2. See discussion in Cárdenas, Ocampo, and Thorp (2000); Bulmer-Thomas (2003).
3. See Brothers and Solis (1966), Larrain and Selowsky (1991) on Nafin and Corfo, respec­
tively. The history of BNDES, which was BNDE until the 1980s, is discussed in BNDES (2002).
4. Amsden (1989); Wade (1990); World Bank (1993).
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to lend in a countercyclical pattern, thus providing a public good in the finan­
cial sector.5 It is further argued that state banks are required to  serve less- 
privileged groups and individuals. Several categories o f  potential clients are 
involved. The main focus o f this book is on small firms, but others include vul­
nerable sectors (such as agriculture and housing) and households in poor neigh­
borhoods or distant locations. Since private sector financial institutions tend to 
find such clients unprofitable, public banks are again providing a public good.6
In the recent wave o f  literature on finance and growth, by contrast, state- 
owned financial institutions have come under heavy attack. The principal theo­
retical argument against them  is the alleged political motive behind lending, as 
opposed to the developmental or social motives that dom inated the earlier 
analyses. This argum ent is closely related to the rent-seeking critiques o f  the 
state role in the economy more generally, claiming that “governments acquire 
control o f . . . banks in order to provide employment, subsidies, and other bene­
fits to supporters, who return the favor in the form o f votes, political contribu­
tions, and bribes.”7 Given such motives, credit is likely to fund inefficient proj­
ects, which— even if  they are actually carried out— will have low rates o f return 
at the m icroeconom ic level and underm ine productivity and growth at the 
macroeconomic level.
A growing empirical literature analyzes the im pact o f  state-owned banks. 
Based mainly on large-sample, cross-country regression studies rather than indi­
vidual country experiences, this new literature finds h i 
banks to be correlated w ith low growth rates, low efficiency, low profits, high 
volumes o f nonperform ing loans, and corruption. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
and Shleifer took the lead in these studies. They argue that their findings sup­
port the political rather than the developmental view in that efficiency, growth, 
and productivity have negative (and sometimes statistically significant) coeffi­
cients in the regressions they ran, while controlling for other relevant variables.8
Levy-Yeyati, Micco, and Panizza come to somewhat more nuanced conclu­
sions after reviewing a variety o f studies on the effects o f state-owned banks. For 
example, they find that the La Porta results are sensitive to sample and period: 
when they reran the data with another sample, the data lost their statistical sig­
nificance. Moreover, they cite other empirical studies that find more positive 
results, such as Micco and Panizza, who report that public sector lending is less
5. This includes regional or international public sector banks. See ECLAC (2002); Titelman
(2003).
6. Banks such as Nafin and Corfo have now become second-tier banks, working with first-tier 
private banks; SMEs are their primary clients. BNDES operates through both first- and second-tier 
arrangements and also targets SMEs.
7. La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002, p. 266).
8. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002). Similar conclusions are reported in Barth, 
Caprio, and Levine (2001a); World Bank (2001); Galindo and Micco (2003); Caprio and others
(2004).
state ownership o f
procyclical than that o f private banks.9 Their conclusion: “W hile we find no evi­
dence that the presence o f  state-owned banks prom otes economic growth or 
financial development, we also find that the evidence that state-owned banks 
lead to lower growth and financial development is not as strong as previously 
thought.”10
T he Levy-Yeyati, Micco, and Panizza paper also introduces an issue that is 
im portant for our analysis. In addition to developmental, social, and political 
views about government ownership o f banks, they add the concept o f an agency 
view. This approach stresses the difficulty for public banks to carry out intended 
(developmental) goals, given the political pressures to which they are subjected. 
Others broach the same point, when they write o f the tendency for reforms of 
public banks to fail in their objectives o f  providing better m anagem ent.11 We 
return to the question o f “good” versus “bad” public sector banks in our discus­
sion o f  the institutional environment in which they operate.
Foreign-Owned Banks
Foreign banks had an earlier origin than did public banks in Latin American 
economies, dating back to the nineteenth and early tw entieth centuries, when 
they provided the main source o f  finance for capital accumulation in the export 
sectors. International bond issues were also im portant, despite frequent 
defaults.12 In the postwar years, however, foreign banks were often nationalized 
or marginalized as governments assumed a greater role in economic affairs. A 
more complex relationship existed in East Asia, where colonial control lasted 
longer than in Latin America.13
N ot surprisingly, the reemergence o f foreign banks, mainly as a result o f  the 
liberalization process in the 1990s, introduced many new issues and sharp dif­
ferences of opinion about the advantages and disadvantages o f their presence in 
developing countries. Three main arguments were presented in  favor of 
increased foreign presence. First, it was argued that foreign banks would bring 
new technology, em bodied in both hardware and m anagem ent techniques, 
w hich would raise productivity in their own institutions and spread to local 
ones as well. The sector as a whole would thus become more efficient. Second, 
foreign banks would have access to international sources o f capital, from both 
their own home institutions and the international capital markets, and so could 
contribute to the deepening o f local financial sectors. T hird , because o f their
9. Micco and Panizza (2004).
10. Levy-Yayeti, Micco, and Panizza (2004, abstract).
11. See, for example, Hanson (2004). A variant of the same argument is found in de la Torre
(2002), who identifies a syndrome whereby public banks try to improve efficiency and profitability 
to the point where they lose much of their social rationale for existence. They thus move back 
toward social goals, only to encounter economic problems again.
12. Stallings (1987); Bulmer-Thomas (2003).
13. On Japanese control of finance in Korea, for example, see Eckert (1991) and Woo (1991).
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access to external sources o f finance, foreign banks would be a positive force for 
stability in  the face o f  financial turbulence. A nother contribution  to  stability 
would come from their hom e central banks and regulatory agencies, which 
would both m onitor their banks’ behavior and help local regulators to increase 
their skills.14
W hile not opposing foreign banks across the board, other experts and policy­
makers are more cautious. Two main concerns are behind their reluctance to 
open doors too widely to foreign entry; they mirror the reasons discussed earlier 
for supporting public sector banks. In terms o f macroeconomic and financial 
stability, many worry that foreign banks are too large for local agencies to super­
vise. They are concerned that foreign banks will serve as conduits for large capi­
tal inflows, which can destabilize macroeconomic behavior. These experts and 
policymakers are also apprehensive that vulnerable groups in local societies—  
low-income households, distant regions, declining sectors, and small firms—  
will be left w ithout credit and other financial services.15
A substantial am ount o f research has been carried out to measure the impact 
of foreign banks on developing economies. These studies claim to find a positive 
relationship with efficiency and stability in local financial markets; the impact 
on access is less clear. In general, the impact o f foreign banks seems to be less 
positive in developed than in developing economies. Since most o f the evidence 
comes from the former, Clarke and others suggest that this may lead to an 
underestimation of the benefits to the latter.16
Several studies show that foreign banks are more efficient than their domestic 
counterparts in developing countries, but not in advanced economies. Indica­
tors used to measure efficiency include profitability, overhead costs, and prob­
lem loans; higher values on each are interpreted as indicators of less competition 
and lower efficiency.17 Claessens, Demirgu^-Kunt, and Huizinga go on to  look 
at changes that occur when foreign banks enter a domestic market. They find 
that increased foreign bank presence has a statistically significant effect in lower­
ing profits and overhead costs; negative but insignificant relationships result for 
net interest margins and loan loss provisions. The positive impact on efficiency 
is found to occur w ith the initial entry o f  foreign banks, before they acquire a 
large market share.18 Lensink and Hermes extend this analysis by disaggregating 
the data for high- and low-income countries. They find that the relationship
14. There is a good deal of consensus on these arguments; see, for example, Mathieson and 
Roldos (2001).
15. One of the most influential critiques is Stiglitz (1994). A useful and balanced study of the 
impact of foreign direct investment in the financial sector was recently carried out by the Bank for 
International Settlements; see BIS (2004).
16. Clarke and others (2003).
17. Demirgii^Kunt and Huizinga (1999); Claessens, Demirgii^-Kunt, and Huizinga (2001); 
Mathieson and Roldos (2001).
18. Claessens, Demirgii^-Kunt, and Huizinga (2001).
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varies between the two. Specifically, in low-income countries, the costs o f 
domestic banks increase with the entry o f foreign banks since they have to make 
new investments in order to compete. In high-income countries, costs either go 
down or stay the same.19
Another issue concerns the relationship between foreign banks and stability. 
Several analysts find, after controlling for other variables likely to produce bank­
ing crises, that greater foreign presence is a stabilizing factor. They use foreign 
ownership as one o f  the variables in a regression analysis designed to explain 
worldwide banking crises; the relationship proves to be a negative one.20 O ther 
studies concentrate on Latin America— w hich is not surprising, given the 
region’s proclivity toward crises. Crystal, Dages, and Goldberg report that for­
eign banks have higher provisioning or higher reserve coverage than local banks 
and are generally m ore aggressive in addressing loan quality deterioration .21 
Others find that foreign bank lending has not declined significantly during cri­
sis periods in Latin America, if  it comes through local subsidiaries rather than 
cross-border sources. Related findings are that foreign subsidiaries moderate the 
tendency toward international capital flight during crises by providing a local 
venue where nervous depositors can put their money.22
Finally, w ith regard to access, evidence on the behavior o f  foreign banks is 
scarce. In one o f  the most widely cited studies, Clarke and others analyze lend­
ing patterns in four Latin American countries in the late 1990s. They conclude 
that foreign banks generally lend a smaller share of their funds to SMEs than do 
domestic banks, but this result is accounted for by the behavior o f small foreign 
banks. Larger institutions in two o f  the four countries actually lend more to 
SMEs than do local banks.23 A nother study by some o f  the same authors uses 
survey data to ask about finance for SMEs. It finds that foreign banks are more 
likely to finance large firms than small ones, but that the latter nonetheless get 
m ore credit than they w ould otherwise have had.24 O ther researchers suggest 
that if foreign banks concentrate on large firms, this may encourage other banks 
to seek out smaller clients.25 O f  course, this positive impact is not likely to occur 
if  many local banks are driven out o f  business.
Hypothesis on Ownership and  Performance
By the early 2000s, the arguments for and against public and foreign banks had 
become quite familiar. M uch less has been said about the relative merits o f pri­
vate domestic banks.26 These institutions are implicitly seen as falling between
19. Lensink and Hermes (2004).
20. Dem¡rgü£-Kunt and Detragiache (1998b).
21. Crystal, Dages, and Goldberg (2001).
22. Dages, Goldberg, and Kinney (2000); Peak and Rosengren (2000); García-Herrero and 
Martinez Peria (2005).
23. Clarke and others (2002).
24. Clarke, Cull, and Martinez Peria (2001).
25. Bonin and Abel (2000); Jenkins (2000).
26. Mian (2005) compares the three.
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the other two types o f banks. As private institutions, they are governed by profit 
considerations, so they are less likely than public banks to lend for political rea­
sons and suffer the negative consequences. At the same time, they are less likely 
to be up-to-date w ith respect to banking technology or to have access to the 
deep pockets o f their foreign competitors. Nonetheless, they are more familiar 
w ith local conditions and so perhaps are more willing to support local firms, 
especially SMEs, which are crucial to econom ic and social developm ent 
processes.
Another topic that has not been discussed is whether certain ownership com­
binations might be particularly advantageous. We know that economies dom i­
nated by any one o f the three ownership types face problems. An economy com­
pletely reliant on private domestic banks will be cut off from external sources of 
capital and innovation, undermining the growth potential o f the financial sector 
itself and the economy more generally. At another extreme, domination by for­
eign banks may be good for the largest firms, bu t the gap relative to SMEs is 
likely to widen. In addition, foreign dom ination may arouse political protest 
against perceived infringement o f  sovereignty, which in tu rn  can have negative 
effects on the business environment.27 Finally, economies in which public sector 
banks have a very large m arket share will have the same disadvantages as 
economies in which local banks dominate, but inefficiency is likely to be greater. 
Given that competition can help to bring out the positive features o f banks and 
suppress the negative ones, a mixed financial framework might offer advantages 
over “pure” ownership structures.
Based on the recent literature and the above extensions, our first hypothesis is 
that foreign-dominated banking systems will perform best, while public- 
dominated systems will deliver the worst performance. Systems dominated by pri­
vate domestic banks will fall in between. We would also expect combined systems 
to do well, but we have insufficient evidence to place them in a rank ordering.
Institutional Environment
W hen we move from cross-country analysis, where the units are individual 
banks, to within-country analysis, where the units are banking systems, it is pos­
sible— and desirable— to take into account the environm ent in w hich banks 
operate. The environm ent consists o f  a great many factors, ranging from geo­
graphical location to political system to cultural background. We are particularly 
interested in the institutional environm ent and how it affects banking system 
performance. Institutions are defined as formal and informal rules that shape 
the behavior o f  individuals and organizations by reducing uncertainty.28
27. On the issue of bank ownership and sovereignty, see Makler and Ness (2002).
28. This definition comes from the work of North (1990) and those following his lead; a com­
mon alternative is to define institutions as organizations. On the implications of using one or the 
other definition in the Latin American context, see Graham and Naim (1998).
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A growing num ber o f  authors argue that institutions are am ong the m ost 
im portan t determ inants o f  econom ic growth, and several even claim to have 
found evidence that institutions trum p all other factors. M uch o f the contempo­
rary literature on institutions and growth dates back to N orth’s work on U.S. 
econom ic history.29 T he current focus, however, is m ostly on the developing 
world.30 Econometric analysis o f the relationship is now abundant. Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson are leaders in this enterprise, and they are also among 
the strongest advocates for the primacy of institutions as a causal factor. In their 
review o f  the literature on institu tions and growth, they state the following: 
“Although cultural and geographical factors may also m atter for economic per­
formance, differences in economic institutions are the m ajor source o f  cross­
country differences in economic growth and prosperity.”31
An im portant aspect o f  the debate on institutions and growth is the issue o f 
potential reverse causality. T h a t is, do better institutions cause higher growth 
and higher income, or does higher income bring about better institutions, or 
both? The strongest proponents o f institutions as the independent variable are 
W orld Bank economists, who have created a large data set to measure institu­
tions.32 Using new empirical techniques, K aufm ann and Kraay reconfirm  a 
strong positive link from institutions (or governance, in their terminology) to 
growth. More controversially, they find a weak, or even negative, relationship in 
the opposite direction.33 Others continue to believe in a two-way causal process 
or argue that institutions are the dependent variable.34
As we move from economic growth in general to the role of the financial sec­
tor in particular, the focus is on the positive influence o f  high-quality institu­
tions on both the depth o f the banking sector and the development o f capital 
markets. T he two, in turn , are said to prom ote growth. La Porta, Lopéz-de- 
Silanes, and Shleifer again play an influential role, not only making the intellec­
tual argument that the legal system (especially the protection o f  property rights) 
is crucial in determ ining financial development, but also devising a m ethodol­
ogy and data set to test the hypothesis. Their key insight is that current financial
29. North (1961).
30. Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2002) helped to make the transition with their comparative 
analysis of growth in the United States and other New World countries. Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson (2001, 2002) extend this line of research to other parts of the developing world.
31. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2004, pp. 2-3). Others who agree with this conclusion 
include Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002); Easterly and Levine (2003). A more policy- 
focused interest in institutions and growth arose from the disappointment with the economic 
reforms process of the 1980s and 1990s. One response was to point to the need for a so-called sec­
ond generation of reforms that would be centered on better institutions, thus leading to stronger 
growth. See, for example, Burki and Perry (1998); Kuczynski and Williamson (2003).
32. See Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastuzzi (2004). We provide more information on this data set 
later in the chapter.
33. Kaufmann and Kraay (2002).
34. On the two-way causal process, see, for example, Lora (2002); Pritchett (2002). On institu­
tions as the dependent variable, see Glaeser and others (2004).
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rules, and thus outcomes, vary according to legal origin. Specifically, countries 
following the English common law tradition protect property rights most dili­
gently and thus have deep financial systems, while those following French civil 
law are at the opposite end o f the spectrum. German and Scandinavian tradi­
tions lie in between.35
Levine and various colleagues further develop the idea o f the legal proxy for 
linking institutions and finance. They show tha t the m ost relevant aspect of 
legal origin is difference in adaptability, arguing that the French tradition is 
more rigid than the British or German. Systems that can adapt to changing con­
ditions prom ote financial developm ent more effectively than those that can­
no t.36 In a study o f  the Mexican case, H aber goes beyond the legal origins 
approach to look at the relationship between institutions, finance, and develop­
m ent more broadly. He argues that three types o f institutions will lead bankers 
to increase the availability o f  credit: those that protect them  from having their 
property expropriated, those that allow them  to enforce debt contracts, and 
those that encourage them  to behave prudently. More controversially, he adds 
that all three derive from a fundam ental set o f institutions that lim its the 
authority and discretion o f government.37 W hatever the channels, the evidence 
increasingly demonstrates that institutions— in part through their im pact on 
finance— are instrumental in promoting economic growth.38
Hypothesis on Ownership, Institutions, and Performance
Institutions have no t received m uch attention in the literature on ownership 
and bank performance as a result o f the methodology used to study the topic. 
Drawing on the works just discussed, we want to introduce institutions into the 
debate on ownership. Specifically, our second hypothesis argues that the institu­
tional context within a country can either reinforce or offset the expected advan­
tages or disadvantages deriving from a particular ownership type. Strong institu­
tions are particularly im portant in countries w ith state-dom inated systems, as 
they can potentially counteract the problems typical o f public banks. The same 
holds for mixed systems, in which public banks are part o f the ownership com­
bination. For private or foreign-dominated systems, strong institutions can rein­
force their positive characteristics, whereas weak institutions can underm ine 
them . W hich institutions are m ost relevant? Regulation and supervision are 
clearly im portant, and we address them  in the next chapter. Here we take a
35. La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1997, 1998).
36. Levine (1998, 1999); Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003).
37. Haber (2004).
38. On institutions and finance in several Latin American countries, see the book produced 
from an Inter-American Development Bank project, especially the chapters by Cristini, Moya, and 
Powell (2001); Fuentes and Maquieira (2001); Monje-Naranjo, Cascante, and Hall (2001); Pin- 
heiro and Cabral (2001).
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broader approach, looking at rule o f law and general characteristics of the gov­
ernment, in addition to regulation.
Trends in Bank Ownership
Over and above the differing views about the advantages and disadvantages of 
public versus private ownership o f banks, a clear consensus has developed about 
recent trends. Throughout the developing world, less public and more foreign 
ownership o f banks has emerged over the last fifteen years. Im portan t differ­
ences remain, however, across regions and individual countries as a result o f his­
torical context and policy decisions.
Regional Trends in Bank Ownership
Comparable data are hard to come by with respect to ownership. One reason is 
that definitions make a great deal o f difference. Some studies report the share of 
assets, loans, or deposits accounted for by ownership type; others base their cate­
gories on ownership o f a certain share of assets (50 percent is the typical cutoff 
point) before control is reported. The former approach tends to show a higher 
ownership for foreign banks, although not necessarily for public banks, since the 
latter share is likely to be quite high if  it exists. In addition, some studies o f pub­
lic sector bank ownership are limited to commercial banks, while others include 
development banks; if development banks exist, they will obviously increase the 
public share. Finally, the treatment o f foreign bank branches versus subsidiaries 
often varies, again giving rise to differences across works purporting to study the 
same phenomena.39
Table 3-1 shows the best estimates available for long-run changes in bank 
ownership, based on a data set com piled by La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer.40 It provides inform ation on ownership status o f the ten largest banks 
in ninety-two countries in 1970, 1985, and 1995 based on the share o f assets 
held. T he sample includes industrial, developing, and transition economies. 
W hile these data do no t separate private domestic from foreign ownership, they 
are useful for two reasons.41 First, they offer a twenty-five-year perspective that 
begins before financial liberalization and ends after a substantial part o f  it had 
taken place. Second, the data enable us to compare across regions, including the 
industrial countries as well as subgroups o f  developing and transition 
economies.
Beginning with the broadest categories, we see a shift from public to private 
banking in both industrial and developing countries, although the percentage
39. The biggest problem with these definitional differences is that the authors frequently fail to 
specify which definitions they are using.
40. La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000, 2002).
41. We calculated private ownership as a residual from the La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer data, which are limited to the share of public ownership.
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Government Private Government Private Government Private
Developed 37.0 63.0 31.6 68.4 21.8 78.2
Developing 65.6 34.4 62.6 37.4 48.8 51.2
East Asia Pacific 49.1 50.9 45.7 54.3 41.1 58.9
Eastern Europe 90.2 9.8 96.0 4.0 49.9 50.1
Latin America 65.8 34.2 54.8 45.2 40.1 59.9
Middle East 55.4 44.6 55.1 44.9 54.2 45.8
South Asia 94.7 5.3 97.9 2.1 87.5 12.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 40.8 59.2 48.5 51.5 33.6 66.4
Sources: Calculated from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000, 2002).
change is much larger in the latter. The share o f private sector ownership rose by 
24 percent in industrial countries between 1970 and 1995, but it increased by 
49 percent in the developing world. In both cases, the majority o f  the change 
came about in the ten years between 1985 and 1995. Am ong developing 
regions, the most dramatic shift took place in the former socialist bloc, which 
began with almost all its banks in state hands. The share fell to little more than 
half during the period under study. The other big change occurred in Latin 
America, where nearly two-thirds o f banks were public in 1970, declining to 
two-fifths by 1995.42 O ther regions, including East Asia, saw m uch smaller 
changes, although that region is especially heterogeneous.
Table 3-2 provides a more detailed look at three developing regions during a 
more recent period. It is based on data from the Bank for International Settle­
ments (BIS) for all three ownership categories— public, private, and foreign—  
for the years 1990 and 2002. The trends are consistent with those found in table 
3-1. In Latin America and in Eastern Europe, government ownership fell, for­
eign ownership increased, and private domestic ownership contracted some­
what. The situation was more complex in East Asia. W hile foreign ownership 
increased in most cases, it fell in the two places where foreign ownership was the 
highest in the region. Government ownership also rose, especially in those coun­
tries where financial crises occurred in the late 1990s. This seemingly contradic­
tory result came about because governments felt obliged to intervene when bank 
survival was threatened or when bank crises seemed likely to spill over into the 
rest o f the economy. They are now in the process o f  divesting these assets, but 
the process has not yet been completed.
42. In percentage terms, the second biggest change was in South Asia, but this was from a very 
low base, and the 1995 total for private sector ownership was only 12.5 percent.
Table 3-2. Ownership Structure o f Banking Systems in Emerging Markets, 
1990 and2002
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Percent
Region 1990 2002
and country Government Private Foreign Government Private Foreign
Asia
China 100 0 0 98a 2
Hong Kong 0 11 89 28a 72
Indonesia 96a 4 51 37 13
India 91 4 5 80 12 8
Korea 21 75 4 30 62 8
Malaysia n.a. n.a. n.a. I T 18
Philippines 7 84 9 12 70 18
Singapore 0 11 89 0 24 76
Thailand 13 82 5 31 51 18
Latin America 
Argentina 36 54 10 33 19 48
Brazil 64 30 6 46 19 27
Chile 19 62 19 13 46 42
Mexico 97 1 2 0 18 82
Peru 55 41 4 11 43 46
Venezuela 6 93 1 27 39 34
Eastern Europe 
Bulgaria 100a 0 13 20 67
Czech Republic 78 12 10 4 14 82
Estonia n.a. n.a. n.a. 0 1 99
Hungary 81 9 10 27 11 62
Poland 80 17 3 17 10 63
Russia 94a 6 68 23 9
Slovakia 100a 0 5 9 85
Source: BIS (2004, p. 9). 
n.a. Not available.
a. Disaggregated data are not available.
Bank Ownership in Latin America
T he two data sets already discussed provide an idea o f general trends in bank 
ownership in Latin America. The substantial drop in government control and 
the rise in foreign ownership are in line with the analysis o f the previous chapter, 
w hich docum ented rapid— if  volatile— financial liberalization in the region. 
Table 3-3 focuses on individual country behavior, including that o f  some 
smaller countries. It is based on a recent World Bank data set, which has infor­
mation for 2001.43
43. The definition of ownership is based on answers to a two-part question: what fraction of 
the banking system’s assets is in banks that were (a) 50 percent or more government 
owned and (b) 50 percent or more foreign owned at the end of 2001? See World Bank website
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Mexico 0 17 83
Panama 12 29 59
Mainly private
Colombia 18 60 22
Ecuador 14 79 7
El Salvador 4 84 12
Guatemala 3 88 9
Honduras 0 81 19
Peru 0 57 43
Venezuela 7 50 43
Mainly public
Costa Rica 62 15 23
Mixed
Argentina 32 36 32
Brazil 32 38 30
Chile 13 40 47
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (online).
The table reveals that ownership patterns are far from homogeneous. We can 
identify four subgroups. A first group consists o f countries where foreign capital 
dominates the banking system. Only two Latin American countries clearly fall 
into this category: Mexico, where foreign banks account for nearly 85 percent of 
banking assets, and Panama, a regional financial center w ith nearly 60 percent 
foreign ownership. A second group is made up o f  countries where private 
domestic institutions account for the majority o f the banking system. The coun­
tries that most clearly fit this pattern are among the smallest. In Ecuador, El Sal­
vador, Guatemala, and Honduras, private domestic banks represent around 80 
percent o f assets. In Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela, private banks account for 
between 50 and 60 percent o f  the total. A th ird  group is centered on state- 
owned banks. W hile this situation was quite typical o f  Latin America in the 
early postwar years, by 2000 only Costa Rica had m aintained this kind o f sys­
tem, w ith a majority o f its banking sector (62 percent) in public hands. Finally, 
a last group is characterized by mixed ownership, where no single type repre­
sents more than half o f  total assets and where all ownership types are repre­
sented. This group includes Argentina, Brazil, and Chile.
(econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?theSitePK=478060&contentMDK=20345037&menu 
PK=546154&pagePK=64168182&piPK=64168060), questions 3.8.1 and 3.8.2.
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Hong Kong 0 11 89
Singapore 0 11 89
Mainly private
Malaysia 0 81 19
Philippines 11 74 15
Thailand 31 62 7
Mainly public
China 98 0 2
Indonesia 51 37 13
Vietnam 75 10 15
Mixed
Korea 40 30 30
Sources: World. Bank, World Development Indicators (online); Fitch Ratings (2003) and IMF (2003d) 
for Vietnam.
Bank Ownership in East Asia
East Asia also displays a good deal o f  heterogeneity in bank ownership. Table
3-4, w hich is based on the same W orld Bank data set as the previous table, 
reveals several clusters that are superficially similar to those found in Latin 
America. W hen we look more closely, however, the characteristics o f  the clusters 
and their distribution vary in im portant ways.
We first note that two East Asian countries— H ong Kong and Singapore—  
are heavily reliant on foreign banking (nearly 90 percent o f total assets). These 
two city states, which are regional financial centers, also have very large foreign 
production sectors tha t m atch their banking facilities. In this sense, they are 
similar to Panama, but very different from Mexico. A second group o f countries 
has m ainly private banks. In the Southeast Asian nations o f  Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand, over 60 percent o f the banking system is in private 
domestic hands; m any o f these banks have traditionally been family-owned 
franchises. Third, a large majority o f the banking sector in China and Vietnam 
is still state owned, reflecting their socialist economic history. We also place 
Indonesia in this group. Although public ownership is only slightly over 50 per­
cent, the characteristics o f its banking sector are similar to the state-dominated 
group. The fourth group, consisting o f  mixed ownership, is small in the East 
Asian region. South Korea is currently the only clear example, but several East 
Asian countries are moving toward mixed systems as banks taken over during 
the crisis are reprivatized, often being sold to foreign owners.
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Ownership and Performance
Having examined the literature on bank ownership, as well as ownership charac­
teristics and trends in the two regions, we now return to the two hypotheses pre­
sented earlier. The first leads us to ask how different types o f  banking systems, 
defined by ownership characteristics, compare in performance. We also want to 
examine whether the Latin American and East Asian regions display significant 
differences with respect to this question and, if so, why. It is very difficult to test 
this hypothesis, for a variety o f reasons. First is the problem o f definitions and 
cutoff points. Exactly what share o f total bank assets must pertain to a particular 
ownership type to be classed as domination? Second, we have very few examples 
o f each o f the respective ownership types. Third, getting adequate and compara­
ble data is problematic. This exercise should therefore be regarded as exploring 
some initial evidence that, if  it proves useful, should be reconsidered later with a 
larger sample.
Tables 3-5 and 3-6 show a num ber o f indicators for banks in East Asia and 
Latin America, w ith the banks grouped into the categories that were identified 
in the previous section. The indicators include a broad characteristic o f  the 
economies (per capita income); four indicators o f bank efficiency (private sector 
credit/GDP, overhead costs/net income, nonperforming loans/credit, and prof­
itability44); and three indicators o f stability (the capital ratio, provisions/nonper­
forming loans, and M oody’s bank ratings). The Moody’s rating is an assessment 
o f the financial strength o f each bank in a given country, weighted by assets.45 
Unfortunately, lack o f data makes it impossible to provide a systematic treat­
m ent o f access to finance.
Given the exploratory nature o f  this exercise, we start by asking two ques­
tions w ith respect to the tables. First, do the variables characterizing the four 
ownership types cluster around certain values? Second, are these values consis­
tent with the predictions of the literature we have examined? Positive answers to 
both questions, but especially the first, would provide some initial validation of 
the categories we have defined.
44. Profitability is included here since it is typically used in this type of analysis. Profitability 
has been interpreted in two opposing ways, however. On the one hand, low profitability is some­
times taken as an indicator of poor performance and low efficiency, especially among public sector 
banks (for example, Levy-Yeyati, Micco, and Panizza, 2004). On the other hand, low profitability 
is also seen as the result of competition and greater efficiency (for example, Demirgiiq-Kunt, 
Levine, and Min, 1998). Because of this ambiguity, we interpret profitability based on the other 
characteristics of each individual case.
45. The Moody’s rating measures the probability that a bank will need outside help, not 
whether it will receive it. Factors taken into account include individual bank fundamentals and the 
operating environment (such as the prospective performance of the economy, the structure and rel­
ative fragility of the financial system, and the quality of banking regulation and supervision). See 
the definition for Bank Financial Strength Rating on Moody’s website (www.moodys.com).
We look at East Asia first, since the relationship between ownership and per­
formance is clearest there, and we then contrast Latin America with the Asian 
cases. As table 3-5 indicates, the best performance on most indicators is found 
in high-income Hong Kong and Singapore, with their foreign-dominated bank­
ing systems. Indeed, the banks in these two financial centers are am ong the 
strongest in the world. Both countries’ financial sectors are deep and stable, the 
banks are extremely efficient, nonperform ing loans are low, capital ratios and 
provisions are high, and they receive very high marks from the rating agencies. 
W hile profitability is on the low side, in this case we interpret low profits as an 
indicator o f  com petition rather than systemic weakness. T he foreign-owned 
banking systems in these city-states are consistent with the productive systems, 
where foreign investm ent is also very prom inent. Partially as a consequence, 
high foreign ownership has no t aroused local hostility as it has in some Latin 
American cases.
T he countries w ith m ainly private banking systems— Malaysia, Thailand, 
and the Philippines— are from middle-income Southeast Asia. The Southeast 
Asian nations have traditionally been open economies that relied heavily on 
trade, and from the m id-1980s they received large am ounts o f  foreign invest­
m ent, especially from their N ortheast Asian neighbors. Nonetheless, their 
largely family-owned banks were protected from foreign ownership. The rapid 
growth in these economies over the last several decades was abruptly halted in 
1997 by a financial crisis from which they are only now recovering. Thus, 
despite their financial depth, they have high nonperform ing loans, low provi­
sions, and low stability scores from the rating agencies. The Philippines, while 
fitting in this category in most ways, displays differences that have led it to be 
referred to in Asia as a quasi-Latin American country. Because it was relatively 
poor and less attractive to foreign capital than its neighbors in the 1990s, it was 
not initially affected as much as they were when foreign capital withdrew during 
the crisis. Later, however, the crisis spilled over into the Philippine economy, 
raising its nonperforming loans and lowering its efficiency.
The public-dom inated banking systems in East Asia are archetypical exam­
ples o f the negative characteristics discussed in the literature. They are found in 
the poorest countries in the region— although these countries have been grow­
ing rapidly. W ith  the im portan t exception o f  C hina, they have lower credit 
ratios than others in the region. They also have very high nonperforming loans 
and low stability ratings. Both China and Vietnam are in transition toward capi­
talist economies, despite their attempts to maintain authoritarian political sys­
tems. M any o f their current problems derive from their socialist pasts, when 
state-owned banks financed money-losing state enterprises, thus leading to huge 
volumes o f nonperforming loans.46 Indonesia is a different case in that it is not a
46. While nonperforming loan measures are hard to define in most countries, they are espe- 
daily so in these two cases. In China, for example, some experts believe that nonperforming loans 
were at least double the official figure shown in table 3-5; see, for example, Lardy (2001).
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Mainly foreign“ 26,730 132 45.3 3.6 0.9 11.8 16.7 107.8 68.5
Hong Kong 26,189 151 47.2 3.9 0.8 13.5 15.4 n.a. 62.3
Singapore 27,270 112 43.3 3.2 0.9 10.1 17.9 107.8 74.7
Mainly private“ 3,129 69 68.8 14.3 1.1 12.0 14.7 54.4 23.2
Malaysia 4,965 97 n.a. 13.9 1.4 17.1 13.7 38.9 33.3
Philippines 1,239 31 68.8 16.1 1.1 8.5 16.3 51.5 20.4
Thailand 3,182 79 n.a. 12.8 0.7 10.5 14.0 72.8 15.8
Mainly public“ 851 84 n.a. 18.2 0.9 22.1 16.8 143.2 6.5
China 1,024 148 n.a. 22.0 0.1 n.a. 11.2 n.a 10.0
Indonesia 1,090 20 n.a. 17.9 1.6 22.1 22.3 143.2 3.0
Vietnam 438 n.a. n.a. 15.0 n.a. n.a. n.a n.a n.a.
Mixed 15,291 95 43.3 2.6 0.5 12.3 10.5 109.4 18.3
Korea 15,291 95 43.3 2.6 0.5k 12.3k 10.5 109.4 18.3
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators (online) for per capita income and credit; IMF (country reports) for efficiency, Vietnam data; IMF, Global Financial Sta­
bility Report (September 2004 and April 2005) for nonperforming loans, return on assets, return on equity, capital ratio, provisions, Moody's Ratings, 
n.a. Not available.
a. Unweighted averages of countries shown in table.
b. Per capita GDP in 1995 dollars.
c. Credit to private sector as share of GDP.
d. Operating expenses as share of gross operational margin.
e. Nonperforming loans as share of total loans, excluding loans sold to asset management firms.
f. Profits as a share of assets.
g. Profits as a share of equity.
h. Bank regulatory capital as share of risk-weighted assets.
i. Provisions as share of nonperforming loans.
j. Financial strength index (0 = lowest, 100 = highest), 
k. Average of 2002-04.
transition economy, but most o f its postwar history was played out under a cor­
rupt authoritarian ruler who used the banking system to finance personal and 
political objectives. This experience left the banks with a large overhang o f non­
performing loans.
Korea, the lone current example o f a mixed banking system in East Asia, was 
the most aggressive in bringing the financial crisis under control. The decline o f 
nonperform ing loans to less than 3 percent is the best indicator o f  its success, 
together with its high score on efficiency. One o f the ways that Korea battled the 
effects o f the crisis was to open its banking sector to foreign ownership when it 
began to reprivatize the banks taken over during the crisis. Initially, the foreign 
owners were equity firms, bu t more recently some major international banks 
have entered the market. At the same time, Korea m aintains several well-run 
development banks despite the government’s avowed intention to reprivatize all 
o f  the commercial banks. This com bination led to the current mixed system, 
w hich others in the region are beginning to im itate. Its low M oody’s rating, 
when compared to the favorable performance indicators, is due to the overly 
rapid switch from corporate to consumer lending as another result o f the crisis. 
As a consequence, significant problems in the credit card industry slowed economic 
growth starting in 2003 and caused new difficulties for the banking sector.47
Overall, then, the banking systems in the East Asian countries not only share 
characteristics w ithin each group, but the groups behave as the literature pre­
dicts for specific types o f  banks. The foreign-dom inated systems are the 
strongest, the public sector systems are the weakest, and the private domestic 
systems lie in between. The new mixed banking system in Korea also appears to 
be working well, approaching the success o f the foreign-ownership countries on 
several indicators.
Latin America presents some interesting exceptions to this clear pattern (see 
table 3-6). We begin the discussion as before with the countries characterized by 
foreign dom ination o f  their banking systems— namely, Mexico and Panama. 
Both are middle-income countries within the Latin American region, but their 
economies and banking systems differ in major ways. Panama’s strong perform­
ance is similar to that o f  other financial centers, featuring a high credit-to-GDP 
ratio together w ith high efficiency and profitability. Mexico’s performance has 
been much weaker. Since the 1994—95 crisis, when foreign banks purchased the 
large majority o f bank assets, Mexico has not experienced many o f the advan­
tages that foreign institutions are expected to bring. T he new foreign owners 
have recapitalized the banks, lowered nonperforming loans, and increased prof­
its. O n  the other side o f  the ledger, however, they have made m oney m ainly 
through increasing fees and commissions and holding risk-free governm ent 
bonds rather than financing new activities that need capital. Mexico is a particu­
larly inauspicious case for such heavy foreign ownership. Unlike Panama and the
47. On these current problems in the Korean banking system, see IMF (2003c, 2005b).
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Mainly foreign3 3,607 52 55.8 3.2 1.9 20.0 14.2 167.1 39.6
Mexico 3,717 16 74.2 3.2 1.7 14.2 14.2 167.1 39.6
Panama 3,496 87 37.4 n.a. 2.0 25.7 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Mainly private1 1,896 24 77.5 5.4 1.1 16.1 12.7 101.4 16.0
Ecuador 1,812 20 88.5 7.9 1.9 12.7 12.2 127.3 8.3
El Salvador 1,790 41 73.1 2.8 1.0 9.8 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Guatemala 1,544 18 78.4 7.1 0.4 6.8 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Honduras 713 38 81.9 3.8 1.1 12.0 13.0 36.8 n.a.
Colombia 2,321 20 79.7 6.8 2.4 17.0 12.4 98.3 24.2
Peru 2,438 22 81.1 5.8 1.1 10.8 13.3 141.1 23.3
Venezuela 2,655 10 60.1 7.7 6.2 44.0 n.a. 103.7 8.3
Mainly public 4,093 31 69.2 1.7 2.1 19.5 16.5 145.9 n.a.
Costa Rica 4,093 31 69.2 1.7 2.1 19.5 16.5 145.9 n.a.
Mixed3 5,733 34 65.6 12.2 0.1 4.2 15.7 125.9 26.9
Argentina 7,071 11 n.a. 30.5 -2 .5 -20.6 14.0 81.2 0.0
Brazil 4,577 29 65.7 4.4 1.6 16.4 18.9 165.6 24.3
Chile 5,552 62 65.4 1.6 1.3 16.7 14.1 130.9 56.5
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators (online) for per capita income and credit; Latin Finance (August 2004) for efficiency, nonperforming loans, return on 
assets, return on equity for El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama; IMF, Global Financial Stability Report (September 2004) for nonperforming loans, return on assets, 
return on equity, capital ratio, provisions, Moody's Ratings, 
n.a. Not available.
a. Unweighted averages of countries shown in table.
b. Per capita GDP in 1995 dollars.
c. Credit to private sector as share of GDP.
d. Operating expenses as share of gross operational margin.
e. Nonperforming loans as share of total loans, excluding loans sold to asset management firms.
f. Profits as a share of assets.
g. Profits as a share of equity.
n. Bank regulatory capital as share of risk-weighted assets, 
i. Provisions as share of nonperforming loans, 
j. Financial strength index (0 = lowest, 100 = highest).
two East Asian financial centers, its domestic productive sector is nationally 
based, so production and finance are mismatched.48 W hile the poor perform ­
ance in recent years m ight arguably represent a necessary transition toward a 
stronger banking system in the future, this outcom e remains very m uch to be 
seen.
In Latin America, unlike East Asia, the countries dom inated by private 
domestic banks are the poorest in the region. These are Central American and 
Andean countries that have not developed to the same extent as their neighbors. 
In recent years, political conflicts have exacerbated the economic problems, par­
ticularly in the Andean region. Earlier political conflicts in C entral America 
have subsided, although they have not been overcome entirely. N ot surprisingly, 
their low level o f development and political instability has lim ited their attrac­
tiveness for foreign investors, including banks. O nly 13 percent o f total assets 
are held by foreign banks in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, while the 
figure is less than 30 percent for Andean countries. Their financial institutions 
thus remain locally owned, but the domestic banks have been unable to support 
their economies adequately. They are characterized by the lowest credit-to-GDP 
ratios, the lowest efficiency ratings, the highest nonperforming loans, the lowest 
profitability, and the lowest stability ratings in Latin America. W hile the Central 
American and Andean subgroups display im portant differences, both are located 
at the low end o f the performance range.
O ne o f the surprises we uncovered is the relatively good performance by 
Costa Rica, despite the fact that public banks account for almost two-thirds of 
total assets. T he literature, as well as the East Asian cases, led us to expect a 
m uch weaker showing. In com parison w ith its Latin American counterparts, 
Costa Rica has a fairly high per capita income, and it has traditionally been seen 
as a wealthy and stable exception in the Central American region. O f  the th ir­
teen Latin American countries in table 3-6, Costa Rica ranks second on nonper­
forming loans and the capital ratio, third on profitability, and fifth on efficiency 
and credit as a share o f GDP.49 Costa Rican citizens have made it clear that they 
do not want to privatize major state-owned assets, including the banking sys­
tem. At the same time, Costa Rican governments have recognized that if  they 
are to maintain economic control, they m ust provide a stable and efficient sys­
tem. They have been relatively effective, according to the indicators cited, 
although Costa Rica has not escaped the typical Latin American problem o f lack
48. One of the results of the mismatch is political opposition to foreign ownership. In Mexico, 
such opposition has manifested itself primarily in attacks on the banks’ owners for allegedly fraudu­
lent activities of their predecessors in making bad loans that were eventually paid for by the taxpay­
ers. The fact that the banks had been purchased by foreigners undoubtedly increased the opposi­
tion, which probably would have occurred in any case.
49. These data pertain only to onshore banking operations. Costa Rican private banks also have 
offshore operations, which are only partially supervised by national authorities. The offshore opera­
tions began in the days when private banks were heavily restricted in terms of what activities they 
could pursue; the possibility of phasing them out is currently under discussion.
7 2  C hanges in  L a t in  A m er ic a ’s F in a n c ia l  System  since 1 9 9 0
of financial depth in the banking system. Nonetheless, the country provides evi­
dence that it is possible to maintain a sound banking system in the face o f dem­
ocratic opposition to privatization.
Finally, the three countries in the mixed-ownership group are the wealthiest 
in the Latin American sample (though still far below the high-incom e Asian 
cases). Unlike the three previous groups, this group shows wide variation in per­
formance. Each country has a significant public sector banking presence, but 
the results vary dramatically. Argentina, w ith a still unresolved financial crisis, 
has two o f Latin America’s worst-performing state banks. The other two coun­
tries in this group— Chile and Brazil— have some of the strongest banks in the 
region, including their public sector institutions. Overall, the two have relatively 
deep financial sectors, strong efficiency scores, low nonperform ing loans, and 
high evaluations on stability. Chile is substantially stronger than Brazil on the 
last two items, while Brazil has a higher capital ratio and provisions. W ith  
respect to profitability, the two are in the middle ranks because o f strong compe­
tition in the two markets. The good performance o f the public sector banks (as 
well as the banking systems as a whole) is noteworthy. Both governments have 
taken decisive steps to clean up their banking systems, improve corporate gover­
nance, and strengthen regulation with positive results.
Ownership, Institutions, and Performance
O ur second hypothesis, concerning the impact o f the institutional context on 
bank performance, is also difficult to study. The problems o f measuring bank 
performance, as discussed previously, are now com pounded by the problem of 
measuring the im pact o f  institutions. We want a broad concept o f institutions 
that goes beyond bank regulation and supervision, which is the subject o f the 
next chapter. A W orld Bank project on governance provides a useful methodol­
ogy and a data set that disaggregates governance into six components. Four are 
relevant institutional factors that can be expected to affect bank behavior: gov­
ernm ent effectiveness (that is, quality o f bureaucracy, credibility o f government’s 
com m itm ent to policies, quality o f public service provision), regulatory quality 
(appropriate balance between market orientation and government control), rule 
o f  law (effectiveness and predictability o f  judiciary, enforceability o f  contracts), 
and control o f corruption (extent to which society is free o f  the need to pay 
bribes at the microeconomic level and the avoidance o f elite capture o f the state 
at the macroeconomic level). The project combines twenty-five data sets created 
by eighteen organizations to quantify the components o f governance in the 199 
countries that are included in the database.50
50. Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2004) explain the methodology of the project, and asso­
ciated data files provide data for each country and each variable for 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002.
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Table 3-7. Latin America and East Asia: Institutional Quality Index, 20021
Region and country Rating Ranking Region and country Rating Ranking
Latin America -0.21 n.a. East Asia 0.36 n.a.
Chile 1.39 3 Singapore 2.05 1
Costa Rica 0.67 5 Hong Kong 1.44 2
Mexico 0.06 8 Korea 0.73 4
Panama 0.03 9 Malaysia 0.62 6
Brazil -0 .08 10 Thailand 0.19 7
Peru -0.30 13 China -0 .22 11
El Salvador -0 .37 14 Philippines -0.25 12
Colombia -0.41 15 Vietnam -0.51 16
Guatemala -0 .56 17 Indonesia -0 .80 20.5
Honduras -0 .67 18
Argentina -0.71 19
Ecuador -0 .80 20.5
Venezuela -0.92 22
Source: Calculated from World Bank website (www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata).
n.a. Not available.
a. Institutional characteristics are defined by World Bank as government effectiveness, rule of law, reg­
ulatory quality, and control of corruption; see text for explanation.
Using 2002 data on government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule o f law, 
and control o f corruption as measures o f institutional quality, we assign a rating 
and ranking to thirteen Latin American and nine East Asian countries, as shown 
in table 3-7. A num ber o f  points are o f interest for our analysis. First, institu­
tional quality in Latin America, according to this measure, is well below that o f 
East Asia. The unweighted average ratings are -0 .21  for Latin America versus 
0.36 for East Asia. Likewise, only four of thirteen countries in Latin America 
receive positive ratings compared with five o f nine in East Asia. O n the individ­
ual components, Latin America is strongest on regulatory quality and weakest 
on rule o f law, while East Asia scores best on government effectiveness and worst 
on corruption control.
Second, a com parison o f tables 3-5 and 3-7 reveals tha t the institutional 
scores for the East Asian countries are highly correlated w ith income levels, 
which in turn  are highly correlated w ith the type o f banking system and per­
formance. These relationships are no t as close in Latin America. Insofar as a 
strong correlation exists, it causes a problem since we are interested in the rela­
tionship between institu tions and perform ance, and incom e may determ ine 
both. As m entioned earlier, there is an ongoing debate about the relationship
Criticisms of these data have been raised, some of which are addressed by the authors themselves. 
Those who agree with the spirit of the exercise criticize the use of data on perceptions, rather than 
the underlying factors themselves; the possible bias of these perceptions; and the sometimes rapid 
changes in institutions that are expected, by definition, to change only slowly. Others (such as Prze- 
worski, 2004a, 2004b) have more profound objections to the very idea of measuring the impact of 
institutions, given the methodological problems of dealing with counterfactuals.
between institutions and income. The World Bank group argues that the causal 
relationship runs from institutions to income and not in the other direction.51 
O ur concern is different, though related: do institutions affect bank perform ­
ance beyond any effect that per capita income level may have? We suspect that 
all o f the relationships run in both directions, but— at the least— institutions are 
a mechanism through which income affects bank performance.
Third, the institutional characteristics in East Asia seem to reinforce owner­
ship in terms o f explaining performance (see tables 3-5 and 3-7). T hat is, the 
strongest institutions are found in foreign-based banking systems, which have 
the best performance in the region. The next strongest are in the private- 
dominated systems, which perform second best, and the weakest institutions are 
in the poorly perform ing public-bank systems. But what are the mechanisms 
involved? Exactly how do institutions affect performance? Based on the institu­
tional measures from the W orld Bank study, we can outline three channels o f 
influence. First, respect for rule o f  law gives private institutions, including 
banks, the confidence to make long-term investments, since they have some rea­
sonable certainty that their money will be safe. Second, high regulatory quality 
(by the World Bank definition) means that rules will be established in a way that 
is consistent with market mechanisms, which is also conducive to entrepreneur­
ial initiative. Finally, an effective and honest government bureaucracy provides 
some assurance that laws and rules will be im plem ented fairly. All o f these 
mechanisms mean that banks are more likely to make the com m itm ents that 
will lead to better performance.52
Fourth, institutions help to explain some o f the unexpected results in the 
relationship between ownership and performance in Latin America (see tables
3-6 and 3-7). As we have seen, Mexican banks perform less well than predicted 
for a foreign-dominated banking system. They have low efficiency scores and a 
low volume o f credit as a share of GDP. Indeed, the credit ratio fell throughout 
most o f the past decade. The reasons are discussed in some detail in chapter 7; 
here we simply poin t ou t that the low quality o f  Mexican institutions can be 
expected to inhibit performance. The two institutional components on which 
Mexico has negative scores are rule o f  law and  corruption. These problems 
lessen the willingness o f the new foreign bank owners to take the risk o f making 
loans, since they are unsure if they will be able to recover their money. Arguing 
along the same lines, Haber and Musacchio make a more specific case that lack 
o f contractual security shapes bank performance in Mexico.53
51. See Kaufmarm and Kraay (2002), as well as the critiques accompanying their article (Lora, 
2002; Pritchett, 2002).
52. Returning to the issue of relying on perceptions about institutions in the World Bank indi­
cators, it is precisely perceptions that are important in determining whether investors will risk their 
money.
53. Haber and Musacchio (2005). The use of a single country study over time is an alternative 
way to study the impact of institutions on bank behavior.
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The opposite situation seems to have occurred in Costa Rica. W hereas the 
literature tells us that public sector banks are generally characterized by poor 
performance, Costa Rica has a relatively good record within the Latin American 
region, featuring high efficiency, low nonperform ing loans, good profitability, 
and strong stability. An im portant part o f  the explanation for this unexpected 
result is the environm ent in which Costa Rica’s banks operate. O n  the one 
hand, the country is known for its political and economic stability. O n the 
other, its strong institutions (namely, good regulation, low corruption, and 
adherence to the rule o f law) have enabled the Costa Rican government to fol­
low its citizens’ desire to m aintain public sector services that function effec­
tively.54 In the m id-1990s, the U.S. Agency for International D evelopm ent 
(USAID) financed a program specifically designed to strengthen financial insti­
tutions in Costa Rica. Private banks have been prom oted to increase com peti­
tion for public banks; one of the largest public banks was closed for not follow­
ing governm ent regulations; and the central bank has been extremely 
conservative in its management style. This is not to imply that the Costa Rican 
financial sector has no problems. Although the government is taking steps to 
improve the situation, the public banks still enjoy some advantages compared to 
their private sector counterparts, and the offshore banking sector is only par­
tially supervised. C om pared w ith its neighbors, however, Costa Rica’s banks 
rank highly.55
Finally, the three Latin American countries w ith mixed banking systems—  
Chile, Brazil, and Argentina— have very different performance records. Chile 
has by far the strongest financial system in the region; Brazil has a m edium  
record in the Latin American context; and Argentina has a very weak banking 
system that has been unable to escape from the crisis that has ravaged the coun­
try since the late 1990s. The institutional characteristics o f the three would pre­
dict exactly these outcomes.
Chile’s institutions are the strongest in the Latin American region and are 
exceeded only by H ong Kong and Singapore in our sample. Chile is known for 
its adherence to the rule o f law, the competence o f its central bank and finance 
ministry, and its stable macroeconomic performance since it emerged from a 
financial crisis in the m id-1980s. These characteristics have helped the sole 
state-owned commercial bank receive high marks from  rating agencies and 
international financial institutions. Brazil falls in the m iddle o f our sample of 
Latin American and Asian countries (ranking tenth out o f twenty-two on our 
institutions index). Its only positive score is on regulatory quality, but it also has
54. Several cases of high-level corruption have recently been uncovered in Costa Rica, but in 
both relative and absolute terms, the country remains an exception to the pattern of corruption in 
neighboring countries.
55. Personal interview with a former Costa Rican government official. See also two publica­
tions by the long-time central bank governor (Lizano, 2003, 2005). For a critical, but supportive, 
analysis of Costa Rica’s banking system, see IMF (2003b, 2004c).
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Figure 3-1. Latin America and East Asia: Institutional Quality Index versus 
Credit to Private Sector1
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Institutional quality index
Credit to private sector
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (online) for credit; table 3-7 for institutional 
quality index.
a. Institutional quality index (for 2002) consists of government effectiveness, rule of law, regula­
tory quality, and control of corruption. Credit to the private sector (for 2003) is share of GDP.
very capable economists and bankers in its economics ministries. The country 
privatized m ost o f  its public sector banks in recent years, and its two largest 
remaining government-owned banks are generally acknowledged to be run on a 
highly professional basis. Argentina’s institutions, by contrast, compete w ith 
Indonesia and Venezuela at the bottom  of the scale. The economic performance 
of the country has been especially volatile, and corruption has long been consid­
ered a serious problem. O ther indicators, however, have declined significantly in 
recent years due to political and economic instability, including a m ajor debt 
default and freezing o f  bank deposits. In this environm ent, Argentina’s two 
main public sector banks have had particularly poor records in terms o f nonper­
forming loans, efficiency, and profits.
In short, countries w ith strong institutions can have well-functioning public 
sector banks, while those with weak institutions not only will have clear difficul­
ties w ith public banks, bu t also will no t be able to take advantage o f private 
banks.56 Figures 3-1 to 3-3 map the relationships between institutions and three 
o f the performance measures shown in the tables. They include credit as a share
56. Latin America provides many examples of the latter in addition to Mexico. The countries 
dominated by private domestic banks have both the weakest performance indicators and the weak­
est institutions.
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Sources: IMF, Global Financial Stability Report (September 2004) and Latin Finance (August 
2004) for nonperforming loans; table 3-7 for institutional quality index.
a. Institutional quality index (for 2002) consists of government effectiveness, rule of law, regula­
tory quality, and control of corruption. Nonperforming loans are for 2003.
o f GDP, nonperforming loans as a share o f total loans, and M oody’s ratings as 
an indicator o f stability. All confirm the expected relationships: better institu­
tions are associated w ith more credit, fewer nonperform ing loans, and higher 
M oody’s scores. The closest fit is between institutions and the M oody’s ratings 
(R2 = 0.83), followed by credit to the private sector (R2 = 0 .64).57 T he lowest 
correlation (R2 = 0.09) is found between institutions and nonperforming loans, 
a variable that is notoriously difficult to measure and subject to varying defini­
tions across countries.
Since the three figures show East Asian as well as Latin American countries, 
they highlight some o f the differences across the two regions. The Asian coun­
tries generally outperform their Latin American counterparts. More are located 
in the upper quadrants, indicating positive scores on institutions; only China, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and V ietnam  are located on the lower part o f  the 
graph. For Latin America, only Chile and Costa Rica are clearly in the upper 
quadrants; Mexico, Panama, and Brazil are near the middle; while the others fall
57. China has been eliminated from this graph since credit to state-owned firms (the majority 
of total credit) is combined with credit to the private sector, thus producing a misleading statistic.
Figure 3-3. Latin America and East Asia: Institutional Quality Index versus 
Moody’s Ratingf
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Institutional quality index
Moody’s ratings
Source: IMF, Global Financial Stability Report (September 2004) for Moody's Ratings; table 
3-7 for institutional quality index.
a. Institutional quality index (for 2002) consists of government effectiveness, rule of law, regula­
tory quality, and control of corruption. Moody's ratings are for 2003.
to the bottom . T he East Asian countries also tend to be above the trend line, 
indicating performance even better than their institutional scores would predict, 
while the Latin American countries are generally below. T he Latin American 
countries with private sector banks are all in the lower left-hand quadrant o f the 
graphs, indicating the com bination o f the poorest quality institutions and the 
worst performance.
Conclusions
The data presented in this chapter confirm the worldwide trend in bank owner­
ship toward less emphasis on public participation and a greater role for foreign 
owners. This process has occurred in both Latin America and East Asia. Despite 
these common trends in the two regions, we find that ownership remains quite 
heterogeneous from  country to  country. Unlike m ost o f  the literature, we 
focused on the ownership characteristics o f the banking systems w ithin coun­
tries rather than ori particular types o f banks across countries. Based on the 
characteristics o f the banking systems, we identified four groups o f countries in
each region: a first group in w hich foreign ownership dom inates, a second in 
which local private ownership is the most common form, a third in which public 
banks still control the m ajority o f  bank  assets, and a fourth  in w hich mixed 
ownership prevails.
W hen we tried to match performance data to the ownership characteristics of 
the banking systems, we found that the two regions behaved in somewhat dif­
ferent ways. The pattern in East Asia fits what our first hypothesis would pre­
dict. T hat is, foreign-dominated systems perform best, followed by local private 
ownership. The countries with predominantly public banks fared the worst. Per­
formance by the single mixed ownership system fell between the foreign and 
private domestic systems. In Latin America, by contrast, the situation is less 
clear-cut. Th®«hest’perforrtliHg Banking system ïC hile) has mixed ownership,T -I?;"—*•*-'* ...■ " m.ufcrfrwiair .»#
followed first Dythe only public-sector-dominated banking system in the region 
(Costa Rica) and then by the two foreign-dominated banking systems (Mexico 
and Panama). T he worst performers tend to be those countries where private 
domestic banks dom inate. T he mixed group varies greatly, including the best 
performer, a middle-level one, and one o f the worst performers.
To explain these findings, we turned to the second hypothesis: the relation­
ship between perform ance and institutional characteristics o f  the respective 
countries. In East Asia, institutions reinforced the previous findings. T he best 
institutions were found in the countries with the best-performing banking sys­
tems and vice versa. In Latin America, institutions contributed to explaining the 
anomalies found. Costa Rica has strong institutions, which helps explain why its 
state-dom inated banking system works much better than the literature would 
lead us to believe. The same is true for the mixed cases. Chile has the strongest 
institutions in the region, which has enabled its single public bank to perform 
well. Brazil has a larger public presence, w hich makes the m anagem ent task 
more difficult, and its institutions are also weaker than those in Chile. The 
result is a mid-level performance. Argentina had enormous institutional defi­
ciencies by 2002, which compounded the performance problems deriving from 
the financial crisis in that country. Finally, institutions also help explain why the 
foreign-dominated banks in Mexico have not performed as well as expected. In 
East Asia, the two foreign-controlled banking systems were the top performers 
in those two countries, but Mexico’s institutions are far weaker than those o f its 
East Asian counterparts and not even very strong in the Latin American context.
In summary, adding the institutional dimension helps explain the relation­
ship between bank ownership and performance. For example, the analysis sug­
gests that public banks can perform well according to commonly used indica­
tors— but only if  the country’s institu tional framework is strong. O ther 
examples, such as Argentina, China, Indonesia, and Vietnam, show the difficul­
ties in managing public banks in the face o f weak institutions. At the same time,
8 0  C hanges in  L a t in  A m er ic a ’s F in a n c ia l  System  sin ce 1 9 9 0
foreign banks can perform extremely well, as seen in East Asia, but there is no 
guarantee— especially in the context o f relatively weak institutions, as found in 
Mexico. The message, then, is that the real world is more complex than some of 
the literature would lead us to believe. We need to look at individual cases to 
understand the ways in which ownership characteristics affect performance and 
how banking systems interact with their institutional environments.
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T o w a r d  S t a b i l i t y :  
R e g u l a t i o n ,  S u p e r v i s io n ,  
a n d  t h e  M a c r o e c o n o m i c  C o n t e x t
T he financial crises o f  1994-95  and 1997—98 sounded wake-up calls to 
Latin America and East Asia, respectively, indicating that regulation and 
supervision needed to be strengthened. But what exactly does strengthening reg­
ulation and supervision mean? Until recently, the phrase would have been uni­
versally interpreted as tightening government regulations on capital adequacy, 
classification o f problem loans, and provisions for expected losses at individual 
banks. It would also have been associated w ith giving supervisors more power 
and autonomy to enforce the regulations. In the last few years, however, a new 
view has been pu t forth  that posits the superiority o f private m onitoring of 
banking systems over the traditional public approach. According to this new 
view, regulators and supervisors should concentrate on getting banks to disclose 
as m uch inform ation as possible so customers can evaluate their quality and 
decide which ones to patronize. These market mechanisms, it is argued, force 
banks to behave prudently and to provide resources to society as needed. A third 
approach also relies on governmental supervision, but it differs from both o f the 
others in that it focuses on the macroeconomic level. It is primarily concerned 
with the ways in which procyclical practices can undermine the financial stabil­
ity o f  the system as a whole.
O ur first aim in this chapter is to present the ongoing debates among these 
three perspectives and to ask if  they are mutually exclusive or complementary. 
The discussion is a more specific instance o f the one begun in the last chapter,
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where we considered a broad range o f institutions, from government effective­
ness to support for rule o f law to control o f corruption. Now we focus on a par­
ticular type of institu tion  tha t is central to any study o f the financial sector. 
Strengthening government-based regulation and supervision has been a typical 
response to crises that have occurred in developing countries following financial 
liberalization, bu t private m onitoring has also increased in  m any cases. We 
explore the choices that individual governments have made in this respect.
We also extend the discussion to take into account two other elements that 
are essential to understanding the impact o f regulation and supervision on the 
stability of banking systems. T he first is the macroeconomic context. O n the 
positive side, low inflation, stable growth rates, and policies to cope with inter­
national capital flows and external debt can provide support for banking sys­
tems. O n the negative side, macroeconomic shocks, such as high interest rates, 
asset bubbles, devaluations, and capital flow reversals, can cause problems for 
even the strongest systems, especially those in developing countries. The second 
element encompasses international rules and best practices, such as those estab­
lished by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the International 
M onetary Fund (IMF). Such rules also have both positive and negative implica­
tions for banking. Given these interactions, regulation and supervision— how­
ever defined— can no longer be considered in isolation.
O ur own analysis indicates that private m onitoring is positively related to 
bank performance, while government-based regulation and supervision have a 
very weak negative relationship. We also find abundant evidence that procycli­
cality is a m ajor problem ; in particular, it was an im portan t cause o f tw in 
(banking and currency) crises in emerging market economies in the 1980s and 
1990s. We conclude that complementarities exist among the three approaches 
to regulation and supervision, and they should be emphasized in policymaking. 
Private monitoring— especially increased transparency and public disclosure of 
bank inform ation— should certainly be incorporated in to  bank regulations. 
Given the interconnections among banks and the fact that rational behavior for 
individual institutions can underm ine the stability o f  the overall system, how­
ever, we disagree w ith the idea tha t private m onitoring could substitute for 
governm ent-based regulation and supervision. We also argue that regulation 
and supervision should look for ways to dampen procyclical tendencies in bank 
behavior. Insofar as the new BIS accord encourages procyclical behavior, as 
some experts claim, this is a serious problem that will need to be dealt with as 
implementation proceeds.
As in the other chapters, we explore these topics in the context o f a compari­
son between emerging market economies in Latin America and East Asia. The 
first section looks at the literature just mentioned and outlines several hypothe­
ses to be evaluated. The second section presents data on the current state o f reg­
ulation and supervision in Latin America and East Asia, including changes that
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have come about as a result o f  recent crises. The th ird  section evaluates the 
hypotheses, using both quantitative data on regulation and supervision across 
countries and case study materials on specific national experiences in the two 
regions. The last section concludes.
Regulation and Supervision: Literature and Hypotheses
Regulation and supervision have become controversial topics in much the same 
way that bank ownership has aroused new debates. Indeed, some o f the same 
analysts are involved in both  sets o f discussions, and some o f the argum ents 
about private versus public control are brought to bear. For our part, we suggest 
that macroeconomic and international contexts play an im portant role in deter­
mining the impact of regulation and supervision, just as we argued in the previ­
ous chapter that ownership needs to be seen within a broader institutional con­
text. M acroeconomic stability— or the lack thereof—is a crucial element that 
affects both individual banking institutions and banking systems as a whole. At 
the same time, while decisions on regulation and supervision used to be consid­
ered the exclusive purview o f nation-states, it is now generally accepted tha t 
international organizations will standardize approaches across countries through 
proposing and trying to enforce rules and best practices.
Approaches to Regulation and Supervision
Three approaches to regulation and supervision are currently on the interna­
tional agenda. The first, which we call the traditional approach, dominates prac­
tice in individual countries.1 The other two represent intellectual critiques made 
by analysts with close ties to im portant international organizations, and they 
thus form part o f the policy discussion. The traditional approach is a micropru­
dential one that focuses on individual banks and their performance indicators, 
particularly those that relate to stability.2 Comparisons are with a peer group o f 
o ther institutions. T he m ain aim is to make sure tha t individual banks are 
sound, under the assum ption tha t if  all individual institutions m eet require­
ments, then the system as a whole will be safe. This approach relies on govern­
m ent regulation o f  bank behavior and government supervisors to enforce the 
regulations. It is regarded as appropriate by most governments and rating agen­
1. Although we call this approach traditional, it has only been used in developing countries for 
a relatively brief time. Until financial liberalization took place, regulation largely consisted of orders 
from the finance ministry or central bank with respect to interest rates, credit allocation, and so on. 
The concepts of prudential regulation and supervision are new to most Latin American and East 
Asian countries, although they are well established in the industrial world. A discussion of them 
can be found in any textbook on money and banking; see, for example, Mishkin (2001, chap. 11).
2. For the definition of a microprudential approach, in contrast to a macroprudential one, see 
Borio (2003, especially pp. 2—4).
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cies. The international financial institutions also accept substantial parts o f  this 
approach, although they go beyond it.
O ne set o f criticisms o f  traditional government-based regulation and supervi­
sion is also based on a microprudential model in that the unit o f analysis is the 
sum o f the individual banks in a given country, and no account is taken of the 
relationships among them or the impact o f macroeconomic shocks to the system 
as a whole. The methodology involves cross-country regressions using variables 
from a large num ber o f developed and developing countries. Such analysis has 
become feasible through a W orld Bank—sponsored database that provides 
detailed information on the characteristics o f  regulation and supervision in over 
150 countries, based on surveys o f  bank supervisors in 1999 and 2003. Barth, 
Caprio, and Levine— the creators o f  the database— use it to analyze the impact 
o f  different kinds o f regulation and supervision on outcomes including bank 
development (credit to the private sector as a share of GDP), stability (lack of a 
systemic crisis in recent years), efficiency (administrative costs as a share o f 
assets), and integrity (control o f corruption).3
The results o f  their analysis are controversial. Contrary to  the accepted wis­
dom  o f m ost governments and the main international financial institutions, 
they find that greater supervisory power and regulations restricting banks’ activi­
ties are negatively correlated w ith bank development and efficiency and posi­
tively related to financial fragility and corruption. In a symmetrical fashion, they 
find a positive relationship between bank development and private sector m oni­
toring, defined by an index that includes the use o f outside auditors, evaluations 
by rating agencies, accounting disclosure and director liability, and the avoid­
ance o f explicit insurance schemes. Results with respect to capital regulations are 
ambiguous, but the authors interpret them  as nonpositive. W hile they generally 
decline to make specific policy recommendations on the basis o f  their findings, 
the authors nonetheless criticize two o f the three pillars o f the new Basel Accord 
being forged by the BIS. These include the use o f  capital regulations and the 
reliance on official supervisory mechanisms as a means o f  enforcement. They 
praise the third pillar— namely, the use o f market discipline— but refer to it as 
the underdeveloped element o f  the agreement.
T he analysis becomes even more controversial when Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine place their findings in  a general political-econom ic context, arguing 
against governm ent interventions in a variety o f forms. These include bank 
ownership, which links their findings to those discussed in the previous chapter. 
They base their position on the premise that politicians will use bank supervisors
3. An early paper, based on the 1999 survey, is Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001a); a book 
based on both data sets is Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2005). For a sample of others working in this 
same line, see Shleifer and Vishny (1998) on the general topic of the government role in finance; 
Blum (1999) on capital requirements; Claessens and Klingebiel (2001) on the scope of bank activi­
ties; Demirgiiij-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) on deposit insurance.
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to promote pet projects, banks will be able to capture regulators, and political 
and legal institutions will not be able to contain these forces. The proper role for 
government, they argue, is to create institutions that require disclosure and hold 
bank officials responsible, rather than giving additional power to supervisors 
and increasing the restrictions on bank behavior.
A very different critique moves from a micro- to a m acroprudential model 
and focuses on the procyclicality o f the financial system.4 The problem includes, 
but goes beyond, the concern with asymmetric information. It has to do w ith at 
least two processes. First, increasing confidence am ong individual investors 
tends to generate a self-fulfilling rise in asset prices. As investors become more 
optimistic, they try to expand their asset holdings at a pace that is far more rapid 
than the expansion in supply. Booms in asset prices then tend to corroborate 
past expectations, leading to further optimism. Individual risk assessment thus 
changes with the state o f collective enthusiasm. Second, banks also behave in a 
procyclical way, even though the mechanisms involved are slightly different. 
Waves o f  optimism in the banking sector lead to an expansion o f  lending, which 
affects the level of aggregate demand and thus the income and cash flow o f con­
sumers and the productive sector. In times o f expansion, real and financial asset 
prices increase, as does the value o f collateral. T hrough these self-fulfilling 
processes, banks tend to increase their leverage and thus their vulnerability to 
changes in the variables that affect their risks: economic activity and level o f 
em ploym ent (credit risk), borrowing interest rates (liquidity risk), and asset 
prices (market risk). The contention is that individual actors cannot or will not 
take into account the impact o f their actions on the rest o f the system, creating a 
collective action problem that requires the government to step in to provide a 
public good in the form o f financial stability.5
Saying that government action is necessary for addressing procyclicality prob­
lems does not mean that regulation and supervision are functioning appropri­
ately at the present. Indeed, proponents o f this approach identify significant 
deficiencies in current versions o f  regulation and supervision. Perhaps the most 
serious involves m isinterpretation o f the tim ing o f risk. W hile risks are gener­
ated during a boom as a result o f the processes mentioned above, they are com­
monly viewed as increasing as an economy slows and reaching their peak during 
a recession. The fact tha t they materialize only when growth slows does not 
mean that greater risk is present, but bankers, supervisors, and rating agencies 
act as if risks were greater. This leads to increased provisions and a reduction in 
loan volume as risk aversion rises. W ith less access to credit, borrowers cannot
4. BIS representatives are especially prominent in putting forward these arguments. See, for 
example, BIS (2000); Crockett (2000, 2001); Borio, Furfme, and Lowe (2001); Turner (2002); 
Borio (2003). A call for modeling these processes is found in Goodhart (2004). On the Latin 
American region in particular, see Hausmann and Gavin (1996); Ocampo (2003).
5. On international financial stability as a public good, see Underhill (2001).
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keep up on their payments, and it becomes harder for economies to emerge 
from a recession.
Economists and regulators who adhere to this view o f the financial sector 
have suggested a num ber o f policy proposals. They argue that lengthening the 
time horizon over which risk is measured and managed is a necessary precondi­
tion for any improvement. O ne proposal is for greater discretion in the use of 
supervisory instruments. For example, greater provisions could be required in a 
boom period if  it was thought that risk was being assessed improperly. Likewise, 
an increase in capital requirements could be sought if  capital inflows were con­
sidered very risky. A related prescription is to use a rule to bring about the same 
kind o f  countercyclical effect w ithout having to rely on supervisory discretion.6 
A nother proposal uses m onetary policy to address imbalances in the financial 
system. This idea has been under discussion recently in the context o f  whether 
central banks should target asset price increases as well as inflation in goods and 
services. A less far-reaching proposal is to have monetary authorities give more 
prominence to the problems o f risk to try to shift views on the issue to include 
the need to avoid procyclicality.7
Regulation, Supervision, and Macroeconomics
N ot surprisingly, the two microprudential approaches do not see the macroeco­
nomic environment as particularly relevant to their concerns. It is rarely m en­
tioned in discussions involving what we call the traditional approach. Likewise, 
the economists who argue for a private-sector-based regulatory and supervisory 
system limit themselves to using inflation or growth as control variables in some 
o f their equations. The intim ate relationship between the financial sector and 
macroeconomics is axiomatic for the procyclicality approach, but the tendency 
is to emphasize the link in which finance is the independent variable.8 We want 
to underscore the fact that the impact of macroeconomics on finance— and on 
the regulatory and supervisory process— is equally important.
A major concern o f the BIS economists and others studying procyclicality, in 
addition to the possibility that it can generate financial crises, is the effect it can 
have on the real economy. The m acroprudential approach thus embodies the 
linkage from finance to macroeconomic variables insofar as its goal is to avoid 
large output losses. Indeed, the devastating nature o f crises in emerging market 
economies in the 1990s appears to be a major factor in the spurt o f literature on 
these topics, as we have already discussed in chapter 2. We presented data on the
6. Countercyclical supervision has been used by the Bank of Spain. For a discussion, see Fer­
nández de Lis, Martínez, and Saurina (2001); Ocampo (2003).
7. Economists following this approach have also criticized the new Basel Accord; in their case, 
however, it is because the accord may increase procyclicality, as discussed later.
8. See, for example, Borio, Furfine, and Lowe (2001). We do not mean to imply that macro- 
economic causes of crises have not been considered; we merely want to underline their importance 
and discuss some of the mechanisms.
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scale o f output loss over and above the fiscal costs o f crises. The negative impact 
on asset prices and interest rates is also im portant in considering the m echa­
nisms behind output losses.
The opposite relationship, from macroeconomics to finance, becomes rele­
vant for explaining the source o f  financial stress. For example, a sudden increase 
in interest rates can cause a rise in delinquencies if  loans have been made at 
floating rates; alternatively, the banks will be directly squeezed if  their cost of 
funds rises in the face o f fixed-rate assets. An abrupt fall in asset prices will 
threaten banks to the extent that they are holding large stocks o f securities or 
real estate. A devaluation can cause financial chaos if  currency mismatches are 
prevalent in bank portfolios. And a reversal o f capital inflows is likely to trigger 
a decline in growth rates, which will lead to an increase in nonperforming loans. 
The fact that these shocks are at the macroeconomic level means that they will 
affect all banks, although the impact will vary somewhat depending on the char­
acteristics o f individual institutions— in particular, their levels o f capital, liquid­
ity, and the soundness o f their assets. If the shocks are strong enough, they can 
undermine regulatory and supervisory systems as well as causing problems for 
banks. The recent Argentine experience, which we examine later, is an example 
o f the potential for damage. The macroeconomic context m ust thus be taken 
into account in order to understand the origins, development, and im pact o f  
financial instability.9
International Pressures on Banking Regulation
In part because o f the systemic factors discussed in the previous sections, bank­
ing regulation is no longer left exclusively to national authorities. W hile many 
o f the changes in regulation and supervision in emerging economies came in 
response to events in individual countries or in regions more broadly (for exam­
ple, the im pact o f  the Mexican crisis o f  1994—95 or the East Asian crisis o f  
1997-98 in their respective geographical areas), developments at the interna­
tional level have also played a role. The BIS and the Basel Committee on Bank­
ing Supervision have been m ost influential in pu tting  these issues onto the 
agenda and hom ogenizing standards for developed and developing countries 
alike. Following the Asian crisis, they were joined by the Financial Stability 
Forum (FSF), which brings together finance ministers, regulators, and central 
bank authorities to coordinate actions am ong the industrial countries w ith 
respect to financial issues. This process also affects developing countries, despite 
their lack of a voice to express their concerns.10
9. For discussion of regulation and supervision in the context of macroeconomics, see Haus- 
mann and Gavin (1996); Lindgren, García, and Saal (1996); IMF (1998a); World Bank (1999); 
Ocampo (2003); Studart (2003).
10. The BIS expanded its membership in the mid-1990s to fifty-five, including most of the 
emerging market economies. Membership in the Basel Committee and the FSF, however, is limited 
to the major industrial countries (plus Hong Kong and Singapore in the case of the FSF), so it is 
difficult for the developing countries to present their viewpoints on issues of concern to them.
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International standards themselves are currently in  a state o f  flux, and 
recently agreed changes pose new challenges to developing country institutions. 
The Basel Capital Adequacy Accord (Basel I), introduced in 1988, was a mile­
stone in banking regulation. The 8 percent m inim um  capital requirem ent for 
internationally active banks, which was adopted by over a hundred countries, 
clearly improved financial stability. Nonetheless, critics claimed that the 
approach was too rigid and simplistic and that it did not correspond to actual 
levels o f risk. Developing countries were especially troubled about the rules pro­
viding incentives for short-term over long-term lending.
Basel II was m eant to correct the problems identified by introducing more 
complex alternatives for determ ining risk, including the use o f  models devel­
oped by individual banks. Some experts studying the potential impact on devel­
oping countries fear that the new approach will have a negative impact on those 
economies through two channels. First, the new risk categories may overesti­
mate the risk o f lending to developing countries and thus lead to a significant 
decline in the volume o f loans or a large increase in their cost. Second, the new 
mechanisms for adjusting capital requirements may formalize procyclical ten­
dencies already inherent in regulation and supervision and thus increase the fre­
quency o f crises that have an especially negative im pact on the developing 
w orld.11 O ther problems from the developing country viewpoint include the 
anticipated difficulties in evaluating and m onitoring the new bank-based m od­
els and the fear that the criteria o f  industrial country banks and regulators will 
be imposed upon them .12
In addition to negotiating international agreements, the BIS— in collabora­
tion with the IM F and the W orld Bank— tries to influence more specific aspects 
o f  the financial sector in developing (and other) economies. T he most im por­
tan t instrum ent w ith respect to  banking is the Core Principles for Effective 
Banking Supervision. These specify the recom m ended powers o f  supervisors, 
their duties, and their access to inform ation .13 Since the BIS itself lacks the 
capacity to evaluate the implementation of the standards, it must rely on others. 
Key partners are the IM F and the W orld Bank, which in 1999 began to conduct 
joint Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAPs) among their member coun­
tries. T he FSAPs are geared toward assessing risks and vulnerabilities in the 
financial sector, with a focus on possible macroeconomic shocks. A major tech­
nique is stress testing, whereby shocks are simulated to determine their impact 
on individual banks and national financial systems as a whole.
11. For critiques along these lines and policy proposals, see Reisen (2000); Griffith-Jones
(2003); Griffith-Jones and Persaud (2005). Powell (2005) makes a different, but related, critique 
that focuses on the problems of the private sector and SMEs in particular. Gottschalk and Sodri
(2005) also express concern about the implications for SME lending, based on a study of Brazil.
12. Personal interviews with banking and supervisory authorities in several Latin American 
countries.
13. The Core Principles can be found on the BIS website (www.bis.org).
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W hile the assessments are allegedly voluntary, governments face a good deal 
o f  pressure to participate. Some 120 had done so by m id-2005, but regional 
participation varied substantially: three-quarters o f N orth, Central, and South 
American countries had taken part (excluding the U nited States), bu t only 
about one-third o f East Asian countries had enlisted.14 This difference is 
reflected in regulatory and supervisory practices in the two regions. Despite 
increased efforts to move away from a one-size-fits-all approach, the FSAPs and 
the Basel Accords are mechanisms through which individual countries have lost 
autonomy in setting policy on regulation and supervision.15
Hypotheses on Regulation and Supervision
Several hypotheses suggest themselves as a result o f this brief review o f the litera­
ture on regulation and supervision. A first relates to the debate about the relative 
merits o f public versus private supervision. Using the new empirical evidence 
that is now available, we test the hypothesis that private m onitoring has a more 
positive impact on bank performance in Latin America and East Asia than does 
traditional regulation and supervision. A second hypothesis focuses on the other 
debate, which concerns macro- as opposed to microprudential models and their 
relationship to systemic stability. We look for evidence o f  the procyclicality that 
is central to the macroprudential approach and how it might relate to trends in 
regulation and supervision in the two regions. In addition, we ask whether any 
data show that macroeconomic shocks have played an im portant role in under­
mining regulatory and supervisory systems in Latin America or East Asia. Third, 
the increased international influence on techniques o f regulation and supervi­
sion implies that they should become more similar over tim e. We assess the 
available evidence to see whether this hypothesis is supported.
Regulation and Supervision: The State of the Art
Drawing on a database sponsored by the World Bank, we sketch out the current 
situation with respect to regulation and supervision o f  the banking sector in 
many Latin American and East Asian countries in 1999 and 2003.16 It enables 
us to compare across the two regions in terms o f  regulation and two types o f 
supervision: the traditional government-based approach and private sector m on­
itoring. We concentrate on the data for 1999, but provide some indications o f 
im portant changes as o f 2003. The changes may be useful in tracing the impact 
o f crises on regulation and supervision.
14. IMF and World Bank (2005, pp. 8—11).
15. The most recent review of the program is described in IMF (2005a) and IMF and World 
Bank (2005). Most of the country evaluations are posted on the IMF website (www.imf.org), 
although governments have to agree to make them public.
16. See Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001b) for a description of the database, which we men­
tioned earlier in the chapter.
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Table 4-1. Latin America and East Asia: Bank Regulation, 1999
Actual Overall
Minimum risk- Capital Bank bank Overall
capital- adjusted stringency entry activities regulation
asset capital index index index index
Region and country ratio (%) ratio (%) (0 -6 / (0 -3 / (0 -4 / (O Rlÿ
Latin America
Argentina 11.5 16.4 6.0 2.0 1.8 37.7
Brazil 11.0 15.8 3.0 3.0 2.5 35.3
Chile 8.0 12.3 3.0 2.0 2.8 28.1
Mexico 8.0 13.0 5.0 2.0 3.0 31.0
Peru 9.1 12.7 5.0 1.0 2.0 29.8
Venezuela 10.0 14.0 2.0 1.0 2.5 29.5
Average 9.6 14.0 4.0 1.8 2.4 31.9
East Asia
Indonesia 8.0 12.5 2.0 3.0 3.5 29.0
Korea 8.0 9.3 5.0 1.0 2.3 25.5
Malaysia 8.0 12.8 1.0 2.0 2.5 26.3
Philippines 10.0 18.0 2.0 1.0 1.8 32.7
Singapore 12.0 20.0 5.0 2.0 2.0 41.0
Taiwan 8.0 10.4 3.0 1.0 3.0 25.4
Thailand 8.5 12.2 3.0 2.0 2.3 27.9
Average 8.9 13.6 3.0 1.7 2.5 29.7
Source: World Bank website (econ.worldbank.org/externaI/default/main?tlieSitePK=478060& 
contentMDK=20345037&menuPK= 546154&pagePK=64168182&piPK=64168060).
a. Possible range of index in parentheses.
b. Sum of individual components.
Table 4-1 begins w ith a set o f  indicators on banking regulation in six Latin 
American and seven East Asian countries. The best known indicator is the m ini­
m um  capital-asset ratio, currently set at 8 percent by the BIS through the Basel I 
agreement. Most governments seem to regard the 8 percent m inim um  as inade­
quate. Less than half o f  the thirteen set their own m inim um s at the official 8 
percent level, while the remainder have higher ratios; Argentina, Brazil, and Sin­
gapore top the list with required ratios between 11 and 12 percent. The actual 
risk-adjusted ratios are even higher. W ith two exceptions, all countries maintain 
ratios above 12 percent, and several are more than double the 8 percent m ini­
m um . These ratios are in  line w ith  recom m endations from  Latin American 
regional organizations that developing countries should set ratios above the 
international norm , given the greater volatility o f  their economies in compari­
son with industrial countries and the extremely high cost o f banking crises.17
Several other indexes are also presented in table 4-1. T he capital stringency 
index includes adherence to the BIS guidelines, as well as various measures o f 
the degree to which leverage is lim ited.18 The bank entry index measures the dif-
17. See, for example, Hausmann and Gavin (1996); ECLAC (2002).
18. For precise definitions, see Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001b).
f i c u l t y  i n  s e t t i n g  u p  n e w  b a n k s  i n  a  g iv e n  c o u n t r y ;  s p e c i f ic a l ly ,  i t  r e f l e c ts  t h e  
ty p e s  o f  a s se ts  t h a t  c o u n t  t o w a r d  t h e  c a p i ta l - a s s e t  r a t io .  T h e  b a n k  a c t iv i t ie s  i n d e x  
c o n c e r n s  w h e t h e r  b a n k s  c a n  e n g a g e  i n  v a r io u s  n o n b a n k i n g  a c t iv i t i e s  ( s u c h  as 
s e c u r i t ie s ,  in s u r a n c e ,  a n d  re a l  e s ta te ) .
T h e  d a t a  p r e s e n t e d  i n  t a b l e  4 - 1  c le a r ly  s h o w  t h a t  r e g u l a t i o n  h a s  m a n y  
d im e n s io n s ,  w i t h  c o u n t r i e s  b e in g  s t r i c te r  o n  s o m e  t h a n  o n  o th e r s .  N o n e th e le s s ,  
t e n d e n c ie s  t o w a r d  c r o s s - c o u n t r y  p a t t e r n s  d o  e m e r g e .  T o  m e a s u r e  th e s e  t e n d e n ­
c ie s ,  w e  p r e s e n t  a  s u m m a r y  in d e x  ( t h e  o v e r a l l  r e g u l a t i o n  in d e x ) ,  w h i c h  is  t h e  
s u m  o f  t h e  f iv e  c o m p o n e n t s .  T h e  la s t  c o l u m n  i n  t h e  ta b le  p r e s e n t s  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  
th e s e  c a lc u la t io n s .  T h e  in d e x e s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  L a t in  A m e r i c a  h a s  a  s l ig h t ly  m o r e  
s t r i n g e n t  r e g u l a t o r y  s y s t e m  t h a n  E a s t  A s ia .  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  s c o re s  a r e  h i g h e r  
t h a n  th o s e  o f  E a s t  A s ia  o n  e v e ry  i t e m  e x c e p t  b a n k i n g  a c t iv i t ie s .  A m o n g  in d i v i d ­
u a l  c o u n t r i e s ,  h o w e v e r ,  S i n g a p o r e  h a s  t h e  s t r i c t e s t  r e g u l a t i o n ,  f o l lo w e d  b y  
A r g e n t i n a  a n d  B r a z i l .  A t  t h e  lo w  e n d  is C h i l e ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h r e e  E a s t  A s ia n  
c o u n t r i e s :  K o re a , M a la y s ia ,  a n d  T a iw a n . W i t h  t h e  e x c e p t io n  o f  S in g a p o r e ,  t h e n ,  
t h e  s t r o n g e s t  e c o n o m ie s  h a v e  lo w e r  lev e ls  o f  r e g u la t io n ,  w h i le  m o r e  p r o b l e m a t ic  
e c o n o m ie s  h a v e  h i g h e r  lev e ls .
T a b le  4 - 2  u se s  t h e  s a m e  d a t a  s o u r c e  t o  e x a m in e  t r e n d s  i n  g o v e r n m e n t - b a s e d  
b a n k  s u p e rv is io n .  W h i l e  m o r e  a t t e n t i o n  is ty p ic a l ly  d e v o te d  t o  t h e  t o p i c  o f  r e g u ­
l a t i o n ,  t h e  b e s t  r e g u l a t i o n s  h a v e  l i t t l e  r e le v a n c e  i f  t h e y  a r e  n o t  e n f o r c e d .  T h e  
m a i n  i n d e x  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  s u p e r v i s io n  is t h e  s u p e r v i s o r y  p o w e r  in d e x .  I t  is  t h e  
s u m m a t i o n  o f  s ix te e n  m e a s u re s  o f  s u p e r v i s o r y  p o w e r  to  d e a l  w i t h  a b n o r m a l  s i t ­
u a t io n s  e n c o u n t e r e d — t h e  g r e a te r  t h e  p o w e r ,  t h e  h ig h e r  t h e  in d e x .  B ra z i l  h a s  t h e  
h ig h e s t  r a n k in g  o n  t h e  s u p e r v i s o r y  p o w e r  in d e x ,  f o l lo w e d  b y  I n d o n e s i a  a n d  S in ­
g a p o r e .  T h e  lo w e s t  s c o r e s  a r e  i n  K o r e a ,  M e x ic o ,  a n d  T a iw a n .  O t h e r  i n d e x e s  
i n c l u d e  a  p r o m p t  c o r r e c t io n  in d e x  t h a t  m e a s u r e s  w h e t h e r  s u p e r v i s o r s  h a v e  t o  
in t e r v e n e  w h e n  a  b a n k ’s i n d i c a to r s  o f  p r o b le m s  r e a c h  a  c e r t a in  le v e l. T h e  p o w e r  
t o  d e c la r e  b a n k s  i n s o l v e n t  a n d  t h e  p o w e r  t o  r e s t r u c t u r e  b a n k s  a r e  s u b c o m p o ­
n e n t s  o f  t h e  s u p e r v i s o r y  p o w e r  in d e x .  F in a l ly ,  t h e  f o r b e a r a n c e  in d e x  i n d i c a t e s  
t h e  e x t e n t  t o  w h i c h  s u p e r v i s o r s  h a v e  p o w e r  t o  d e c id e  o n  t h e i r  o w n  w h e t h e r  to  
e n f o r c e  ru le s ;  h ig h e r  d e c i s io n  le e w a y  is s a id  to  g iv e  s u p e rv is o r s  g r e a te r  p o w e r .
A s  w i t h  r e g u la t i o n  w e  c a lc u la te  a n  o v e ra ll  s u p e r v i s o r y  in d e x  a s  t h e  s u m  o f  t h e  
c o m p o n e n t  p a r t s  (se e  t h e  la s t  c o l u m n  o f  t a b l e  4 - 2 ) .  L a t in  A m e r i c a  a g a in  h a s  a  
s l i g h t l y  h i g h e r  o v e r a l l  s c o re  t h a n  E a s t  A s ia . B ra z i l  h a s  t h e  h i g h e s t  s c o r e  o f  t h e  
t h i r t e e n  c o u n t r i e s ,  f o l lo w e d  b y  I n d o n e s i a .  O t h e r s  w i t h  s t r i c t  s u p e r v i s o r y  c a p a c ­
i t y  a re  P e r u ,  t h e  P h i l i p p in e s ,  a n d  V e n e z u e la ,  w h i le  M a la y s ia ,  T a iw a n ,  a n d  T h a i ­
l a n d  a re  a t  t h e  lo w e s t  e n d .  S u b s t a n t i a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  e x is t  b e tw e e n  t h e  r a n k in g s  o n  
r e g u l a t i o n  a n d  s u p e r v i s io n .  O n l y  B ra z il  is  f o u n d  i n  t h e  t o p  g r o u p  o f  c o u n t r i e s  
o n  b o t h  i n d e x e s .  A g a i n ,  a  t e n d e n c y  e x is ts  f o r  t h e  s t r o n g e s t  e c o n o m i e s  t o  b e  
m o r e  l e n i e n t ,  b u t  A r g e n t i n a  a n d  M e x ic o  a re  c e r t a in ly  e x c e p t io n s  t o  th i s  r u le .
A  d i f f e r e n t  a p p r o a c h  t o  s u p e r v i s i o n  is e m b o d i e d  i n  t h e  p r iv a t e  m o n i t o r i n g  
in d e x ,  w h ic h  is s h o w n  i n  t a b l e  4 - 3 .  T h e  id e a  b e h i n d  p r iv a te  m o n i t o r i n g  is  t h a t
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T a b le  4 - 2 .  L a tin  A m e r ic a  a n d  E a s t  A s ia :  B a n k  S u p e rv is io n , 1 9 9 9
Prompt Declaring
Supervisory corrective Restructuring insolvent Forbearance Overall
power action power power discretion supervision
index index index index index index
Région and. country (0-16/ (0-6? (0-3/ (0-2/ (0-4/ (OSI)h
Latin America
Argentina 12.0 0.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 20.0
Brazil 15.0 6.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 27.0
Chile 11.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 0.0 19.0
Mexico 10.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 19.0
Peru 14.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 24.0
Venezuela 14.0 5.0 3.0 2.0 0.0 24.0
Average 12.7 3.5 3.0 2.0 1.0 22.2
EastAsia
Indonesia 14.0 6.0 2.0 2.0 1.0 25.0
Korea 10.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 20.0
Malaysia 11.0 2.0 3.0 2.0 0.0 18.0
Philippines 12.0 6.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 24.0
Singapore 14.0 0.0 3.0 1.0 2.0 20.0
Taiwan 9.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 1.0 17.0
Thailand 11.0 0.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 18.0
Average 11.6 3.0 2.9 1.7 1.1 20.3
Source: W orld Bank website (econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?theSitePK=478060& 
contentMDK=20345037&menuPK= 546l54&pagePK=64l68182&piPK=64168060).
a. Possible range o f index in parentheses.
b. Sum of individual components.
r a t h e r  t h a n  g iv in g  p o w e r  to  g o v e r n m e n t  s u p e rv is o r s  t o  e n f o rc e  r e g u la t io n s ,  g o v ­
e r n m e n t s  s h o u l d  u s e  t h e i r  p o w e r  t o  c o m p e l  b a n k s  a n d  o t h e r  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u ­
t i o n s  t o  r e v e a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  t h e  p u b l i c  a b o u t  t h e i r  b a l a n c e  s h e e t s  a n d  t h e i r  
p o l ic ie s .  C o r p o r a t i o n s  a n d  e v e n  in d iv id u a l  c i t iz e n s  w il l  t h e n  s u p p o s e d ly  b e  a b le  
t o  m o n i t o r  b a n k  b e h a v i o r  a n d  c h o o s e  t o  d e a l  w i t h  t h e  o n e s  t h a t  f o l lo w  t h e  
s o u n d e s t  p o l ic ie s .  A  v a r i e ty  o f  m e t h o d s  a r e  t h o u g h t  t o  e n h a n c e  p u b l i c  k n o w l ­
e d g e .  C o m p o n e n t s  i n c l u d e  w h e t h e r  a n  e x t e r n a l  a u d i t  is  r e q u i r e d ,  t h e  s h a r e  o f  
t h e  t e n  la r g e s t  b a n k s  t h a t  a re  r a t e d  b y  i n t e r n a t io n a l  r a t i n g  a g e n c ie s ,  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  
a c c o u n t i n g  d i s c lo s u r e ,  d i r e c t o r  l i a b i l i ty ,  a n d  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  a n  e x p l i c i t  d e p o s i t  
i n s u r a n c e  s c h e m e .
O u r  o v e ra l l  p r iv a te  m o n i t o r i n g  in d e x  d o e s  n o t  d i s p la y  m u c h  v a r ia n c e .  S c o re s , 
w h i c h  c o u l d  r a n g e  f r o m  z e r o  t o  e ig h t ,  a c tu a l ly  v a r y  b e t w e e n  4 . 4  a n d  7 .0 .  T h e  
m a i n  r e a s o n  is t h a t  o n  m a n y  o f  t h e  v a r ia b le s ,  e i t h e r  a ll  ( o r  n e a r ly  a ll)  c o u n t r i e s  
c o m p l y  o r  n o n e  o f  t h e m  d o .  I n  t h e  f o r m e r  c a t e g o r y  a r e  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  f o r  a  
c e r t i f i e d  a u d i t ,  d i r e c t o r  l ia b i l i ty ,  a n d  t h e  u se  o f  s u b o r d i n a t e d  d e b t .  L ik e w is e , a ll  
r e j e c t  t h e  a d v ic e  t o  e s c h e w  d e p o s i t  i n s u r a n c e ,  i g n o r i n g  t h e  o p i n i o n  o f  s o m e  
e x p e r t s  w h o  se e  i t  a s  l e a d i n g  t o  m o r a l  h a z a r d  a n d  d i v e r t i n g  a t t e n t i o n  f r o m  t h e
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T a b le  4 - 3 .  L a tin  A m e r ic a  a n d  E a s t  A i a :  P r iv a te  M o n ito r in g , 1 9 9 9
Credit Private
Certified agency Director Deposit Subordinated monitoring
Region and audit rating liability Disclosure insurance debt index
country (0-1/ (0-1/ (0-1/ (0-3/ (0-1/ (0-1/ (PMlf
Latin America
Argentina 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 0.0 1.0 6.0
Brazil 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 0.0 1.0 6.0
Chile 1.0 0.5 1.0 2.0 0.0 1.0 5.5
Mexico 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 5.0
Peru 1.0 0.5 1.0 2.0 0.0 1.0 5.5
Venezuela 1.0 0.4 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 4.4
Average 1.0 0.7 1.0 1.7 0.0 1.0 5.4
East Asia
Indonesia 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 0.0 1.0 6.0
Korea 1.0 1.0 1.0 3.0 0.0 1.0 7.0
Malaysia 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 n.a. 1.0 6.0
Philippines 1.0 0.6 1.0 3.0 n.a. 0.0 5.6
Singapore 1.0 1.0 1.0 3.0 n.a. 1.0 7.0
Taiwan 0.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 n.a. 1.0 5.0
Thailand 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 4.9
Average 0.9 0.9 1.0 2.3 0.0 0.9 5.9
Source: W orld Bank website (econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?theSitePK=478060& 
contentMDK=20345037 8cmenuPK=546l54&pagePK=*64168182&piPK=64l68060).
a. Possible range o f index in parentheses.
b. Sum of individual components.
q u a l i t y  o f  b a n k s .  O n  t h e  o v e ra l l  in d e x ,  K o r e a  a n d  S in g a p o r e  r e a c h  s e v e n  p o i n t s  
o u t  o f  a  p o s s ib le  e i g h t  o n  p r i v a t e  m o n i t o r i n g ;  a  n u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s  i n  b o t h  
r e g io n s  h a v e  s c o re s  o f  s ix  ( A r g e n t in a ,  B ra z il , I n d o n e s i a ,  a n d  M a la y s ia ) .  T h e  lo w ­
e s t  s c o r e s  a r e  i n  M e x ic o ,  T a iw a n ,  T h a i l a n d ,  a n d  V e n e z u e la .  T h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
b e tw e e n  p r iv a t e  m o n i t o r i n g  a n d  g o v e r n m e n t - b a s e d  r e g u l a t i o n  a n d  s u p e r v i s io n  
is c le a r ly  c o m p le x .  S o m e  c o u n t r i e s  ( n a m e ly ,  B r a z i l  a n d  I n d o n e s i a )  a r e  h i g h  o n  
b o t h ,  b u t  n e w  c o u n t r i e s  a l s o  a p p e a r  w i t h  h i g h  s c o r e s  o n  p r iv a t e  m o n i t o r i n g  
( i n c l u d in g  K o r e a  a n d  M a la y s ia ) .  T h e  c o r r e la t i o n  c o e f f ic ie n t  b e tw e e n  t h e  p r iv a te  
m o n i t o r i n g  in d e x  a n d  t h e  o v e ra l l  s u p e r v i s o r y  i n d e x  is  0 .3 7 .
T h e  r e g io n a l  a v e ra g e s  a r e  a ls o  o f  i n t e r e s t .  F o r  t h e  f i r s t  t i m e ,  E a s t  A s ia  h a s  a  
h i g h e r  s c o re  t h a n  L a t i n  A m e r i c a .  L o o k in g  b a c k  o v e r  t h e  t h r e e  t a b l e s ,  L a t in  
A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  h a v e  m o r e  p e r v a s iv e  r e g u l a t i o n  a n d  s t r o n g e r  g o v e r n m e n t -  
b a s e d  s u p e r v i s io n ,  o n  a v e ra g e , w h i le  E a s t  A s ia n  c o u n t r i e s  s c o re  h ig h e r  o n  p r iv a te  
m o n i t o r i n g .  N o n e  o f  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  a re  v e r y  la rg e ,  h o w e v e r . W e  d is c u s s  r e a s o n s  
f o r  th e s e  d i f fe r e n c e s  i n  t h e  f o l lo w in g  s e c t io n .
T h e  B a r th ,  C a p r i o ,  a n d  L e v in e  s u rv e y s  e n a b le  u s  t o  c o m p a r e  t h e  1 9 9 9  d a t a  
w i t h  d a t a  f o r  2 0 0 3 .  W h i l e  o n ly  f o u r  y e a r s  s e p a r a te  t h e  tw o  s u rv e y s , s o m e  in t e r -
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T a b le  4 - 4 .  L a tin  A m e r ic a  a n d  E a s t  A s ia :  C o u n try  C h a n g es in  R e g u la tio n  a n d  
S u p e rv is io n , 1 9 9 9 —2 0 0 3 ''
Region and country
Changes in overall Changes in overall Changes in private 
régulation index (ORI) supervision index (OSI) monitoring index (PMI)
Latin America 
Argentina « «
Brazil » = =
Chile > > >
Mexico » > >
Peru = < =
Venezuela » < >
Average > < =
East Asia 
Korea = » =
Malaysia = >
Philippines << > »
Singapore < =
Taiwan > » >>
Thailand > < >
Average = > >
Source: W orld Bank website (econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?theSitePK=478060&con- 
tentMDK=20345037 &menuPK=546l54&:pagePK=64l68182&piPK=64l68060).
a. =: change between 0.3 and —0.3; >: change between 0.3 and 2.0; » :  change beyond 2.0; <: change 
between -0 .3  and -2 .0 ; <<: change beyond -2 .0 .
e s t in g  c h a n g e s  o c c u r r e d ,  m a in ly  a t  t h e  in d iv id u a l  c o u n t r y  le v e l. T a b le  4 - 4  s h o w s  
t h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  o n e s .  T h e  r e g i o n a l  a v e r a g e s  f o r  t h e  t h r e e  in d e x e s  d o  n o t  
s h o w  a n y  c le a r - c u t  t r e n d s .  I n  L a t in  A m e r ic a ,  r e g u la t i o n  w a s  s t e p p e d  u p  s l ig h tly , 
w h i le  s u p e r v i s io n  s t r i n g e n c y  fe ll  b y  a  s im i la r  a m o u n t .  T h e  o p p o s i t e  p a t t e r n  w a s  
f o u n d  i n  E a s t  A s ia :  r e g u l a t o r y  p r o v i s io n s  r e m a i n e d  c o n s t a n t ,  b u t  g o v e r n m e n t -  
b a s e d  s u p e r v i s io n  w a s  s t r e n g t h e n e d .  W i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  p r iv a t e  s e c to r  m o n i t o r i n g ,  
E a s t  A s ia  in c r e a s e d  i t s  e f fo r ts ,  w h i le  L a t in  A m e r ic a  r e m a in e d  c o n s t a n t .  T h e  m o s t  
i m p o r t a n t  c h a n g e s  b e tw e e n  1 9 9 9  a n d  2 0 0 3  w e r e  f o u n d  a t  t h e  i n d iv id u a l  c o u n ­
t r y  le v e l ,  e s p e c ia l ly  t h o s e  i n v o lv in g  r e s p o n s e  t o  c r is e s , as w e  d is c u s s  i n  t h e  n e x t  
s e c t io n .
Regulation, Supervision, and Financial Performance
T h e  s u r v e y  d a t a  d e s c r i b e d  a b o v e  p r o v i d e  t h e  b a s is  f o r  e v a l u a t i n g  t w o  o f  o u r  
t h r e e  h y p o th e s e s .  O n e  in v o lv e s  t h e  r e la t iv e  b e n e f i t s  t o  b e  o b t a i n e d  f r o m  o f f ic ia l  
s u p e r v i s io n  a s  o p p o s e d  t o  p r iv a te  m o n i t o r i n g .  W e  c a n  a ls o  u s e  t h e  d a t a  t o  in v e s ­
t i g a te  t h e  im p a c t ,  i f  a n y , o f  i n t e r n a t io n a l  p r e s s u re s  o n  d e v e lo p in g  c o u n t r y  g o v ­
e r n m e n t s  t o  f o l lo w  b e s t  p r a c t i c e s  i n  r e g u l a t i o n  a n d  s u p e r v i s io n .  B e s t  p r a c t i c e s  
m a y  w e l l  i n c l u d e  a s p e c t s  o f  b o t h  t y p e s  o f  s u p e r v i s i o n .  W i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e
h y p o th e s is  o n  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h ip  b e tw e e n  m a c r o e c o n o m ic s ,  p ro c y c l ic a l i ty ,  a n d  r e g ­
u l a t i o n  a n d  s u p e r v i s io n ,  w e  h a v e  t o  t u r n  t o  a  d i f f e r e n t  k i n d  o f  d a t a  a n d  lo o k  a t  
in d iv id u a l  c o u n t r y  e x p e r ie n c e s  o v e r  t im e .
A  C h a l le n g e  to  T r a d i t i o n a l  V ie w s
O u r  f i r s t  h y p o th e s is  te s ts ,  f o r  a  p a r t i c u l a r  s u b s e t  o f  c o u n t r i e s ,  t h e  c la im s  r e g a r d ­
i n g  t h e  s u p e r i o r i t y  o f  p r i v a t e  m o n i t o r i n g  o v e r  o f f i c i a l  s u p e r v i s i o n  o f  b a n k s .  
B a r th ,  C a p r i o ,  a n d  L e v in e  f i n d  p o s i t i v e  r e s u l t s  w h e n  u s i n g  a  l a r g e  s a m p le  t h a t  
c o m b i n e s  d e v e l o p e d  a n d  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  E x a m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  s c a t t e r  
p l o t s ,  h o w e v e r ,  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e i r  r e s u l t s  m a y  b e  d r i v e n  b y  d i f f e r e n t  b e h a v i o r  
b e tw e e n  th e s e  tw o  g r o u p s  o f  c o u n t r i e s ,  s in c e  t h e  f o r m e r  t e n d  t o  c lu s te r  i n  o n e  
c o r n e r  o f  t h e  g r a p h s . 19 W e  t r y  t o  r e p l i c a t e  t h e i r  r e s u l t s  u s i n g  a  m o r e  h o m o g e ­
n e o u s  s u b s a m p le  o f  m i d d l e - i n c o m e  c o u n t r i e s  f r o m  L a t in  A m e r i c a  a n d  E a s t  A s ia . 
O u r  m e t h o d o l o g y  is m u c h  s im p le r ,  c e n t e r in g  o n  b iv a r ia te  a n a ly s e s  t h r o u g h  s c a t ­
t e r  p l o t s  a n d  t r e n d  l in e s .  W e  c o n c e n t r a t e  o n  t h e  d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  t h a t  t h e y  
c a ll  b a n k  d e v e lo p m e n t ,  p r o x ie d  b y  b a n k  c r e d i t  t o  t h e  p r iv a te  s e c to r  as a  s h a re  o f  
G D P . W e  a ls o  f o l lo w  t h e i r  le a d  i n  c o m b i n i n g  t h e  1 9 9 9  s u r v e y  w i t h  c r e d i t  d a t a  
f o r  2 0 0 3  t o  p r o v i d e  t h e  l o n g e s t  p o s s ib l e  p e r i o d  b e t w e e n  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  
r e g u l a t o r y  a n d  s u p e r v i s o r y  p r o c e s s e s  a n d  t h e  i m p a c t  o n  c r e d i t .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  
h o w e v e r , w e  p r e s e n t  i n f o r m a t i o n  f r o m  t h e  2 0 0 3  s u r v e y  a n d  c o n t r a s t  t h e  r e s u l ts  
o b t a i n e d  w i t h  t h o s e  f r o m  t h e  1 9 9 9  d a ta .
F ig u r e  4 -1  p l o t s  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h ip  b e tw e e n  c r e d i t  r a t io s  a n d  t h e  o v e ra l l  r e g u la ­
t i o n  in d e x  f o r  t h e  tw o  r e g io n s .  T h e  c o r r e la t i o n  is n e g a t iv e — m o r e  r e g u l a t i o n  is 
a s s o c ia te d  w i t h  lo w e r  c r e d i t  r a t io s — b u t  i t  is  e x c e e d in g ly  w e a k  (R 1 = 0 .0 5 ) .  S in ­
g a p o r e  is  a n  o u t l i e r  i n  t h e  g r a p h ;  r e m o v in g  i t  s t r e n g th e n s  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h ip  g r e a t ly  
(R 2 =  0 .5 0 ) .  W i t h  o r  w i t h o u t  S in g a p o r e ,  h o w e v e r , t h e  tw o  v a r ia b le s  c le a r ly  h a v e  
a  n e g a t iv e  l i n k  t h a t  is  r e p e a t e d  i n  se v e ra l o t h e r  f o r m s  i n  t h e  f o l lo w in g  p a g e s .
T o  e x p lo r e  t h e  n e g a t iv e  l i n k ,  im a g in e  f o u r  q u a d r a n t s  i n  f ig u r e  4 - 1  b a s e d  o n  
t h e  a v e ra g e  v a lu e s  o f  t h e  tw o  v a r ia b le s .20 T h e  lo w e r  r i g h t - h a n d  q u a d r a n t  c o n s is t s  
o f  t h e  s t r o n g e s t  E a s t  A s ia n  e c o n o m ie s ;  i n  o t h e r  g r a p h s ,  S in g a p o r e  j o i n s  t h e m .  
T h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  h a v e  t h e  h ig h e s t  c r e d i t - t o - G D P  r a t io s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  r e la t iv e ly  lo w  
le v e ls  o f  r e g u la t i o n .  C h i l e  h o v e r s  i n  t h e  m i d d l e — t h e  c o u n t r y  w i t h  t h e  h ig h e s t  
c r e d i t  r a t i o  i n  L a t in  A m e r i c a ,  b u t  f a r  b e lo w  t h e  m a i n  A s ia n  c o u n t r i e s — a n d  is 
j u s t  in s id e  t h a t  s a m e  q u a d r a n t .  I n  t h e  u p p e r  l e f t - h a n d  q u a d r a n t  a r e  h a l f  o f  t h e  
L a t in  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s ,  w i t h  t h e  r e m a i n d e r  j u s t  b e lo w  t h e  d iv id in g  l in e .  T h i s  
g r o u p  h a s  l o w  c r e d i t  r a t i o s ,  b u t  h i g h  s c o re s  o n  r e g u l a t i o n .  T h i s  g r o u p  a ls o  
in c lu d e s  t h e  P h i l i p p in e s  ( f r e q u e n t ly  r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  a  q u a s i—L a t in  A m e r i c a n  c o u n -
19. As described in chapter 3, evidence on several variables indicates very different relationships 
for banks from industrial and developing countries.
20. The average ratio for credit to the private sector to GDP is 60 percent; the average for the 
ORI is 30.7.
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F ig u re  4 - 1 .  L a tin  A m e r ic a  a n d  E a s t  A s ia :  C r e d i t  to  th e  P r iv a te  S e c to r  versus 
R egulation*
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Overall regulation index
Credit to private sector
Sources: Table 4-1 for overall regulation index; IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 
(2004, line 22d) for credit to private sector.
a. Overall regulation index (for 1999) is defined in table 4-1. Credit to the private sector (for 
2003) is share of GDP.
t r y )  a n d  I n d o n e s i a  ( t h e  w e a k e s t  o f  t h e  E a s t  A s ia n  g r o u p  a n d  s t i l l  p r o f o u n d l y  
a f f e c te d  b y  th e  1 9 9 7 —9 8  c r is is ) .
R e g io n a l  d if f e r e n c e s  a re  t h u s  d r i v in g  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h ip  t o  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  e x te n t .  
I n  t e r m s  o f  r e g u la t i o n ,  t h e  E a s t  A s ia n  c o u n t r i e s  t e n d  t o  p la c e  g r e a t e r  e m p h a s i s  
o n  w h a t  is  f r e q u e n t l y  c a l le d  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  g u i d a n c e  t h a n  o n  le g a l  o b l ig a t io n s ,  
w h i c h  m a k e s  t h e m  a p p e a r  t o  h a v e  l i g h t e r  r e g u l a t i o n  t h a n  L a t in  A m e r ic a .  T h i s  
d i f f e r e n c e  is  b e g i n n i n g  t o  d i s a p p e a r  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p r e s s u r e s ,  b u t  
s o m e  a s p e c ts  l in g e r .  T h e  i m p o r t a n t  e x c e p t io n  is  S in g a p o r e ,  w h o s e  e x c e p t io n a l -  
i s m  a m o n g  i ts  E a s t  A s ia n  n e i g h b o r s  c a n  b e  e x p la in e d  i n  a t  le a s t  tw o  w a y s . O n e  
is t h e  c o u n t r y ’s a u t h o r i t a r i a n  t r a d i t i o n ,  e v i d e n t  a t  l e a s t  s i n c e  i n d e p e n d e n c e  i n  
1 9 6 5 .  S t r o n g  r e g u la t io n s  e x is t  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  a l l  a s p e c ts  o f  l i fe  i n  th i s  c i t y  s ta te ;  
u n t i l  r e c e n tly , f o r  e x a m p le ,  i t  w a s  i l le g a l  t o  c h e w  g u m  i n  t h e  s t r e e t .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  
h o w e v e r ,  S in g a p o r e  is  a n  i m p o r t a n t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  c e n t e r ,  a n d  i t s  s u r ­
v iv a l  d e p e n d s  o n  i t s  b e i n g  p e r c e iv e d  as a  sa fe  p la c e  t o  d o  b u s in e s s .
F ig u re  4 - 2 ,  w h i c h  i l lu s t r a te s  t h e  l i n k  b e tw e e n  c r e d i t  a n d  s u p e r v i s io n ,  d is p la y s  
a  p a t t e r n  v e r y  s im i l a r  t o  t h a t  o f  c r e d i t  a n d  r e g u la t i o n ,  e x c e p t  t h a t  S in g a p o r e  is 
n o  l o n g e r  a n  o u t l ie r .  U n d e r  th e s e  c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,  a  m u c h  s t r o n g e r  n e g a t iv e  r e la ­
t i o n s h i p  a p p e a r s  (R 2 =  0 .4 1 ) .  T h e r e  is  s o m e  r e o r d e r in g  a m o n g  t h e  tw o  g r o u p s  o f
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F ig u re  4 - 2 .  L a tin  A m e r ic a  a n d  E a s t  A s ia :  C r e d i t  to  th e  P r iv a te  S ec to r  versus 
S u p e rv is io n a
Overall supervision index
Credit to private sector
Sources: Table 4-2 for overall supervisory index; IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 
(2004, line 22d) for credit to private sector.
a. Overall supervision index (for 1999) is defined in table 4-2. Credit to the private sector (for 
2003) is share of GDP.
c o u n t r i e s  i n  l i n e  w i t h  d i f f e r e n c e s  b e tw e e n  r e g u l a t o r y  a n d  s u p e r v i s o r y  t e n d e n ­
c ie s .  O n  t h e  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  s id e ,  B r a z i l ’s s u p e r v i s i o n  is  s t r o n g e r  i n  r e l a t i v e  
t e r m s  t h a n  i ts  r e g u la t i o n ,  w h i le  A r g e n t in a  a n d  M e x ic o  a re  t h e  o p p o s i t e .  A m o n g  
E a s t  A s ia n  c o u n t r i e s ,  K o r e a  is  s im i la r  t o  B ra z il ,  w h i le  S in g a p o r e  fo l lo w s  t h e  s a m e  
p a t t e r n  a s  A r g e n t i n a  a n d  M e x ic o .  T h e  c e n t r a l  m e s s a g e  o f  f i g u r e  4 - 2  is  t h a t  
s t r i c t e r  s u p e r v i s i o n  is  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  l o w e r  c r e d i t  le v e ls ,  b u t  i t  m a y  w e l l  b e  a  
s p u r io u s  r e l a t i o n s h ip  i n  t h a t  b o t h  a r e  i n f lu e n c e d  b y  m o r e  g e n e r a l  r e g io n a l  c h a r ­
a c te r i s t ic s  a n d  h i s to r ic a l  e x p e r ie n c e s ,  as d is c u s s e d  a b o v e .
C o m p l e m e n t i n g  t h e  a n a ly s i s  o f  r e g u l a t i o n  a n d  s u p e r v i s i o n  is f i g u r e  4 - 3 ,  
w h i c h  p r e s e n t s  d a t a  o n  t h e  c o r r e la t i o n  b e tw e e n  c r e d i t  to  t h e  p r iv a t e  s e c to r  a n d  
p r i v a t e  s e c to r  m o n i t o r i n g .  H e r e ,  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t i m e ,  w e  f i n d  a  p o s i t i v e  r e l a t i o n ­
s h ip ,  a lb e i t  a  w e a k  o n e  (R 2 =  0 .1 7 ) .  T h e  E a s t  A s ia n  s u b s a m p le  is  d iv id e d ,  w i t h  
K o r e a  a n d  S i n g a p o r e  s h o w in g  h i g h  s c o re s  o n  p r i v a t e  m o n i t o r i n g  a n d  T a iw a n  
a n d  T h a i l a n d  lo w e r  s c o re s .  T h e  L a t in  A m e r i c a n  g r o u p  is  a ls o  d i s p e r s e d ,  w i t h  
A r g e n t i n a  a n d  B r a z i l  a t  t h e  h i g h  e n d  a n d  V e n e z u e la  i n  t h e  lo w e s t  p o s i t i o n .  
C h i le ,  a s  u s u a l ,  is  i n  t h e  m i d d l e  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  b o t h  v a r ia b le s .
B e fo re  w e  e x p lo r e  t h e  o v e ra l l  im p l i c a t i o n s  o f  th e s e  d a t a ,  i t  is  u s e fu l  t o  r e v ie w  
t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  a  s im i l a r  a n a ly s is  o f  t h e  2 0 0 3  s u r v e y  d a t a .  T a b le  4 - 3  s u m m a r i z e s
F ig u re  4 - 3 .  L a tin  A m e r ic a  a n d  E a s t  A s ia :  C r e d i t  to  th e  P r iv a te  S e c to r  versus  
P r iv a te  M o n i to r in g
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Private monitoring index
Credit to private sector
Sources: Table 4-3 for private monitoring index; IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 
(2004, line 22d) for credit to private sector.
a. Private monitoring index (for 1999) is defined in table 4-3. Credit to the private sector (for 
2003) is share of GDP.
a n d  c o m p a r e s  t h e  tw o  s e ts  o f  r e s u l t s .  L ik e  t h e  o v e ra l l  r e g u la t i o n  in d e x  f o r  1 9 9 9 ,  
t h a t  f r o m  t h e  2 0 0 3  s u r v e y  a ls o  h a s  a  n e g a t iv e  r e l a t i o n s h ip  w i t h  f i n a n c ia l  d e p t h .  
W h i l e  i t  is  s t r o n g e r  t h a n  w h a t  w e  f o u n d  p re v io u s ly ,  i t  is  s t i l l  w e a k  (R 2 = 0 .1 2 ) .  
T h e  m a i n  d if f e r e n c e  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  1 9 9 9  is t h a t  S in g a p o r e  is  le ss  i s o la te d ,  a n d  i t  
is  b a l a n c e d  b y  a  d e c l in e  i n  T a iw a n ’s r e g u la t i o n  le v e l. T h e  d if f e r e n c e s  b e tw e e n  t h e  
tw o  d a t a  se ts  a re  n o t  s ig n i f i c a n t ,  h o w e v e r .
T h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  c r e d i t  a n d  t h e  o v e r a l l  s u p e r v i s i o n  i n d e x ,  b y  c o n ­
t r a s t ,  c o m p l e t e l y  d i s a p p e a r s  b e t w e e n  1 9 9 9  a n d  2 0 0 3  (R 2 =  0 . 0 0  i n  t h e  l a t t e r  
y e a r ) .  T h i s  u n e x p e c t e d  r e s u l t  s t e m s  f r o m  t h r e e  l a r g e  c h a n g e s :  b o t h  K o r e a  a n d  
T a iw a n  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  in c r e a s e d  t h e  p o w e r  o f  t h e i r  s u p e rv is o r s  b e tw e e n  1 9 9 9  a n d  
2 0 0 3 ,  w h i le  A r g e n t i n a  d i d  t h e  o p p o s i t e .  K o r e a  u n d e r w e n t  a  p r o f o u n d  p r o c e s s  o f  
s t r u c t u r a l  c h a n g e  a f t e r  t h e  1 9 9 7 —9 8  f in a n c ia l  c r is is ;  i t s  g o v e r n m e n t  t o o k  a  m u c h  
m o r e  a g g r e s s iv e  a p p r o a c h  t o  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  t h a n  a n y  o f  t h e  o t h e r  A s ia n  c r i s i s  
c o u n t r i e s .  A s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  c h a p t e r  2 ,  a  ty p ic a l  c o m p o n e n t  o f  p o s tc r i s is  r e s t r u c ­
t u r i n g  is t i g h t e n i n g  r e g u la t i o n  a n d  s u p e r v i s io n .  T a iw a n ,  w h i c h  e s c a p e d  t h e  e a r ­
l ie r  c r is is ,  w a s  i n  s e r io u s  p r o b l e m s  o f  i t s  o w n  b y  2 0 0 3 ,  b a s e d  o n  b u b b l e s  i n  i t s  
r e a l  e s ta te  a n d  s to c k  m a r k e t s ,  a m o n g  o t h e r  f a c to r s .  T ig h t e r  s u p e r v i s io n  r e s u l t e d  
f r o m  t r y i n g  t o  d e a l  w i t h  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n .  A t  t h e  o t h e r  e n d  o f  t h e  s p e c t r u m ,
T a b le  4 - 5 .  L a tin  A m e r ic a  a n d  E a s t  A s ia :  R e g u la tio n , S u p e rv is io n , a n d  C re d it,  
1 9 9 9  a n d 2 0 0 3
100 Changes in L a tin  America’s F inancial System since 1 9 9 0
R squared
Index 1999 2003
Credit and overall regulation index (ORI)a 0.05 0.12
Credit and overall supervision index (OSI)a 0.41 0.00
Credit and private monitoring index (PMI)a 0.17 0.36
Sources: Calculated from data in tables 3-5, 3-6, 4-1, 4-2, 4-3, and 4-4.
a. Credit to the private sector as a share of GDP; see text and tables 4-1 through 4-4 for definitions of 
indexes.
A r g e n t i n a  i n  2 0 0 3  w a s  s t i l l  i n  t h e  m i d s t  o f  a  c r is is  i n  w h i c h  t h e  b a n k i n g  s e c to r  
w a s  d e e p ly  in v o lv e d .  T h e  b a n k s  h a d  b e e n  t a r g e t e d  b y  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  t o  p a y  a  
s u b s t a n t i a l  p a r t  o f  t h e  c o s ts  o f  t h e  c r is is  t h r o u g h  t h e  w a y  i n  w h ic h  t h e  d e v a lu a ­
t i o n  w a s  im p le m e n te d .  T h i s  p r o c e s s  j e o p a r d iz e d  t h e  s u p e r v i s o r y  f u n c t io n s  o f  t h e  
c e n t r a l  b a n k .  I n te r e s t in g ly ,  t h e  A r g e n t in e  p o l ic y  w a s  c o u n te r c y c l i c a l ,  w h i le  t h a t  
o f  K o r e a  a n d  T a iw a n  w a s  p r o c y c l ic a l .  T h e  l a t t e r  w o u l d  b e  p r e d i c t e d  b y  t h e  l i t e r ­
a t u r e  o n  c y c le s ;  t h e  A r g e n t i n e  e x c e p t i o n  is l i n k e d  t o  p o l i t i c a l  f a c t o r s  i n  t h a t  
c o u n t r y .21
I n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  a m b ig u o u s  o v e ra ll  f i n d in g s  o n  r e g u la t i o n  a n d  s u p e r v i s io n ,  
p r iv a t e  m o n i t o r i n g  b e c a m e  m o r e  c lo s e ly  a s s o c ia te d  w i t h  p r iv a te  s e c to r  c r e d i t  in  
t h e  2 0 0 3  s u r v e y  d a t a  (R 1 = 0 .3 6 ,  v e r s u s  R 1 = 0 . 1 7  i n  1 9 9 9 ) .  A c r o s s  t h e  b o a r d ,  
c o u n t r i e s  i n  b o t h  r e g io n s  e i t h e r  m a i n t a i n e d  h ig h  s c o re s  o n  p r iv a te  m o n i t o r i n g  o r  
r a is e d  th e m .  P a r t ic u la r ly  la rg e  in c re a s e s  o c c u r r e d  i n  t h e  P h i l i p p in e s  a n d  T a iw a n , 
w h i c h  i n c r e a s e d  b o t h  g o v e r n m e n t - b a s e d  s u p e r v i s i o n  a n d  p r i v a t e  m o n i t o r i n g .  
F iv e  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s — C h i l e ,  M a la y s ia ,  M e x ic o ,  T h a i l a n d ,  a n d  V e n e z u e la — a lso  
s te p p e d  u p  p r iv a te  m o n i t o r i n g ,  t h o u g h  t o  a  le sse r  e x te n t .  A t  t h e  s a m e  t im e ,  th r e e  
o f  t h e  f iv e  in c r e a s e d  o r  m a i n t a i n e d  t h e i r  le v e l o f  g o v e r n m e n t - b a s e d  s u p e r v i s io n .
W h a t  b e g in s  t o  b e c o m e  c le a r ,  e s p e c ia l ly  i n  t h e  2 0 0 3  d a t a ,  is  t h a t  t h e r e  is n o  
r e a l  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  b e t w e e n  s t r o n g  s u p e r v i s i o n  o f  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  g o v e r n m e n t -  
b a s e d  s o r t  a n d  p r iv a t e  m o n i t o r i n g .  I n d e e d ,  p r iv a t e  m o n i t o r i n g — o r  a t  le a s t  t h e  
g r e a t e r  a m o u n t s  o f  d i s c lo s u r e ,  t r a n s p a r e n c y ,  a n d  i n f o r m a t i o n  t h a t  a r e  u s e d  as 
i n d i c a t o r s — is v e r y  m u c h  p a r t  o f  t h e  n e w  b e s t  p r a c t i c e s  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  a n d  o th e r s  a r e  p u s h in g .  T h e  a t t e m p t  t o  p o r t r a y  t h e m  a s  a l t e r n a t iv e s ,  
w i t h  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t h a t  s t r o n g  t r a d i t i o n a l  s u p e r v i s io n  b e  r e p la c e d  b y  p r i ­
v a te  m o n i t o r i n g ,  is  n o t  i n  t u n e  w i th  r e a l i ty  in  d e v e lo p in g  c o u n t r i e s  th e m s e lv e s .  
T h i s  is  e s p e c ia l ly  t h e  c a s e  i n  l i g h t  o f  th e  c o n c e r n s  t h a t  w e  a d d r e s s  l a t e r  r e g a r d in g  
f in a n c ia l  c r ise s  a n d  in s ta b i l i ty .
21. After substantial political turmoil in 2001—02, the new Argentine president took a very 
aggressive stance against international norms, organizations, and markets. This type of political 
reaction did not occur in other twin crisis countries for reasons that are beyond the scope of this 
analysis.
T o w a rd  S ta b il i ty :  R e g u la tio n , S u p e rv is io n , a n d  th e  M a c ro e c o n o m ic  C o n te x t  1 0 1  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n f lu e n c e
B y  t h e  e a r ly  1 9 9 0 s ,  s e v e ra l  i n t e r n a t io n a l  a n d  r e g io n a l  o r g a n iz a t io n s  w e r e  s t r e s s ­
i n g  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  b e t t e r  f i n a n c i a l  r e g u l a t i o n  a n d  s u p e r v i s i o n .  T h e s e  c o n ­
c e r n s  w e r e  g r e a t ly  m a g n i f ie d  b y  t h e  M e x ic a n  c r is is  o f  1 9 9 4 - 9 5  a n d  e s p e c ia l ly  b y  
t h e  A s ia n  c r i s i s  o f  1 9 9 7 - 9 8 .  I n  b o t h  c a s e s , t h e  d i a g n o s i s  o f  t h e  c a u s e s  o f  t h e  
c r is e s  f o c u s e d  h e a v i ly  o n  d e f ic ie n c ie s  i n  r e g u l a t i o n  a n d  s u p e r v i s io n .  W h a t  w a s  
m e a n t  b y  th is ?  D o c u m e n t s  f r o m  t h e  B I S ,  t h e  I M F , t h e  W o r l d  B a n k ,  a n d  
r e g io n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  b e t t e r  r e g u l a t i o n  a n d  s u p e r v i s i o n  in v o lv e s  
b o t h  t i g h t e r  p r u d e n t i a l  r e g u la t i o n  o f  s u c h  i t e m s  a s  c a p i ta l  a d e q u a c y ,  a s s e t  q u a l ­
ity , p r o v i s io n in g ,  a n d  t h e  u s e  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a c c o u n t i n g  s t a n d a r d s ,  a s  w e l l  as 
g r e a te r  d is c lo s u re .  S in c e  d is c lo s u r e  is  t h e  e s s e n c e  o f  t h e  p r iv a te  m o n i t o r i n g  p a r a ­
d ig m ,  t h e  tw o  s e e m  t o  b e  r e l a t e d  i n  a  p o s i t iv e  w ay .
U s e f u l  d o c u m e n t s  f o r  e x p lo r in g  th i s  p r o p o s i t i o n  a re  t h e  m o s t  r e c e n t  r e p o r t s  
o n  t h e  I M F / W o r l d  B a n k  F in a n c ia l  S ta b i l i ty  A s s e s s m e n t  P r o g r a m  ( F S A P ) .22 T h e  
is s u e s  d i s c u s s e d  c o v e r  t h e  m o s t  c o m m o n  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  t o  c o m e  o u t  o f  t h e  
F S A P  e v a lu a t io n s .  T h e s e  i n c l u d e  t h e  n e e d  t o  im p r o v e  c o r p o r a t e  g o v e r n a n c e  o f  
f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  ( t w o - t h i r d s  o f  F S A P s ) ,  e x p a n d  le g a l  a n d  j u d i c i a l  f r a m e ­
w o r k s  ( h a l f ) ,  s t r e n g t h e n  g o v e r n a n c e  o f  o v e r s i g h t  a g e n c ie s  ( h a l f ) ,  r e i n f o r c e  
s u p e r v i s o r y  s t a f f  ( h a l f ) ,  im p r o v e  d a t a  a n d  r e p o r t i n g  s y s te m s  ( h a l f ) ,  a n d  in c r e a s e  
c o m p e t i t i o n  ( o n e - f i f th ) .  T h i s  c le a r ly  e n c o m p a s s e s  b o t h  t r a d i t i o n a l  s u p e r v i s io n  
a n d  p r iv a te  m o n i t o r i n g .
A n o t h e r  r e c e n t  I M F  d o c u m e n t  re v e a ls  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h ip  b e tw e e n  I M F / W o r l d  
B a n k  e v a lu a t io n s  a n d  t h e  m a c r o p r u d e n t i a l  a p p r o a c h  a d v o c a t e d  b y  t h e  B IS  a n d  
o t h e r s .23 T h i s  d o c u m e n t  m a k e s  i t  c le a r  t h a t  s y s te m ic  s t a b i l i t y  is  t h e  m a i n  fo c u s  
o f  t h e  F S A P s .  T h e  f i n a n c i a l  s o u n d n e s s  i n d i c a t o r s  e m p l o y e d  i n  t h e  F S A P s  a r e  
p l a c e d  s q u a r e l y  w i t h i n  a  m a c r o p r u d e n t i a l  f r a m e w o r k .  O f  s p e c i a l  n o t e  is  t h e  
e m p h a s i s  o n  c r e d i t  b o o m s  a n d  t h e i r  r o le  in  in c r e a s in g  s y s te m ic  v u ln e r a b i l i t y  a n d  
t h e  t r a n s m is s io n  o f  m a c r o e c o n o m i c  s h o c k s  t h r o u g h  t h e  b a n k i n g  s y s te m . S tre s s  
t e s t i n g  is t h e  i n s t r u m e n t  o f  c h o ic e  f o r  m e a s u r in g  t h e  v u ln e r a b i l i t y  o f  in d iv id u a l  
c o u n t r i e s ’ f in a n c ia l  s y s te m s .
G iv e n  t h e  h ig h - p r o f i l e  r e c o m m e n d a t io n s  o f  t h e  B IS  a n d  a s s o c ia te d  o r g a n iz a ­
t i o n s  a n d  t h e  p r e v a le n c e  o f  t h e  F S A P s , i t  is  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  a s k  a b o u t  t h e i r  i m p a c t  
o n  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  c o u n t r i e s .  S in c e  t h e  c u r r e n t  F S A P s  
a r e  o n e - s h o t  e v a lu a t io n s ,  w e  c a n n o t  lo o k  a t  c h a n g e s  o v e r  t im e .  I f  t h e  in f lu e n c e  
o f  t h e  i n t e r n a t io n a l  o r g a n iz a t io n s  is s t r o n g ,  h o w e v e r , w e  w o u l d  e x p e c t  im p r o v e ­
m e n t s  i n  t h e  s c o re s  o n  t h e  B a r t h - C a p r i o - L e v i n e  s u r v e y s  a n d  i n c r e a s e d  h o m o ­
g e n e i t y  a c r o s s  c o u n t r i e s — e s p e c i a l l y  i n  o u r  m i d d l e - i n c o m e  s a m p le .  T a b le  4 - 6  
e n a b le s  u s  t o  c h e c k  o n  th e s e  p o i n t s .  T h e  ta b le  s h o w s  t h a t  t h e  c o m b i n e d  s a m p le
22. See IMF (2005a); IMF and World Bank (2005).
23. IM F (2004b).
T a b le  4 - 6 .  L a tin  A m e r ic a  a n d  E a s t  A s ia :  S u m m a r y  S ta tis tic s  o n  R e g u la tio n  a n d
1 0 2  Changes in L atin  America’s Financial System since 1990
S u p e rv is io n , 1 9 9 0 - 2 0 0 3
Index
Latin America East Asia Latin America and East Asia
Mean Mean Mean Standard deviation
Regulation 1999 31.9 29.7 30.7 4.97
Regulation 2003 32.9 29.8 31.4 4.77
Supervision 1999 22.2 20.3 21.2 3.13
Supervision 2003 21.0 22.0 21.5 4.42
Private monitoring 1999 5.4 5.9 5.7 0.80
Private monitoring 2003 5.7 6.6 6.2 0.64
Source: W orld Bank website (econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?theSitePK=478060& 
contentM DK=20345037&menuPK=546l54&pagePK=64l68182&piPK=64l68060).
r e g i s t e r e d  a n  in c r e a s e  i n  a l l  t h r e e  c a t e g o r i e s :  r e g u l a t i o n ,  g o v e r n m e n t - b a s e d  
s u p e r v i s io n ,  a n d  p r iv a t e  m o n i t o r i n g .  N o n e th e le s s ,  t h e  in c r e a s e s  w e r e  v e r y  s m a ll .  
W i t h i n  r e g io n s ,  t h e  p a t t e r n  h e l d  f o r  E a s t  A s ia , w h i le  L a t in  A m e r i c a  s a w  a  r e v e r ­
s a l  i n  t e r m s  o f  g o v e r n m e n t - b a s e d  s u p e r v i s i o n  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  l a r g e  c h a n g e s  i n  
A r g e n t in a .  W e  a ls o  c a lc u la te d  s t a n d a r d  d e v ia t io n s  t o  se e  i f  th e s e  b e c a m e  s m a lle r  
b e t w e e n  t h e  1 9 9 9  a n d  2 0 0 3  s u r v e y s ,  w h i c h  w o u l d  i n d i c a t e  i n c r e a s e d  h o m o ­
g e n e i ty .  T h e y  f e l l  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  r e g u l a t i o n  a n d  p r i v a t e  m o n i t o r i n g ,  b u t  
i n c r e a s e d  f o r  s u p e r v i s i o n .  A g a in ,  t h e  c h a n g e s  w e r e  a l l  s m a l l ,  b u t  t h e y  i n d i c a t e  
s o m e  t e n d e n c y  to w a r d  g r e a te r  s im i la r i ty  a c ro s s  c o u n t r i e s .
Financial Fragility and Procyclicality
T h e  t h i r d  h y p o th e s i s  t h a t  w e  e v a lu a te  in v o lv e s  t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  b e tw e e n  m a c r o ­
e c o n o m ic s  a n d  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s y s te m . I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  w e  l o o k  f o r  e v id e n c e  i n  t h e  
L a t in  A m e r ic a n  a n d  E a s t  A s ia n  c a se s  o f  t h e  p r o c y c l ic a l i ty  t h a t  is  t h e  b a s is  f o r  t h e  
m a c r o p r u d e n t i a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  r e g u la t i o n  a n d  s u p e r v i s io n .  A s  e x p la in e d  a t  t h e  
b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h e  c h a p te r ,  t h e  p r o b le m s  r e s u l t  f r o m  l e n d i n g  b o o m s  t h a t  a c c o m ­
p a n y  t h e  u p s w in g  o f  b u s in e s s  c y c le s  a s  b o r r o w e r s  a n d  l e n d e r s  a l ik e  r e s p o n d  t o  
h i g h  a n d  g r o w in g  e x p e c t a t i o n s .  W h i l e  i t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  r is k s  a r e  lo w  i n  t h e  e a r ly  
p a r t  o f  a  c y c le , i n  r e a l i ty  v u ln e r a b i l i t i e s  b u i ld  u p  as b a n k s  f i n d  i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  d is ­
t i n g u i s h  a m o n g  p o t e n t i a l  c l i e n t s ,  a l l  o f  w h o m  a p p e a r  t o  b e  g o o d  r i s k s .  T h e  
l ik e ly  r e s u l t  is  a d v e r s e  s e le c t io n  a n d  p e r h a p s  a ls o  m o r a l  h a z a r d .  O n l y  a s  t h e  c y c le  
w e a r s  i t s e l f  o u t  d o  t h e  u n d e r l y i n g  w e a k n e s s e s  b e c o m e  o b v io u s .  A t  t h a t  p o i n t ,  
l e n d i n g  is c u r t a i l e d  a s  r e g u l a t i o n s  a r e  t i g h t e n e d  a n d  r i s k  a v e r s io n  s e ts  i n ,  
a l t h o u g h  r is k s  a r e  r e a l ly  n o  g r e a t e r  t h a n  t h e y  w e r e  b e f o re .  T h i s  e x a c e rb a te s  t h e  
e c o n o m ic  s lo w d o w n .
W e  f i n d  a n  e x t r e m e  v e r s io n  o f  th i s  ty p ic a l  c y c lic a l  p a t t e r n  i n  t h e  t h r e e  L a t in  
A m e r i c a n  a n d  f o u r  E a s t  A s ia n  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  s u f f e r e d  t w i n  ( b a n k i n g  a n d  c u r ­
r e n c y )  c r ise s  b e tw e e n  t h e  e a r ly  1 9 8 0 s  a n d  t h e  l a t e  1 9 9 0 s .  A s  s h o w n  i n  c h a p t e r  2 ,
t h e  c r is e s  f o l lo w e d  f in a n c ia l  l ib e r a l iz a t io n ,  w h i c h  lo o s e n e d  o r  e l im in a t e d  t h e  r e g ­
u l a t o r y  r e s t r i c t i o n s  t h a t  p r e v a i l e d  d u r i n g  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  p e r i o d  o f  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p re s s io n .  W h i l e  t h e  d e r e g u la t i o n  o f  f i n a n c ia l  m a r k e t s  b r o u g h t  m a n y  b e n e f i t s ,  
a  m a jo r  p r o b le m  w a s  t h a t  a n  a l t e r n a t iv e  f r a m e w o r k  o f  p r u d e n t i a l  r e g u la t i o n  a n d  
s u p e r v i s io n ,  a p p r o p r i a t e  f o r  a  m o d e r n  f in a n c ia l  s y s te m , w a s  n o t  y e t  i n  p la c e .
T o  c o m p l i c a t e  m a t t e r s  f u r t h e r ,  c a p i t a l  a c c o u n t  o p e n i n g  g e n e r a l ly  a c c o m p a ­
n i e d  d o m e s t i c  f i n a n c i a l  l i b e r a l iz a t i o n .  B o th  b a n k s  a n d  n o n f i n a n c i a l  e n te r p r i s e s  
s o u g h t  c r e d i t  i n  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m a r k e t s ,  s o m e t i m e s  t o  s u p p l e m e n t  lo c a l  
s o u r c e s  o r  s o m e t im e s  b e c a u s e  h ig h  d o m e s t i c  i n t e r e s t  r a te s  l e d  t h e m  t o  s u b s t i t u t e  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f o r  d o m e s t i c  c r e d i t .  T h e  a b s e n c e  o f  a d e q u a t e  r e g u l a t o r y  r e s t r i c ­
t i o n s  o n  f o r e ig n  c u r r e n c y  l ia b i l i t ie s ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  l a c k  o f  e x p e r ie n c e  i n  i n t e r n a ­
t i o n a l  m a r k e t s ,  l e d  t o  a  v e r y  r a p i d  b u i l d u p  o f  d e b t .  M u c h  o f  i t  w a s  o n  s h o r t  
te r m s  s in c e  th i s  w a s  c h e a p e r  t h a n  lo n g e r - t e r m  c r e d i t .
A  t h i r d  e l e m e n t ,  w h i c h  e x a c e r b a te d  t h e  tw o  p r e v io u s  p r o b le m s ,  w a s  m a c r o -  
e c o n o m ic  p o lic y . F o r  d i f f e r in g  r e a s o n s  in  t h e  v a r io u s  c a se s , e x c h a n g e  r a te s  w e r e  
c lo s e ly  l i n k e d  to  t h e  d o l la r .  I n  L a t in  A m e r ic a ,  a n  e x c h a n g e  r a te  a n c h o r  w a s  u s e d  
t o  lo w e r  i n f la t i o n .  I n  E a s t  A s ia , a n  u n d e r v a l u e d  e x c h a n g e  r a te  w a s  u s e d  t o  p r o ­
m o t e  e x p o r ts .  I n  t h e  f o r m e r  s i t u a t i o n ,  t r a d e  d e f ic i t s  b u i l t  u p  a s  l a c k  o f  c o m p e t i ­
t i v e n e s s  r e s u l t e d  f r o m  a n  o v e r v a l u e d  e x c h a n g e  r a t e ,  w h i l e  i n  t h e  l a t t e r  t h e  
d i l e m m a  w a s  n e a r l y  t h e  o p p o s i t e .  U n d e r v a l u e d  e x c h a n g e  r a te s  a n d  o t h e r  g o v ­
e r n m e n t  s u p p o r t  h e l p e d  to  m a k e  E a s t  A s ia n  c o u n t r i e s  e x p o r t i n g  p o w e r h o u s e s  
a n d  e v e n tu a l ly  s a t u r a t e d  m a r k e t s  f o r  t h e i r  m a i n  p r o d u c t s .  I n  b o t h  r e g io n s ,  c u r ­
r e n t  a c c o u n t  d e f ic i t s  w e r e  a n  i m p o r t a n t  e l e m e n t  o f  t h e  f o r e ig n  e x c h a n g e  p r o b ­
le m s  t h a t  l e d  t o  d e v a lu a t io n s .  T h o s e  d e v a l u a t i o n s ,  i n  t u r n ,  e i t h e r  t r ig g e r e d  o r  
e x a c e r b a t e d  b a n k i n g  c r is e s .  W e  e x a m i n e  th e s e  e x p e r i e n c e s  i n  d e t a i l  t o  u n d e r ­
s t a n d  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  r e g u la t i o n  a n d  s u p e r v i s io n .
W e  d i v i d e  t h e  t w i n  c r i s i s  c o u n t r i e s  i n t o  t h e  tw o  r e g i o n a l  g r o u p s  s in c e  t h e  
d e ta i l s  o f  t h e  o v e ra l l  s to r ie s  v a r y  a c ro s s  r e g io n s .  I n t r a r e g io n a l  v a r i a t i o n  w a s  a ls o  
p r e s e n t ,  b u t  i t  w a s  less  s ig n i f i c a n t  b e c a u s e  o f  s h a r e d  s t r u c t u r a l  c h a r a c te r i s t i c s  a n d  
h i s t o r i c a l  e x p e r i e n c e s  a m o n g  n e i g h b o r i n g  c o u n t r i e s . 24 T o  h i g h l i g h t  b o t h  t h e  
c o m m o n a l i t i e s  a n d  d i f f e r e n c e s ,  f i g u r e  4 - 4  p r e s e n t s  d a t a  o n  g r o w t h  r a t e s  o f  
d o m e s t i c  c r e d i t  t o  t h e  p r iv a te  s e c to r  a n d  i n t e r n a t io n a l  l ia b i l i t ie s  t o  t h e  b a n k i n g  
s e c to r  d u r i n g  t h e  s ix  y e a r s  b e f o r e  a n d  a f t e r  t h e  t w i n  c r is e s . I n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  w e  
a re  l o o k in g  a t  t r e n d s  i n  c r e d i t  a n d  i n  a n  i m p o r t a n t  s o u r c e  o f  f u n d i n g  f o r  th o s e  
c r e d i t s .  E v e ry  c a se  f e a tu r e s  a  l e n d i n g  b o o m  in  t h e  p e r i o d  p r e c e d in g  a  c r is is . W i t h  
t h e  e x c e p t io n  o f  K o re a ,  c r e d i t  fe ll  o f f  s h a r p ly  a f t e r  t h e  c r is is  a n d  r e m a in e d  a t  lo w  
le v e ls  f o r  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  p e r i o d ,  c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  l o w  g r o w t h  o r  e v e n  r e c e s s io n  in  
t h e  r e s p e c tiv e  c o u n t r i e s .  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  l i a b i l i t ie s  a ls o  ro s e , b u t  t h e  r e la t iv e  m a g ­
n i t u d e  o f  t h e  in c r e a s e s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  d o m e s t i c  c r e d i t  v a r i e d  a c r o s s  t h e  t w o  
re g io n s .
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24. See Stallings (1995) for a discussion of the sources and impacts of regional differences.
104 Changes in L a tin  Americas Financial System since 1 9 9 0
F ig u re  4 - 4 .  L a tin  A m e r ic a  a n d  E a s t  A s ia :  C r e d i t  to  P r iv a te  S e c to r  a n d
In te r n a t io n a l  L ia b i l i t ie s 1
C hile (1975 = 100) Mexico (1989 = 100)
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Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook (2001, 2004).
a. Six years before crisis {t-6) = 100. For Chile, crisis year is 1981; Mexico, 1995; Argentina, 
1995 and 2001; Thailand, 1997; Indonesia, 1997; and Korea, 1997. Credit and international lia­
bilities are in constant (2000) dollars.
T h e  h i s to r ic a l  e x p e r ie n c e s  o f  C h i l e  in  t h e  e a r ly  1 9 8 0 s  a n d  M e x ic o  i n  t h e  e a r ly  
1 9 9 0 s  c lo s e ly  r e f l e c t  t h e  p r o c e s s  o u t l i n e d  a b o v e .  I n  b o t h  c a s e s ,  c r e d i t  b o o m s  
w e r e  f a c i l i ta t e d  b y  la x  r e g u la to r y  s y s te m s  t h a t  f a i le d  t o  o v e rs e e  t h e  b a n k s  a n d  b y  
l e g a l  s y s te m s  t h a t  f a i l e d  t o  p r e v e n t  f r a u d u l e n t  a c t i v i t i e s  w i t h i n  t h e  b a n k i n g  
in d u s t r y .  W i t h  t h e  a d v a n ta g e  o f  h in d s ig h t ,  i t  b e c o m e s  c le a r  t h a t  b o t h  m o r a l  h a z ­
a r d  a n d  a d v e rs e  s e le c t io n  w e r e  i n  p lay .
T h e  C h i l e a n  c r is is  r e p r e s e n te d  i n  f ig u re  4 - 4  t o o k  p la c e  m u c h  e a r l ie r  t h a n  th e  
o t h e r s . 25 F i n a n c i a l  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  i n  C h i l e  o c c u r r e d  a f t e r  t h e  m i l i t a r y  c o u p  in  
1 9 7 3 ,  f o l lo w e d  b y  a  c r is is  i n  t h e  e a r ly  1 9 8 0 s .  C r e d i t  in  C h i l e  i n  t h e  s ix  p r e c r is is
25. For details and references on Chile, see chapter 6.
y e a rs  in c r e a s e d  a n  a s t o u n d in g  t w e n ty f o ld .26 I n t e r n a t i o n a l  l ia b i l i t ie s  r o s e  t e n f o ld ,  
b u t  in  r e la t iv e  t e r m s  t h e  l a t t e r  a m o u n t  s e e m s  s m a ll ,  as s e e n  i n  t h e  f i r s t  p a n e l  in  
t h e  g r a p h .  T h i s  l e n d i n g  b in g e  h a d  a  v e r y  l o w  s t a r t i n g  p o i n t :  c r e d i t  a s  a  s h a re  o f  
G D P  i n  t h e  e a r ly  1 9 7 0 s  h a d  r e a c h e d  u n u s u a l ly  lo w  le v e ls , a n d  t h e  e c o n o m y  h a d  
b e e n  c lo s e d  i n  f i n a n c i a l  t e r m s .  T h e  in c r e a s e  w a s  f a c i l i t a t e d  b y  v e r y  la x  r e g u la ­
t i o n ,  w h ic h  w a s  p a r t  o f  t h e  m i l i t a r y  g o v e r n m e n t  s id e o lo g y  i n  o p p o s i t i o n  to  s ta te  
i n t e r v e n t i o n .  T h e  b a n k s  w e r e  q u i c k l y  p r i v a t i z e d  a n d  f o r m e d  t h e  b a s is  f o r  n e w  
c o n g lo m e r a te s  t h a t  e n g a g e d  i n  v e r y  a g g re ss iv e  a n d  r is k y  t r a n s a c t io n s .  A  s u b s t a n ­
t i a l  s h a r e  o f  t h e  n e w  lo a n s  w e n t  t o  r e la te d  p a r t i e s  a n d  n o n p e r f o r m i n g  lo a n s  p r o ­
l i f e r a te d ,  b u t  a d e q u a te  p r o v is io n s  w e r e  n o t  m a d e .
T h e s e  m i c r o e c o n o m ic  p r a c t i c e s  t o o k  p la c e  i n  a  m a c r o e c o n o m ic  c o n t e x t  t h a t  
g r e a t l y  i n c r e a s e d  v u l n e r a b i l i t y .  T h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  w a s  u s e d  t o  l o w e r  i n f l a t i o n  
f r o m  t h e  t h r e e - d i g i t  le v e ls  i t  h a d  r e a c h e d  i n  1 9 7 3 .  I n  t h e  p ro c e s s ,  c o m p e t i t i v e ­
n e s s  f e l l  a n d  t h e  t r a d e  d e f i c i t  b a l l o o n e d .  T h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  d e f i c i t  r e a c h e d  
n e a r ly  1 5  p e r c e n t  o f  G D P  i n  t h e  m o n t h s  b e f o re  t h e  c r is is . T h e s e  d e f ic i t s  h a d  to  
b e  f i n a n c e d  b y  la r g e - s c a le  c a p i t a l  i n f lo w s ,  s o m e  o f  w h i c h  w e r e  r e p r e s e n t e d  b y  
t h e  b a n k  l ia b i l i t ie s  s e e n  i n  f ig u re  4 - 4 .  S h o c k s  c a m e  in  t h e  f o r m  o f  b a n k  fa i lu re s  
i n  1 9 8 1 ,  f o l lo w e d  b y  a  la rg e  d e v a lu a t io n  i n  1 9 8 2 ;  th i s  s e t  o f f  a  c r is is  t h a t  la s te d  
f o r  s e v e ra l  y e a r s  a n d  c o s t  t h e  e c o n o m y  a r o u n d  4 0  p e r c e n t  o f  G D P  i n  f is c a l  c o s ts  
a lo n e .  T h e  d e c l in e  i n  d o m e s t i c  c r e d i t  e x a c e rb a te d  t h e  r e c o v e ry  p r o b le m s .  O n e  o f  
t h e  r e s u l t s  i n  t h e  p o s tc r i s is  p e r i o d  w a s  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  s t r e n g t h e n i n g  o f  r e g u la t i o n  
a n d  s u p e rv is io n .
T h e  M e x ic a n  e x p e r ie n c e  w i t h  u n c o n t r o l l e d  l e n d i n g  w a s  s u r p r i s in g ly  s im i la r  
t o  t h a t  o f  C h i le ,  a l t h o u g h  i t  t o o k  p la c e  a  d e c a d e  la te r .27 C r e d i t  r o s e  n e a r ly  s ix fo ld  
b e tw e e n  1 9 8 9  a n d  1 9 9 4 ,  b u t  i n t e r n a t io n a l  l i a b i l i t ie s  t o  t h e  b a n k i n g  s e c to r  d i d  
n o t  g r o w  v e r y  fa s t .  T h i s  w a s  o n e  a r e a  i n  w h i c h  M e x ic o  m a i n t a i n e d  s t r o n g  r e g u ­
l a t o r y  r e q u i r e m e n t s .  P r u d e n t i a l  r e g u l a t i o n  w a s  g e n e r a l l y  u n d e r d e v e l o p e d  
b e c a u s e  t h e  b a n k s  w e r e  n a t io n a l i z e d  i n  1 9 8 2  a n d  r u n  b y  g o v e r n m e n t  d e c r e e  f o r  
n e a r ly  a  d e c a d e  b e f o r e  t h e y  w e r e  r e p r iv a t i z e d  i n  t h e  e a r ly  1 9 9 0 s .  S in c e  t h e  n e w  
o w n e r s  p a i d  v e r y  h i g h  p r ic e s ,  t h e y  w e r e  w i l l i n g  t o  e n g a g e  i n  r i s k y  p r a c t i c e s  t o  
r e c o u p  t h e i r  c o s ts  a n d  b e g in  m a k i n g  p r o f i t s .  N o n p e r f o r m i n g  lo a n s  b u i l t  u p  r a p ­
id ly . A g a in  l ik e  C h i l e ,  m a c r o e c o n o m ic  p r o b le m s  e x a c e rb a te d  t h o s e  a t  t h e  m ic r o -  
e c o n o m i c  le v e l .  A  s e m if ix e d  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  a n c h o r e d  a  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  p r o g r a m ,  
l e a d in g  t o  la rg e  t r a d e  a n d  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  d e f ic i t s  a n d  m a t c h i n g  c a p i ta l  in f lo w s .  
I n  t h e  M e x ic a n  c a s e , t h e  c r is is  w a s  t r ig g e r e d  b y  a  s e t  o f  p o l i t i c a l  s h o c k s  i n  t h e  
e l e c t i o n  y e a r  o f  1 9 9 4 .  A  d e v a l u a t i o n  a t  t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  y e a r  b o t h  r e v e a l e d  t h e  
e x t r e m e ly  w e a k  s i t u a t i o n  o f  t h e  b a n k s  a n d  l e d  t o  t h e i r  b a n k r u p tc y .
26. The amplitude of the Chilean cycle was magnified by exchange rate trends. Using constant 
local currency, the increase was “only” tenfold. Exchange rate trends also affected some of the other 
cases to a more limited extent, but the basic pattern of booms in domestic credit and international 
borrowing were found with either measure.
27. See chapter 7 on Mexico.
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T h e  A r g e n t in e  c a se  is  m o r e  c o m p l i c a t e d  s in c e  t h e  c o u n t r y  s u f f e r e d  tw o  s e p a ­
r a te  f i n a n c ia l  c r is e s  i n  t h e  1 9 9 0 s .28 F in a n c i a l  l i b e r a l iz a t i o n ,  w h i c h  b e g a n  i n  t h e  
e a r ly  1 9 9 0 s ,  l i f t e d  m o s t  o f  t h e  c o n t r o l s  o n  d o m e s t i c  a n d  f o r e ig n  o p e r a t i o n s  o f  
t h e  f in a n c ia l  s y s te m  t h a t  h a d  b e e n  i m p o s e d  d u r i n g  t h e  p r e v io u s  p e r i o d  o f  h ig h  
i n f la t i o n  a n d  e x te r n a l  c o n s t r a in t s .  L ib e r a l i z a t io n  t o o k  p la c e  in  t h e  c o n te x t  o f  a n  
e x c h a n g e - r a te - b a s e d  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  p r o g r a m  e m b o d i e d  i n  a  c u r r e n c y  b o a r d .  P r ic e  
s t a b i l i t y  a n d  t h e  f ix e d  e x c h a n g e  r a te  r e g im e  a b r u p t l y  r e d u c e d  b o t h  i n f la t i o n  a n d  
e x c h a n g e  r a t e  r i s k .  T h i s  c r e a t e d  a  f e r t i l e  e n v i r o n m e n t  f o r  t h e  r a p i d  g r o w t h  o f  
f in a n c ia l  a c t iv i ty , b u t  i t  a ls o  l e d  t o  m a t u r i t y  a n d  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  m is m a tc h e s .
U n t i l  1 9 9 4 ,  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  a p p e a r e d  q u i t e  p r o m is in g .  D e p o s i t s  a n d  lo a n s  g r e w  
ra p id ly ,  w h i le  p e s o  a n d  d o l l a r  l e n d i n g  r a te s  fe ll  s ig n if ic a n t ly .  T h e s e  r e s u l t s  w e r e  a  
m ix  o f  se v e ra l i m p o r t a n t  f e a tu re s :  a  m o n e t i z a t i o n  p r o c e s s  c a u s e d  r a p i d  g r o w th  o f  
d e p o s i t s  i n  t h e  b a n k i n g  s e c to r ;  a n  in c r e a s e  o f  f o r e ig n  c a p i t a l  in f lo w s  l e d  t o  t h e  
d o l l a r iz a t i o n  o f  b o t h  l i a b i l i t ie s  a n d  a s se ts ;  a n d  t h e  in c r e a s e d  c o m p e t i t i o n  a m o n g  
b a n k s  a n d  t h e  im p r o v e m e n t  o f  o v e ra l l  c o n f id e n c e  r e s u l te d  i n  a  r a p i d  e x p a n s io n  
o f  c r e d i t ,  as is  e v id e n t  i n  f ig u re  4 - 4 .  G iv e n  t h e  c u r r e n c y  b o a r d  r u le s ,  w h ic h  m a d e  
m o n e t a r y  a n d  c r e d i t  p o l i c y  d e p e n d e n t  o n  f o r e ig n  c a p i ta l  in f lo w s ,  f o r e ig n  l i a b i l i ­
t ie s  r o s e  m o r e  r a p id ly  r e la t iv e  t o  d o m e s t i c  c r e d i t  t h a n  i n  C h i l e  o r  M e x ic o .
I n  1 9 9 5 ,  h o w e v e r , t h e  A r g e n t i n e  e c o n o m y  a n d  b a n k i n g  s e c to r  w e r e  h i t  h a r d  
b y  t h e  s p i l lo v e r  f r o m  t h e  M e x ic a n  c r is is . U n d e r  t h e  c u r r e n c y  b o a r d  s y s te m , t h e  
o n l y  i n s t r u m e n t  t h a t  d o m e s t i c  m o n e t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  h a d  f o r  f a c i n g  p o t e n t i a l  
c a p i t a l  o u t f lo w s  w a s  t o  a l lo w  d o m e s t i c  i n t e r e s t  r a te s  to  r is e .  T h i s  r is e ,  i n  t u r n ,  
p r o v o k e d  a n  in c r e a s e  o f  a r r e a r s  a n d  d e f a u l t s  a n d  r e d u c e d  t h e  c o n f i d e n c e  o f  
d e p o s i to r s ,  l e a d in g  t o  s ig n i f i c a n t  w i th d r a w a ls .  D e s p i t e  s te p s  b y  t h e  c e n t r a l  b a n k ,  
t h e  b a n k s  lo s t  1 2  p e r c e n t  o f  t h e i r  d e p o s i ts  in  t h e  f i r s t  f o u r  m o n t h s  o f  1 9 9 5 .
I n  t h e  a f t e r m a t h  o f  t h i s  f i r s t  c r i s i s ,  a  s e t  o f  m e a s u r e s  w a s  i n t r o d u c e d  t o  
r e s t r u c tu r e  t h e  s e c to r  b y  in j e c t i n g  m o r e  c a p i ta l ,  p r o m o t i n g  m e r g e r s  a n d  a c q u is i ­
t i o n s ,  a n d  c r e a t i n g  i n c e n t i v e s  f o r  t h e  e x p a n s i o n  o f  f o r e i g n  b a n k s .  A  d e p o s i t  
i n s u r a n c e  s c h e m e  w a s  a ls o  i n t r o d u c e d ,  a n d  a  n e w  s y s te m  o f  r e s e rv e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  
w a s  i n t r o d u c e d  t o  r e d u c e  le v e ra g e . I n  t h e  s e c o n d  h a l f  o f  t h e  1 9 9 0 s ,  p r iv a te  b a n k  
p r o v i s io n s  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t o t a l  c r e d i t  in c r e a s e d  s u b s ta n t ia l ly ,  l i q u i d i ty  w i t h i n  t h e  
b a n k i n g  s e c to r  r o s e ,  a n d  t h e  c a p i ta l  a d e q u a c y  r a t i o  w a s  m a i n t a i n e d  a t  le v e ls  f a r  
b e y o n d  t h o s e  e s t a b l i s h e d  b y  t h e  B a s e l  I g u i d e l i n e s .  F o r e i g n  b a n k s  m o r e  t h a n  
d o u b l e d  t h e i r  s h a re  o f  t h e  m a r k e t  b e tw e e n  1 9 9 4  a n d  1 9 9 9 .  I n  s u m ,  t h e  b a n k i n g  
s e c to r  b e c a m e  m o r e  s o l id ,  w h i c h  e x p la in s  w h y  i ts  a b i l i ty  t o  d e a l  w i t h  t h e  e m e r g ­
i n g  m a r k e t  c r ise s  t h a t  c h a r a c te r i z e d  t h e  la te  1 9 9 0 s  w a s  f a r  s u p e r i o r  t o  w h a t  w a s  
o b s e r v e d  a f te r  t h e  M e x ic a n  c r is is .  N o n e th e l e s s ,  m a c r o e c o n o m i c  p o l ic ie s — e s p e ­
c ia l ly  t h e  c u r r e n c y  b o a r d — e v e n t u a l l y  u n d e r m i n e d  th e s e  i m p r o v e m e n t s  a s  t h e  
b a n k in g  s e c to r  a n d  t h e  e c o n o m y  a s  a  w h o le  fe ll  i n t o  c r is is  a f t e r  t h e  d e v a lu a t io n
28. On Argentina, see Kiguel (2001); de la Torre, Levy-Yeyati, and Schmukler (2003); Fanelli 
(2003); Daseking and others (2004); Diaz Bonilla and others (2004).
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i n  J a n u a r y  o f  2 0 0 2 .  R e g u la to r y  a n d  s u p e r v i s o r y  im p r o v e m e n ts  w e r e  s w e p t  a w a y  
i n  t h e  p ro c e s s ,  as d o m e s t i c  c r e d i t  a n d  in t e r n a t io n a l  b o r r o w in g  f e l l .29
T h e  E a s t  A s ia n  c r is is  c o u n t r i e s  d i f f e r e d  f r o m  t h e i r  L a t in  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t e r ­
p a r t s  i n  a  n u m b e r  o f  i m p o r t a n t  w a y s .  T h e y  h a d  a  t h i r t y - y e a r  h i s t o r y  o f  h i g h  
g r o w th  a n d  lo w  i n f la t i o n ,  a n d  th e y  h a d  s t r o n g  e x te r n a l  s e c to r s  as a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e i r  
e x p o r t  o r i e n t a t i o n .  O n e  e l e m e n t  o f  t h i s  h i g h - g r o w t h  m o d e l  w a s  t h e  u s e  o f  t h e  
f in a n c ia l  s e c to r  a s  a  c h a n n e l  t o  i m p l e m e n t  g o v e r n m e n t  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  p o l ic ie s .  
W h i l e  t h e  m o d e l  w a s  m o s t  h i g h l y  d e v e lo p e d  i n  N o r t h e a s t  A s ia , S o u th e a s t  A s ia  
s h a r e d  a  s ig n i f i c a n t  n u m b e r  o f  th e s e  c h a r a c te r i s t i c s .  I n  t h e  l a te  1 9 8 0 s  a n d  e a r ly  
1 9 9 0 s ,  a ll  o f  th e s e  c o u n t r i e s  b e g a n  t o  d i s m a n t l e  t h e i r  e x te n s iv e  c o n t r o l s ,  i n c l u d ­
i n g  t h o s e  p e r t a i n i n g  t o  t h e  f i n a n c ia l  s e c to r .
T h e  l a s t  t h r e e  p a n e l s  i n  f i g u r e  4 - 4  ( I n d o n e s i a ,  K o r e a ,  a n d  T h a i l a n d )  s h o w  
s o m e  i n t e r e s t i n g  d i f f e r e n c e s  c o m p a r e d  w i t h  t h e  p a t t e r n s  i n  L a t in  A m e r i c a .  
W h i l e  e a c h  A s ia n  c o u n t r y  s a w  s ig n i f i c a n t  g r o w th  o f  c r e d i t  i n  t h e  p e r i o d  p r e c e d ­
i n g  t h e  1 9 9 7  c r is is , t h e  in c r e a s e s  w e r e  n o t  as la rg e  as t h o s e  i n  A r g e n t in a ,  M e x ic o ,  
o r — e s p e c i a l l y — C h i l e .  C r e d i t  t o  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  m o r e  o r  le s s  d o u b l e d  i n  
I n d o n e s i a  a n d  K o r e a ,  w h i le  i t  t r i p l e d  i n  T h a i l a n d .  U n l ik e  L a t in  A m e r ic a ,  h o w ­
e v e r , i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l i a b i l i t i e s  i n  a i l  t h r e e  E a s t  A s ia n  c a s e s  o u t p a c e d  t h e  g r o w t h  
r a t e  o f  d o m e s t i c  c r e d i t .30 T h i s  p a t t e r n  r e f le c ts  E a s t  A s ia ’s h i s t o r y  o f  m o r e  c lo s e d  
f in a n c ia l  s e c to rs .  O n c e  t h e y  w e r e  g iv e n  t h e  a u t h o r i z a t i o n  t o  m o v e  i n t o  i n t e r n a ­
t i o n a l  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s ,  b o t h  b a n k s  a n d  n o n f m a n c i a l  c o r p o r a t i o n s  d i d  s o  w i t h  a  
v e n g e a n c e  s in c e  t h e y  w e r e  w i t h o u t  m a n y  c o n s t r a i n t s  o n  t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  r e s p e c ­
t iv e  g o v e r n m e n ts .
T h a i l a n d  s ta n d s  o u t  a m o n g  i ts  n e ig h b o r s  f o r  b o t h  t h e  size  o f  i ts  c r e d i t  in c r e a s e  
a n d  t h e  g r o w th  o f  in t e r n a t io n a l  l ia b i l i t ie s ;  t h e  l a t t e r  ro s e  e ig h t f o ld  b e tw e e n  1 9 9 1  
a n d  1 9 9 7 .  A  s i g n i f i c a n t  p o r t i o n  o f  th e s e  l i a b i l i t i e s  w e r e  p r o b a b l y  c o n t r a c t e d  
t h r o u g h  t h e  o f f s h o re  b a n k i n g  c e n te r ,  t h e  B a n g k o k  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  B a n k in g  F a c ility , 
b u t  t r a n s p a r e n c y  w a s  l o w  so  t h e  d e ta i l s  a re  u n c le a r .  F in a n c ia l  l ib e r a l iz a t io n ,  b o t h  
d o m e s t i c  a n d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l ,  s e t  t h e  s c e n e  f o r  a  d e c a d e  o f  r a p i d  G D P  g r o w t h ,  
w h i c h  a v e r a g e d  9  p e r c e n t  p e r  y e a r  b e t w e e n  1 9 8 7  a n d  1 9 9 6 ,  f e d  b y  t h e  c r e d i t  
b o o m  a n d  c a p i ta l  in f lo w s . A s  t h e  e c o n o m y  g re w  a n d  a s se t  p r ic e s  b a l lo o n e d ,  b a n k  
p o r t f o l i o s  d e t e r i o r a t e d .  L a rg e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  d e f ic i t s  u l t i m a t e l y  d e p l e t e d  
re se rv e s , a n d  t h e  b a h t  w a s  f l o a t e d  i n  J u ly  1 9 9 7 ,  u n d e r m i n i n g  T h a i l a n d ’s b a n k s  
a n d  s e t t i n g  o f f  t h e  c r is is  t h a t  s p r e a d  r a p id ly  t o  its  n e ig h b o r s .31
29. For an elaboration of these issues in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, see Stallings and 
Studart (2003).
30. This does not mean that international liabilities were larger than domestic credit. On the con­
trary, one reason the former grew so rapidly was a relatively low starting point. Domestic credit as a 
share of GDP started from a high level. Thus, the amplitude of the various curves is heavily influ­
enced by initial conditions, but all cases display a rapid rise of credit and international liabilities.
31. On Thailand’s financial crisis, see Vajragupta and Vichyanond (1999); Alba, Hernández, 
and Klingebiel (2001); Nidhiprabha (2003); Warr (2004).
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I n d o n e s i a  s a w  c r e d i t  d o u b l e  i n  t h e  s ix  y e a r s  l e a d i n g  u p  t o  t h e  c r i s i s ,  a n d  
in t e r n a t io n a l  l i a b i l i t ie s  c lo s e ly  t r a c k e d  t h e  g r o w th  o f  c r e d i t ,  a s  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  f ig ­
u r e  4 - 4 .  F o l l o w i n g  f i n a n c i a l  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  i n  t h e  l a t e  1 9 8 0 s ,  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  
b a n k s  a n d  v o lu m e  o f  c r e d i t  b e g a n  to  r ise . M a n y  o f  t h e  lo a n s  w e r e  t o  r e la te d  b o r ­
r o w e r s ;  t h i s  w a s  a n  e s p e c i a l l y  s e r io u s  p r o b l e m  i n  I n d o n e s i a  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  
c r o n y  c a p i t a l i s m  u n d e r  t h e  S u h a r t o  r e g im e .  T h e  g o v e r n m e n t  a c t u a l l y  e n c o u r ­
a g e d  c o m p a n ie s  t o  b o r r o w  a b r o a d  b y  i t s  h i g h  i n t e r e s t  r a te  p o l i c ie s .  S h o r t - t e r m  
c a p i ta l  in f lo w s  a c c o m p a n ie d  t r a d e  a n d  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  d e f ic i t s ,  s o  t h a t  I n d o n e ­
s ia  h a d  t h e  i n t e r n a l  c h a r a c te r i s t i c s  t h a t  m a d e  i t  v u ln e r a b l e  t o  c o n t a g i o n  f o l lo w ­
in g  t h e  d e v a lu a t io n  o f  t h e  b a h t . 32
I n  K o r e a ,  l ik e  T h a i l a n d ,  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l i a b i l i t ie s  f a r  o u t p a c e d  t h e  g r o w t h  o f  
c r e d i t ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  l a t t e r  n e a r l y  d o u b l e d .  T h e  r e la t iv e ly  l o w  in c r e a s e  i n  c r e d i t  
w a s  p a r t l y  d u e  t o  i t s  s u b s t i t u t i o n  b y  o f f - b a l a n c e - s h e e t  i t e m s  t h a t  e n a b l e d  t h e  
b a n k s  t o  c o m p e te  w i t h  t h e  g r o w in g  n o n b a n k  s e c to r .  K o re a ’s f in a n c ia l  l ib e r a l iz a ­
t i o n  b e g a n  in  t h e  l a t e  1 9 8 0 s ,  b u t  i t  a c c e le r a te d  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  n e g o t i a t i o n s  
t o  j o i n  t h e  O E C D  i n  t h e  e a r ly  1 9 9 0 s .  T h e  n e w ly  o p e n e d  c a p i t a l  a c c o u n t  
e n a b l e d  f i n a n c i a l  a n d  n o n f i n a n c i a l  f i r m s  t o  b o r r o w  a b r o a d ;  m u c h  o f  t h e  d e b t  
w a s  c o n t r a c t e d  o n  s h o r t  t e r m s .  A l t h o u g h  i t  h a d  a  m u c h  s t r o n g e r  a n d  m o r e  
d iv e r s i f ie d  e c o n o m y  t h a n  i ts  n e ig h b o r s ,  i t  a ls o  s u c c u m b e d  t o  t h e  r e g io n a l  c r is is , 
as i t s  f o r e ig n  e x c h a n g e  re s e rv e s  w e r e  e x h a u s t e d  a n d  i ts  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  fe ll 
i n t o  b a n k r u p tc y .33
K o r e a  s ta n d s  o u t  f r o m  t h e  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  s h o w n  i n  f ig u r e  4 - 4  in  t h a t  c r e d i t  
fe l l  o n l y  b r ie f ly  d u r i n g  t h e  c r is is  a n d  t h e n  b e g a n  t o  g r o w  a g a in .  I t  e x c e e d e d  i ts  
p r e v io u s  p e a k  b y  1 9 9 9  a n d  c o n t i n u e d  r i s in g ,  t h u s  u n d e r p i n n i n g  t h e  r e c o v e r y  
t h a t  w a s  m o r e  r a p i d  t h a n  i n  o t h e r  c a s e s .34 A n o t h e r  c r e d i t  b o o m  o c c u r r e d ,  
in v o lv in g  c r e d i t  c a rd s  a n d  c o n s u m e r  l e n d i n g  a s  t h e  b a n k s  t r i e d  t o  d iv e r s i fy  t h e i r  
p o r t f o l i o s  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  i n v e s tm e n t - l e d  d e m a n d  f o r  c r e d i t .  A  s e c o n d  m i n i ­
c r i s i s  t o o k  p l a c e  i n  K o r e a  i n  2 0 0 3  a s  a  d i r e c t  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  c o n s u m e r  c r e d i t  
b u i l d u p .  T h e  b e t t e r  s t a t e  o f  t h e  b a n k i n g  s e c to r ,  i n c l u d i n g  i m p r o v e d  r e g u la t i o n  
a n d  s u p e r v i s i o n ,  h e l p e d  t o  k e e p  th e s e  p r o b l e m s  u n d e r  c o n t r o l  i n  c o m p a r i s o n  
w i t h  1 9 9 7 - 9 8 .
I n  s u m m a r y ,  th e s e  s ix  c a s e s  p r o v id e  a m p l e  e v id e n c e  o f  t h e  p r o c y c l ic a l i ty  a n d  
r e s u l t i n g  f i n a n c i a l  f r a g i l i t y  t h a t  c o n t i n u e  t o  w o r r y  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  
i n s t i t u t i o n s .  T h e  a r g u m e n t  t h a t  t h e y  w e r e  e x t r e m e  c a se s  a n d  n o t  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  
o f  n o r m a l  t r e n d s  is  t r u e  o n l y  u p  t o  a  p o i n t .  T h e  s a m e  u n d e r l y i n g  t e n d e n c ie s  a re  
a ls o  a t  w o r k  i n  le ss  d r a m a t i c  c i r c u m s ta n c e s .  R e c e n t  e x a m p le s  c e n t e r  o n  t h e  s ig ­
32. Indonesia’s crisis is discussed in Ghosh and Pangestu (1999); Nasution (1999, 2002); 
Pangestu and Habir (2002).
33. On Korea, see Hahm (1999); Cho (2002); Coe and Kim (2002); Ahn and Cha (2004).
34. Argentina had a similar pattern, but it resulted in a second, much more serious, crisis. Mex­
ico’s rapid recovery was a temporary one—based on exports to the United States—without access 
to credit. The lack of credit has become a serious problem in Mexico, as discussed in chapter 7.
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n i f i c a n t  in c r e a s e  i n  c o n s u m e r  c r e d i t  i n  m a n y  d e v e l o p i n g  e c o n o m i e s .  T h e  
K o r e a n  e x p e r i e n c e  is  l ik e ly  t o  b e  t h e  f i r s t  o f  m a n y  p r o b l e m a t i c  e x p e r ie n c e s  i n  
t h i s  r e g a r d .
Conclusions
S e v e ra l  d i f f e r e n t  a p p r o a c h e s  t o  r e g u la t i o n  a n d  s u p e r v i s io n  a r e  c u r r e n t l y  c o m p e t ­
i n g  f o r  t h e  a t t e n t i o n  o f  p o l i c y m a k e r s ,  e s p e c ia l ly  t h o s e  i n  d e v e lo p in g  c o u n t r i e s .  
O n e  is t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l ,  m ic r o e c o n o m ic  a p p r o a c h  t h a t  f o c u s e s  o n  t h e  s t a b i l i t y  o f  
in d iv id u a l  b a n k s  i n  o r d e r  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e i r  d e p o s i to r s .  F r o m  th i s  p e r s p e c t iv e ,  t h e  
m o r e  r e g u la t i o n  a n d  s u p e r v i s io n ,  t h e  b e t te r .  A  c h a l le n g e  t o  th i s  p e r s p e c t iv e  h a s  
r e c e n t ly  b e e n  m o u n t e d  b y  e x p e r ts  w h o  p r o v id e  e v id e n c e  t h a t  s t r i c t e r  r e g u la t i o n  
a n d  s u p e r v i s i o n  a r e  n e g a t iv e ly  c o r r e l a t e d  w i t h  f i n a n c i a l  d e p t h ,  e f f ic ie n c y ,  a n d  
e v e n  s ta b il i ty .  T h e s e  r e s u l t s  c o m e  o u t  o f  la r g e - s a m p le  e c o n o m e t r i c  s tu d i e s  t h a t  
c o m b i n e  d a t a  o n  b o t h  d e v e lo p e d  a n d  d e v e lo p in g  c o u n t r i e s .
W e  r e p l i c a te d  th e s e  r e s u l ts  f o r  a  s m a lle r ,  m o r e  h o m o g e n e o u s  s a m p le  o f  c o u n ­
t r i e s  i n  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  a n d  E a s t  A s ia .  W e  f o u n d  a  w e a k  n e g a t i v e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
b e tw e e n  r e g u la t i o n  a n d  b a n k  d e v e lo p m e n t ,  d e f i n e d  as c r e d i t  t o  t h e  p r iv a t e  s e c ­
t o r  as a  s h a re  o f  G D P , a n d  a  s t r o n g e r  n e g a t iv e  c o r r e la t i o n  b e tw e e n  b a n k  s u p e r v i ­
s io n  a n d  c r e d i t  r a t io s .  W e  a ls o  f o u n d  a  p o s i t iv e  r e l a t i o n s h ip  b e tw e e n  c r e d i t  a n d  
p r iv a te  m o n i t o r i n g .
C o n c l u d i n g  f r o m  th e s e  r e s u l t s  t h a t  g o v e r n m e n t s  o f  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  
s h o u l d  b e  e n c o u r a g e d  t o  p u l l  b a c k  f r o m  r e g u la t i o n  a n d  s u p e r v i s io n  a n d  r e ly  o n  
p r iv a te  m o n i t o r i n g  w o u l d  b e  t o  ig n o r e  a n o t h e r  s e t  o f  p r o b le m s  t h a t  is  t h e  f o c u s  
o f  t h e  t h i r d  a p p r o a c h  t o  r e g u la t i o n  a n d  s u p e r v i s io n .  T h i s  a p p r o a c h  is a d v o c a te d  
b y  in t e r n a t io n a l  f in a n c ia l  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  w h ic h  a re  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  t h e  s t a b i l i t y  o f  
t h e  o v e ra l l  f in a n c ia l  s y s te m s  o f  in d iv id u a l  c o u n t r i e s  a n d — g iv e n  in c r e a s e d  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e — o f  t h e  w o r l d  f in a n c ia l  s y s te m  as a  w h o le .  M a c r o e c o ­
n o m i c  s h o c k s  f a c e  a l l  b a n k s  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y ,  a n d  t h e y  a r e  t h u s  b e y o n d  t h e  
p u r v i e w  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  M o r e o v e r ,  i n d i v i d u a l  a c to r s ,  b e h a v i n g  i n  a  
p e r f e c t ly  r a t i o n a l  w a y , c a n  in c r e a s e  r is k s  f o r  t h e  f in a n c ia l  s y s te m  as  a  w h o le .
S o m e  o f  th e s e  p r o b le m s  a r is e  f r o m  a  m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  t i m i n g  o f  r i s k  
a n d  r e s u l t  i n  i n a p p r o p r i a t e  r e g u l a t o r y  r e s p o n s e .  R is k s  in c r e a s e  d u r i n g  a  b o o m ,  
b u t  t h e y  o n l y  b e c o m e  a p p a r e n t  i n  t h e  s l o w d o w n  p r o c e s s .  A t  t h a t  p o i n t ,  t h e  
a p p e a r a n c e  o f  g r e a t e r  r i s k  c a u s e s  r e g u l a t i o n  t o  b e  t i g h t e n e d ,  r i s k  a v e r s io n  t o  
in c r e a s e ,  a n d  t h e  tw o  t o g e t h e r  b e c o m e  a  d r a g  o n  e c o n o m ic  g r o w th .  M a c r o e c o ­
n o m i c  p o l ic ie s  f r e q u e n t l y  e x a c e r b a te  th i s  p r o c y c l ic a l i ty .  W e  p r o v i d e d  e v id e n c e  
s u p p o r t i n g  th i s  p e r s p e c t iv e  t h r o u g h  e x a m in in g  d a t a  o n  l e n d i n g  p a t t e r n s  a m o n g  
c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  s u f f e r e d  t w in  c r ise s  i n  t h e  1 9 8 0 s  a n d  1 9 9 0 s .
T h e  s o l u t i o n  t o  th e s e  a p p a r e n t ly  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  se ts  o f  e v id e n c e  a n d  c o n c e r n s  
w o u l d  s e e m  t o  b e  s m a r t e r  r e g u l a t i o n  a n d  s u p e r v i s i o n ,  n o t  le s s  r e g u l a t i o n  a n d  
s u p e r v i s io n .  M o r e  d i s c lo s u r e  a n d  a  b e t t e r  i n f o r m e d  p u b l i c  s h o u l d  c e r t a i n l y  b e
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p a r t  o f  a n y  s e t  o f  p o l i c y  r e c o m m e n d a t io n s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s e c to r .  
T h e  p r iv a te  m o n i t o r i n g  p a r a d ig m  is a n  i m p o r t a n t  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  p o l ic y  f o r  t h e  
f u tu r e ,  b u t  i t  n e e d s  t o  b e  c a r e f u l ly  i n t e g r a t e d  i n t o  e x is t in g  p r u d e n t i a l  r e g u la t io n s  
t h a t  h a v e  p r o v e d  v a lu a b le  i n  t h e  p e r i o d  a f t e r  f i n a n c i a l  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  p u t  th e s e  
is s u e s  o n t o  t h e  a g e n d a .
A t  t h e  s a m e  t im e ,  t h e  a r g u m e n t s  f o r  m a c r o p r u d e n t i a l  r e g u la t i o n  a n d  s u p e r v i ­
s io n  m u s t  b e  t a k e n  i n t o  a c c o u n t  a s  w e ll .  T h o s e  a d v o c a t in g  th i s  a p p r o a c h  a re  a lso  
c r i t i c a l  o f  e x i s t i n g  r e g u l a t i o n  a n d  s u p e r v i s i o n — a l t h o u g h  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  r e a s o n s  
t h a n  th o s e  s u p p o r t i n g  p r iv a te  m o n i t o r i n g .  T h e y  b e l ie v e  t h a t  e x is t in g  r e g u la t i o n  
a n d  s u p e r v i s io n  a r e  p r o c y c l ic a l  a n d  t h u s  e x a c e rb a te  p r o b le m s  o f  in s ta b i l i ty .  R e c ­
o m m e n d a t i o n s  o n  th i s  s id e  i n c lu d e ,  a b o v e  a ll, a  lo n g e r  t i m e  h o r i z o n  f o r  r e g u la ­
to r s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  r e g u la to r s  n e e d  t o  f i n d  w a y s  t o  l i m i t  t h e  in c r e a s e d  v u ln e r a b i l i ­
t ie s  d u r i n g  b o o m  p e r i o d s  ( t o  m a n a g e  t h e  b o o m ,  a s  s o m e  p u t  i t )  a n d  t o  a v o id  
o v e r t i g h te n in g  d u r i n g  r e c e s s io n s .  T h e y  a ls o  m u s t  l o o k  f o r  w a y s  t o  i d e n t i f y  a n d  
p r o t e c t  t h e  f in a n c ia l  s y s te m  a g a in s t  m a c r o e c o n o m ic  s h o c k s ,  w h e t h e r  e x o g e n o u s  
o r  e n d o g e n o u s .  W h i l e  p r o p o s a l s  f o r  c o u n te r c y c l i c a l  r e g u l a t i o n  a n d  s u p e r v i s io n  
w o u l d  b e  v e r y  d i f f i c u l t  t o  c a r r y  o u t  i n  p r a c t i c e ,  s o m e  s o l u t i o n s  t o  t h e  p r o b le m s  
o f  c y c l ic a l i ty  m u s t  b e  s o u g h t .  T h e s e  is su e s  a re  e s p e c ia l ly  p r e s s in g  a t  t h e  m o m e n t  
b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  p o s s ib i l i ty  t h a t  t h e  n e w  B a se l A c c o r d  i t s e l f  m a y  in c r e a s e  p r o c y c l i ­
c a l  b e h a v io r  a n d  m a g n i f y  in s ta b i l i ty .
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5
F r o m  B a n k s  t o  C a p i t a l  M a r k e t s :  
N e w  S o u rc e s  o f  F in a n c e
E m e r g i n g  m a r k e t  e c o n o m i e s — i n c l u d i n g  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  a n d  E a s t  A s ia —  
h a v e  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  h a d  b a n k - b a s e d  f i n a n c i a l  s y s te m s ,  w i t h  s m a l l ,  p o o r l y  
d e v e l o p e d  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s .  B o n d  m a r k e t s  h a v e  t e n d e d  t o  b e  .s h a l lo w , h e a v i ly  
d o m i n a t e d  b y  g o v e r n m e n t  d e b t ,  a n d  w i t h  lo w  t u r n o v e r .  S t o c k  m a r k e t s  h a v e  
l ik e w is e  f e a tu r e d  f e w  is su e s , a n d  m o s t  h a v e  n o t  b e e n  t r a d e d  w i t h  a n y  f re q u e n c y .  
T h u s ,  t h e  b a n k i n g  s y s t e m  h a s  p r o v i d e d  t h e  m a i n  s o u r c e  o f  f i n a n c e  f o r  b o t h  
p u b l i c  a n d  p r i v a t e  b o r r o w e r s .  R e c e n t  f i n a n c i a l  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  r e f o r m s  c h a n g e d  
t h e  w a y  t h a t  b a n k i n g  s y s te m s  o p e r a t e  b y  l i m i t i n g  g o v e r n m e n t  c o n t r o l s  o v e r  
i n t e r e s t  r a te s  a n d  o v e r  t h e  v o lu m e  a n d  r e c ip ie n t s  o f  c r e d i t .  W h i l e  t h e y  a ls o  p r o ­
v id e d  s o m e  s t im u lu s  f o r  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t  d e v e lo p m e n t ,  n o  d r a m a t i c  c h a n g e s  h a v e  
o c c u r r e d  t o  m a t c h  th o s e  f o u n d  in  b a n k in g .
A c c o r d i n g  t o  o n e  s t r a n d  o f  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e ,  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  d o e s  n o t  p o s e  a n y  
p a r t i c u l a r  p r o b l e m  s in c e  b a n k - b a s e d  s y s te m s  p r o v id e  a  p e r f e c t ly  v ia b le  s o u r c e  o f  
f i n a n c e ;  i n d e e d ,  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  c o u n t r i e s  h a v e  b a n k - b a s e d  s y s ­
te m s .  T h e  s o - c a l le d  A n g lo - S a x o n  m o d e l ,  b a s e d  o n  s t r o n g  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s ,  is a n  
a n o m a l y  e v e n  a m o n g  i n d u s t r i a l  e c o n o m i e s .  A n o t h e r  l i n e  o f  t h o u g h t  s u g g e s t s  
t h a t  i t  is  i m p o r t a n t  t o  h a v e  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  b a n k i n g  s y s te m  
b e c a u s e  c a p i ta l  m a r k e t s  p r o v id e  a  u s e fu l  a l t e r n a t iv e  to  b a n k  f in a n c e  d o m e s t ic a l ly  
a n d  lo w e r  d e p e n d e n c e  o n  v o l a t i l e  f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l  f lo w s  f o r  p u b l i c  a n d  p r i v a t e  
b o r r o w e r s  a l ik e .  T h e y  a ls o  o f f e r  n e w  s a v in g s  i n s t r u m e n t s  a n d  i n f o r m a t i o n  o n  
b e n c h m a r k  in te r e s t  ra te s .
h i
W e  a g re e  w i t h  t h e  a r g u m e n t  t h a t  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s  a re  a  u s e fu l  c o m p l e m e n t  to  
b a n k i n g  s y s te m s ,  b u t  t h e  c h a p t e r  d e m o n s t r a t e s  t h a t  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  t r a i l s  f a r  
b e h i n d  E a s t  A s ia  a n d  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  c o u n t r i e s  i n  te r m s  o f  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t  d e v e lo p ­
m e n t  a n d  f in a n c ia l  d e p t h  m o r e  g e n e ra lly . L a c k  o f  d iv e r s i f i c a t io n  t o w a r d  c a p i ta l  
m a r k e t s  is  e s p e c ia l ly  p r o b l e m a t i c  f o r  t h e  i n v e s tm e n t  p r o c e s s  i n  L a t in  A m e r ic a ,  
g iv e n  t h e  r e g i o n ’s l o w  le v e ls  o f  d o m e s t i c  b a n k  c r e d i t .  T h r e e  f a c t o r s  h a v e  h i n ­
d e r e d  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t  d e v e l o p m e n t :  l a c k  o f  m a c r o e c o n o m i c  s t a b i l i t y ,  l a c k  o f  
s t r o n g  in s t i t u t i o n s ,  a n d  t h e  e x is te n c e  o f  i n t e r n a t io n a l  ( e s p e c ia l ly  U .S .)  f in a n c ia l  
m a r k e t s  a s fa n  a l t e r n a t iv e  t o  d o m e s t i c  m a r k e t s .  W h i l e  w e  w o u l d  e x p e c t  s t r u c t u r a l  
r e f o r m s  t o  s t im u la t e  c a p i ta l  m a r k e t s — as th e y  d i d  i n  C h i l e — th e y  w e r e  g e n e r a l ly  
c a r r i e d  o u t  i n  a  p r o b l e m a t i c  w a y  s u c h  t h a t  t h e  f u l l  a d v a n t a g e s  w e r e  n o t  
o b t a i n e d .  F in a n c ia l  l i b e r a l iz a t io n ,  f o l lo w e d  b y  f in a n c ia l  c r is e s ,  w a s  a  p r o m i n e n t  
e x a m p le .  W e  a r g u e  t h a t  L a t in  A m e r i c a n  p o l ic y m a k e r s  s h o u l d  t a k e  s te p s  t o  p r o -  
! m o t e  m a r k e t s  b y  a d v a n c i n g  f u r t h e r  i n  t h e  m a c r o e c o n o m i c  p o l i c y  a r e a  a n d  
s t r e n g t h e n i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  e s p e c ia l ly  c o r p o r a t e  g o v e r n a n c e .  G o v e r n m e n t s  m a y  
a ls o  h a v e  t o  t a k e  p r o a c t iv e  m e a s u re s  to  s t im u la t e  t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  n e w  a c to r s  
t h r o u g h  le g a l  c h a n g e s  a n d  o t h e r  in c e n t iv e s .
T h i s  c h a p t e r  c o m p a r e s  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t  d e v e l o p m e n t  i n  L a t in  A m e r i c a  w i t h  
t h a t  in  E a s t  A s ia . T h e  f i r s t  s e c t io n  re v ie w s  t h e  l i t e r a tu r e  a b o u t  t h e  ro le  o f  c a p i ta l  
m a r k e ts ,  t h e i r  re la t iv e  im p o r t a n c e ,  a n d  t h e  d e t e r m in a n t s  o f  t h e i r  p e r f o r m a n c e .  I t  
a lso  p r e s e n ts  se v e ra l h y p o th e s e s  a b o u t  t h e  r e a s o n s  f o r  L a t in  A m e r ic a ’s la g g in g  p e r ­
f o r m a n c e .  T h e  s e c o n d  s e c t io n  p r o v id e s  d a t a  o n  f in a n c ia l  m a r k e t  t r e n d s  i n  L a t in  
A m e r i c a  a n d  E a s t  A s ia  s in c e  1 9 9 0 .  T h e  t h i r d  s e c t i o n  a n a ly z e s  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  
b e tw e e n  th e  tw o  r e g io n s  i n  l i g h t  o f  t h e  h y p o th e s e s .  T h e  f in a l  s e c t io n  c o n c lu d e s .
Capital Market Performance: Literature and Hypotheses
I n  a n  in f lu e n t i a l  s t u d y  p u b l i s h e d  m o r e  t h a n  tw o  d e c a d e s  a g o , Z y s m a n  p o p u l a r ­
i z e d  t h e  i d e a  t h a t  f i n a n c i a l  s y s t e m s  c a n  b e  d i v i d e d  i n t o  t h r e e  t y p e s :  a  s y s t e m  
b a s e d  o n  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s  (a s  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S ta te s  a n d  G r e a t  B r i t a i n ) ,  a  c r e d i t -  
b a s e d  s y s te m  a d m i n i s t e r e d  b y  g o v e r n m e n t s  ( s u c h  a s  F r a n c e  a n d  J a p a n ) ,  a n d  a  
c r e d i t - b a s e d  s y s te m  d o m i n a t e d  b y  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  ( l ik e  G e r m a n y ) . Z y s ­
m a n ,  a  p o l i t i c a l  s c ie n t is t ,  is i n t e r e s t e d  i n  th i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  im p l i c a ­
t i o n s  f o r  g o v e r n m e n t  p o l i c y  a n d  r e l a t i o n s  a m o n g  p o l i t i c a l  a c to r s .  H e  b e l ie v e s  
t h a t  f in a n c ia l  s y s te m s  in f lu e n c e  g o v e r n m e n ts ’ c a p a c i ty  t o  in t e r v e n e  i n  t h e  e c o n ­
o m y  a n d  t h e  t y p e s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  c o n f l i c t s  t h a t  e m e r g e .  S p e c i f ic a l ly ,  t h e  b o o k  
a rg u e s  t h a t  p r iv a te  s e c to r  f i rm s  d o m i n a t e  e c o n o m y  a n d  s o c ie ty  i n  t h e  U .S . - U .K .  
t y p e  o f  a r r a n g e m e n t s ,  g o v e r n m e n t  p o l i c i e s  a r e  k e y  f a c t o r s  i n  e c o n o m i e s  l i k e  
J a p a n  a n d  F ra n c e ,  a n d  n e g o t i a t e d  s o lu t io n s  p r e v a i l  in  G e r m a n - s ty l e  s t r u c t u r e s .1
I n  t h e  e c o n o m ic s  f ie ld ,  a n  e q u a l ly  i n f lu e n t i a l  b o o k  b y  A l le n  a n d  G a le  lo o k s  a t  
t h e  s a m e  f iv e  c o u n t r i e s ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  a u th o r s  c o l la p s e  Z y s m a n ’s tw o  c r e d i t - b a s e d  
s y s te m s  a n d  s p e a k  o n l y  o f  b a n k s  v e r s u s  m a r k e t s .  T h e i r  p r i n c i p a l  a im  is t o  c r i t i -
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1. Z y s m a n  ( 1 9 8 3 ) .
c iz e  s t a n d a r d  e c o n o m ic  t h e o r y  a b o u t  t h e  a l l o c a t io n  o f  r e s o u r c e s  t h r o u g h  f i n a n ­
c ia l  m a r k e t s .  T h e y  s e t  o u t  “t o  d e v e lo p  th e o r ie s  t h a t  b e t t e r  c a p tu r e  h o w  re s o u rc e s  
a r e  a l l o c a t e d  i n  p r a c t i c e  a n d  u n d e r s t a n d  t h e  n o r m a t iv e  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  
s y s te m s ,” b u t  t h e y  a r e  a ls o  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  c o m p a r i n g  t h e  a d v a n ta g e s  a n d  d i s a d v a n ­
t a g e s  o f  m a r k e t - b a s e d  v e r s u s  c r p d i t d aa s e d  ( i n t e r m e d i a t e d )  s y s te m s .  C r i t i c i z i n g  
th i s  s im p l i s t i c  d ic h o to m y ,  t h e y  a r g u e  t h a t  e a c h  s y s te m  h a s  a d v a n ta g e s  a n d  d i s a d ­
v a n ta g e s .  T h e y  c o n c lu d e  t h a t  d i f f e r e n t  i n s t i t u t i o n s  c a n  p e r f o r m  t h e  s a m e  f u n c ­
t i o n s  a n d  t h a t  t h e  id e a l  s y s te m  re l ie s  o n  b o t h . 2
A  t h i r d  b o o k  o f  i n t e r e s t  f o r  o u r  t o p i c ,  a n  e d i t e d  v o lu m e  b y  D e m i r g i iq - K u n t  
a n d  L e v in e ,  b r i n g s  t w o  n e w  e l e m e n t s  t o  t h e  d i s c u s s io n  o f  b a n k s  a n d  m a r k e t s .  
F i r s t ,  t h e y  m o v e  a w a y  f r o m  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  c o u n t r i e s  a n d  f o c u s  o n  t h e  d e v e lo p in g  
w o r ld .  I n  th i s  s e n s e , t h e y  lo o k  m o r e  t o  G o l d s m i t h  a s  a n  a n t e c e d e n t  t h a n  t o  t h e  
a u t h o r s  j u s t  m e n t i o n e d .3 S e c o n d ,  t h e y  p r o v id e  e m p i r ic a l  d a t a ,  i n c l u d i n g  a  n e w  
d a t a b a s e ,  w i t h  w h i c h  t o  c o m p a r e  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  tw o  ty p e s  o f  s y s te m s  
a c r o s s  a  l a r g e  n u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s .  E c h o i n g  A l le n  a n d  G a le ,  t h e y  d o  n o t  f i n d  
e i t h e r  t y p e  t o  b e  s u p e r io r ;  r a th e r ,  t h e y  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  c r u c i a l  p o i n t  is  h o w  w e l l  
e i t h e r  f u n c t io n s .  T h e y  a d v is e  g o v e r n m e n ts  t o  f o c u s  o n  le g a l ,  r e g u la to ry ,  a n d  p o l ­
ic y  r e f o r m s  t h a t  im p r o v e  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  b o t h  b a n k s  a n d  m a r k e t s .4
D e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  t e n d  t o  b e  l o c a t e d  o n  o n e  e x t r e m e  o f  t h e  s p e c t r u m  
b e tw e e n  b a n k s  a n d  c a p i ta l  m a r k e t s ,  s in c e  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  f o r  s e t t i n g  u p  b a n k ­
in g  s y s te m s  a r e  m u c h  le ss  s t r i n g e n t  t h a n  f o r  m a r k e t s .  T h u s ,  e v e n  m o v in g  to w a r d  
A l le n  a n d  G a le ’s id e a l  o f  a  c o m b i n e d  s y s te m  w o u l d  r e q u i r e  a d d i t i o n a l  e f f o r t  t o  
p r o m o t e  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s .  B y  t h e  l a t e  1 9 9 0 s ,  e c o n o m is t s ,  b u s in e s s  p e o p le ,  g o v ­
e r n m e n t  o f f ic ia ls ,  a n d  t h e  i n t e r n a t io n a l  f in a n c ia l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  w e r e  a ll c a l l in g  f o r  
m o r e  m o v e m e n t  i n  th i s  d i r e c t i o n .  A s ia n  g o v e r n m e n t s  h a v e  b e e n  e s p e c ia l ly  e a g e r  
t o  p r o m o t e  t h e  g r o w t h  o f  b o n d  m a r k e t s  i n  t h e  a f t e r m a t h  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  c r is is  
o f  t h e  la te  1 9 9 0 s ,  i n  t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  t h e  c r is is  w o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  less  se v e re  i f  m a r ­
k e ts  h a d  b e e n  m o r e  d e v e lo p e d .5
P a r t ic u la r  e m p h a s i s  h a s  b e e n  p la c e d  o n  t h e  s o - c a l le d  m is s in g  m a r k e t  f o r  g o v ­
e r n m e n t  a n d  c o r p o r a te  b o n d s .  T h e  t e r m  d e r iv e s  f r o m  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  s t o c k  m a r k e t s  
a r e  m o r e  c o m m o n  t h a n  b o n d  m a r k e t s  i n  d e v e lo p in g  c o u n t r i e s ,  i n  p a r t  b e c a u s e  
t h e  u p s id e  o f  a  b o n d  is l i m i t e d  b y  t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a te ,  w h i le  a n  e q u i t y  c la im  h a s  a n  
u n l i m i t e d  u p s id e  a n d  s o  c a n  c o m p e n s a t e  f o r  h i g h  r i s k .6 T h o s e  u r g i n g  s u p p o r t
2. Alien and Gale (2000).
3. Goldsmith (1969).
4. Demirgii$-Kunt and Levine (2001).
5. The Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), and 
the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCA£)> have carried out stud­
ies and made recommendations on how to strengthen the bond markets in the Asian region. See, 
for example, ESCAP (1998); Kim (2001); Yoshitomi and Shirai (2001). Larin American govern­
ments have been less concerned with these issues, although the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB) recently published a volume on the capital markets (Dowers and Masci, 2003), and the IDB 
itself has sponsored programs to stimulate the development of financial markets.
6. See BIS (2002, box 2) for a discussion on “why equity markets may exist where bond mar­
kets fail to thrive.”
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f o r  t h e  m is s in g  m a r k e t  o f f e r  a  v a r ie ty  o f  e x p la n a t io n s  f o r  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  a n  
a c t i v e  b o n d  m a r k e t . 7 F i r s t ,  a  b o n d  m a r k e t  is  t h e  o n l y  m e a n s  o f  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a  
m a r k e t - d e t e r m i n e d  i n t e r e s t  r a t e ,  w h ic h  w i l l  h e l p  in v e s to r s  c a lc u la te  t h e  o p p o r ­
t u n i t y  c o s ts  o f  a l t e r n a t iv e  i n v e s tm e n ts .  S e c o n d ,  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  a  b o n d  m a r k e t ,  
s a v e r s  w i l l  h a v e  f e w e r  i n v e s t m e n t  c h o ic e s  a n d  t h u s  a  l o w e r  v o l u m e  o f  s a v in g s  
m a y  b e  m o b i l i z e d .  T h i r d ,  f i r m s  w il l  f a c e  a  h i g h e r  c o s t  o f  f u n d s  w i t h o u t  a  b o n d  
m a r k e t  a n d  m a y  b e  b i a s e d  t o w a r d  s h o r t - t e r m  i n v e s tm e n t s  i n  t r y i n g  t o  m a t c h  
m a tu r i t i e s .  F o u r t h ,  t o  c o m p e n s a t e  f o r  th e  la c k  o f  a  d o m e s t i c  b o n d  m a r k e t ,  f i rm s  
a n d  g o v e r n m e n t s  m a y  b o r r o w  a b r o a d  a n d  t h u s  t a k e  e x c e s s iv e  f o r e ig n  e x c h a n g e  
r is k s . F i f t h ,  in  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  a  d e e p  b o n d  m a r k e t ,  t h e  b a n k i n g  s e c to r  b e c o m e s  
m o r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a n  i t  w o u l d  b e  o th e r w i s e ,  w h i c h  m a k e s  t h e  e c o n o m y  m o r e  
v u ln e r a b le  t o  c r ise s .
O t h e r  e x p e r ts  c o n c e n t r a t e  o n  s p e c if ic  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  n e e d s  t o  ju s t i f y  t h e  c a l l  f o r  
in c r e a s e d  e m p h a s i s  o n  b o n d  m a r k e t s .  F r o m  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’s p e r s p e c t iv e ,  f o r  
e x a m p le ,  a  b o n d  m a r k e t  is  u s e fu l  f o r  f i n a n c in g  f isc a l d e f ic i t s  w i t h o u t  in c r e a s in g  
i n f la t i o n  o r  t a k i n g  o n  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  r i s k  a n d  f o r  r u n n i n g  m o n e t a r y  p o lic y . F i rm s  
a n d  h o u s e h o l d s  a ls o  n e e d  a c c e s s  t o  b o n d  m a r k e t s  t o  o b t a i n  l o n g - t e r m  f in a n c e  
f o r  in v e s tm e n t  a n d  m o r tg a g e s .
F in a lly , a n  a r g u m e n t  t h a t  h a s  b e c o m e  in c r e a s in g ly  c o m m o n  c o m b i n e s  s o m e  
o f  t h e  ju s t i f i c a t i o n s  a b o v e : n a m e ly ,  d o m e s t i c  c a p i ta l  m a r k e t s  p r o v id e  a n  a l t e r n a ­
t iv e  t o  b o r r o w i n g  a b r o a d  a n d  t h u s  a v o id  t h e  r is k s  a n d  v o la t i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  l a t t e r  
e n t a i l s .  T h e  h e a d  o f  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  M o n e t a r y  F u n d  ( I M F )  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t  
d i v i s io n  r e c e n t l y  s t a t e d ,  “ T h e  e f f o r t s  t o  d e v e lo p  lo c a l  s e c u r i t i e s  m a r k e t s  h a v e  
b e e n  m o t iv a t e d  b y  a  n u m b e r  o f  c o n s id e r a t i o n s ,  e s p e c ia l ly  t h e  d e s i re  t o  p r o v id e  
a n  a l t e r n a t iv e  s o u r c e  o f  f u n d i n g  i n  o r d e r  t o  s e l f - in s u r e  a g a in s t  r e v e rsa ls  i n  c a p i ta l  
f l o w s .” 8 H e  w e n t  o n  t o  q u o t e  A l a n  G r e e n s p a n ’s w e l l - k n o w n  c o m m e n t  t h a t  
s m o o t h l y  f u n c t i o n i n g  b o n d  m a r k e t s  c a n  a c t  a s  a  “s p a re  t i r e ” t o  u s e  w h e n  o t h e r  
s o u r c e s  o f  f u n d s  d r y  u p .
T h e  n e w  i n t e r e s t  i n  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s  h a s  s p a r k e d  a n  i n c r e a s i n g  a m o u n t  o f  
a n a ly s is  a im e d  a t  b e t t e r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  h o w  th e y  o p e r a te .  A l t h o u g h  m o s t  o f  t h e  
s t u d i e s  c o n c e r n  e q u i t i e s ,  b o n d  m a r k e t s  a r e  a ls o  c o n s i d e r e d .  T o p ic s  o f  i n t e r e s t  
i n c lu d e  th e  r e l a t i o n s h ip  o f  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s  t o  e c o n o m ic  g r o w th  a n d  in v e s tm e n t ,  
t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  u n d e r  w h i c h  t h e y  w o r k  b e s t ,  t h e i r  l i n k s  t o  o t h e r  f o r m s  o f  
f in a n c e ,  a n d  d if f e r e n c e s  o r  s im i la r i t ie s  a c ro s s  r e g io n s .  W h i l e  s t r o n g  o v e r la p s  e x is t  
w i t h  t h e  l i t e r a tu r e  w e  h a v e  a l r e a d y  d is c u s s e d  o n  t h e  f u n c t i o n in g  o f  b a n k i n g  sy s­
te m s ,  s o m e  n e w  to p ic s  a r e  a ls o  i n t r o d u c e d .
T h e o r e t i c a l  m o d e l s  a re  a m b ig u o u s  o n  w h e t h e r  s to c k  m a r k e t s  a re  p o s i t iv e ly  o r  
n e g a t iv e ly  l i n k e d  t o  e c o n o m ic  g r o w th .  F o r  e x a m p le ,  t h e  l i t e r a tu r e  c o n ta in s  a r g u ­
m e n t s  b o t h  f o r  a n d  a g a i n s t  m a r k e t s ’ c a p a c i t y  t o  m o n i t o r  f i r m  b e h a v i o r ;  t h i s
7. See Herring and Chatusripitak (2000, especially pp. 14-24). Others make similar argu­
ments.
8. Hausler, Mathieson, and Roldos (2003, p. 21).
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d e b a te  is  e s s e n t ia l ly  t h e  r e f le c t io n  o f  t h e  o n e  a b o u t  b a n k s  v e r s u s  m a r k e t s .  G iv e n  
th e s e  d i s a g r e e m e n t s ,  t h e  r e c e n t  e m p i r ic a l  a n a ly s is  is  e s p e c ia l ly  i m p o r t a n t .  O n e  
o f  t h e  m o s t  f r e q u e n t l y  c i t e d  a r t ic le s  is  t h a t  b y  L e v in e  a n d  Z e r v o s ,  w h i c h  e x a m ­
in e s  e v id e n c e  o n  a  s e t  o f  d e v e lo p e d  a n d  d e v e l o p i n g  e c o n o m ie s  o v e r  t h e  p e r i o d  
1 9 7 6 - 9 3 . 9 T h e y  s t u d y  s e v e ra l  m e a s u re s  o f  s to c k  m a r k e t  p e r f o r m a n c e  a s  p r e d i c ­
to r s  o f  e c o n o m ic  g r o w th :  s iz e  ( m a r k e t  c a p i t a l i z a t io n  as a  s h a re  o f  G D P ) ,  t r a d i n g  
v a lu e  ( v o lu m e  t r a d e d  a s  a  s h a r e  o f  G D P ) ,  a n d  t h e  t u r n o v e r  r a t io  ( v o lu m e  t r a d e d  
a s  a  s h a r e  o f  m a r k e t  c a p i t a l i z a t i o n ) .  S e v e ra l  m e a s u r e s  o f  g r o w t h  a r e  a ls o  u s e d :  
G D P , c a p i ta l  s to c k ,  a n d  p r o d u c t iv i ty .  T o  a ssess  w h e t h e r  s to c k  m a r k e t s  a n d  b a n k s  
a r e  s u b s t i t u t e s  o r  c o m p l e m e n t s ,  t h e y  i n c l u d e  b o t h  i n  t h e i r  a n a ly s i s ,  t o g e t h e r  
w i t h  v a r io u s  c o n t r o l  v a r ia b le s .  T h e i r  c o n c lu s io n  is t h a t  b o t h  s t o c k  m a r k e t s  a n d  
b a n k s  a re  i n d e p e n d e n t  d e t e r m i n a n t s  o f  g r o w th ,  b u t  t h e  r e le v a n t  f a c to r  i n  s to c k  
m a r k e t s  is  l iq u id i ty ,  n o t  size .
I f  w e  a s s u m e  t h a t  f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t s  a r e  p o s i t i v e ly  l i n k e d  t o  i n v e s tm e n t  a n d  
g r o w th ,  w h a t  h a s  s t i m u l a t e d  t h e i r  g r o w th  a n d  w h a t  d e t e r m in e s  t h e i r  d e p t h  a n d  
l iq u id i ty ?  T h e  f in a n c ia l  s y s te m  r e fo r m s ,  w h ic h  w e r e  t h e  m a i n  s u b je c t  o f  c h a p te r  
2 ,  a r e  a n  i m p o r t a n t  p a r t  o f  t h e  a n s w e r  t o  th e s e  q u e s t io n s .  F in a n c i a l  l ib e r a l iz a ­
t i o n  b o t h  s e rv e d  a s  a  s ig n a l  t o  p o t e n t i a l  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  t h e  m a r k e t s  t h a t  a  g o v ­
e r n m e n t  w a s  c o m m i t t e d  t o  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  e c o n o m y  a n d  
o p e n e d  s p a c e  f o r  m a r k e t  m e c h a n i s m s  t o  f u n c t i o n .  O t h e r  r e f o r m s  w e r e  a ls o  
i m p o r t a n t .  O p e n i n g  t h e  c a p i ta l  a c c o u n t  m a d e  f o r e ig n  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  t h e  m a r ­
k e ts  p o s s ib le ;  p r iv a t i z a t i o n  p r o v id e d  n e w  f i rm s  t h a t  w e r e  e a g e r  t o  o b t a i n  f u n d s ;  
a n d  p e n s i o n  r e f o r m  b r o u g h t  i n  n e w  a c to r s  o n  t h e  d e m a n d  s id e .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  
r e f o r m s  g e n e r a l ly  l e d  t o  in c r e a s e d  m a c r o e c o n o m ic  s ta b il i ty ,  w h ic h  w a s  v e r y  p o s i ­
t iv e  f o r  t h e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s .  C o n t r o l  o f  i n f l a t i o n  w a s  i m p o r t a n t  
f o r  b o t h  s to c k  a n d  b o n d  m a r k e t s ,  w h i le  t h e  s iz e  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  b u d g e t  d e f ic i t s  
w a s  c r u c ia l  i n  d e t e r m i n in g  t h e  c h a r a c te r i s t ic s  o f  t h e  l a t t e r .10
R e f o r m s  o f  t h e  e c o n o m y  a s  a  w h o l e  w e r e  c o m p l e m e n t e d  b y  c h a n g e s  t h a t  
w e r e  s p e c i f ic a l ly  o r i e n t e d  t o  im p r o v i n g  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t  f u n c t i o n in g .  A  s t u d y  b y  
t h e  W o r l d  B a n k  id e n t i f i e s  f iv e  s u c h  a re a s  i n  L a t in  A m e r ic a :  c r e a t io n  o f  s u p e r v i ­
s o r y  a g e n c ie s ,  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  i n s i d e r  t r a d i n g  la w s , a n d  i m p r o v e m e n t  o f  c u s ­
t o d y  a r r a n g e m e n t s ,  t r a d i n g  s y s te m s ,  a n d  c l e a r in g  a n d  s e t t l e m e n t  p r o c e s s e s .  B y  
2 0 0 2 ,  b e t w e e n  8 8  a n d  1 0 0  p e r c e n t  o f  L a t in  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  h a d  i m p l e ­
m e n t e d  s u c h  c h a n g e s .11 M o r e  g e n e ra l ly , c o r p o r a te  g o v e r n a n c e  w a s  a ls o  s t r e n g t h ­
e n e d  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  r ig h ts  o f  in v e s to r s ,  i n c l u d i n g  m i n o r i t y  s h a r e h o ld e r s .12
9. Levine and Zervos (1998). Levine (2004) mentions a number of criticisms of the article, 
including difficulties with causality, the measurement of liquidity, the possibility of spurious corre­
lation, and the failure to include other parts of the financial markets in the analysis. Demetriades 
and Andrianova (2004) provide more fundamental criticisms.
10. On the economic reforms in Latin America, see Stallings and Peres (2000).
11. World Bank (2004c, chap. 2, figure 9).
12. On corporate governance, see Shleifer and Vishny (1997); Oman (2001); Oman, Fries, and 
Buiter (2003). On corporate governance in the financial sector, see Litan, Pomerleano, and Sun- 
dararajan (2002).
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T h e  l i t e r a tu r e  s u g g e s ts  t h a t  in  a d d i t i o n  t o  r e fo r m s ,  i n s t i t u t i o n s  a re  i m p o r t a n t  
i n  d e t e r m i n in g  h o w  w e l l  t h e  m a r k e t s  o p e r a te .  A s  i n  c h a p t e r  3 ,  w e  u s e  t h e  t e r m  
in s t i tu t io n  t o  r e f e r  t o  f o r m a l  a n d  i n f o r m a l  r u l e s  t h a t  h e l p  t o  e l i m i n a t e  u n c e r ­
t a in ty .  L a  P o r t a ,  L ó p e z - d e - S i l a n e s ,  a n d  S h le i f e r  p r o p o s e  t h e  u s e  o f  a  c o u n t r y ’s 
le g a l  o r ig in s  a s  a  p r o x y  f o r  t h e  t y p e  o f  i n s t i t u t i o n s  t h a t  w o u l d  b e  f o u n d  la te r ;  
t h e y  c o n s id e r  le g a l  o r ig in s  t o  b e  p a r t i c u l a r ly  i m p o r t a n t  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  p r o p e r t y  
r i g h t s .13 T h e  a u t h o r s  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  E n g l i s h  c o m m o n  la w  t r a d i t i o n  le a d s  t o  b e t ­
t e r  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  t h a n  G e r m a n  a n d  S c a n d i n a v i a n  t r a d i t i o n s .  
F r e n c h  c iv il  l a w  is s a id  to  b e  t h e  le a s t  p r o t e c t iv e  o f  s u c h  r ig h ts .
T h i s  ty p e  o f  a p p r o a c h  h a s  a ls o  b e e n  e x t e n d e d  t o  t h e  a n a ly s is  o f  s t o c k  m a r ­
k e t s .  I n  a  s e r ie s  o f  p a p e r s ,  L a  P o r t a  a n d  c o l l e a g u e s  s t u d y  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
b e tw e e n  le g a l  o r ig in  a n d  v a r io u s  m e a s u re s  o f  s to c k  m a r k e t  p e r f o r m a n c e ,  i n c l u d ­
i n g  s iz e  o f  t h e  m a r k e t s ,  n u m b e r  o f  l i s t e d  f i r m s ,  i n i t i a l  p u b l i c  o f f e r in g s  ( I P O s ) ,  
a n d  o w n e r s h ip  c o n c e n t r a t i o n . 14 T h e i r  c r o s s - c o u n t r y  r e g re s s io n s  g e n e r a l ly  s u p ­
p o r t  t h e i r  h y p o th e s e s .  T h e y  a lso  l o o k  a t  m o r e  s p e c if ic  m e a s u re s  o f  in v e s to r  p r o ­
t e c t i o n — i n c l u d i n g  r u l e  o f  la w , a n t i d i r e c t o r  r i g h t s ,  a n d  o n e - s h a r e  o n e - v o t e  
r u le s — a n d  f in d  s im i la r  c o n c lu s io n s  f o r  s o m e  o f  t h e  m e a s u re s .
I n  a  r e c e n t  p a p e r ,  t h e y  c o n f i r m  t h a t  “ la w  m a t t e r s , ” b u t  a r g u e  s t r o n g l y  t h a t  
p r iv a te  e n f o r c e m e n t  is m o r e  r e le v a n t  t h a n  p u b l i c  r u l e s .15 I n  th i s  s e n s e , t h e y  c o m ­
p l e m e n t  t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  B a r th ,  C a p r i o ,  a n d  L e v in e ,  d is c u s s e d  i n  c h a p t e r  4 ,  w h o  
m a k e  a  s im i la r  a r g u m e n t  f o r  t h e  b a n k i n g  s e c to r .  I n  p a r t i c u la r ,  L a  P o r ta ,  L ó p e z -  
d e - S i la n e s ,  a n d  S h le i f e r  f i n d  t h a t  h a v in g  a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  r e g u la to r  o r  t h e  a b i l i ty  
t o  i m p o s e  c r i m i n a l  s a n c t i o n s  is  n o t  i m p o r t a n t ,  w h i l e  e x t e n s iv e  d i s c lo s u r e  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  a n d  s im p le  p r o c e d u r e s  f o r  in v e s to r  r e c o v e ry  o f  lo s s e s  a re  a s s o c ia te d  
w i t h  la r g e r  s to c k  m a r k e ts .
A  f in a l  s e t  o f  p a p e r s  fo c u s e s  o n  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h ip  b e tw e e n  d o m e s t i c  a n d  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s .  I n  t h e i r  a n a ly s i s  o f  L a t i n  A m e r i c a ’s c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s  
m e n t i o n e d  a b o v e , W o r ld  B a n k  e c o n o m is ts  c o n f i r m  t h a t  m a c r o e c o n o m i c  s ta n c e ,  
i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  a n d  e c o n o m ic  r e f o r m s  a re  p o s i t iv e ly  a s s o c ia te d  w i t h  d o m e s t i c  s to c k  
m a r k e t  d e v e l o p m e n t .  T h e y  a ls o  f i n d ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  a c t i v i t y  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
m a r k e t s  in c re a s e s  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  th e s e  f a c to r s .  I n d e e d ,  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  r a t i o  o f  
i n t e r n a t io n a l  t o  d o m e s t i c  s to c k  m a r k e t  a c t iv i ty  i n d ic a te s  t h a t  t h e y  h a v e  a  la r g e r  
i m p a c t  o n  L a t in  A m e r i c a n  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  s t o c k  m a r k e t s  a b r o a d .  E v id e n c e  is 
c o m p i l e d  f r o m  b o t h  d e s c r ip t i v e  s ta t i s t i c s  a n d  e c o n o m e t r i c  a n a ly s is ;  i t  i n c lu d e s  
s e v e ra l  m e a s u r e s  o f  s t o c k  m a r k e t  p e r f o r m a n c e — c a p i t a l i z a t i o n - t o - G D P  r a t io s ,  
tu r n o v e r ,  a n d  n e w  is s u e s . S im i la r  e v id e n c e  is f o u n d  f o r  g o v e r n m e n t  b o n d  m a r ­
k e ts ,  a l t h o u g h  d a t a  p r o b le m s  p r e c lu d e  a n a ly s is  o f  c o r p o r a te  b o n d s .16
13. La Porta and others (1998).
14. La Porta and others (1997, 1998).
15. La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003).
16. World Bank (2004c, chap. 3).
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G o i n g  f u r th e r ,  L e v in e  a n d  S c h m u k le r  f i n d  n e g a t iv e  r a m i f i c a t i o n s  i n  t e r m s  o f  
t h e  e f fe c ts  o f  i n t e r n a t io n a l  a c t i v i t y  o n  d o m e s t i c  m a r k e t s  i n  L a t in  A m e r ic a .  T h e  
m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  is  a  d e c r e a s e  i n  t h e  l i q u i d i t y  o f  lo c a l  m a r k e t s .  A s  m o r e  f i r m s  
is s u e  s t o c k  a n d  b o n d s  a b r o a d ,  l i q u i d i t y  f a l ls  d r a m a t i c a l l y  o n  lo c a l  c a p i t a l  m a r ­
k e ts .  S m a ll  s iz e  a n d  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  f u r t h e r  th e s e  p r o b le m s .  S o m e  f i rm s  h a v e  le f t  
lo c a l  m a r k e t s  a l t o g e th e r  a n d  m o v e d  t o  i n t e r n a t io n a l  s t o c k  m a r k e t s  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  
S ta te s  o r  E u r o p e ,  u s u a l ly  as a  r e s u l t  o f  p u r c h a s e  b y  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  c o r p o r a t i o n s .17
T h e  i s s u e  o f  s iz e  is  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  o n e  f o r  t h i s  g r o u p  o f  W o r l d  B a n k  e c o n o ­
m i s t s .  T h e y  s t r e s s  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  t h e  s iz e  o f  a n  e c o n o m y  a n d  t h e  
d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  i t s  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s ,  i n c l u d i n g  b o n d  a n d  s to c k  m a r k e t s ;  i n  b o t h  
c a s e s , a  s t r o n g  p o s i t i v e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  is  f o u n d .  T h e  c o n c l u s i o n  d r a w n  is  t h a t  
s m a l le r  c o u n t r i e s  s h o u l d  c o n c e n t r a t e  t h e i r  e f fo r t s  o n  i n t e g r a t in g  th e m s e lv e s  w i th  
t h e  i n t e r n a t io n a l  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  t r y in g  t o  c r e a te  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s  a t  
h o m e .  T h e y  a ls o  a r g u e  t h a t  r e g io n a l  m a r k e t s  d o  n o t  p r o v id e  a  g o o d  a l t e r n a t iv e  
b e c a u s e  c o s ts  w i l l  b e  h i g h e r  t h a n  o n  i n t e r n a t io n a l  e x c h a n g e s .18 C o n t r a r y  t o  t h e  
W o r l d  B a n k  a p p r o a c h ,  A s ia n  g o v e r n m e n t s  h a v e  b e e n  p r o m o t i n g  r e g io n a l  m a r ­
k e ts .  T h e y  a r e  a t t e m p t i n g ,  f o r  e x a m p le ,  t o  f o r m  a  r e g io n a l  b o n d  m a r k e t  i n  a d d i ­
t i o n  t o  t h e  s y s te m  o f  s w a p s  t h a t  is a l r e a d y  i n  p la c e .19
O u r  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  is  t o  e x a m i n e  w h y  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  h a s  l a g g e d  
b e h i n d  o t h e r  r e g io n s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  E a s t  A s ia , i n  t h i s  a r e a  o f  f i n a n c e ,  j u s t  as i t  d i d  
i n  b a n k i n g .  B a s e d  o n  t h e  l i t e r a tu r e  j u s t  d is c u s s e d ,  w e  p r e s e n t  f o u r  h y p o th e s e s .  
F i r s t ,  w e  s u g g e s t  t h a t  m a c r o e c o n o m i c  p e r f o r m a n c e  is a n  i m p o r t a n t  d e t e r m i ­
n a n t  o f  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t  d e v e l o p m e n t .  H i g h e r  g r o w t h ,  l o w e r  i n f l a t i o n ,  a n d  
h i g h e r  s a v in g s  r a te s  w o u l d  b e  e x p e c te d  t o  in c r e a s e  t h e  s iz e  ( a n d  p e r h a p s  t h e  l i ­
q u id i ty )  o f  b o n d  a n d  s t o c k  m a r k e t s .  S e c o n d ,  t h e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  r e f o r m s —  
i n c l u d i n g  f i n a n c i a l  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n ,  p r i v a t i z a t i o n ,  a n d  p e n s i o n  r e f o r m — s h o u l d  
f a v o r  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t  d e v e l o p m e n t .  A t  l e a s t  t w o  c h a n n e l s  m a y  b e  r e l e v a n t :  
r e f o r m s  a r e  a  s ig n a l  t o  i n v e s to r s ,  a n d  t h e y  p r o v id e  n e w  a c to r s  a n d  i n s t r u m e n t s  
t h a t  h e l p  t h e  m a r k e t s  f u n c t i o n  b e t t e r .  T h i r d ,  w e  a r g u e d  i n  c h a p t e r s  3  a n d  4  
t h a t  i n s t i t u t i o n s  p l a y  a n  i m p o r t a n t  r o le  in  d e t e r m i n i n g  b a n k  p e r f o r m a n c e ;  w e  
b e l ie v e  t h e  s a m e  is  l ik e ly  t o  h o l d  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  s t o c k  a n d  b o n d  m a r k e t s .  W e  
h y p o th e s iz e  t h a t  s t r o n g e r  i n s t i t u t i o n s  w il l  b e  a s s o c ia te d  w i t h  l a r g e r  m a r k e t s  a n d  
p e r h a p s  w i t h  h i g h e r  l i q u i d i ty .  F in a l ly ,  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m a r k e t s  
c o u l d  h a v e  a  n e g a t iv e  i m p a c t  o n  d o m e s t i c  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s .  L o c a l  a c to r s  m a y  se e  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m a r k e t s  a s  a  s u b s t i t u t e ,  t h u s  r e l i e v in g  p r e s s u r e  f o r  lo c a l  m a r k e t  
d e v e l o p m e n t .  M o r e o v e r ,  i n t e r n a t io n a l i z a t i o n  m a y  u n d e r m i n e  lo c a l  m a r k e t s  b y  
s h r i n k i n g  l i q u id i ty .
17. Levine and Schmukler (2004).
18. World Bank (2004c, chap. 3); Claessens, Klingebiel, and Schmukler (2002).
19. Recent analyses of the Asian regional market initiatives include Amyx (2004); Ma and 
Remolona (2005); Park and Park (2005).
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S e v e r a l  r e c e n t  e m p i r i c a l  s t u d i e s  h e l p  t o  i d e n t i f y  t r e n d s  i n  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s  i n  
e m e r g in g  e c o n o m ie s ,  e s p e c ia l ly  b o n d  m a r k e t s .20 T h e i r  m e s s a g e  is t h a t  d o m e s t i c  
c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s  h a v e  b e e n  e x p a n d i n g ,  a l t h o u g h  f a i r l y  u n e v e n l y  a c r o s s  r e g io n s  
a n d  i n d i v i d u a l  c o u n t r i e s .  T h i s  e x p a n s i o n  h a s  g e n e r a l l y  b e e n  a c c o m p a n i e d  b y  
g r o w th  o f  d o m e s t i c  b a n k  c r e d i t  a n d  in c r e a s e d  u s e  o f  i n t e r n a t io n a l  f i n a n c ia l  m a r ­
k e t s .  T h u s ,  d o m e s t i c  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s  d o  n o t  s e e m  t o  h a v e  d i s p l a c e d  o t h e r  
s o u r c e s  o f  f i n a n c e ,  a l t h o u g h  a  b e t t e r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  a m o n g  
t h e  v a r io u s  m a r k e t s  w o u l d  b e  h e lp f u l .21
W e  b e g in  w i t h  a n  o v e r v ie w  o f  t h e  f in a n c ia l  s y s te m  i n  L a t in  A m e r i c a  a n d  E a s t  
A s ia .  T a b le  5 -1  c o m p a r e s  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t s  a s  a  w h o l e ,  
i n c l u d i n g  b a n k s ,  b o n d s ,  a n d  e q u i ty ,  o v e r  t h e  p e r i o d  b e tw e e n  1 9 9 0  a n d  2 0 0 3 . 22 
T h e s e  d a t a  p r o v i d e  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  c o n t r a s t  b o t h  t h e  o v e r a l l  d e p t h  o f  t h e  
f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t s  i n  t h e  t w o  r e g i o n s  a n d  t h e  r e l a t i v e  w e i g h t  o f  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  
c o m p o n e n t s .  T h e  p r in c ip a l  m e a s u re  u s e d  i n  th i s  t a b le  ( a n d  m o s t  o f  t h e  o th e r s  in  
t h e  c h a p te r )  is  o u t s t a n d i n g  a m o u n t s  o f  f in a n c e  a s  a  s h a re  o f  G D P , w h ic h  s h o w s  
t h e  im p o r t a n c e  o f  t h e  v o lu m e  o f  f in a n c e  r e la t iv e  to  t h e  s iz e  o f  a n  e c o n o m y . D o l ­
l a r  f ig u r e s  a r e  a ls o  s h o w n  t o  c o m p a r e  t h e  a b s o l u t e  s iz e  o f  t h e  m a r k e t s ,  b o t h  
b e t w e e n  t h e  tw o  r e g io n s  a n d  w i t h  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s ;  t h e  l a t t e r  
w il l  b e  a n  e l e m e n t  o f  t h e  d is c u s s io n  b e lo w  o n  t h e  v i a b i l i ty  o f  lo c a l  m a r k e t s .
S e v e r a l  i m p o r t a n t  p o i n t s  e m e r g e  f r o m  t h e  t o p  p a n e l  o f  t h e  t a b l e .  F i r s t ,  i n  
2 0 0 3 ,  d o m e s t i c  f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t s  as a  w h o le  i n  E a s t  A s ia  w e r e  tw ic e  a s  d e e p  as 
th o s e  in  L a t in  A m e r i c a  ( 2 3 6  p e r c e n t  o f  G D P  as  o p p o s e d  t o  1 1 2  p e r c e n t ) .  E a c h  
in d i v i d u a l  c o m p o n e n t  e c h o e d  t h e  g a p  b e t w e e n  t h e  tw o  r e g i o n s ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  
d i f f e r e n c e  w a s  e s p e c ia l ly  p r o m i n e n t  in  t h e  b a n k i n g  s e c to r .  S e c o n d ,  t h e  r e la t iv e  
s t r e n g t h  o f  E a s t  A s ia  h a s  b e e n  p r e s e n t  a t  le a s t  s in c e  1 9 9 0 .  W h e n  m e a s u r e d  as a  
s h a r e  o f  G D P , t h e  E a s t  A s ia n  a d v a n ta g e  s h r a n k  s o m e w h a t  o v e r  t h e  p e r io d .  T h e  
g r o w t h  r a t e  o f  t o t a l  d o m e s t i c  f i n a n c e  a s  a  s h a r e  o f  G D P  i n  L a t in  A m e r i c a  w a s  
7 8  p e r c e n t ,  c o m p a r e d  w i t h  6 7  p e r c e n t  f o r  E a s t  A s ia . T h i s  d iv e r g e n c e ,  h o w e v e r ,  
w a s  d u e  e x c lu s iv e ly  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  G D P  g r e w  t h r e e  t i m e s  a s  f a s t  i n  E a s t  A s ia  
( 7 .5  p e r c e n t  a n n u a l  a v e r a g e  i n c r e a s e  v e r s u s  2 . 6  p e r c e n t  i n  L a t i n  A m e r i c a ) .  I n  
a b s o lu te  te r m s ,  f in a n c e  i n  E a s t  A s ia  g r e w  m o r e  r a p id ly :  2 5 3  p e r c e n t  i n  n o m i n a l  
d o l l a r  te r m s ,  c o m p a r e d  w i t h  1 8 0  p e r c e n t  i n  L a t in  A m e r ic a .  T h i r d ,  a  s im i la r  p a t ­
t e r n  u n f o l d e d  i n  t h e  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t  s e g m e n t  ( b o n d s  a n d  s t o c k  m a r k e t s ) .  L a t in
20. See, for example, United Nations (1999); BIS (2002); Masuyama (2002); Dowers and 
Masci (2003); Litan, Pomerleano, and Sundararajan (2003); World Bank (2004c).
21. For two different approaches to the complementarities between banks and securities mar­
kets, see Levine and Zervos (1998) and Hawkins (2002).
22. This kind of exercise entails significant data problems, so the numbers should only be taken 
as approximations, although we believe that the trends are accurate. Different sources produce dif­
ferent figures for the same variables, and the same source can even produce different estimates in 
different publications! Problems also arise since the data are aggregated in U.S. dollars, which 
introduces distortions stemming from exchange rate variations.
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Table 5-1. Latin  America an d  East Asia: Composition o f  Domestic F inancial Sector, 1990—2 0 0 3
Bank claimsa Bonds outstanding Stock markef Total
Measure and region 1990 1995 2003 1990 1995 2003 1990 1995 2003 1990 1995 2003
Relative size of markets 
(share of GDP)
Latin America“1 34 33 41 17 21 37 12 25 34 63 86 112
East Asia' 63 71 96 30 31 60 48 72 80 141 185 236
Share of total finance 
(percentf 
Latin America 55 42 37 26 27 31 19 32 32 100 100 100
East Asia 46 41 41 19 18 26 35 ; 42 34 100 100 100
Absolute size of market 
(billions of dollars) 
Latin America 340 500 639 162 319 540 121 383 563 623 1,202 1,742
East Asia 471 981 1,463 190 433 915 355 1,007 1,210 1,016 2,421 3,588
Sources: See references for tables 5-2, 5-3, and 5-4.
a. Total claims by deposit money banks.
b. Total bonds outstanding.
c. Stock market capitalization.
d. Weighted averages; includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela.
e. Weighted averages; includes Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand.
f. Calculated on the basis of absolute size of market.
A m e r ic a  s a w  a b ig g e r  in c r e a s e  a s  a  s h a re  o f  G D I ’ b u t  g r o w th  w a s  v i r tu a l ly  i d e n ­
t i c a l  i n  a b s o l u t e  t e r m s .  T h u s ,  t h e  c o m b i n e d  b o n d  a n d - s to c k - f l a a r k e t  s h a r e  o f  
G D P  i n  2 0 0 3  i n  L a t in  A m e r ic a  w a s  s t i l l  o n l y  a b o u t  h a l f  t h a t  i n  Eaust A s ia .
T h e  s e c o n d  p a n e l  o f  t a b l e  5 -1  s h o w s  t h e  r e l a t i v e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  t h e  t h r e e  
f in a n c ia l  s e c to r  c o m p o n e n t s  w i t h i n  e a c h  r e g io n .  T h e  th r e e  w e r e  f a i r ly  e v e n ly  d i s ­
t r i b u t e d  i n  L a t in  A m e r i c a  i n  2 0 0 3 ,  w h i l e  i n  E a s t  A s ia ,  b a n k  c r e d i t  w a s  s o m e ­
w h a t  m o r e  i m p o r t a n t  t h a n  e i t h e r  o f  t h e  o t h e r  c o m p o n e n t s .  S o m e  s h i f t s  
o c c u r r e d  o v e r  t i m e .  F o r  L a t i n  A m e r i c a ,  t h e  m o s t  o b v i o u s  t r e n d s  w e r e  t h e  
r e d u c e d  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  b a n k  c r e d i t  a n d  t h e  i n c r e a s e d  r o l e  o f  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s .  
T h e  c h a n g e s  w e r e  less  m a r k e d  i n  E a s t  A s ia .
T h e  t h i r d  p a n e l  s h o w s  t h e  a b s o lu te  s ize  o f  t h e  m a r k e t s .  B y  2 0 0 3 ,  t o t a l  f i n a n ­
c ia l  m a r k e t  s iz e  w a s  $ 3 .6  t r i l l i o n  i n  E a s t  A s ia , m o r e  t h a n  tw ic e  t h e  s iz e  o f  L a t in  
A m e r i c a n  m a r k e t s  a t  $ 1 .7  t r i l l i o n .  C a p i t a l  m a r k e t s  ( b o n d s  a n d  s to c k s )  i n  L a t in  
A m e r i c a  i n c r e a s e d  f r o m  a  l i t t l e  le s s  t h a n  $ 3 0 0  b i l l i o n  t o  $ 1 .1  t r i l l i o n  b e tw e e n  
1 9 9 0  a n d  2 0 0 3 .  E a s t  A s ia n  m a r k e t s  g r e w  f r o m  $ 5 5 0  b i l l i o n  t o  $ 2 .1  t r i l l i o n  i n  
t h e  s a m e  p e r io d .  S in c e  t h e  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s  e x p a n d e d  a t  a b o u t  t h e  s a m e  r a t e  i n  
th e  tw o  r e g io n s ,  t h e  la rg e  g a p  w a s  n o t  r e d u c e d .  T h e s e  r e g io n a l  f ig u re s  n e e d  t o  b e  
b r o k e n  d o w n  b y  c o u n t r y ,  s i n c e  t h e  m a r k e t s  a r e  c u r r e n t l y  o r g a n i z e d  o n  a  
n a t i o n a l  b a s is . W h e n  w e  c o m b i n e  b o n d s  o u t s t a n d i n g  a n d  s to c k  m a r k e t  c a p i t a l ­
i z a t i o n ,  f iv e  c o u n t r i e s  h a d  m a r k e t s  t h a t  e x c e e d e d  $ 2 0 0  b i l l i o n  i n  2 0 0 3 :  B ra z i l  
( $ 5 3 5  b i l l i o n )  a n d  M e x ic o  ( $ 2 7 1  b i l l i o n )  in  L a t in  A m e r i c a ;  a n d  K o r e a  ( $ 7 7 6  
b i l l i o n ) ,  T a iw a n  ( $ 5 3 6  b i l l i o n ) ,  a n d  M a la y s ia  ( $ 2 6 7  b i l l i o n )  i n  E a s t  A s ia . T h i s  
c o m p a r e s  w i t h  a n  a v e ra g e  o f  a r o u n d  $ 5  t r i l l i o n  f o r  t h e  f iv e  l a r g e s t  O E C D  m a r ­
k e ts  in  b o n d s  a lo n e .23
T a b le  5 -1  fo c u s e s  o n  a m o u n t s  o u t s t a n d i n g  f o r  e a c h  c o m p o n e n t .  A n o t h e r  w a y  
t o  l o o k  a t  t h e  p r o c e s s  is  t o  f o c u s  o n  r e c e n t  t r e n d s  i n  f i n a n c i a l  f lo w s . F lo w  d a t a  
f o r  t h e  p e r i o d  1 9 9 7 —2 0 0 2  r e in f o r c e  s o m e  o f  t h e  d i f fe r e n c e s  o b s e r v e d  i n  t h e  d a t a  
o n  s to c k s  b u t  r e v e r s e  o t h e r s .  T h e  o v e r a l l  a m o u n t  r a i s e d  b y  t h e  tw o  r e g io n s  i n  
d o m e s t i c  a n d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m a r k e t s  w a s  a b o u t  t h e  s a m e — a r o u n d  $ 2 .3  t r i l l i o n  
o v e r  f iv e  y e a r s .  I n  b o t h  c a s e s , t h e  v a s t  m a j o r i t y  c a m e  f r o m  d o m e s t i c  m a r k e t s .  
O t h e r  p a t t e r n s  w e r e  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t .  B a n k  c r e d i t  w a s  m u c h  m o r e  s ig n i f i c a n t  f o r  
E a s t  A s ia  t h a n  f o r  L a t in  A m e r ic a ;  b o n d s  w e r e  m u c h  m o r e  i m p o r t a n t  f o r  L a t in  
A m e r i c a  ( e s p e c ia l ly  f o r  t h e  p u b l i c  s e c to r )  t h a n  f o r  E a s t  A s ia . T h e  s to c k  m a r k e t  
f a d e d  i n  b o t h  r e g io n s ,  e s p e c ia l ly  L a t in  A m e r ic a .  I n  g e n e r a l ,  t h e  p u b l i c  s e c to r  w a s  
t h e  m a i n  b o r r o w e r  i n  L a t in  A m e r ic a ,  r a i s in g  $ 2  t r i l l i o n ,  w h i le  t h e  p r iv a te  s e c to r  
r e c e iv e d  o n ly  $ 2 6 0  b i l l i o n .  T h e  s i t u a t i o n  w a s  r e v e r s e d  i n  E a s t  A s ia , as $ 1 .6  t r i l ­
l i o n  w e n t  t o  t h e  p r iv a te  s e c to r  a n d  $ 7 0 0  b i l l i o n  t o  t h e  p u b l i c  s e c to r .24
W e  n o w  e x a m in e  t h e  t h r e e  c o m p o n e n t s  s e p a ra te ly , i n c l u d i n g  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  
a m o n g  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h i n  r e g io n s .  W e  b e g in  w i t h  b a n k  c la im s ,  as s h o w n  i n  t a b le
23. Data on bonds are from the BIS website (www.bis.org/statistics/qcsv/anxl6a.csv); stock 
market capitalization is from Standard and Poor’s (2005).
24. Calculated from data in Mathieson and others (2004, pp. 6—9).
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T a b le  5 -2 .  L a tin  A m e r ic a  a n d  E a s t  A s ia :  D o m e s tic • B a r j^ jQ x d it ,  1 9 9 0  a n d 2 0 0 3  
Percent o f  GDP
Region and country
Total credit Credit to private sectô
1990 2003 1990 2003
Latin America0 34 41 23 ** 7.7... .
Argentina 26 " n r " 16 11
Brazil 45 46 31 29
Chile 48 6?) 45 62
Colombia 18 32 16 20
Mexico 22 42 15 16
Peru 19 25 8 22
Venezuela 19 16 17 JSL
East Asia0 63 c C S ’ 55 C spIndonesia 50 vïgç 46 20
Korea 56 99 53 95
Malaysia 82 H? 69 97
Philippines 27 54 19 31
Singapore 96 141 84 112
Taiwan 76 124 60 101
Thailand 74 91 65 79
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook (2001, 2004); Republic o f China (2004) for 
Taiwan.
a. Total claims by deposit money banks (IFS lines 22a-g, 22bx, 22cg).
b. Claims on private sector by deposit money banks (IFS line 22d).
c. Weighted averages o f countries shown in table.
5 - 2 .25 I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  p r o v i d in g  d a t a  o n  t h e  o v e ra l l  t r e n d s  a l r e a d y  d e s c r ib e d ,  t h e  
t a b l e  c o m p a r e s  c r e d i t  t o  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c to r  w i t h  t o t a l  c r e d i t  i n  e a c h  e c o n o m y .  
T h e  d o m i n a n t  m e s s a g e  is  th p t  t h e  p r iv a t e  s e c to r  g o t  m u c h  m o r e  c r e d i t  i n  E a s t  
A s ia  t h a n  i n  L a t in  A m e r ic a G P r iv a te  s e c to r  c r e d i t  i n  L a t in  A m e r i c a  r e m a in e d  less  
t h a n  2 5  p e r c e n t  o f  G D P  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  p e r i o d  s tu d i e d ,  w h i l e  i t  in c r e a s e d  f r o m  
5 5  t o  8 2  p e r c e n t  i n  E a s t  A s ia . J j h e  p r iv a t e  s e c to r  s h a r e  o f  t o t a l  c r e d i t  w a s  a ls o  
m u c h  h i g h e r  i n  E a s t  A s ia :  B T 'p e r c e n t  i n  1 9 9 0 ,  f a l l in g  s l ig h t ly  t o  8 5  p e r c e n t  i n  
2 0 0 3 .  F o r  L a t in  A m e r i c a ,  t h e  f ig u re s  w e r e  6 8  p e r c e n t  a n d  5 4  p e r c e n t ,  r e s p e c ­
tiv e ly . I n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  n o t  o n l y  d i d  t h e  L a t in  A m e r i c a n  p r iv a t e  s e c to r  r e c e iv e  a  
s m a l le r  s h a r e  o f  e x is t in g  c r e d i t ,  b u t  t h e  g a p  in c r e a s e d  o v e r  t h e  p e r io d .  M o r e o v e r ,  
a  h u g e  g a p  r e m a in e d  i n  te r m s  o f  G D P  s h a re ,  a n d  th i s  is  t h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  f a c ­
t o r  i n  t e r m s  o f  i t s  i m p a c t  o n g r o s a b .  j
25. The data in these tables are from international sources, which have attempted to standard­
ize them across countries. Thus, substantial differences often exist with respect to national data in 
individual countries because of different methodologies and the inclusion of different items. The 
differences are likely to be most significant with respect to bank credit, both in total and to the pri­
vate sector. They will be evident in comparing the tables in this chapter with those in chapters 6 
through 8.
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T a b le  5 -3 . L a tin  A m e r ic a  a n d  E a s t  A s ia :  D o m e s tic  B o n d s  O u ts ta n d in g ,  
1 9 9 0  a n d 2 0 0 3
Percent of GDP
Region and country
Total bonds Bond-Xforjprivate sector6
1990 2003 1993 2003
Latin America“ 17 37 2 8
Argentina 8 17 0.1 10
Brazil n.a. 61 n.a. 11
Chile 35 57 11 28
Colombia 3 28 0.3 n.a.
Mexico 23 24 1 3
Peru n.a. 8 n.a. 4
Venezuela n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
East Asia“ 30 60 21 37
Indonesia n.a. 32 n.a. 3
Korea 36 74 30 55
Malaysia 74 95 18 56
Philippines 21 30 n.a. n.a.
Singapore 30 64 16 23
Taiwan 18 56 15 29
Thailand 10 40 7 18
Sources: BIS website (www.bis.org/statistics/qcsv/anxl6a.csv) for total bonds, (www.bis.org/statistics/ 
qcsv/anxl6b.csvamounts) for private sector bonds; World Bank, World Development Indicators (online) 
for GDP; Republic o f China (2004) for Taiwan GDP 
n.a. N ot available.
a. Weighted averages o f  countries shown in table.
b. Includes both corporate and financial sector bonds outstanding.
T a b le  5 - 2  a ls o  s h o w s  d a t a  f o r  t h e  s e v e n  L a t in  A m e r i c a n  a n d  s e v e n  E a s t  A s ia n  
c o u n t r i e s  f o r  w h ic h  d a t a  a re  m o s t  r e a d i ly  a v a i la b le . W i t h  o n e  e x c e p t io n ,  t h e y  a re  
a ls o  t h e  la r g e s t  e m e r g in g  m a r k e t  e c o n o m ie s  i n  e a c h  r e g io n .26 A  p a t t e r n  a p p e a r s  
h e r e  t h a t  r e c u r s  w i t h  a l l  o u r  d a t a :  s o m e  c o u n t r i e s  i n  e a c h  r e g i o n  h a v e  m u c h  
d e e p e r  f in a n c ia l  m a r k e t s  t h a n  o th e r s .  I n d e e d ,  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  w i t h i n  r e g io n s  a re  
s o m e t i m e s  a s  i m p o r t a n t  a s  t h o s e  a c r o s s  r e g io n s .  I n  t e r m s  o f  t o t a l  b a n k  c r e d i t ,  
C h i l e  h a s  h a d  a c c e s s  t o  m u c h  m o r e  c r e d i t  t h a n  o t h e r  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  
e c o n o m i e s .  I n  E a s t  A s ia ,  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  h a s  b e e n  m o r e  e v e n  a c r o s s  c o u n t r i e s ,  
a l t h o u g h  I n d o n e s i a  a n d  t h e  P h i l i p p in e s  l a g g e d  b e h i n d .  T h e  s a m e  g e n e r a l  p a t ­
t e r n  h o l d s  f o r  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  c r e d i t ,  w h i c h  a c t u a l l y  f e l l  a s  a  s h a r e  o f  G D P  
b e t w e e n  1 9 9 0  a n d  2 0 0 3  i n  a  n u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s  i n  b o t h  r e g io n s  ( n a m e ly ,  
A r g e n t in a ,  B ra z il , V e n e z u e la ,  a n d  I n d o n e s ia ) .
26. China is by far the largest emerging economy in the Asian region. It is not included for two 
main reasons: there are very serious data problems for China, and including China in weighted 
averages would overwhelm the rest of the East Asian region, making comparisons with Latin Amer­
ica quite difficult.
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T a b le  5 - 3  s h o w s  t o t a l  d o m e s t i c  b o n d s  o u t s t a n d i n g  a n d  b o n d s  is s u e d Q g rJ th e  
p r iv a te  s e c to r .  D a t a  p r o b le m s  a re  m o r e  s e v e re  f o r  b o n d s  t h a n  f o r  b a n k  lo a n s ,  so  
s e v e ra l  c o u n t r i e s  a r e  m is s in g  f r o m  t h e  t a b l e  f o r  1 9 9 0 .  I t  is  n o t  c le a r  i f  t h e  d a t a  
a r e  u n a v a i la b le  o r  i f  t h e r e  w e r e  n o  b o n d  issu e s ; i n  a n y  c a s e , t h e y  w o u l d  n o t  h a v e  
b e e n  la rg e .  F o r  t h e  p r iv a t e  s e c to r ,  d a t a  a r e  o n l y  a v a i la b le  a s  o f  1 9 9 3  a n d  a g a in  
f o r  s e le c te d  c o u n t r i e s .  E a s t  A s ia  f a r  o u tp a c e s  L a t in  A m e r i c a  i n  t o t a l  b o n d s  o u t ­
s t a n d in g  as a  s h a re  o f  G D P , b u t  a n  e v e n  g r e a te r  d if f e r e n c e  e x is ts  f o r  p r iv a te  se c ­
t o r  b o n d s  ( i n c lu d in g  b o t h  t h e  c o r p o r a te  a n d  f in a n c ia l  s e c to r s ) .  W h i l e  t h e  p r iv a te  
s e c to r  s h a re  i n c r e a s e d  i n  b o t h  r e g io n s ,  b y  2 0 0 3  t h e  p r iv a te  s e c to r  i n  L a t in  A m e r ­
ic a  s t i l l  a c c o u n t e d  f o r  o n l y  2 2  p e r c e n t  o f  t o t a l  b o n d s  o u t s t a n d i n g  ( r e p r e s e n t in g  
8  p e r c e n t  o f  G D P ) .  I n  E a s t  A s ia ,  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  r e p r e s e n t e d  6 2  p e r c e n t  o f  
t o t a l  b o n d s  ( 3 7  p e r c e n t  o f  G D P ) .  O n  t h e  o t h e r  s id e  o f  t h e  l e d g e r ,  t h e n ,  t h e  
p u b l i c  s e c to r  a c c o u n t e d  f o r  n e a r l y  8 0  p e r c e n t  o f  b o n d s  i n  L a t in  A m e r i c a ,  b u t  
le ss  t h a n  4 0  p e r c e n t  i n  E a s t  A s ia .27
A g a in ,  w e  f i n d  s u b s t a n t i a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  w i t h i n  a s  w e l l  a s  a c ro s s  r e g io n s .  C h i l e  
a n d  B ra z i l  d o m i n a t e  t h e  b o n d  m a r k e t s  i n  L a t in  A m e r i c a ,  s in c e  B r a z i l i a n  b o n d  
m a r k e t s  **"* T*17llTi k * ” 1* c la im s .  K o r e a  a n d  M a la y s ia  a r e  t h e  l a r g e s t  p a r t i c i ­
p a n t s  i n  E a s t  A s ia n  b o n d  m a r k e t s .  A  v e r y  la rg e  g a p  n o n e th e le s s  r e m a in s  b e tw e e n  
t h e  l e a d in g  e c o n o m ie s  i n  t h e  tw o  r e g io n s :  t h e  tw o  E a s t  A s ia n  l e a d e r s  r e p r e s e n t  
5 5  p e r c e n t  o f  G D P  i n  p r iv a te  s e c to r  b o n d s ,  w h i le  t h e  f ig u re  is  less  t h a n  2 0  p e r ­
c e n t  f o r  t h e i r  L a t in  A m e r i c a n  c o u n te r p a r t s .
'J >fie  s t o c k  m a r k e t 1̂  p o t e n t i a l l y  a n  i m p o r t a n t  s o u r c e  o f  f i n a n c e  f o r  p r i v a t e  
f irrriS ; b u t  t h e  f i g u r e s  f o r  m a r k e t  c a p i t a l i z a t i o n  g iv e  a  g r e a t l y  i n f l a t e d  v i e w  o f  
t h e i r  r o le .  A s  n o t e d  e a r l ie r ,  i s s u a n c e  o f  s h a re s  o n  t h e  m a r k e t s  ( t h e  s o - c a l l e d  p r i ­
m a r y  m a r k e t s )  fe l l  t o  a  v e r y  l o w  le v e l  i n  b o t h  r e g io n s  o v e r  t h e  la s t  f iv e  y e a r s  o f  
t h e  s a m p le  p e r i o d  ( to  o n ly  2  p e r c e n t  o f  G D P  i n  L a t in  A m e r i c a  a n d  8  p e r c e n t  i n  
E a s t  A s ia ) .28 T h i s  c o m p a r e s  w i t h  m a r k e t  c a p i t a l i z a t i o n  f ig u re s  o f  3 4  p e r c e n t  a n d  
8 0  p e r c e n t  o f  G D P ,  r e s p e c t iv e ly  ( s e e  t a b l e  5 - 4 ) .  I n d i v i d u a l  c o u n t r i e s  d i s p l a y  
s o m e  c h a n g e s  r e l a t i v e  t o  b a n k  lo a n s  a n d  b o n d s .  W h i l e  t h e  t w o  l a r g e s t  s t o c k  
m a r k e t s  i n  L a t in  A m e r ic a  ( in  t e r m s  o f  G D P  s h a re )  a r e  a g a in  f o u n d  i n  C h i l e  a n d  
B ra z i l ,  M a la y s ia  a n d  S in g a p o r e  t o p  t h e  l i s t  i n  E a s t  A s ia .
T a b le  5 - 4  a ls o  s h o w s  t h e  t u r n o v e r  r a t i o ,  w h i c h  is a n  i n d i c a t o r  o f  h o w  a c t iv e  
t h e  s e c o n d a r y  m a r k e t  is  i n  e a c h  c o u n t r y  o r  r e g io n .  T h e  m e a s u r e  is  d e f in e d  as t h e  
t o t a l  v a lu e  o f  s h a re s  t r a d e d  d u r i n g  a  g iv e n  p e r io d ,  d iv id e d  b y  t h e  a v e ra g e  m a r k e t  
c a p i t a l i z a t i o n  f o r  t h e  p e r io d .  T h e  r a t i o  is i m p o r a n i J b a a J ^ ^
IP  P ,m  j n t Q - a J i ^ u i A a w w J t - m a r k e t  ( w i t h  a  h i g h  t u r n o v e r  r a t i o )
t h a n  a n  i l l i q u id  o n e .  M o r e  a c t iv e  t r a d i n g  a ls o  p r o v id e s  m o r e  a c c u r a te  p r i c i n g  o f  
i n d i v i d u a l  is s u e s  a n d  im p r o v e s  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  r e s o u r c e s .  T h e  d a t a  s h o w  t h a t  
t u r n o v e r  i n  E a s t  A s ia  v a s t ly  e x c e e d s  t h a t  i n  L a t in  A m e r i c a  ( 1 5 2  p e r c e n t  v e r s u s
27. It is interesting to note that the public sector share grew as a result of the financial crisis of 
1997-98 in East Asia. In 2001, the public sector share was only 32 percent.
28. M athieson and others (2004, pp. 6 -9 ).
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T a b le  5 - 4 .  L a tin  A m e r ic a  a n d  E a s t  A s ia :  D o m e s tic  S to ck  M a r k e t  In d ica to rs, 











1990 2003 1990 2003 1990 2003 1990 2003
Latin America'1 8 34 30 20 1,624 1,238 326 1,288
Argentina 2 30 34 6 179 107 268 1,033
Brazil 4 48 24 32 581 367 41 369
Chile 45 119 6 10 215 240 839 3,227
Colombia 4 18 6 3 80 114 300 783
Mexico 12 20 44 21 199 159 761 2,145
Peru 3 27 n.a. 6 294 197 n.a. 357
Venezuela 17 4 43 4 76 54 552 182
East Asiad 48 80 145 152 1,792 4,576 445 401
Indonesia 7 26 76 34 125 333 99 34
Korea 42 54 61 237 669 1,563 483 414
Malaysia 110 162 25 34 282 897 138 140
Philippines 13 29 14 9 153 234 870 828
Singapore 93 159 n.a 71 150 475 n.a. n.a.
Taiwan 78 129 430 185 199 669 632 637
Thailand 28 83 93 117 214 405 381 346
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators (online), based on Standard and Poor's (2000, 
2005).
n.a. N ot available.
a. Market capitalization as share o f GDP.
b. Value o f shares traded to market capitalization.
c. 1984 = 100 except Peru, where 1992 = 100; and Indonesia, where 1989 = 100.
d. Weighted averages o f countries shown in table.
2 0  p e r c e n t ,  re sp e c tiv e ly , i n  2 0 0 3 ) ;  in d e e d ,  t u r n o v e r  a c tu a l ly  fe ll  i n  L a t in  A m e r ­
ic a  d u r i n g  t h e  p a s t  d e c a d e .  T h i s  is  a  s e r io u s  p r o b l e m .  E v id e n c e  s h o w s  t h a t  l i ­
q u id i ty ,  r a th e r  t h a n  m a r k e t  s iz e , is m o s t  c lo s e ly  l i n k e d  t o  e c o n o m ic  g r o w th .
T u r n o v e r  a p p e a r s  t o  b e  r e la te d  t o  t h e  a b s o lu te  s iz e  o f  m a r k e t  c a p i t a l i z a t io n —  
a s  o p p o s e d  to  s h a re  o f  G D P , w h ic h  is o u r  b a s ic  m e a s u r e  i n  t h i s  c h a p te r .  O f  t h e  
f iv e  s t o c k  m a r k e t s  w i t h  c a p i t a l i z a t i o n  o v e r  $ 1 0 0  b i l l i o n ,  f o u r  ( B ra z i l ,  M e x ic o ,  
K o r e a ,  a n d  T a iw a n )  h a d  t h e  h i g h e s t  t u r n o v e r  i n  t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  r e g io n s ,  
a l t h o u g h  B ra z i l  a n d  M e x ic o  w e r e  w e l l  b e lo w  t h e i r  A s ia n  c o u n t e r p a r t s .  C h i l e  is 
a n  i n t e r e s t i n g  c a s e  i n  t h a t  i t  h a s  t h e  l a r g e s t  s t o c k  m a r k e t  i n  t e r m s  o f  G D P  in  
L a t in  A m e r ic a  b u t  a  v e r y  lo w  tu r n o v e r ;  t h e  r e a s o n s  a r e  d is c u s s e d  la te r .
A  l o o k  a t  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  f i r m s  l i s t e d  o n  e a c h  s t o c k  m a r k e t  o v e r  t h e  p e r i o d  
1 9 9 0 —2 0 0 3  re v e a ls  t h a t  t h e  tw o  r e g io n s  s t a r t e d  o u t  a t  v e r y  s im i la r  le v e ls : 1 ,6 2 4  
i n  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  a n d  1 ,7 9 2  i n  E a s t  A s ia .  B y  2 0 0 3 ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  
l i s t e d  f i r m s  i n  L a t in  A m e r i c a  h a d  f a l l e n  t o  1 ,2 3 8 ,  w h i le  i t  h a d  m o r e  t h a n  d o u ­
b le d  i n  E a s t  A s ia  t o  4 ,5 7 6 .  E v e ry  c o u n t r y  i n  t h e  A s ia n  s a m p le  s h o w e d  b u o y a n t
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Latin America*1 10 31 33 29 0 6
Brazil 22 30 0 49 0 0
Chile 0 31 62 7 0 0
Colombia 25 20 46 2 0 7
Mexico 0 57 13 29 1 0
Peru 3 16 43 14 0 24
East Asiab 5 50 12 17 1 17
Indonesia 0 96 0 4 0 0
Korea 2 63 20 14 2 0
Malaysia 7 0 0 24 1 68
Thailand 11 39 26 24 0 0
Source: BIS (2002, p. 29).
a. No data are available for Argentina, Venezuela, the Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan.
b. Unweighted averages o f countries shown in table.
g r o w th ,  w h i le  o n ly  tw o  i n  L a t in  A m e r ic a  g r e w  a t  a ll . T h i s  “d e l i s t in g ” p h e n o m e ­
n o n  h a s  s e r io u s  im p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  m a r k e t  l iq u id i ty ,  a s  d is c u s s e d  b e lo w . T h e  t r e n d  
in  n u m b e r  o f  l i s t e d  f i rm s  c o m p le m e n t s  t h e  d a t a  o n  m a r k e t  c a p i t a l i z a t io n ,  c la r i ­
f y i n g  t h e  r e l a t i v e  r o l e  o f  p r i c e  a n d  v o l u m e  in c r e a s e s .  T h e s e  d a t a  s u g g e s t  t h a t  
p r i c e  in c r e a s e s  w e r e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  i n  L a t in  A m e r ic a ,  w h i l e  v o l u m e  in c r e a s e s  
d o m i n a t e d  in  A s ia . M o r e  d i r e c t  e v id e n c e  o f  th i s  f a c t  is p r o v id e d  i n  t h e  la s t  c o l ­
u m n  o f  t h e  t a b le .  T h e  l e a d in g  p r i c e  i n d e x  o f  e m e r g in g  m a r k e t  s to c k s  in d i c a t e s  
t h a t  E a s t  A s ia n  s h a r e  p r ic e s  f e l l  s l i g h t l y  b e t w e e n  1 9 9 0  a n d  2 0 0 3 ,  w h i l e  L a t i n  
A m e r i c a n  p r ic e s  r o s e  b y  3 0 0  p e r c e n t  i n  d o l l a r  t e r m s .29
A  f in a l  s e t  o f  d a t a  t h a t  is e s s e n t ia l  f o r  a n a ly z in g  d o m e s t i c  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s  c o n ­
c e r n s  t h e  p u r c h a s e r s  o f  b o n d s  a n d  s to c k s .  T a b le  5 - 5  s h e d s  s o m e  l i g h t  o n  th i s  
i s s u e ,  a l t h o u g h  d a t a  a r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  c o m p i l e  a n d  c o u n t r y - s p e c i f i c  c a t e g o r i e s  
m a k e  t h e m  h a r d  t o  i n t e r p r e t ;  t h e  d a t a  a r e  a ls o  l i m i t e d  t o  d e b t  s e c u r i t i e s .  
N o n e th e le s s ,  s o m e  u s e fu l  p o i n t s  c a n  b e  e x t r a c te d  f r o m  t h e  t a b le .  F ir s t ,  c o m m e r ­
c ia l  b a n k s  a r e  t h e  d o m i n a n t  p u r c h a s e r s  in  E a s t  A s ia , h o l d i n g  h a l f  o f  a l l  b o n d s ;  i n  
L a t in  A m e r ic a ,  t h e  b a n k s ’ s h a re  is le ss  t h a n  o n e - t h i r d .  S e c o n d ,  t h e  s in g le  l a r g e s t  
c a t e g o r y  o f  p u r c h a s e r  i n  L a t in  A m e r ic a  is i n s t i t u t i o n a l  in v e s to r s  ( t h a t  is , p r iv a te  
p e n s i o n  f u n d s ,  i n s u r a n c e  c o m p a n i e s ,  a n d  i n v e s t m e n t  f u n d s  o f  v a r io u s  k i n d s ) .  
T h e  t h i r d  m a j o r  d i f f e r e n c e  c o n c e r n s  t h e  c a t e g o r y  “o t h e r , ” w h i c h  in c lu d e s  i n d i -
29. Standard and Poofs (2000, 2005). While prices fell in East Asia after the crisis in 1997-98, 
faster price rises in Latin America were not due exclusively to this factor. In 1996, for example, the year 
before the crisis, the Asian index was 403, while the Latin American index was 649 (1984 = 100).
126 Changes in L a tin  America’s F inancial System since 1990
T a b le  5 - 6 .  L a tin  A m e r ic a  a n d  E a s t  A s ia :  O u ts ta n d in g  A m o u n ts  o f  I n te r n a t io n a l  










1995 2003 1995 2003 1995 2003 1995 2003
Latin America' 15 29 4 19 1 2 20 50
Argentina 16 28 6 68 2 5 24 101
Brazil 11 22 3 17 0 2 14 41
Chile 33 70 1 14 2 3 36 87
Colombia 13 15 2 17 0 0 15 32
Mexico 22 34 9 12 4 2 35 48
Peru 11 22 0 4 0 2 11 28
Venezuela 16 22 5 17 0 0 21 39
East Asia' 34 30 4 11 1 4 39 45
Indonesia 24 17 2 4 1 3 FI 24
Korea 17 17 5 10 1 3 23 30
Malaysia 24 59 8 23 2 4 34 86
Philippines 13 30 4 31 3 4 20 65
Singapore 255 148 1 24 2 11 258 183
Taiwan 12 22 1 7 1 8 14 37
Thailand 40 27 4 6 1 5 45 38
Sources: BIS website (www.bis.org/statistics/hcsv/hanx9a_int.csv) for bank loans, (www.bis.org/statis- 
tics/qcsv/anx!5b.csv) for bonds; IMF, Global Financial Stability Report (September 2004) and unpub­
lished data for equity.
a. Includes cross-border loans and foreign currency loans from local offices o f foreign banks.
b. Equity outstanding is sum of cumulative emissions since 1991.
c. Weighted averages o f countries shown in table.
v id u a l  in v e s to r s  a n d  c o r p o r a t i o n s .  T h i s  g r o u p  is  m u c h  m o r e  s ig n i f i c a n t  i n  A s ia  
t h a n  i n  L a t in  A m e r i c a .  T h e s e  d i f f e r e n t  t y p e s  o f  b u y e r s  a r e  i m p o r t a n t  b e c a u s e  
t h e y  h a v e  d i f f e r e n t  p o r t f o l i o  r e q u i r e m e n t s .  T o  t a k e  t h e  t w o  e x t r e m e s ,  i n s t i t u ­
t i o n a l  in v e s to r s  t e n d  t o  b u y  a n d  h o ld ,  w h i le  in d iv id u a l  in v e s to r s  a re  m u c h  m o r e  
l ik e ly  t o  t r a d e  f r e q u e n t ly .  T h e  in v e s to r  p r o f i l e  is  p r o b a b l y  r e l a t e d  to  t h e  t u r n o v e r  
r a te  r e p o r t e d  i n  t a b l e  5 - 4 — a s s u m in g  t h a t  o w n e r s  o f  s to c k  a n d  b o n d s  b e h a v e  in  
s im i la r  w a y s .
T h u s  fa r, w e  h a v e  f o c u s e d  o n  d o m e s t i c  f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t s ,  b u t  g o v e r n m e n t s  
a n d  t h e  p r iv a te  s e c to r  h a v e  a n  a l t e r n a t iv e  s o u r c e  a t  t h e  i n t e r n a t io n a l  le v e l. I n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  b a n k s  c a n  p r o v i d e  l o a n s  t o  b o r r o w e r s  i n  e m e r g i n g  m a r k e t  e c o n o m ie s  
( e i t h e r  t h r o u g h  t h e  h e a d  o f f i c e s  o r  t h r o u g h  lo c a l  b r a n c h e s  i n  e m e r g i n g  
e c o n o m ie s  th e m s e lv e s ) ,  a n d  a c to r s  i n  e m e r g in g  m a r k e t s  c a n  a ls o  is s u e  b o n d s  o r  
e q u i t y  i n t e r n a t io n a l ly .  T a b le  5 - 6  p r o v id e s  i n f o r m a t i o n  o n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  b a n k  
lo a n s ,  b o n d s ,  a n d  e q u i t y  o u t s t a n d i n g  in  1 9 9 5  a n d  2 0 0 3 .  H e r e  w e  f i n d  a  s o m e ­
w h a t  d i f f e r e n t  p a t t e r n  t h a n  i n  t h e  p r e v io u s  ta b le s :  i n t e r n a t io n a l  f in a n c e  i n  2 0 0 3
c o n s t i t u t e d  a  l a r g e r  s h a r e  o f  G D P  ( 5 0  p e r c e n t )  i n  L a t in  A m e r i c a  t h a n  i t  d i d  in  
E a s t  A s ia  ( 4 5  p e r c e n t ) .  T h e  d a t a  f u r t h e r  s h o w  t h a t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c e  a s  a  
s h a r e  o f  t o t a l  f i n a n c e  ( d o m e s t i c  a n d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l )  w a s  3 1  p e r c e n t  i n  L a t in  
A m e r i c a  v e r s u s  1 6  p e r c e n t  i n  E a s t  A s ia . N o n e th e l e s s ,  t h e  a d d i t i o n  o f  t h e  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  c o m p o n e n t  d o e s  n o t  o f f s e t  t h e  d i f fe r e n c e s  i n  d o m e s t i c  f in a n c e  b e tw e e n  
th e  tw o  r e g io n s .
I f  w e  d i s a g g re g a te  t h e  f ig u re s  f o r  b a n k  lo a n s  a n d  b o n d  is s u e s  f r o m  t h e  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  m a r k e t s ,  w e  f i n d  r e s u l t s  t h a t  a re  s im i la r  to  th o s e  f o r  t h e  d o m e s t i c  m a r ­
k e t s  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  p u b l i c - p r i v a t e  a l l o c a t i o n .  F o r  L a t in  A m e r i c a ,  n e a r l y  tw o -  
t h i r d s  o f  t h e  b o n d s  i s s u e d  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m a r k e t s  w e r e  b y  g o v e r n m e n t s  i n  
2 0 0 3 .  T h e  r a n g e  is f r o m  3 1  p e r c e n t  i n  C h i l e  t o  9 6  p e r c e n t  i n  P e r u .  O n l y  1 6  
p e r c e n t  w a s  i s s u e d  b y  n o n f i n a n c i a l  c o r p o r a t i o n s  i n  L a t in  A m e r i c a ,  v e r s u s  3 5  
p e r c e n t  i n  E a s t  A s ia ;  t h e  r e m a i n d e r  i n  b o t h  c a s e s  w a s  i s s u e d  b y  lo c a l  f i n a n c i a l  
i n s t i t u t i o n s .  T h u s ,  i n  L a t i n  A m e r i c a ,  b o t h  d o m e s t i c  a n d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  b o n d  
m a r k e t s  w e r e  l a r g e ly  t h e  p r o v i n c e  o f  g o v e r n m e n t s  n e e d i n g  t o  f i n a n c e  d e f ic i t s .  
T h e  o p p o s i t e  w a s  t h e  c a se  in  E a s t  A s ia , w h e r e  p r iv a te  s e c to r  f i rm s  w e r e  t h e  m a in  
is s u e r s  o f  d e b t .  W i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  b a n k  lo a n s ,  t h e  p i c t u r e  is  m o r e  n u a n c e d .  T h e  
p u b l i c  s e c to r  r e c e iv e d  o n l y  a  s l ig h t ly  la r g e r  s h a re  o f  t o t a l  i n t e r n a t io n a l  lo a n s  i n  
L a t in  A m e r ic a  i n  2 0 0 3  ( 2 2  p e r c e n t )  t h a n  i n  E a s t  A s ia  ( 1 9  p e r c e n t ) .  A m o n g  p r i ­
v a te  s e c to r  e n t i t i e s ,  t h e  n o n f in a n c i a l  s e c to r  in  L a t in  A m e r ic a  w a s  t h e  m a j o r  b o r ­
ro w e r ;  a b o u t  6 0  p e r c e n t  o f  t o t a l  lo a n s  w a s  o b t a i n e d  b y  th i s  s e c to r .  I n  E a s t  A s ia , a  
f a i r ly  e v e n  d iv i s io n  w a s  f o u n d  b e tw e e n  f in a n c ia l  a n d  n o n f i n a n c i a l  b o r r o w e r s .30
Analysis of Financial Market Trends
T h e  p r e v io u s  s e c t io n  i d e n t i f i e d  i m p o r t a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  b e tw e e n  d o m e s t i c  f i n a n ­
c ia l  m a r k e t s  i n  L a t in  A m e r i c a  a n d  E a s t  A s ia  a lo n g  a  n u m b e r  o f  d im e n s io n s .  T h e  
m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  a r e  m u c h  d e e p e r  a n d  m o r e  l i q u i d  m a r k e t s  i n  E a s t  A s ia  t h a n  in  
L a t i n  A m e r i c a  a n d  a  s t r o n g e r  e m p h a s i s  i n  A s ia  o n  p r o v i d i n g  r e s o u r c e s  t o  t h e  
p r i v a t e  s e c to r .  L a t i n  A m e r i c a ’s g r e a t e r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  
m a r k e t s  o f fe r s  s o m e  c o u n te r b a l a n c e ,  b u t  n o t  e n o u g h  t o  m a k e  u p  f o r  E a s t  A s ia ’s 
a d v a n ta g e  i n  t h e  d o m e s t i c  s p h e re .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  i n t e r n a t io n a l  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t  p a r ­
t i c i p a t i o n  m a y  b e  a  d o u b le - e d g e d  s w o rd ,  o f f e r in g  i m p o r t a n t  b e n e f i t s  i n  t e r m s  o f  
t h e  v o lu m e  a n d  p r ic e  o f  f in a n c e  w h i le  a ls o  p r o v id in g  c h a n n e l s  f o r  c o n t a g i o n  in  
p e r i o d s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  c r is is  a n d  p e r h a p s  u n d e r m i n i n g  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  d o m e s t i c  
m a r k e t s .  I n  th i s  s e c t io n ,  w e  e x a m in e  e v id e n c e  a b o u t  t h e  h y p o th e s e s  p r e s e n t e d  
e a r l ie r  t o  e x p la in  t h e  d i f fe r e n c e s  b e tw e e n  t h e  tw o  r e g io n s .  T h e  h y p o th e s e s  fo c u s  
o n  t h e  m a c r o e c o n o m i c  e n v i r o n m e n t ,  s t r u c t u r a l  r e f o r m s ,  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  i n s t i t u ­
t i o n s ,  a n d  t h e  r o le  o f  in t e r n a t io n a l  f in a n c ia l  m a r k e t s  i n  t h e  tw o  r e g io n s .
30. Calculated from the BIS website. For international bonds, see www.bis.org/statistics/ 
qcsv/anx!2.csv; for international bank loans, see www.bis.org/statistics/hcsv/panx9a.csv.
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128 Changes in  L atin  Americas F inancial System since 1990
T a b le  5 - 7 .  L a tin  A m e r ic a  a n d  E a s t  A s ia :  M a c ro e c o n o m ic  In d ica to rs , 1 9 6 5 —2 0 0 3  
Percent
















Source: World Bank (1992) for 1965—90; World Bank (2004a) for GDP growth and inflation in 
1991—2003; World Bank, World Development Indicators (online) for savings in 2000—03.
a. Broad definitions of Latin America and East Asia.
b. Consumer price index.
c. Gross domestic savings as share of GDP
M a c r o e c o n o m ic  E n v i r o n m e n t
O n e  r e a s o n  t h a t  E a s t  A s ia ’s d o m e s t i c  f in a n c ia l  m a r k e t s  a r e  tw ic e  as d e e p  as th o s e  
i n  L a t in  A m e r ic a  ( a n d  t h e  g a p  is w id e n in g )  h a s  t o  d o  w i t h  d i f fe r e n c e s  i n  m a c r o -  
e c o n o m i c  p e r f o r m a n c e .  T a b le  5 - 7  c o m p a r e s  t h e  tw o  r e g i o n s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  
t h r e e  m a c r o e c o n o m ic  v a r ia b le s  t h a t  a re  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  r e le v a n c e  f o r  f i n a n c ia l  s e c ­
t o r  d e v e lo p m e n t :  t h e  d o m e s t i c  sa v in g s  r a te ,  G D P  g r o w th ,  a n d  in f la t io n .
T h e  s a v in g s  r a t e  is  o b v io u s ly  i m p o r t a n t  s in c e  i t  is  a  n a t i o n s  s a v in g s  t h a t  a re  
r e c y c le d  t h r o u g h  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s y s te m . A s  t h e  t a b l e  s h o w s , s a v in g s  r a te s  i n  E a s t  
A s ia  w e r e  n e a r ly  d o u b l e  t h o s e  i n  L a t in  A m e r i c a  i n  t h e  l a s t  f i f t e e n  y e a r s  o f  t h e  
s a m p le  p e r io d ,  d e s p i te  s t a r t i n g  a t  t h e  s a m e  le v e l i n  t h e  1 9 6 0 s .  E a s t  A s ia n  sa v in g s  
r a te s  a f t e r  1 9 9 0  w e r e  a r o u n d  3 7  p e r c e n t  o f  G D P , o n  a v e ra g e , c o m p a r e d  w i t h  2 1  
p e r c e n t  i n  L a t in  A m e r i c a .  A  v a r i e ty  o f  r e a s o n s  h a v e  b e e n  s u g g e s te d  t o  a c c o u n t  
f o r  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e ,  i n c l u d i n g  h i g h e r  g r o w th  r a te s ,  lo w e r  i n f l a t i o n  r a te s ,  a n d  t h e  
g r e a t e r  n e e d  t o  p r o v i d e  f o r  e d u c a t i o n  a n d  s o c ia l  s e c u r i t y  i n  A s ia . T h i s  l i s t  s u g ­
g e s ts  t h a t  t h e  t h r e e  m a c r o e c o n o m ic  v a r ia b le s  a r e  c lo s e ly  i n t e r r e l a t e d  a n d  c o n s t i ­
t u t e  a  p a c k a g e  o f  f a c to r s  r a t h e r  t h a n  se v e ra l i n d e p e n d e n t  o n e s .
I n f l a t i o n  r a te s  a r e  r e le v a n t  b e c a u s e  t h e y  in f lu e n c e  p e o p l e s  w i l l in g n e s s  t o  h o l d  
lo c a l  c u r r e n c y  a n d  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t r u m e n t s  p r i c e d  i n  t h a t  c u r re n c y .  W h i l e  t h e r e  is 
c o n s e n s u s  o n  th i s  g e n e r a l  p o i n t ,  d i s a g r e e m e n t  a r ise s  o n  t h e  le v e l  o f  i n f l a t i o n  t h a t  
m a y  d i s c o u r a g e  p e o p l e  f r o m  h o l d i n g  f i n a n c i a l  a s s e ts .  S o m e  a n a ly s t s  h a v e  s u g ­
g e s t e d  a  t h r e s h o l d  b e lo w  w h i c h  i n f l a t i o n  is  n o t  v e r y  i m p o r t a n t . 31 I n  a n y  c a s e , 
L a t in  A m e r i c a s  i n f l a t i o n  ra te s  d u r i n g  t h e  1 9 8 0 s  w e r e  f a r  h i g h e r  t h a n  a n y  p o s s i ­
b le  t h r e s h o l d ,  a v e r a g in g  n e a r ly  2 0 0  p e r c e n t  as a  r e s u l t  o f  h y p e r i n f l a t i o n  i n  s e v ­
e r a l  c o u n t r i e s .  T h e  r e g i o n ’s r e c o r d  i m p r o v e d  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  i n  t h e  1 9 9 0 s  
( a l t h o u g h  t h e  a v e r a g e  r a te s  s h o w n  i n  t a b l e  5 - 7  a r e  s k e w e d  u p w a r d  b e c a u s e  o f  
B r a z i l ) ;  b y  t h e  e a r ly  2 0 0 0 s  i n f l a t i o n  w a s  i n  t h e  s in g le  d ig i t s .  A  m e a s u r e  o f  t h e  
c h a n g e d  e n v i r o n m e n t  is  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  s i g n i f i c a n t  d e v a lu a t io n s  i n  L a t in  A m e r i c a  
i n  t h e  l a t e  1 9 9 0 s  d i d  n o t  in c r e a s e  i n f l a t i o n ,  s i n c e  t h e  d e m a n d  f o r  m o n e y  
i n c r e a s e d .  N o n e t h e l e s s ,  E a s t  A s ia ’s lo w e r ,  s t a b le  i n f l a t i o n  h i s t o r y  o v e r  r e c e n t  
d e c a d e s  w o u l d  b e  e x p e c te d  t o  s u p p o r t  g r e a te r  f in a n c ia l  d e p t h .
T h e  r o le  o f  g r o w t h  is m o r e  c o m p le x .  A s  d e s c r i b e d  i n  e a r l i e r  c h a p t e r s ,  m o s t  
s c h o la r s  c u r r e n t l y  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  d o m i n a n t  c a u s a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e tw e e n  f in a n c e  
a n d  g r o w t h  r u n s  f r o m  t h e  f o r m e r  t o  t h e  l a t t e r ,  b u t  t h e y  a ls o  a g re e  t h a t  t h i s  is  a  
m e s s y  a r e a  a n d  t h a t  f e e d b a c k  a n d  s i m u l t a n e i t y  a r e  p r o b a b l y  in v o lv e d .32 I n  th i s  
s e n s e ,  d e e p  f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t s  m a y  f a c i l i ta t e  g r o w th ,  b u t  h i g h  g r o w t h  r a te s  a ls o  
s t i m u l a t e  f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t s ,  f o r m i n g  a  v i r t u o u s  c i r c le .  M o r e  g e n e ra l ly ,  g r o w t h  
w i l l  c a l l  f o r t h  s o m e  k i n d  o f  f i n a n c e ;  t h e  q u e s t i o n  is  w h e t h e r  i t  is  r o b u s t  a n d  
s u s t a i n a b l e  o r  f r a g i l e  a n d  s h o r t - l i v e d .  G r o w t h  r a t e  v o l a t i l i t y  is  a l s o  r e l e v a n t ,  
s in c e  h i g h  v o la t i l i t y  g e n e r a l ly  r e d u c e s  in v e s to r s ’ w i l l in g n e s s  t o  p u t  m o n e y  i n t o  
f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t s .
E a s t  A s ia ’s g r o w th  ra te s  w e r e  t h e  h ig h e s t  i n  t h e  w o r l d  i n  t h e  1 9 6 0 - 9 0  p e r i o d  
a n d  r e m a r k a b ly  s t a b le .  T h e y  r e m a i n e d  h i g h  i n  t h e  1 9 9 0 s ,  u n t i l  t h e  c r i s i s  o f  
1 9 9 7 - 9 8 .  L a t in  A m e r i c a n  g r o w t h ,  w h i l e  s t r o n g  i n  t h e  e a r ly  p o s t w a r  d e c a d e s ,  
l a g g e d  t h a t  o f  E a s t  A s ia  a n d  fe ll  s h a r p ly  i n  t h e  1 9 8 0 s  as a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  d e b t  c r is is . 
I t  t h e n  p i c k e d  u p  i n  t h e  e a r ly  1 9 9 0 s ,  o n ly  t o  fa ll  b a c k  a f t e r  t h e  M e x ic a n  f i n a n ­
c ia l  c r is is  o f  1 9 9 4 - 9 5 .  T h e  h a l t s  i n  g r o w th  i n  b o t h  r e g io n s  c o r r e la te  w i t h  p r o b ­
l e m s  i n  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t s .  I n  L a t in  A m e r i c a ,  a  s e r io u s  c r e d i t  c r u n c h  d e v e l ­
o p e d  i n  t h e  b a n k i n g  s e c to r  i n  s e v e ra l  c o u n t r i e s  ( e s p e c ia l ly  M e x ic o )  a f t e r  1 9 9 5 ,  
w h i le  i n  E a s t  A s ia , s t o c k  m a r k e t  c a p i t a l i z a t i o n  fe ll  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  a f t e r  1 9 9 7 - 9 8 ,  
l e a d in g  t o  a  t e m p o r a r y  s t a g n a t io n  i n  v o lu m e  o f  f in a n c e  o u t s t a n d i n g .
T o  i l lu s t r a te  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h ip  b e tw e e n  m a c r o e c o n o m ic  p e r f o r m a n c e  a n d  c a p i ­
t a l  m a r k e t  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  f ig u re s  5 - 1 ,  5 - 2 ,  a n d  5 - 3  c o r r e la te  s a v in g s  r a te s ,  i n f l a ­
t i o n ,  a n d  G D P  g r o w t h  w i t h  m a r k e t  c a p i t a l i z a t i o n  i n  L a t in  A m e r i c a  a n d  E a s t  
A s ia .  A s  e x p e c t e d ,  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i t h  s a v in g s  a n d  g r o w t h  a r e  p o s i t i v e  a n d  
t h a t  w i t h  i n f l a t i o n  is  n e g a t iv e .  T h e  s t r o n g e s t  is  w i t h  s a v in g s  (R1 =  0 . 5 2 ) ,  f o l ­
l o w e d  b y  g r o w th  (R 2 = 0 .3 2 )  a n d  i n f la t i o n  ( i f  = 0 .2 8 ) .33
31. See, for example, Boyd, Levine, and Smith (2001).
32. For a discussion, see Demetriades and Andrianova (2004).
33. The correlations between the three macroeconomic variables and bonds outstanding were 
generally lower than with stock market capitalization; the exception was with GDP growth, where 
the correlation was higher (R2 = 0.39 versus R2 = 0.32). Correlations between macroeconomic vari­
ables and turnover were very weak.
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F ig u re  5 - 1 .  L a tin  A m e r ic a  a n d  E a s t  A s ia :  M a r k e t  C a p i ta l i z a t io n  versus G ross 
D o m e s tic  S a v in g f
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Market capitalization
Gross domestic savings 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (online).
a. Market capitalization (for 2003) and gross domestic savings (for 2003) are both shares of GDP.
F ig u re  5 -2 . L a tin  A m e r ic a  a n d  E a s t  A s ia :  M a r k e t  C a p i ta l i z a t io n  versus 
G D P  G r o w th
Market capitalization
G D P growth
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (online).
a. Market capitalization (for 2003) is share of GDP; GDP growth is the average of 1994—2003.
F ro m  B a n k s  to  C a p i ta l  M a r k e ts :  N e w  Sou rces o f  F in a n c e  1 3 1  
F ig u re  3 -3 .  L a tin  A m e r ic a  a n d  E a s t  A s ia :  M a r k e t  C a p ita lizM tio n  versus In fla tion"
Market capitalization
Inflation
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (online).
a. Market capitalization (for 2003) is share of GDP; inflation is the average change in the con­
sumer price index for 1994—2003.
S t r u c t u r a l  R e fo r m s
A  s e c o n d  f a c t o r  i n  e x p l a i n i n g  t h e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  s iz e  a n d  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  c a p i t a l  
m a r k e t s  in v o lv e s  t h e  ro le  o f  s t r u c tu r a l  r e fo r m s .  T h e  r e f o r m s  h a v e  a  d o u b l e  f u n c ­
t i o n :  a s  a  s ig n a l  t o  p r iv a t e  i n v e s to r s  a n d  a s  p r a c t i c a l  i n s t r u m e n t s  t h a t  c a n  p r o ­
m o t e  c a p i ta l  m a r k e t  g r o w th .  W e  f o c u s  o n  th r e e  r e fo r m s :  f i n a n c ia l  l ib e r a l iz a t io n ,  
p r iv a t iz a t io n ,  a n d  p e n s io n  r e f o r m .  U n f o r tu n a t e ly ,  d a t a  to  s u p p o r t  c ro s s - r e g io n a l  
c o m p a r i s o n s  a r e  sc a rc e . S e v e ra l a t t e m p t s  h a v e  b e e n  m a d e  t o  m e a s u re  r e f o r m s  i n  
L a t in  A m e r ic a ,  b u t  w e  a re  n o t  a w a re  o f  a n y  c o m p a r a b le  d a t a  s e ts  f o r  E a s t  A s ia .34 
W e  t h u s  u s e  p r o x ie s  t o  m a k e  o u r  c o m p a r i s o n s ,  d r a w in g  o n  s e v e ra l  ta b le s  a n d  f ig ­
u re s  i n  e a r l ie r  c h a p te r s .
W e  s t a r t  w i t h  f i n a n c i a l  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n ,  w h i c h  e n a b le s  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  
( d o m e s t i c  a n d  fo r e ig n )  t o  m a k e  d e c is io n s  o n  f in a n c ia l  is s u e s , r a t h e r  t h a n  h a v in g  
t h e m  i m p o s e d  b y  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t .  H e r e  w e  d o  h a v e  r e f o r m  m e a s u r e s  f o r  b o t h  
r e g io n s .  C h a p t e r  2  p r e s e n t e d  a  f i n a n c i a l  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  in d e x  m a d e  u p  o f  t h r e e  
c o m p o n e n t  p a r t s :  d o m e s t i c  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n ,  c a p i t a l  a c c o u n t  o p e n i n g ,  a n d  s t o c k  
m a r k e t  d e r e g u l a t i o n .  T h o s e  d a t a  s h o w e d  t h a t  L a t in  A m e r i c a ’s f i n a n c i a l  s e c to r  
o v e ra ll  w a s  s o m e w h a t  m o r e  o p e n  a t  t h e  e n d  o f  2 0 0 2  t h a n  t h a t  o f  E a s t  A s ia , i f  w e
34. On Latin America, see Burki and Perry (1997); Morley, Machado, and Pettinato (1999); 
Lora (2002).
d i s c o u n t  A r g e n t in a ’s  b a c k s l id in g  (see  f ig u re  2 -1  i n  c h a p t e r  2 ) .  T h e  m a i n  d i f f e r ­
e n c e  h a d  t o  d o  w i t h  t h e  c a p i t a l  a c c o u n t ,  w h i c h  r e m a i n e d  m o r e  c lo s e d  i n  E a s t  
A s ia .
A  s e c o n d  r e f o r m  is p r iv a t iz a t i o n .  P r iv a t i z a t io n  t e n d s  t o  r e s u l t  i n  la rg e  p r iv a te  
f i rm s  t h a t  n e e d  n e w  s o u r c e s  o f  c a p i t a l ,  s in c e  t h e y  n o  l o n g e r  h a v e  a c c e ss  t o  g o v ­
e r n m e n t  r e v e n u e  t o  t o p  u p  r e t a i n e d  e a r n i n g s .  T h e  n e w  f i r m s  a r e  l i k e ly  t o  
b e c o m e  m o r e  e f f i c i e n t  a n d  p r o f i t a b l e  t h a n  t h e i r  g o v e r n m e n t - r u n  p r e d e c e s s o r s ,  
b u t  e x te r n a l  f u n d s  w il l  s t i l l  b e  n e e d e d .  A s  a  r e s u l t ,  t h e y  m a y  w e l l  b e  l i s t e d  o n  a  
l o c a l  s t o c k  e x c h a n g e  a n d  t a k e  s te p s  t o  is s u e  b o n d s .  W h i l e  w e  d o  n o t  h a v e  d a t a  
f o r  o v e r a l l  p r i v a t i z a t i o n s  i n  E a s t  A s ia ,  t h e  d a t a  o n  b a n k  p r i v a t i z a t i o n s  f r o m  
c h a p t e r  3  p r o v id e  a n  i n d i c a t o r  o f  t r e n d s  i n  t h e  tw o  r e g io n s .  T a b le  3 -1  r e v e a le d  
t h a t  p u b l i c  o w n e r s h ip  o f  b a n k s  d e c r e a s e d  m u c h  m o r e  r a p id ly  i n  L a t in  A m e r i c a  
t h a n  i n  E a s t  A s ia  i n  1 9 7 0 - 9 5 .  H o w e v e r ,  w h i l e  a  g o o d  d e a l  m o r e  p r i v a t i z a t i o n  
o c c u r r e d  i n  L a t i n  A m e r i c a ,  t h e  s h a r e  o f  p r i v a t e - o w n e d  b a n k s  w a s  a b o u t  t h e  
s a m e  i n  t h e  tw o  r e g io n s  b y  1 9 9 5 . D a t a  f r o m  ta b le  3 - 2 ,  b y  c o n t r a s t ,  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  
b e tw e e n  1 9 9 0  a n d  2 0 0 2 ,  p r iv a te  b a n k s  in  L a t in  A m e r ic a  i n c r e a s e d  t h e i r  c o n t r o l  
f r o m  5 4  to  7 8  p e r c e n t  o f  t o t a l  a s s e ts , w h i le  i n  E a s t  A s ia , o n  a v e ra g e , g o v e r n m e n t  
o w n e r s h i p  i n c r e a s e d  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  c r is is .  A l t h o u g h  t h i s  r i s e  i n  g o v e r n m e n t  
c o n t r o l  w a s  g e n e r a l ly  t e m p o r a r y ,  t h e  r e n a t io n a l i z e d  b a n k s  w o u l d  n o t  h a v e  b e e n  
c a n d i d a t e s  f o r  f l o t a t i o n  o n  t h e  lo c a l  s t o c k  e x c h a n g e s ,  a s  h a p p e n e d  in  L a t in  
A m e r ic a .35
F in a lly , w e  t u r n  t o  p e n s i o n  r e f o r m .  A g a in  n o  c o m p a r a b le  d a t a  a r e  a v a i la b le ,  
b u t  t a b l e  5 - 5  s h o w e d  w h o  p u r c h a s e d  d e b t  o f f e r in g s  i n  t h e  t w o  r e g io n s  a t  t h e  
b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h e  c u r r e n t  d e c a d e .  I n  L a t in  A m e r i c a ,  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  i n v e s to r s  
( m a in ly  p e n s io n  f u n d s )  w e r e  t h e  s in g le  la r g e s t  g r o u p  o f  d e b t  h o ld e r s ,  a c c o u n t i n g  
f o r  3 3  p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  t o t a l .  T h e y  w e r e  f o l lo w e d  b y  c o m m e r c i a l  b a n k s ,  w i t h  3 1  
p e r c e n t ,  a n d  o t h e r  f i n a n c ia l  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  w i t h  2 9  p e r c e n t .  I n  E a s t  A s ia , b y  c o n ­
t r a s t ,  5 0  p e r c e n t  o f  d e b t  w a s  h e l d  b y  c o m m e r c ia l  b a n k s  a n d  o n l y  1 2  p e r c e n t  b y  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  i n v e s to r s .  T h e  c o n v e r s i o n  o f  p a y - a s - y o u - g o  g o v e r n m e n t  p e n s i o n  
p r o g r a m s  t o  f u l ly  f u n d e d  p r i v a t e  s c h e m e s  i n  L a t in  A m e r i c a  b e g a n  i n  C h i l e  i n  
1 9 8 1 .  T h e  C h i l e a n  s y s t e m  w a s  l a t e r  a d a p t e d  i n  m a n y  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  i n  t h e  
r e g io n ,  e s p e c ia l ly  i n  t h e  1 9 9 0 s ,  i n c l u d i n g  A r g e n t in a ,  B o l iv ia ,  C o l o m b i a ,  E l  S a l­
v a d o r ,  M e x ic o ,  P e r u ,  a n d  U r u g u a y .  A l t h o u g h  B ra z i l  h a s  n o t  p r iv a t iz e d  i t s  p e n ­
s i o n  s y s te m ,  i t  d o e s  h a v e  a  c o m p l e m e n t a r y  v o l u n t a r y  s y s te m  w h o s e  a s s e ts  a r e  
in v e s te d  b y  f u n d  m a n a g e r s .  I n  E a s t  A s ia , g o v e r n m e n t  p e n s io n  s y s te m s  h a v e  n o t  
b e e n  a b a n d o n e d ,  y e t  s e v e ra l  c o u n t r i e s  h a v e  l a r g e  g o v e r n m e n t - c o n t r o l l e d  p r o v i ­
d e n t  f u n d s  t h a t  a re  a c t iv e ly  m a n a g e d ;  t h e  l a r g e s t  a re  i n  M a la y s ia  a n d  S in g a p o r e .
M a n a g e d  p e n s io n  f u n d s ,  w h e t h e r  c o n t r o l l e d  b y  t h e  p u b l i c  o r  p r iv a t e  s e c to r ,  
a r e  i m p o r t a n t  p la y e r s  i n  lo c a l  d e b t  a n d  ( p e rh a p s )  s to c k  m a r k e t s .  T h e  q u e s t io n  is
35. On privatization in developing countries, see Gupta (2000); Kagami andTsuji (2000); Bor- 
tolotti and Siniscalco (2004); Nellis and Birdsall (2005). On Latin America, see Chong and López- 
de-Silanes (2005).
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w h e t h e r  t h e y  c a n  in v e s t  in  p r iv a te  s e c to r  s e c u r i t ie s  o r  o n ly  i n  g o v e r n m e n t  p a p e r .  
W h e r e  t h e  f o r m e r  is  t h e  r u le ,  t h e  f u n d s  h a v e  b e c o m e  a n  i m p o r t a n t  s t im u lu s  o n  
t h e  d e m a n d  s id e  f o r  l o n g - te r m  p r iv a te  s e c to r  s e c u r i t ie s .  P e n s io n  f u n d s  i n  C h i le ,  
f o r  e x a m p le ,  a re  w id e ly  c r e d i t e d  a s  b e in g  a  m a j o r  f a c to r  i n  b o l s t e r i n g  s e c u r i t i e s  
m a r k e t s ,  a n d  t h e  s a m e  is b e g i n n i n g  t o  o c c u r  i n  M e x ic o .  I n  m o s t  c a se s , h o w e v e r , 
t h e y  a r e  l i m i t e d  t o  p r o v i d i n g  a  n o n i n f l a t i o n a r y  w a y  t o  f i n a n c e  g o v e r n m e n t  
d e f i c i t s .  B r a z i l ’s c o m p l e m e n t a r y  f u n d s  a r e  m o s t l y  i n  g o v e r n m e n t  d e b t ,  w i t h  a  
s m a l l  s h a r e  i n  p r iv a te  e q u i t y  a n d  b o n d s .  T a b le  5 - 8  s h o w s  t o t a l  a s s e ts  as a  s h a re  o f  
G D P  f o r  t h e  L a t in  A m e r i c a n  a n d  E a s t  A s ia n  m a n a g e d  f u n d s .  T h e  l a r g e s t  f u n d s  
a re  i n  C h i l e ,  M a la y s ia ,  a n d  S in g a p o r e .  ( I n  d o l l a r  t e r m s ,  h o w e v e r ,  B r a z i l ’s f u n d s  
a r e  l a r g e r  t h a n  C h i l e ’s .)  I n  m o s t  c a s e s , g o v e r n m e n t  s e c u r i t i e s  p r e d o m i n a t e .  
E q u i t y  i n v e s tm e n t  is  v e r y  s m a ll ,  a l t h o u g h  in v e s tm e n t  i n  c o r p o r a te  a n d  e s p e c ia l ly  
f in a n c ia l  s e c to r  s e c u r i t ie s  is  m o r e  c o m m o n .36
Quality of Institutions
O u r  t h i r d  h y p o t h e s i s  a b o u t  w h y  E a s t  A s ia n  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s  a r e  d e e p e r  t h a n  
t h o s e  o f  L a t in  A m e r i c a  c o n c e r n s  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  i n  t h e  t w o  
r e g io n s .  C h a p t e r  3  e x p lo r e d  t h e  in f lu e n c e  o f  i n s t i t u t i o n s  i n  d e t e r m i n i n g  b a n k ­
i n g  s e c to r  p e r f o r m a n c e .  I n s t i t u t i o n s  a r e  e v e n  m o r e  i m p o r t a n t  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  
c a p i ta l  m a r k e t s ,  w h e r e  t h e  is s u e  o f  c o n f id e n c e  is c r u c ia l .  W e  c o r r e la te d  t h e  i n d e x  
o f  i n s t i t u t i o n s  s h o w n  i n  t a b l e  3 - 7  w i t h  t h e  s iz e  o f  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s ;  t h e  r e s u l t  is  
s h o w n  i n  f ig u r e  5 - 4 .  T h e  r e l a t i o n s h ip  is s t r o n g ly  p o s i t iv e  ( R 1 =  0 .6 6 ) .  T h e  m a i n  
o u t l i e r s  a re  C o s t a  R ic a , w h o s e  m a r k e t  c a p i t a l i z a t i o n  is m u c h  s m a l le r  t h a n  w o u l d  
b e  p r e d i c t e d  b y  t h e  h i g h  q u a l i t y  o f  i t s  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  a n d  M a l a y s i a  a n d  H o n g  
K o n g ,  w h ic h  h a v e  la r g e r  m a r k e t s  t h a n  e x p e c te d .  I n  c o n t r a s t  t o  m a r k e t  s iz e , v i r ­
t u a l l y  n o  r e l a t i o n s h i p  e x i s ts  b e t w e e n  i n s t i t u t i o n s  a n d  l i q u i d i t y  ( t h e  t u r n o v e r  
r a t io ) .  L iq u id i ty  a p p e a r s  t o  b e  m o r e  c lo s e ly  l i n k e d  w i t h  t h e  s t r a te g y  o f  in v e s to r s ,  
r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  c h a r a c te r i s t i c s  o f  t h e  m a r k e t s .  I n  p a r t i c u la r ,  l i q u i d i ty  is  l ik e ly  to  
b e  l o w e r  i n  c o u n t r i e s  w h e r e  p e n s i o n  f u n d s  p l a y  a n  i m p o r t a n t  r o le ,  s in c e  t h e y  
t e n d  t o  b u y  a n d  h o l d .  T h i s  is  m o r e  ty p ic a l  o f  L a t in  A m e r i c a  t h a n  o f  E a s t  A s ia , 
w h e r e  b a n k s  a n d  in d iv id u a l s  a r e  t h e  m a i n  in v e s to r s .  W e  d is c u s s  o t h e r  r e a s o n s  f o r  
lo w  l i q u i d i ty  i n  L a t in  A m e r i c a  la te r .
T h e  a b o v e  i n d i c a t o r s  a r e  m e a s u r e s  o f  t h e  w a y  s o c ie t ie s  a n d  e c o n o m i e s  a s  a  
w h o le  f u n c t i o n ,  o r  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  g o v e r n a n c e .  T h e y  a re  e x t r e m e ly  i m p o r t a n t  in  
d e t e r m i n in g  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t  i n  w h i c h  b u s in e s s  d e c is io n s  a r e  m a d e ,  b u t  a  m o r e  
s p e c i f i c  s e t  o f  i n s t i t u t i o n s  is e q u a l ly  r e le v a n t .  T h e s e  a r e  e l e m e n t s  o f  c o r p o r a t e  
g o v e r n a n c e ,  w h i c h  is  d e f i n e d  a s  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  a n d  p r a c t i c e s  t h r o u g h  w h i c h  
s u p p l i e r s  o f  f i n a n c e  t o  c o r p o r a t i o n s  e n s u r e  t h a t  t h e y  w i l l  g e t  a  r e t u r n  o n  t h e i r
36. On pension reform in Latin America and East Asia, see Holzmann and Hinz (2005). A 
more extensive analysis of the Latin American experience and its impact on financial markets is 
found in Gill, Packard, and Yermo (2004). On Chile, see Uthoff (2001); Corbo and Schmidt- 
Hebbel (2003). On Brazil, see Studart (2000).
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Table 5-8. L atin  America and  East Asia: Allocation o f  Pension F u n d  Assets, circa 2 0 0 2 “
















Argentina 11.7 11.3 76.7 1.1 2.6 6.5 1.8 8.9 2.4
Bolivia 1.1 15.5 69.1 13.4 14.7 0.0 0.0 1.3 1.5
Brazil“1 47.7 10.4 54.3 2.2 23.0 27.7 0.0 0.0 11.5
Chile 35.5 55.8 30.0 7.2 34.2 9.9 2.5 16.2 0.1
Colombia 6.3 7.7 49.4 16.6 26.6 2.9 0.0 4.5 0.0
Costa Rica 0.1 0.9 90.1 4.6 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
El Salvador 1.1 7.4 84.7 0.5 14.4 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mexico 31.5 5.3 83.1 14.8 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Peru 4.5 8.1 13.0 13.1 33.2 31.2 0.8 7.2 1.6
Uruguay 0.9 9.3 55.5 4.3 39.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5
East Asia 
Indonesia 6.9 4.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Malaysia 54.4 57.3 37.0 19.0 21.6 21.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Philippines 7.4 9.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Singapore 52.9 60.1 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Thailand' 11.8 9.3 40.0 n.a. 28.3 8.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sources: Yermo (2004) for Latin America, except Brazil; Asher (2002) for East Asia; Armijo and Ness (2004) and O EC D  (2005) for Brazil, 
n.a. Not available.
a. End 2002 for Latin America; varying dates between 1999 and 2001 for East Asia.
b. In billions o f dollars.
c. Bank deposits and money market funds for East Asia.
d. Company pension funds only; share attributed to government securities may include some other items.
e. Only partial allocation available.
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F ig u re  5 - 4 .  L a tin  A m e r ic a  a n d  E a s t  A s ia :  M a r k e t  C a p i ta l i z a t io n  versus  
I n s t i tu t io n a l  Q u a li ty  In d e x 1
Market capitalization
Institutional quality index
Sources: Table 3-7 for institutional quality index; World Bank, World Development Indicators 
(online) for market capitalization.
a. Market capitalization (for 2003) is share of GDP. Institutional quality index (for 2002) con­
sists of an average of four indexes: government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and 
control of corruption.
i n v e s t m e n t . 37 I n  a  c a p i t a l i s t  s o c ie ty , t h e  l a t t e r  is  c r u c i a l  i f  r is k s  a r e  t o  b e  t a k e n  
a n d  m o n e y  is t o  b e  in v e s te d .  C o r p o r a t e  g o v e r n a n c e  h a s  in c r e a s in g ly  c o m e  t o  b e  
r e c o g n i z e d  a s  a  d e t e r m i n a n t  o f  a  c o u n t r y ’s e c o n o m i c  s u c c e s s  i n  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  
w o r ld .  H e r e  w e  a ssess  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  w h ic h  i t  is  in f lu e n t i a l  in  t h e  c a p i ta l  m a r k e t s  
i n  o u r  s e t  o f  e m e r g in g  e c o n o m ie s .
T h e  W o r l d  E c o n o m ic  F o r u m  ( W E F )  c o m p i l e s  i n f o r m a t i o n  o n  g lo b a l  c o m ­
p e t i t i v e n e s s  a n d  i n c l u d e s  i n d i c a t o r s  o f  c o r p o r a t e  g o v e r n a n c e  a s  a n  i m p o r t a n t  
a s p e c t  o f  c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s .  W e  s e le c te d  f o u r  o F tK e  q u e s t io n s  f r o m  t h e i r  a n n u a l  
s u r v e y  o f  b u s in e s s  e x e c u t iv e s  a n d  c o n v e r t e d  t h e m  i n t o  a n  in d e x .  T h e  f o u r  q u e s ­
t i o n s  i n c l u d e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  f i n a n c i a l  d i s c lo s u r e ,  i n s i d e r  t r a d i n g ,  
a n d  r e g u l a t o r y  s t a n d a r d s . 38 T h e  r e s u l t s  o f  c r o s s i n g  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  g o v e r n a n c e  
in d e x  w i t h  m a r k e t  c a p i t a l i z a t io n  i n  L a t in  A m e r i c a n  a n d  E a s t  A s ia n  c o u n t r i e s —
37. Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 737). For a broader approach to corporate governance, see 
Oman (2001); Oman, Fries, and Buiter (2003). On corporate governance in Latin America, see 
Capaul (2003); for East Asia, see Zhuang and others (2000); for Southeast Asia, see Ho (2005).
38. World Economic Forum (1999). The exact questions are as follows: (1) Is information 
about business extensive and easily available? (2) Is the level of required financial disclosure exten­
sive and detailed? (3) Is insider trading uncommon in the domestic stock market? (4) Are regula­
tory standards among the worlds most stringent? Each is coded on a scale from one to seven, where
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F ig u re  5 -5 . L a tin  A m e r ic a  a n d  E a s t  A s ia :  M a r k e t  C a p i ta l i z a t io n  versus C o rp o ra te  
G o vern a n ce  In d ex 2
Market capitalization
Corporate governance index
Sources: World Economic Forum (1999) for corporate governance index; World Bank, World 
Development Indicators (online) for market capitalization.
a. Market capitalization (for 2003) is share of GDP. Corporate governance index (for 1999) con­
sists of four indexes: availability of information, financial disclosure, insider trading, and regulatory 
standards.
s h o w n  i n  f ig u re  5 - 5 — p r o d u c e s  a  s im ila r ,  b u t  s l ig h t ly  w e a k e r ,  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t h a n  
w e  f o u n d  w i t h  t h e  m o r e  g e n e r a l  i n d i c a t o r s  o f  s o c ie ta l  g o v e r n a n c e  (R 2 = 0 .5 7 ) .  
T h e  A s ia n  c o u n t r i e s  g e n e r a l l y  f a l l  a b o v e  t h e  t r e n d  l i n e ,  i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  t h e i r  
s t o c k  m a r k e t s  a r e  la r g e r  t h a n  w o u l d  b e  p r e d i c t e d  b y  t h e  i n d i c a to r s  o f  c o r p o r a te  
g o v e r n a n c e ;  H o n g  K o n g  a n d  M a la y s i a  a r e  e x a m p le s  o f  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n .  L a t i n  
A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  g e n e r a l l y  h a v e  s m a l l e r  m a r k e t s  t h a n  w o u l d  b e  p r e d i c t e d .  
T h e  r e l a t i o n s h ip  b e tw e e n  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  g o v e r n a n c e  in d i c a t o r s  a n d  b o n d  is s u e s  
o u t s t a n d i n g  is a ls o  p o s i t iv e ,  b u t  m u c h  w e a k e r  t h a n  f o r  s to c k  m a r k e t s .  T h e  s a m e  
is  t r u e  f o r  tu r n o v e r .
L a  P o r t a ,  L o p e z - d e - S i la n e s ,  a n d  S h le i f e r  p r o v id e  a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  t h e  W E F  
d a t a . 39 T h e y  c r e a te  t w o  s u b - in d e x e s  w i t h i n  a  f r a m e w o r k  f o r  c o m p a r i n g  p u b l i c  
a n d  p r iv a te  e n f o r c e m e n t  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e i r  i m p a c t  o n  v a r io u s  i n d i c a t o r s  o f  m a r ­
k e t  s iz e  a n d  p e r f o r m a n c e .  P u b l i c  e n f o r c e m e n t  in c lu d e s  a t t r i b u t e s  o f  s u p e rv is o r s ;
seven is the most positive response. The survey included 3,934 respondents in fifty-eight countries 
in 1999. It now has a much wider coverage, but unfortunately the most relevant questions for our 
purposes are no longer included, so we use the 1999 data.
39. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003).
t h e  i n v e s t i g a t i v e  p o w e r s  o f  s u p e r v i s o r s ;  s u p e r v i s o r s ’ a b i l i t y  t o  g iv e  o r d e r s  t o  
is s u e r s ,  d i s t r i b u t o r s ,  a n d  a c c o u n t a n t s ;  a n d  s u p e r v i s o r s ’ a b i l i t y  t o  i s s u e  c r im in a l  
s a n c t io n s .  P r iv a te  e n f o r c e m e n t  in c lu d e s  m e a s u re s  o f  d is c lo s u r e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  a n d  
t h e  r u le s  a b o u t  b u r d e n  o f  p r o o f  w h e n  a n  in v e s to r  w a n t s  t o  r e c o v e r  lo sse s . W h i l e  
t h e y  f i n d  a  p o s i t i v e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e tw e e n  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t  d e v e l o p m e n t  a n d  p r i ­
v a te  e n f o r c e m e n t  ( b u t  n o t  p u b l i c  e n f o r c e m e n t ) ,  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  f o r  t h e  c o u n ­
t r ie s  w e  s t u d y  is  m u c h  w e a k e r  t h a n  i n  f ig u re  5 - 5 .  S o m e  o f  t h e  o u t l i e r s  a ls o  c a s t  
d o u b t  o n  t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  i n d i c a to r s .  F o r  e x a m p le ,  t h e  s in g le  h ig h e s t  s c o re  
f o r  p r i v a t e  e n f o r c e m e n t  is  f o u n d  i n  t h e  P h i l i p p in e s ,  w h i le  I n d o n e s i a  a n d  P e r u  
r a n k  h i g h e r  t h a n  C h i l e ;  M e x ic o  c o m p e te s  w i t h  E c u a d o r  a n d  V e n e z u e la  f o r  t h e  
b o t t o m  p la c e s  i n  t h e  in d e x .  A s  a  c o n s e q u e n c e ,  w e  c o n s id e r  t h a t  t h e  r e la t i o n s h ip  
b e tw e e n  p u b l i c  a n d  p r iv a te  e n f o r c e m e n t  n e e d s  f u r t h e r  r e s e a rc h .
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o n t e x t
A  f in a l  h y p o th e s is  a b o u t  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s  i n  t h e  tw o  r e g io n s  c e n te r s  o n  t h e  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  c o n t e x t .  D o m e s t i c  f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t s  p r o v i d e  t h e  v a s t  m a j o r i t y  o f  
f in a n c e  i n  a ll  e m e r g in g  e c o n o m ie s ,  b u t  i n t e r n a t io n a l  c a p i t a l  h a s  g e n e r a l ly  p la y e d  
a  s ig n i f i c a n t  r o le ,  to o .  T h e  c h a n n e l s  t h r o u g h  w h i c h  f o r e ig n  c a p i ta l  e n t e r e d  h a v e  
v a r i e d  o v e r  t i m e .  F o r e i g n  d i r e c t  i n v e s tm e n t  ( F D I )  w a s  t h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  i n  
t h e  1 9 5 0 s  a n d  1 9 6 0 s ,  b u t  i t  w a s  r e p la c e d  b y  s y n d ic a t e d  E u r o lo a n s  i n  t h e  1 9 7 0 s . 
T h e  l a t t e r  l e d  t o  a  se v e re  d e b t  c r is is  i n  t h e  1 9 8 0 s  i n  L a t in  A m e r ic a  a n d  i n  s o m e  
A s ia n  c o u n t r i e s .  I n  t h e  1 9 9 0 s ,  w h i l e  F D I  a g a in  b e c a m e  s i g n i f i c a n t  ( i n c l u d in g  
i m p o r t a n t  in v e s tm e n t s  i n  b a n k in g ,  p e n s io n  f u n d s ,  a n d  o t h e r  p a r t s  o f  t h e  f i n a n ­
c ia l  s e c to r  i t s e l f ) ,  p o r t f o l i o  i n v e s tm e n t  a lso  p la y e d  a  la rg e  ro le .  T h e  l a t t e r  e n t e r e d  
v ia  i n v e s tm e n t  in  lo c a l  s t o c k  m a r k e t s  a n d ,  t o  a  le s s e r  e x t e n t ,  b o n d  m a r k e ts ;  b a n k  
d e p o s i t s  c o n s t i t u t e d  t h e  m a i n  c h a n n e l  i n  s m a l l e r  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  p o o r l y  d e v e l ­
o p e d  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s .  M o s t  o f  t h e  f o r e ig n  p o r t f o l i o  i n v e s t m e n t  d r i e d  u p  a f t e r  
t h e  m id - 1 9 9 0 s ,  h o w e v e r , as i n t e r n a t io n a l  in v e s to r s  b e c a m e  m o r e  r i s k  a v e rse .
A t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e ,  g o v e r n m e n t s ,  b a n k s ,  a n d  l a r g e  n o n f i n a n c i a l  c o r p o r a t i o n s  
i n  e m e r g in g  m a r k e t  e c o n o m ie s  s o u g h t  f u n d s  o n  i n t e r n a t io n a l  m a r k e t s  b y  f l o a t ­
i n g  b o n d s ,  i s s u in g  A m e r i c a n  o r  g lo b a l  d e p o s i to r y  r e c e ip t s  ( A D R s  a n d  G D R s ) ,  
a n d  b o r r o w i n g  f r o m  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  b a n k s .  A s s h o w n  i n  t a b l e  5 - 6 ,  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
b a n k  lo a n s  r e a c h e d  2 9  p e r c e n t  a n d  3 0  p e r c e n t  o f  G D P  i n  2 0 0 3  f o r  L a t in  A m e r ­
i c a  a n d  E a s t  A s ia ,  r e s p e c t iv e ly .  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  b o n d s  w e r e  1 9  p e r c e n t  i n  L a t in  
A m e r i c a  a n d  11 p e r c e n t  i n  E a s t  A s ia ,  w h i l e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e q u i t y  c o n t r i b u t e d  a  
s m a l l e r  a m o u n t ,  a c c o u n t i n g  f o r  4  p e r c e n t  o f  G D P  i n  A s ia  a n d  2  p e r c e n t  i n  
L a t in  A m e r i c a .  T h o s e  w i t h  a c c e s s  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m a r k e t s  c o u l d  o b t a i n  l a r g e r  
a m o u n t s  o f  f i n a n c e  a t  a  lo w e r  p r ic e  t h a n  w a s  a v a i la b le  lo c a lly .40 O f  c o u r s e ,  a c c e ss
40. See Zervos (2004) for detailed information on comparative costs of domestic versus inter­
national finance. She focuses on the three countries that are studied in depth in this book: Brazil, 
Chile, and Mexico. She finds that costs vary widely. In general, debt financing is cheaper than 
equity, and international issuance tends to be cheaper than domestic issuance (except for Mexico).
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t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m a r k e t s  is  a v a i l a b l e  o n l y  t o  a n  e x t r e m e l y  l i m i t e d  s e t  o f  v e r y  
l a r g e  a n d  w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d  p r i v a t e  f i r m s ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  g o v e r n m e n t s  a n d  
g o v e r n m e n t - o w n e d  c o r p o r a t io n s .
D e s p i t e  t h e  a d v a n ta g e s  o f  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m a r k e t s ,  a c c e s s  t o  
t h e s e  m a r k e t s  h a s  b e e n  a c c o m p a n i e d  b y  v o la t i l i ty ,  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  r i s k ,  a n d  (a ll  
t o o  f r e q u e n t ly )  f i n a n c ia l  c r ise s . A s  d is c u s s e d  i n  c h a p t e r  2 ,  a  g o o d  d e a l  o f  c o n t r o ­
v e r s y  e x is ts  o v e r  t h e  r e la t iv e  w e ig h t  o f  d o m e s t i c  a n d  in t e r n a t io n a l  s o u r c e s  o f  c r i ­
s is . A t  a  m i n i m u m ,  h o w e v e r , a n a ly s ts  a g re e  t h a t  i n t e r n a t io n a l  f i n a n c ia l  m a r k e t s  
h a v e  b e e n  t h e  s o u r c e  o f  s e r io u s  p r o b le m s ,  b o t h  f o r  m a c r o e c o n o m ic  m a n a g e m e n t  
a n d  f o r  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  f i rm s  a t  t h e  m ic r o e c o n o m ic  lev e l.
S e v e ra l  s u c h  p r o b le m s  h a v e  b e e n  id e n t i f i e d .  T h e  m o s t  o b v io u s  is t h a t  f o r e ig n  
c a p i t a l  t e n d s  t o  m o v e  i n  w a v e s .  L a r g e  i n f lo w s  e n t e r  a s  e n t h u s i a s m  b u i l d s  f o r  
e m e r g i n g  m a r k e t  e c o n o m i e s ,  b u t  th e s e  f lo w s  c a n  m o v e  o u t  a s  r a p i d l y  a s  t h e y  
a r r iv e d  w h e n  c o n f i d e n c e  w a n e s  f o r  w h a te v e r  r e a s o n .  ( T h e  g r a p h s  i n  f ig u r e  4 - 4  
p r o v i d e d  d r a m a t i c  e v i d e n c e  o f  t h e s e  c y c le s  i n  L a t in  A m e r i c a  a n d  E a s t  A s ia . )  
T h e s e  s u r g e s  a n d  d r o u g h t s  a r e  e x t r e m e ly  d i f f i c u l t  t o  m a n a g e ,  g iv e n  t h e i r  la rg e  
s iz e  r e la t iv e  to  m o s t  e m e r g in g  e c o n o m ie s .  A  r e la te d  p r o b l e m  is t h e  p r o c y c l ic a l i ty  
a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  f lo w s ,  w h i c h  c a n  p r o d u c e  a s s e t  p r i c e  b u b b l e s  
t h a t — w h e n  t h e y  b u r s t — w r e a k  g r e a t e r  h a v o c  o n  th e s e  e c o n o m i e s  t h a n  i n  t h e  
i n d u s t r i a l  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  t h e i r  s t r o n g e r  f i n a n c i a l  s y s te m s .  A  t h i r d  p r o b l e m  
in v o lv e s  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  a p p r e c i a t i o n ,  w h ic h  is f e d  b y  c a p i ta l  in f lo w s  a n d  u n d e r ­
m in e s  t h e  t r a d e  b a la n c e — th u s  i n c r e a s in g  t h e  n e e d  f o r  m o r e  c a p i ta l  in f lo w s .41
B e y o n d  th e s e  f r e q u e n t l y  d is c u s s e d  p r o b le m s ,  a  n e w  d i l e m m a  h a s  b e e n  h i g h ­
l i g h t e d  b y  W o r l d  B a n k  e c o n o m i s t s  w h o  h a v e  s t u d i e d  L a t i n  A m e r i c a ’s c a p i t a l  
m a r k e t s  a n d  t h e  r e a s o n s  f o r  t h e i r  la c k  o f  d y n a m is m .42 W h i l e  t h e y  a r r iv e  a t  c o n ­
c lu s io n s  t h a t  a r e  s im i la r  t o  o u r s  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  p o s i t iv e  i m p a c t  o f  m a c r o e c o ­
n o m i c  p e r f o r m a n c e ,  r e f o r m s ,  a n d  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o n  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  d o m e s t i c  
c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s ,  t h e y  f i n d  t h a t  t h e s e  s a m e  f a c to r s  a r e  a ls o  p o s i t i v e ly  r e l a t e d  t o  
L a t in  A m e r i c a n  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m a r k e t s .  O n e  o f  t h e  t e c h n i q u e s  
t h e y  u s e  t o  a n a ly z e  t h e  p h e n o m e n o n  is t o  c o n s t r u c t  a  v a r ia b le  t h a t  is  t h e  r a t io  o f  
f o r e i g n  a c t i v i t y  t o  d o m e s t i c  a c t iv i ty .  A f t e r  r e g r e s s in g  t h i s  v a r i a b l e  o n  r e f o r m ,  
m a c r o e c o n o m i c ,  a n d  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  v a r ia b le s ,  t h e y  c o n c l u d e  t h a t  w h i l e  b o t h  
d o m e s t i c  m a r k e t  d e v e l o p m e n t  a n d  i n t e r n a t io n a l i z a t i o n  a r e  d r iv e n  b y  t h e  s a m e  
f u n d a m e n t a l s ,  t h e  l a t t e r  r e l a t i o n s h i p  is t h e  s t r o n g e r  o f  t h e  tw o .  T h a t  is , 
i m p r o v e m e n ts  i n  f u n d a m e n t a l s  a c c e le r a te  i n t e r n a t io n a l iz a t io n .  T h e y  f i n d  s im i la r  
e v i d e n c e  f o r  g o v e r n m e n t  b o n d  m a r k e t s ,  a l t h o u g h  d a t a  p r o b l e m s  p r e c l u d e d  
a n a ly s is  o f  c o r p o r a te  b o n d s .
A  f o l lo w - u p  q u e s t io n  c o n c e r n s  t h e  c o m p a r i s o n  b e tw e e n  L a t in  A m e r i c a  a n d  
E a s t  A s ia  o n  t h i s  i s s u e .  O u r  d a t a  i n  t a b l e  5 - 6  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l
41. A recent analysis of these problems in emerging markets is found in Ffrench-Davis and 
Griffith-Jones (2003).
42. World Bank (2004c); Claessens, Klingebiel, and Schmukler (2004).
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f i n a n c e  is m o r e  i m p o r t a n t  f o r  t h e  f o r m e r  t h a n  t h e  l a t t e r .  O v e r  3 0  p e r c e n t  
o f  L a t in  A m e r ic a ’s t o t a l  f i n a n c e  i n  2 0 0 3  w a s  f r o m  i n t e r n a t io n a l  s o u r c e s ,  v e r s u s  
1 6  p e r c e n t  i n  E a s t  A s ia . O n e  e x p la n a t io n  f o r  t h e  d if f e r e n c e  is t h a t  g e o g r a p h ic a l  
a n d  c u l tu r a l  p r o x i m i t y  t o  t h e  U n i t e d  S ta te s  p r o v id e d  t h e  o p t i o n  o f  in t e r n a t io n a l  
f i n a n c e  f o r  L a t in  A m e r i c a ,  e s p e c ia l ly  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  M e x ic o ,  w h i c h  m i g h t  h a v e  
m a d e  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  d o m e s t i c  m a r k e t s  s e e m  le s s  u r g e n t  t h a n  i n  t h e  c a s e  
o f  A s ia .
T h e  W o r l d  B a n k  s t u d y  a ls o  a d d r e s s e s  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  o n  
d o m e s t i c  m a r k e t s  i n  t h e  tw o  r e g io n s  a n d  f in d s  i t  t o  b e  n e g a t iv e  f o r  L a t in  A m e r ­
ic a .  O n e  o f  t h e  p a p e r s  f i n d s  t h a t  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  f u n d a m e n t a l s  a n d  
a c c e l e r a t i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  h o l d s  o n l y  f o r  L a t in  A m e r i c a .43 T h e  a u t h o r s  
i d e n t i f y  t w o  c h a n n e l s .  O n e  c o n c e r n s  m i g r a t i o n  a n d  s p i l l o v e r s .  W h e n  L a t in  
A m e r i c a n  f i r m s  i s s u e  s t o c k  a n d  b o n d s  a b r o a d ,  l i q u i d i t y  f a l l s  o n  lo c a l  c a p i t a l  
m a r k e t s .  S m a l l  s iz e  a n d  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  f u r t h e r  t h e s e  p r o b l e m s .  I n  t h e  e x t r e m e  
c a s e — w h i c h  h a s  o c c u r r e d  w i t h  s o m e  f r e q u e n c y  i n  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  b u t  n o t  i n  
A s ia — f irm s  a re  d e l i s t e d  lo c a l ly  a n d  t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  i n t e r n a t io n a l  s t o c k  m a r k e t s  in  
t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  o r  i n  E u r o p e .  T h e  o t h e r  c h a n n e l  is  t r a d e  d i v e r s i o n .  W h e n  
f i r m s  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e ,  d o m e s t i c  t r a d i n g  i n  t h e i r  s h a r e s  o n  lo c a l  m a r k e t s  
in c r e a s e s  a t  t h e  e x p e n s e  o f  lo c a l  f i rm s .  T h u s ,  w h i le  r e fo r m s  e n c o u r a g e  t h e  d e v e l ­
o p m e n t  o f  d o m e s t i c  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s  i n  d i r e c t  w a y s ,  t h e y  c a n  a ls o  d i s c o u r a g e  
t h e m  in d ire c t ly .
I n  s u m m a r y ,  a f t e r  c o n s i d e r i n g  f o u r  s e ts  o f  f a c to r s  t h a t  w e  w o u l d  e x p e c t  t o  
d e t e r m i n e  t h e  r e la t iv e  d y n a m i s m  o f  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s  i n  L a t in  A m e r i c a  i n  c o m ­
p a r i s o n  w i t h  E a s t  A s ia , w e  f o u n d  t h r e e  t h a t  s e e m  t o  f a v o r  t h e  l a t t e r  r e g io n  a n d  
o n e  t h a t  is  m o r e  p o s i t i v e  i n  t h e  f o r m e r .  T h e  m a c r o e c o n o m i c  e n v i r o n m e n t  
c le a r ly  s u g g e s ts  t h a t  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s  s h o u l d  f u n c t i o n  b e t t e r  i n  E a s t  A s ia  t h a n  i n  
L a t in  A m e r i c a .  L ik e w is e ,  t h e  s t r o n g e r  s o c ie ta l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  i n  E a s t  A s ia  s h o u l d  
a ls o  b u t t r e s s  t h e  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s .  T h e  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  t w o  r e g io n s  is 
m u c h  s m a l le r  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  c o r p o r a t e  g o v e r n a n c e  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  b u t  E a s t  A s ia  
s t i l l  h a s  a  s l ig h t  a d v a n ta g e .  L a t in  A m e r ic a ’s a c t iv e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  i n t e r n a t io n a l  
f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t s  p r o v id e s  s o m e  a d v a n ta g e s  t o  t h e  r e g i o n ’s f i r m s  a n d  g o v e r n ­
m e n t s ,  b u t  t h e  d o w n s id e s  s e e m  t o  o u t w e i g h  t h e  a d v a n ta g e s .  T h i s  is  e s p e c ia l ly  
t h e  c a se  i n  l i g h t  o f  th e  W o r l d  B a n k ’s n e w  e v id e n c e  t h a t  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  i n t e r n a ­
t i o n a l  m a r k e t s  c a n  u n d e r m i n e  d o m e s t i c  m a r k e t s .
O n l y  t h e  m o r e  e x te n s iv e  r e f o r m  e f f o r t— f in a n c ia l  l i b e r a l iz a t io n ,  p r iv a t iz a t io n ,  
a n d  p e n s io n  r e f o r m — se e m s  t o  b e  m o r e  p o s i t iv e  f o r  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t  d e v e lo p m e n t  
i n  L a t in  A m e r ic a ,  b u t  i t  h a s  c le a r ly  n o t  b e e n  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  o f f s e t  t h e  o t h e r  t h r e e  
f a c to r s  t h a t  h a v e  b e n e f i t e d  E a s t  A s ia  m o r e .  O n e  r e a s o n  is t h a t  t h e  r e fo r m s  h a v e  
n o t  a lw a y s  t u r n e d  o u t  a s  t h e i r  p r o p o n e n t s  e x p e c te d .  T h e  f in a n c ia l  c r is e s  f o l lo w ­
i n g  f in a n c ia l  l ib e r a l iz a t io n  a re  p e r h a p s  t h e  m o s t  d r a m a t i c  e x a m p le s ,  b u t  s e r io u s
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4 3 .  L e v in e  a n d  S c h m u k l e r  ( 2 0 0 4 ) .
e c o n o m ic  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  p r o b le m s  h a v e  a ls o  a r i s e n  w i t h  p r iv a t iz a t i o n .  A t  t h e  s a m e  
t i m e ,  p e n s i o n  f u n d  r e f o r m — w h i c h  p r o v e d  a  b o o n  f o r  t h e  g r o w t h  o f  c a p i t a l  
m a r k e t s  i n  L a t in  A m e r i c a — h a s  p r o b a b l y  p u t  a  b r a k e  o n  t h e  l i q u i d i t y  o f  L a t in  
A m e r i c a n  c a p i ta l  m a r k e t s .  E v id e n c e  f r o m  o t h e r  r e s e a rc h e r s  s u g g e s ts  t h a t  l i q u i d ­
i t y  is t h e  m a in  c o n n e c t i o n  b e tw e e n  c a p i ta l  m a r k e t s  a n d  e c o n o m ic  g r o w th .
Conclusions
T h i s  c h a p t e r  h a s  p r o v i d e d  d a t a  o n  a  n u m b e r  o f  d i m e n s i o n s  f o r  c o m p a r i n g  t h e  
f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t s  i n  L a t in  A m e r i c a  a n d  E a s t  A s ia . T h e y  c a n  b e  s u m m a r i z e d  in  
t h e  f o l lo w in g  s ix  p o i n t s .  F i r s t ,  t h e  o v e r a l l  f i n a n c i a l  s e c t o r — i n c l u d i n g  b o t h  
b a n k s  a n d  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s — is t w ic e  a s  d e e p  i n  E a s t  A s ia  a s  i n  L a t in  A m e r i c a ,  
( w h e n  m e a s u r e d  a s  a  s h a re  o f  G D P ) .  T h e  g a p  g r e w  in  a b s o lu te  t e r m s  b u t  n o t  as 
a  s h a r e  o f  G D P , s in c e  o u t p u t  e x p a n d e d  s o  m u c h  f a s t e r  i n  A s ia  t h a n  i n  L a t in  
A m e r i c a .  S e c o n d ,  b a n k  c l a im s  a s  a  s h a r e  o f  G D P  g r e w  v e r y  s lo w ly  i n  L a t i n  
A m e r ic a  b e tw e e n  1 9 9 0  a n d  2 0 0 3 ,  i n  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  a  s e r io u s  c r e d i t  c r u n c h  i n  a  
n u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s .  L o a n s  e x p a n d e d  m u c h  f a s t e r  i n  A s ia ,  m e a n i n g  t h a t  t h e  
c r e d i t - t o - G D P  g a p  in c r e a s e d .  M o r e o v e r ,  a  m u c h  lo w e r  s h a re  o f  b a n k  c r e d i t  h a s  
g o n e  t o  t h e  p r iv a t e  s e c to r  i n  L a t in  A m e r ic a .  T h i r d ,  b o n d s  o u t s t a n d i n g  i n  E a s t  
A s ia  g r e w  f a s te r  i n  a b s o lu te  t e r m s ,  b u t  n o t  as a  s h a re  o f  G D P . N o n e th e l e s s ,  t h e  
g a p  r e m a in s  v e r y  la rg e  a n d ,  a g a in ,  a  m u c h  h i g h e r  s h a re  w a s  c a p t u r e d  b y  t h e  p r i ­
v a te  s e c to r  in  A s ia .
F o u r t h ,  s t o c k  m a r k e t  c a p i t a l i z a t i o n  g r e w  r a p i d l y  i n  b o t h  r e g io n s ,  a l t h o u g h  
n e w  is s u e s  fe ll  o f f  s u b s ta n t ia l ly .  P r ic e  in c r e a s e s  p la y e d  a  b ig g e r  r o le  i n  t h e  g r o w th  
o f  m a r k e t  c a p i t a l i z a t i o n  i n  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  t h a n  i n  E a s t  A s ia .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  
n u m b e r  o f  l i s t e d  f i rm s  fe ll  i n  L a t in  A m e r ic a ,  w h i le  i t  m o r e  t h a n  d o u b l e d  i n  E a s t  
A s ia  i n  t h e  1 9 9 0 —2 0 0 3  p e r i o d .  E a s t  A s ia ’s m a r k e t s  w e r e  a l s o  m o r e  a c t i v e  i n  
t e r m s  o f  t r a d i n g  v o lu m e .  F i f th ,  w h i le  L a t in  A m e r i c a  l a g g e d  b e h i n d  E a s t  A s ia  in  
t h e  d o m e s t i c  f in a n c ia l  m a r k e t s ,  t h e  g a p  w a s  p a r t i a l ly  o f f s e t  b y  i ts  g r e a te r  p a r t i c i ­
p a t i o n  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m a r k e t s .  T h e  s h a r e  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c e  i n  t o t a l  
f i n a n c e  w a s  tw ic e  a s  h i g h  i n  L a t in  A m e r i c a  as i n  E a s t  A s ia , b u t  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m a r k e t s  h a s  n e g a t i v e  a s  w e l l  a s  p o s i t i v e  e f f e c t s .  S ix th ,  a l l  o f  t h e  
i n d i c a t o r s  a b o v e  d i s p l a y  g r e a t  d i v e r s i t y  a c r o s s  i n d i v i d u a l  c o u n t r i e s  i n  t h e  tw o  
r e g io n s .  I n  m a n y  c a se s , in t r a r e g io n a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  a re  a b o u t  a s  i m p o r t a n t  a s  i n t e r ­
r e g io n a l  o n e s .44
W e  p r e s e n t e d  f o u r  h y p o t h e s e s  t o  e x p la in  t h e  g r e a t e r  m a r k e t  d e p t h  i n  E a s t  
A s ia , w h ic h  w e r e  s u p p o r t e d  b y  t h e  e v id e n c e  o n  t h e  tw o  s e ts  o f  c a se s . F i r s t ,  t h a t  
r e g io n ’s s u p e r io r  m a c r o e c o n o m ic  p e r f o r m a n c e  s in c e  t h e  e a r ly  1 9 6 0 s  ( in  t h e  f o r m  
o f  h ig h e r  g r o w th  r a te s ,  lo w e r  i n f la t i o n ,  a n d  h i g h e r  sa v in g s )  c r e a t e d  a  p r o p i t i o u s  
e n v i r o n m e n t  f o r  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s .  S e c o n d ,  s t r u c t u r a l  r e f o r m s
44. See, for example, Stallings (2005) on the growing similarities between the financial sectors 
in Chile and South Korea.
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i n  b o t h  r e g io n s  n o t  o n ly  p r o v id e d  a  p o s i t iv e  s ig n a l  t o  p r iv a te  in v e s to r s ,  b u t  a ls o  
e n c o u r a g e d  n e w  a c t o r s  o n  b o t h  t h e  s u p p l y  a n d  d e m a n d  s id e s .  F o r  e x a m p le ,  
n e w ly  p r iv a t iz e d  f i r m s  w e r e  l i s t e d  o n  lo c a l  s t o c k  m a r k e t s ,  w h i le  p r iv a t iz e d  p e n ­
s i o n  f u n d s  w e r e  e a g e r  t o  p u r c h a s e  l o n g - t e r m  a s s e ts .  T h i r d ,  s t r o n g  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
p r o m o t e d  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t  d e v e l o p m e n t  s in c e  t h e y  i n c r e a s e d  t h e  c o n f i d e n c e  o f  
p o t e n t i a l  in v e s to r s .  T h e s e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  w e r e  f o u n d  a t  tw o  le v e ls :, s o c ie ta l - l e v e l  
g o v e r n a n c e  c h a r a c te r i s t i c s  a n d  c o r p o  ra  re  g o v e r n a n c e  - in d ic a to r s . I n  g e n e r a l ,  E a s t  
A s ia ’s i n s t i t u t i o n s  w e r e  s t r o n g e r .  F o u r t h ,  L a t in  A m e r ic a ’s g r e a te r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  
i n t e r n a t io n a l  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s  h a s  p r o v id e d  s o m e  i m p o r t a n t  b e n e f i t s  i n  t e r m s  o f  
a c c e ss  t o  d e e p e r  m a r k e t s  a n d  lo w e r  p r ic e s ,  b u t  i t  in v o lv e s  h ig h  r is k s  i n  t e r m s  o f  
v o la t i l i ty ,  e x c h a n g e - r a t e  m i s m a tc h e s ,  a n d  p o s s ib le  c o n t a g i o n  i n  t im e s  o f  f i n a n ­
c ia l  c r is is . R e c e n t  e v id e n c e  s u g g e s ts  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h ip  b e tw e e n  d o m e s t i c  
a n d  in t e r n a t io n a l  m a r k e t s  m a y  b e  p e n a l i z in g  t h e  f o rm e r .  I n  a n y  c a s e , t h e  o p t i o n  
o f  i n t e r n a t io n a l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  is l i m i t e d  t o  g o v e r n m e n t s  a n d  a  s m a ll  n u m b e r  o f  
f i rm s .
L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  f a c e  m a n y  c h a l l e n g e s  i n  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  b r o a d e n  
a c c e s s  t o  f i n a n c e  a s  a  s t e p  t o w a r d  p r o m o t i n g  h i g h e r  g r o w t h  a n d  a  b e t t e r  s t a n ­
d a r d  o f  l iv in g  f o r  t h e i r  p o p u l a t i o n s .  T h i s  c h a p t e r  f o c u s e d  o n  t h e  r o le  o f  c a p i t a l  
m a r k e t s ,  w h i c h  c a n  p r o v id e  a n  a l t e r n a t iv e  t o  d o m e s t i c  b a n k  f in a n c e  f o r  c e r t a in  
e c o n o m i c  a c to r s  a n d  p e r h a p s  le a v e  m o r e  s p a c e  i n  t h e  c r e d i t  m a r k e t  f o r  o th e r s .  
T h e y  a ls o  o f f e r  n e w  i n s t r u m e n t s  f o r  m o b i l i z in g  s a v in g s  a n d  s e rv e  a s  a  f o c u s  f o r  
i m p r o v in g  c o r p o r a te  g o v e r n a n c e  a n d  o t h e r  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  W h i l e  t h e y  w i l l  n e v e r  b e  
t h e  d o m i n a n t  s o u r c e  o f  f in a n c e ,  t h e y  c a n  b e  a  u s e fu l  s u p p le m e n t .
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C h i le :  
M i x e d  O w n e r s h ip  
P r o v id e s  a  N e w  M o d e l
C h i le  w a s  t h e  f i r s t  c o u n t r y  i n  L a t in  A m e r i c a  t o  e m b a r k  o n  a  m a jo r  a n d  s u s ­
t a i n e d  p r o g r a m  o f  f i n a n c i a l  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n . 1 I t  b e g a n  i n  t h e  m i d - 1 9 7 0 s ,  
s o o n  a f t e r  t h e  m i l i t a r y  o v e r t h r e w  t h e  e le c t e d  g o v e r n m e n t  o f  S a lv a d o r  A l le n d e .  
T h e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  p r o c e s s ,  h o w e v e r ,  r e s u l t e d  i n  a  p e r i o d  o f  u n s u s t a i n a b l e  a n d  
p o o r l y  m a n a g e d  l e n d i n g  t h a t  e n d e d  i n  a  s e r io u s  c r is is  i n  t h e  e a r ly  1 9 8 0 s .  A s  p a r t  
o f  t h e  r e c o v e r y  p r o c e s s ,  C h i l e  b e c a m e  a  p i o n e e r  i n  t e r m s  o f  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  i t s  
b a n k s  a n d  r e v a m p i n g  i t s  r e g u l a t o r y  a n d  s u p e r v i s o r y  s y s t e m .  S in c e  1 9 9 0 ,  t h e  
C h i l e a n  f i n a n c ia l  s e c to r  h a s 'B é e ñ  t h e  m o s t  s u c c e s s fu l  i n  t h e  r e g io n  o n  a  v a r ie ty  
o f  in d ic a to r s .  T h u s ,  t h e  C h i l e a n  c a se  c a n  p r o v id e  le s s o n s , i n  b o t h  a  p o s i t iv e  a n d  
n e g a t iv e  v e in ,  f o r  i t s  c o u n t e r p a r t s  i n  t h e  r e g io n .  I t  o f f e r s  a  b e n c h m a r k  f o r  o u r  
a n a ly s is  o f  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s .
T h e  C h i l e a n  b a n k i n g  s y s te m  .g re w  s te a d i ly  f r o m  t h e  e a r ly  1 9 9 0 s ,  a n d  i t  c u r ­
r e n t l y  e n jo y s  t h e  g r e a te s t  f i n a n c i a l  ̂ ie f* |h  a m o n g  L a t in  A m e r i c a n  e c o n o m ie s —  
a l t h o u g h  th e s e  le v e ls  a r e  s tiH  lo w  b y  i n t e r n a t io n a l  s t a n d a r d s .  I m p r o v e m e n t s  w e r e  
a ls o  m a d e  i n  b a n k  e f f ic ie n c y , a n d  l e n d i n g  r a te s  a n d  s p r e a d s  d e c r e a s e d  s u b s t a n ­
tia lly , a n  i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  p e r c e iv e d  d e f a u l t  r i s k  d e c l in e d  as l e n d i n g  e x p a n d e d .  
C a p i t a l  m a r k e t s  g r e w  d u r i n g  t h e  d e c a d e ,  a l t h o u g h  g r o w t h  w a s  le s s  s u s t a i n e d :  
a f t e r  a  p e r i o d  o f  r a p i d  in c r e a s e ,  t h e y  s u f f e r e d  s h r in k a g e  f o r  a  n u m b e r  o f  y e a r s ,  
b u t  h a v e  b e g u n  t o  g r o w  a g a i n  r e c e n t ly .  I n  t h e  p r o c e s s ,  t h e  m a r k e t s  h a v e
1. We would like to thank Gabriela Clivio, research director at BBVA Corredores de Bolsa in 
Santiago, for valuable help with data for this chapter.
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in c r e a s e d  t h e i r  r o le  i n  t h e  f i n a n c i n g  o f  h o u s e h o l d s  a n d  t h e  p r o d u c t i v e  s e c to r ,  
t h a n k s  i n  la rg e  p a r t  t o  t h e  a c t iv e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  in v e s to r s .  S ta b i l i ty  
is a n o t h e r  c h a r a c te r i s t i c  o f  t h e  C h i l e a n  f in a n c ia l  s y s te m  t h a t  s t a n d s  o u t  v is -à -v is  
t h e  e x p e r ie n c e s  o f  n e i g h b o r i n g  e c o n o m ie s .  T h e  s y s te m  w a s  n o t  d i s r u p t e d  b y  th e  
M e x ic a n  c r is is  ( o n ly  t h e  s to c k  m a r k e t  w a s  a f f e c te d  s ig n i f ic a n t ly )  o r  b y  t h e  s u b s e ­
q u e n t  f i n a n c i a l  s h o c k s  f a c e d  b y  t h e  r e g i o n  i n  t h e  l a t t e r  p a r t  o f  t h e  1 9 9 0 s  
( a l t h o u g h  l e n d in g  d i d  s lo w  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  i ts  p r e v io u s  p a c e ) .  S in c e  2 0 0 3 ,  a  s ig ­
n i f i c a n t  re c o v e r  h a s  b e e n  u n d e r  w ay .
I n  th i s  c h a p te r ,  w e  d is c u s s  s o m e  o f  t h e  d e t e r m i n a n t s  o f  C h i l e s  f in a n c ia l  s u c ­
cess s to ry , a n d  w e  e v a lu a te  h o w  r e c e n t  d e v e lo p m e n ts  i n  t h e  s e c to r  a f fe c t  i t s  a b i l ­
i t y  t o  p r o m o te  g r o w t h  a n d  b r o a d e n  t h e  p r o d u c t i v e  s e c to r ’s a c c e ss  t o  f i n a n c in g .  
T h e  f i r s t  s e c t i o n  p r e s e n t s  a  b r i e f  r e v ie w  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  p r o c e s s  
a n d  t h e  c h a n g e s  i n  r e g u la t i o n  a n d  s u p e r v i s io n  t h a t  t o o k  p la c e  a f t e r  t h e  c r is is  o f  
1 9 8 1 - 8 3 .  T h e  s e c o n d  s e c t io n  d is c u s s e s  c h a n g e s  i n  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  f in a n c ia l  
s y s te m  s in c e  1 9 9 0 .  T h e  t h i r d  s e c t io n  a n a ly z e s  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h ip  b e tw e e n  f in a n c e ,  
i n v e s tm e n t ,  a n d  g r o w th ,  w h i l e  t h e  f o u r t h  lo o k s  a t  a c c e s s  t o  c r e d i t  b y  d i f f e r e n t  
s e g m e n t s  o f  t h e  b u s in e s s  s e c to r .  T h e  l a s t  s e c t i o n  s u m m a r i z e s  t h e  f i n d in g s  a n d  
d is c u s s e s  t h e  c h a l le n g e s  t h a t  f a c e  C h i l e ,  d e s p i te  i t s  p o s i t iv e  p e r f o r m a n c e  i n  t h e  
l a s t  f i f te e n  y e a r s .2
Liberalization, Crisis, and Response
C h i l e  h a s  b e e n  a  m o d e l  o f  f in a n c ia l  s t a b i l i t y  w i t h i n  t h e  L a t in  A m e r i c a n  c o n te x t  
s in c e  1 9 9 0 ,  a n d  t h e  f i n a n c ia l  s y s te m  h a s  p r o v id e d  i m p o r t a n t  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  r e s t  
o f  t h e  e c o n o m y . S u c h  s ta b i l i t y  h a s  n o t  a lw a y s  e x is te d ,  h o w e v e r . T h e  1 9 8 0 s  c r is is , 
i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  w a s  e x t r e m e ly  c o s t ly — f o r  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ,  e n t e r p r i s e s ,  a n d  c o n ­
s u m e r s ,  a s  w e l l  as f o r  t h e  b a n k s  th e m s e lv e s .  O n l y  l a t e r  d i d  t h e  f i n a n c ia l  s y s te m  
a s s u m e  i ts  c u r r e n t  c h a r a c te r i s t i c s .  T o  f h e d d i g h t  o n  th i s  t r a je c to ry ,  w e  lo o k  b a c k  
a t  t h e  f in a n c i a l  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  1 9 ,7 fìs t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  p r o b l e m s  i t  c r e a t e d ,  
e x a m in e  t h e  c r is is  o f  1 9 8 1 —8 3  a n d  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’s r e s p o n s e ,  a n d  t r a c e  t h e  n e w  
s y s t e m  o f  r e g u l a t i o n  a n d  s u p e r v i s i o n  t h a t  w a s  i n t r o d u c e d  a f t e r  t h e  c r i s i s .  W e  
a ls o  g o  b e y o n d  b a n k i n g  t o  c o n s id e r  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c h a n g e s  i n  t h e  c a p i ta l  m a r k e ts .
Financial Liberalization and Its Consequences
A t  t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  A l l e n d e  g o v e r n m e n t  i n  1 9 7 3 ,  C h i l e  h a d  o n e  o f  t h e  m o s t  
r e p re s s e d  f in a n c ia l  s y s te m s  i n  t h e  r e g io n .3 T h e  c e n t r a l  b a n k ,  in  c o n j u n c t i o n  w i th  
t h e  f in a n c e  m in i s t r y ,  s e t  i n t e r e s t  r a te s ,  m a i n t a i n i n g  t h e m  a t  n e g a t iv e  re a l  le v e ls . 
T h e  r e s u l t  w a s  a  v e r y  l o w  v o lu m e  o f  f in a n c ia l  i n t e r m e d ia t io n ;  b a n k  c r e d i t  t o  t h e  
p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  f e l l  t o  o n l y  6  p e r c e n t  o f  G D P  b y  1 9 7 3 .4 R e s e r v e  r e q u i r e m e n t s
2. Two recent papers that deal with some of these same issues are Hernández and Parro (2004, 
2005).
3. On financial repression in the early 1970s, see Valdés Prieto (1992) and Fontaine (1996); 
figures in this paragraph come from those sources unless otherwise noted.
4. Calculated from IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook (2000, line 22d).
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w e r e  h i g h  ( 8 0  p e r c e n t  f o r  s i g h t  d e p o s i t s ) ,  a n d  b a n k s  w e r e  o b l i g e d  t o  p r o v i d e  
c r e d i t  t o  s p e c i f i c  s e c to r s  t h a t  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  w a n t e d  t o  e n c o u r a g e .  M o r e o v e r ,  
t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  d i r e c t l y  o w n e d  o r  c o n t r o l l e d  m o s t  o f  t h e  b a n k s .  T h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  
s t a te - o w n e d " ü 6 W m e f c i a í  B a n k  ( t h e  B a n c o  d e l  É s t a d o 7  w a T r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  4 5  
p e r c e n t  o f  a ll  lo a n s ,  a n d  m o s t  o t h e r  c o m m e r c ia l  b a n k s  w e r e  n a t io n a l i z e d  d u r i n g  
t h e  A l l e n d e  p e r i o d .  T h e  f iv e  s t a t e - o w n e d  d e v e l o p m e n t  b a n k s  a d m i n i s t e r e d  
c r e d i t  e q u a l  to  t h a t  o f  t h e  e n t i r e  c o m m e r c ia l  b a n k i n g  s y s te m .5
O n e  o f  t h e  m a i n  o b je c t iv e s  o f  t h e  m i l i t a r y  j u n t a  t h a t  o v e r th r e w  A l le n d e  w a s  
t o  l ib e r a l iz e  a n d  r e s t r u c tu r e  t h e  f in a n c ia l  s y s te m , as p a r t  o f  a  b r o a d e r  p r o c e s s  to  
e s ta b l is h  a  m a r k e t - o r i e n t e d  e c o n o m y  o p e n  t o  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  w o r l d .6 T h e  p ro c e s s  
w a s  s e t  i n  m o t i o n  w i t h i n  m o n t h s  o f  t h e  m i l i t a r y  c o u p ,  a n d  t h e  c h a n g e s  c a n  b e  
g r o u p e d  i n t o  t h r e e  c a te g o r ie s .  A  f i r s t  g r o u p  in v o lv e d  t h e  e n d  t o  r e s t r i c t i o n s  o n  
f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r m e d i a t i o n .  D i r e c t e d  c r e d i t  r e q u i r e m e n t s  w e r e  l i f t e d ,  r e s e r v e  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  w e r e  lo w e r e d  ( to  1 0  p e r c e n t  f o r  s ig h t  d e p o s i ts ) ,  a n d  r e s t r i c t io n s  o n  
f o r e ig n  b o r r o w i n g  w e r e  r e d u c e d  a n d  e v e n tu a l ly  e l i m i n a t e d  a l to g e th e r .  S e c o n d ,  
i n t e r e s t  r a te s  w e r e  l ib e r a l iz e d .  B y  t h e  e n d  o f  1 9 7 5 ,  b a n k s  w e r e  f r e e  t o  s e t  b o t h  
l e n d i n g  a n d  d e p o s i t  r a t e s ,  s u b j e c t  o n l y  t o  a  “c o n v e n t i o n a l  m a x i m u m ” o n  t h e  
f o rm e r .  T h i r d ,  t h e  b a n k i n g  s e c to r  w a s  r e o rg a n iz e d .  T h e  s t a te - o w n e d  c o m m e r c ia l  
b a n k s  w e r e  s o ld  t o  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c to r — a t  s u b s id i z e d  p r ic e s — w h i c h  f a c i l i t a t e d  
t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  c o n g lo m e r a t e s  (g ru p o s)  c e n t e r e d  o n  t h e  b a n k s .  B y  t h e  e n d  o f  
1 9 7 8 ,  a m o n g  c o m m e r c i a l  b a n k s ,  o n l y  t h e  B a n c o  d e l  E s t a d o  r e m a i n e d  i n  g o v ­
e r n m e n t  h a n d s ,  a l t h o u g h  th r e e  o f  t h e  d e v e lo p m e n t  b a n k s  c o n t i n u e d  t o  o p e r a t e  
u n d e r  n e w  r u le s .  A s  p a r t  o f  t h e  p r i v a t i z a t i o n  p r o c e s s ,  f o r e ig n  i n s t i t u t i o n s  w e r e  
p e r m i t t e d  t o  d o  b u s in e s s  i n  C h i l e ,  a n d  f i n a n c e  c o m p a n i e s  ( f in a n c ie r a s ) ,  b o t h  
r e g u l a t e d  a n d  u n r e g u l a t e d ,  w e r e  a u t h o r i z e d .  F in a l ly ,  t h e r e  w a s  a  m o v e m e n t  
t o w a r d  u n iv e r s a l  b a n k s ,  e l i m i n a t i n g  t h e  p r e v io u s  s e g m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  m a r k e t  
a n d  lo w e r in g  b a r r i e r s  t o  e n try .
T h e  d e c l i n e  i n  r e g u l a t o r y  o v e r s ig h t  l e d  t o  s e r io u s  p r o b l e m s ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e y  
r e m a i n e d  d i s g u i s e d  u n t i l  t h e  e a r ly  1 9 8 0 s .  T h e  b a n k s  a p p e a r e d  t o  b e  i n  s t r o n g  
c o n d i t i o n  b a s e d  o n  a  n u m b e r  o f  in d ic a to r s ,  e s p e c ia l ly  p r o f i t  m a r g in s .  O n e  e a r ly  
s ig n  o f  p o t e n t i a l  t r o u b le  w a s  t h e  e x p lo s iv e  g r o w th  o f  lo a n s ,  w h ic h  in c r e a s e d  a t  a  
re a l  c o m p o u n d  r a te  o f  3 2  p e r c e n t  a  y e a r  b e tw e e n  1 9 7 5  a n d  1 9 8 1 ,  r i s in g  f r o m  1 2  
p e r c e n t  o f  G D P  t o  4 9  p e r c e n t  d u r i n g  t h e  s ix -y e a r  p e r i o d .7 A n  in c r e a s in g  s h a re  
w a s  g o i n g  t o  r e l a t e d  b o r r o w e r s  ( a b o u t  2 0  p e r c e n t  o f  lo a n s  a n d  2 5 0  p e r c e n t  o f  
c a p i t a l  a n d  r e se rv e s  b y  1 9 8 2 ) .  D e s p i t e  t h e  r a p i d  g r o w t h  o f  c r e d i t ,  i n t e r e s t  r a te s
5. They included the National Development Corporation (Corfo), the Agrarian Reform Cor­
poration (Cora), the National Institute for Agricultural Development (Indap), the Housing Corpo­
ration (Corvi), and the National Mining Corporation (Enami).
6. See Ffrench-Davis and Stallings (2001) on the general reform process in Chile; Held and 
Jiménez (2001) focus on the financial sector reform. Data in the text in the rest of this section 
come from the latter source unless otherwise indicated. For a critique of the financial reform, see 
Diaz-Alejandro (1985); Ffrench-Davis (2002).
7. Calculated from IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook (2000, lines 22a-f); the data 
refer to claims of deposit money banks on the private and public sectors; they were deflated by the 
consumer price index.
i n  t h e  d o m e s t i c  m a r k e t  r e m a in e d  w e l l  a b o v e  in t e r n a t io n a l  r a te s ,  w i t h  a n  a v e ra g e  
re a l  r a t e  o f  2 0  p e r c e n t  d u r i n g  t h e  s ix  y e a rs .
M a n y  b a n k s  t o o k  a d v a n ta g e  o f  t h e  w e a k  r e g u la to r y  a n d  s u p e r v i s o r y  e n v i r o n ­
m e n t  t o  e n g a g e  i n  p r a c t i c e s  t h a t  u l t im a te ly  l e d  t o  in s o lv e n c y . B a n k  m a n a g e m e n t  
w a s  h i g h l y  r i s k - p r o n e .  I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  r e l a t e d  c r e d i t s ,  n o n p e r f o r m i n g  lo a n s  
w e r e  n o t  r e c o g n i z e d ,  p r o v i s i o n i n g  f o r  lo s s e s  w a s  d e f i c i e n t ,  a n d  a n  i n c r e a s i n g  
s h a re  o f  lo a n s  w a s  f i n a n c e d  w i t h  e x te r n a l  c r e d i t ,  l e a d in g  t o  c u r r e n c y  m is m a tc h e s  
e s p e c i a l l y  a f t e r  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  w a s  f ix e d  i n  1 9 7 9 .  T h e s e  p r o b l e m s  w e r e  
h e i g h t e n e d  b y  t h e  p r e s u m p t i o n  o f  a  g o v e r n m e n t  g u a r a n t e e  o n  d e p o s i t s .  A f t e r  
t h e  r e s c u e  o f  a n  i m p o r t a n t  b a n k  i n  1 9 7 6 ,  a  l i m i t e d  d e p o s i t  i n s u r a n c e  s c h e m e  
( u p  t o  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  $ 3 ,0 0 0  p e r  a c c o u n t )  w a s  i n t r o d u c e d ,  b u t  p u b l i c  p e r c e p ­
t i o n  w a s  o f  a  m u c h  b r o a d e r  g u a r a n t e e .8  —
M a c r o e c o n o m i c  p o l i c y  e x a c e r b a t e d  p r o b l e m s d r u e r n a l S o ^ d i c i a a ^ s .  T h e  
r a p i d  d e c l in e  in  e x te r n a l  ta r i f f s  l e d  t o  a  la rg e  n u m b e r  o f  c o r p o r a te  b a n k r u p tc i e s ,  
e s p e c ia l ly  in  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  s e c to r .  T h e  f ix e d  e x c h a n g e  r a te  in c r e a s e d  c o m p e t i t i o n  
f o r  d o m e s t i c  f i r m s  a n d  m a d e  e x p o r t i n g  m o r e  d i f f i c u l t .  T h i s  w a s  r e f l e c te d  i n  
la rg e  t r a d e  a n d  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  d e f ic i t s ,  w h ic h  h a d  t o  b e  f i n a n c e d  b y  in c r e a s e d  
f o r e i g n  b o r r o w i n g .  I n  g e n e r a l ,  t h e  v o l a t i l e  g r o w t h  r a t e  i n c r e a s e d  t h e  r i s k s  f o r  
b a n k s ,  a s  t h e i r  c u s t o m e r s  f e l l  o n  h a r d  t i m e s .  T h e s e  p r o b l e m s  w e r e  s i m i l a r  t o  
w h a t  w o u l d  b e  s e e n  l a t e r  in  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  r e g io n  a n d  b e y o n d .
The Financial Crisis and Government Response
A  s e v e re  f i n a n c i a l  c r i s i s  e r u p t e d  i n  1 9 8 1 ,  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  v a r io u s  c o n d i t i o n s  
d e s c r ib e d  a b o v e . T h e  f o l lo w in g  y e a r , t h e  s i t u a t i o n  w a s  c o m p l i c a t e d  b y  a  b a la n c e -  
o f - p a y m e n t s  c r i s i s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  f ix e d  e x c h a n g e  r a t e .  T h e  f i n a n c i a l  c r i s i s  p r e ­
c e d e d  t h e  1 9 8 2  d e c l a r a t i o n  o f  a  m o r a t o r i u m  i n  M e x ic o  a n d  t h e  c u t o f f  o f  e x te r ­
n a l  c r e d i t s  t o  L a t in  A m e r i c a — i n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  t h e  c r i s i s  h a d  d o m e s t i c  r o o t s ,  
a l t h o u g h  i t  w a s  e x a c e r b a te d  b y  in t e r n a t io n a l  e v e n ts .
T h e  f in a n c ia l  c r is is  w a s  m a r k e d  b y  t h e  in s o lv e n c y  o f  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  p r i ­
v a t e  n a t i o n a l  b a n k s  a n d  fm a n c ie r a s .  O f  t h e  tw e n ty - s ix  p r i v a t e  d o m e s t i c  b a n k s  
a n d  s e v e n te e n  f i n a n c i g M k i n  o p e r a t i o n ,  t h e  S u p e r i n t e n d e n c y  o f  B a n k s  a n d  
F in a n c ia l  I n s t i t u t i o n s  (% BIF, B y i ts  S p a n is h  a c r o n y m )  h a d  t o  t a k e  o v e r  t h e  o p e r a ­
t i o n  o f  f o u r t e e n  a n d  e t g m ,  r e s p e c t iv e ly ,  b e t w e e n  1 9 8 1  a n d  1 9 8 6 .  T h e s e  
i n c l u d e d  t h e  tw o  la r g e s t  b a n k s  i n  C h i le :  t h e  B a n c o  d e  C h i l e  a n d  t h e  B a n c o  d e  
S a n t ia g o .  E ig h t  o f  t h e  i n t e r v e n e d  b a n k s  a n d  a l l  e ig h t  o f  t h e  f in a n c ie r a s  w e r e  l i q ­
u i d a t e d ,  w h i le  o th e r s  w e r e  m e r g e d  w i t h  s o lv e n t  i n s t i t u t i o n s .
A  r e c e n t  s t u d y  d e t a i l s  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’s s h o r t - t e r m  r e s p o n s e  a n d  c a lc u la te s  
t h e  c o s t s  i n c u r r e d . 9 T h e  l i q u i d a t i o n  o f  t h e  s i x t e e n  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  w a s  
b a s e d  o n  t h e i r  h a v i n g  b r o k e n  la w s  a n d  r e g u l a t i o n s ,  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e i r  i n s o l ­
v e n c y . C o s t s  w e r e  s h a r e d  b e t w e e n  b a n k  s h a r e h o ld e r s  a n d  g o v e r n m e n t  i n s t i t u -
8. All monetary figures cited in this chapter are in U.S. dollars.
9. See Sanhueza (1999, 2001). The longer-term response is discussed in the following section.
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t i o n s ;  t h e  l a t t e r ’s c o s ts  a m o u n t e d  t o  1 0 .6  p e r c e n t  o f  G D P . T h e  c o s t  o f  t h e  l i q u i ­
d a t i o n  w a s  m a n y  t im e s  t h e  r e c o g n iz e d  b a d  d e b t s  o f  t h e  b a n k s  a n d  f in a n c ie r a s ,  
w h i c h  s u g g e s ts  t h e  s c a le  o f  h i d d e n  lo sse s . I n  a d d i t i o n ,  v e r y  l i t t l e  w a s  r e c o v e r e d ,  
i n d i c a t i n g  e x t r e m e ly  w e a k  l o a n  p o r t f o l i o s ,  a n  in e f f i c i e n t  p r o c e s s  o f  l i q u i d a t i o n ,  
o r  b o t h .
B y  m i d - 1 9 8 2 ,  t h e  c r is is  h a d  b e c o m e  s y s te m ic ,  e x t e n d i n g  t o  s o lv e n t  i n s t i t u ­
t i o n s  w i t h  s e r io u s  s h o r t - t e r m  l i q u i d i t y  p r o b le r r i s .  I n  t h i s  c a s e , t h e  s o l u t i o n ^  
d e v is e d  w a s  f o r  t h e  c e n t r a l  b a n k  t o  p u r c h a s e  t h e  b a n k s ’ b a d - l o a n  p o r t f o l i o s  w i t h  1 
t h e  a g r e e m e n t  t h a t  t h e y  w o u l d  b u y  b a c k  t h e  a s s e ts  la te r ;  t h e y  w e r e  n o t  a l lo w e d 1̂  
t o  p a y  d iv id e n d s  u n t i l  t h e y  d i d  so . T h e  m a jo r i t y  o f  t h e  p o r t f o l i o  p u r c h a s e s  c e n ­
t e r e d  o n  t h e  tw o  la r g e s t  b a n k s ,  b u t  m a n y  o t h e r  i n s t i t u t i o n s  w e r e  a ls o  in v o lv e d .  
T h e  p r o c e s s  w a s  v e r y  p r o t r a c t e d ,  a n d  o n e  o f  t h e  b a n k s  is s t i l l  r e p a y in g  i ts  d e b t s  
t o  t h e  c e n t r a l  b a n k .  C o s t s  to  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  w e re  6 .7  p e r c e n t  o f  G D P  ( 8 .9  p e r ­
c e n t  r e s o u r c e s  t r a n s f e r r e d  m i n u s  2 .2  p e r c e n t  r e c o v e ry ) .  B e y o n d  d e a l in g  w i t h  b a d  
d e b t s ,  m o s t  o f  t h e  b a n k s  a ls o  n e e d e d  t o  b e  r e c a p i ta l iz e d .  A  k e y  m e c h a n i s m  w a s  a  
p r o g r a m  k n o w n  a s  p o p u l a r  c a p i t a l i s m ,  w h i c h  p r o v id e d  v a r io u s  f is c a l  i n c e n t iv e s  
f o r  t h e  p u r c h a s e  o f  n e w  s h a re s  i n  s m a ll  b lo c k s  ( 2 .4  p e r c e n t  o f  G D P ) .
W h i l e  t h e s e  m e c h a n i s m s  w e n t  a  l o n g  w a y  t o  g e t t i n g  t h e  b a n k s  b a c k  i n t o  
o p e r a t i o n ,  p r o v i s io n s  a ls o  h a d  t o  b e  m a d e  f o r  t h e  o t h e r  s id e  o f  t h e  p r o b l e m —  
t h e  d e b t o r s . 10 A  p r e f e r e n t i a l  e x c h a n g e  r a te  w a s  e s t a b l i s h e d  f o r  t h o s e  w i t h  d e b t s  
i n  f o r e ig n  c u r re n c y ,  w h o s e  p r o b le m s  in c r e a s e d  w i t h  t h e  d e v a lu a t io n  o f  t h e  p e s o  
i n  m i d - 1 9 8 2 .  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  s m a l l  a n d  m e d i u m - s i z e d  e n t e r p r i s e s  ( S M E s )  a n d  
m o r tg a g e  h o ld e r s ,  d e b t s  w e r e  r e p r o g r a m m e d .  T h e s e  p r o g r a m s  t o g e t h e r  c o s t  t h e  
g o v e r n m e n t  1 6 .3  p e r c e n t  o f  G D P , t h e  l a r g e  m a j o r i t y  o f  w h i c h  w e n t  t o  f i n a n c e  
t h e  p r e f e r e n t ia l  d o l la r .
T h e  o v e ra l l  p ro c e s s  in v o lv e d  m o r e  t h a n  3 5  p e r c e n t  o f  G D P .11 M o r e o v e r ,  th i s  
r e p r e s e n t s  o n ly  t h e  f is c a l  c o s ts ,  e x c lu d in g  t h e  lo s s  o f  G D P  r e s u l t i n g  f r o m  t h e  c r i ­
s is . T h e  C h i l e a n  r e s c u e  h a s  b e e n  c i t e d  a s  s u c c e s s fu l ,  h o w e v e r , in  t h a t  i t  r e q u i r e d  
s h a r e h o l d e r s  t o  a s s u m e  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  p a r t  o f  t h e  c o s t ,  a v o i d e d  w o r s e n i n g  t h e  
p r o b le m s  i n  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  t h e  r e s c u e  p r o c e s s ,  a n d  u l t i m a t e l y  l e d  t o  t h e  r e s t r u c ­
t u r i n g  o f  t h e  b a n k i n g  s e c t o r  s o  t h a t  l e n d i n g  r e s u m e d . 12 O u t s t a n d i n g  b a n k  
c la im s ,  as m e a s u r e d  i n  c o n s t a n t  lo c a l  c u r re n c y ,  r e a c h e d  a  p e a k  i n  1 9 8 2 ,  fe ll  u n t i l  
1 9 8 6 ,  a n d  t h e n  b e g a n  t o  g r o w  a g a i n .13 A t  t h e  s a m e  t im e ,  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t  o f  
t h e  v a s t  a m o u n t s  o f  p u b l i c  r e s o u r c e s  e x p e n d e d  w a s  v e r y  h i g h ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  a
10. See Eyzaguirre and Larrañaga (1991).
11. Sanhueza (1999, p. 47); calculations are made with 1983 as a base year.
12. See the comparative analysis in Rojas-Suárez and Weisbrod (1996).
13. Given the fact that a similar program in Mexico contributed to the paralysis of lending in 
that country, it is worth looking in detail at the mechanisms used in Chile. Despite the high costs 
and enormous complexity of the Chilean operations, the requirement that banks use their profits 
to buy back their bad-loan portfolios in a fixed period of time—and not pay dividends until they 
did so—meant that the Chilean banks had the incentive to expand their loan portfolios to increase 
revenue. In addition, rapid growth after 1985 made it attractive for the banks to extend credit. 
Both aspects were different in Mexico.
s o c ie ty  c h a r a c te r i z e d  b y  h ig h  a n d  g r o w in g  in e q u a l i ty .  A  le s s o n  f r o m  t h e  C h i l e a n  
e x p e r i e n c e  is t h e  n e e d  t o  d e s i g n  m o r e  e f f i c i e n t  a n d  m o r e  e g a l i t a r i a n  p o l i c i e s  
b e f o re  a  c r is is  s t r ik e s .
The New System of Regulation and Supervision
A f te r  t h e  c r is is ,  a  n e w  a t t i t u d e  e m e r g e d  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  r e g u la t i o n  a n d  s u p e r v i ­
s i o n  o f  t h e  b a n k i n g  s y s t e m .  T h e  s h i f t  w a s  p a r t  o f  a  g e n e r a l  m o v e  t o w a r d  
in c r e a s e d  p r a g m a t i s m  i n  e c o n o m i c  p o lic y , i n  c o n t r a s t  w i t h  t h e  e x t r e m e  v ie w  o f  
t h e  1 9 7 0 s  t h a t  le ss  g o v e r n m e n t  w a s  b e t t e r  u n d e r  a ll  c o n d i t i o n s .
T h e  b a n k i n g  la w  qT 1 9 8 6 ,  w h i c h  b e c a m e  a  m o d e l  f o r  t h e  r e g io n ,  r e in f o r c e d  
t h e  p o w e r s  o f  t h d ^ B i F )  E x p a n d i n g  o n  i n i t i a t i v e s  t h a t  b e g a n  e a r l i e r  i n  t h e  
d e c a d e ,  i t  r e q u i r e d  t h a t  p o r t f o l i o s  b e  r a n k e d  b y  r i s k  c a te g o r y  a n d  t h a t  p r o v i s io n ­
i n g  b e  m a d e  f o r  h i g h e r  r i s k  c r e d i t s .  I t  a l s o  i n c r e a s e d  t h e  t r a n s p a r e n c y  o f  t h e  
p ro c e s s .  I t  t i g h t e n e d  p o l ic ie s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  c r e d i t s  to  i n d iv id u a l  b o r ro w e r s  a n d  
t o  r e la te d  p a r t i e s .  T h e  l a t t e r  t e r m  w a s  d e f in e d  m o r e  s t r i c t l y  t h a n  u n d e r  t h e  p r e ­
v io u s  b a n k i n g  la w , a n d  r e l a t e d  l o a n s  w e r e  l i m i t e d  t o  5  p e r c e n t  o f  c a p i t a l  i f  n o  
c o l l a t e r a l  w a s  p r o v i d e d  a n d  2 5  p e r c e n t  w i t h  c o l l a t e r a l .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  t o t a l  
a m o u n t  o f  r e la te d  c r e d i t  c o u l d  n o t  e x c e e d  b a n k  c a p i ta l  a n d  re se rv e s , a n d  r e la te d  
p a r t y  c r e d i t  c o u l d  n o t  b e  g r a n t e d  o n  te r m s  m o r e  f a v o ra b le  t h a n  t h o s e  f o r  o t h e r  
b o r ro w e r s .  C a p i t a l  a d e q u a c y  r e q u i r e m e n t s  w e r e  le f t  a t  t h e  p r e v io u s  le v e ls : le v e r ­
a g e  c o u ld  n o t  e x c e e d  t w e n t y  t im e s  c a p i ta l  f o r  b a n k s  a n d  f i f t e e n  t im e s  f o r  f in a n c e  
c o m p a n ie s .  D e f i n i t i o n s  w e r e  t i g h t e n e d ,  h o w e v e r .  D e p o s i t  i n s u r a n c e  w a s  e l i m i ­
n a t e d  f o r  t e r m  d e p o s i t s ,  s o  a s  t o  m a k e  d e p o s i to r s  m o r e  v i g i l a n t ,  b u t  a l l  s i g h t  
d e p o s i t s  w e r e  c o v e re d ,  a s  w e r e  a c c o u n t s  o f  s m a l l  d e p o s i to r s  ( u p  t o  a n  a m o u n t  o f  
a b o u t  $ 4 ,0 0 0 ) .14
T h e  b a n k in g  l a w  w a s  m o d i f i e d  i n  1 9 9 7  t o  b r i n g  i t  u p  t o  d a t e  w i t h  d o m e s t i c  
a n d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r e n d s  t h a t  h a d  e m e r g e d  o v e r  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  d e c a d e .  A t  t h i s  
t im e ,  C h i l e  a d h e r e d  t o  t h e  B a n k  f o r  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  S e t t l e m e n t s  (B IS )  c a p i ta l  a d e ­
q u a c y  r a t io  o f  8  p e r c e n t ,  a n d  B IS  r i s k  c a te g o r ie s  w e r e  a ls o  a d o p te d .  B a n k s  w e re  
p e r m i t t e d  to  e x p a n d  t h r o u g h  s u c h  a c t iv i t i e s  a s  a d m i n i s t e r i n g  m u t u a l  a n d  p e n ­
s io n  f u n d s ,  le a s in g , f a c to r in g ,  a n d  f in a n c ia l  a d v is in g  i n  t h e  d o m e s t i c  m a r k e t .  O n  
t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  le v e l ,  t h e y  w e r e  a l lo w e d  t o  s e t  u p  s u b s id i a r i e s  a n d  e n g a g e  in  
o t h e r  d o m e s t ic a l ly  p e r m i t t e d  f u n c t io n s .  T h e y  c o u l d  a ls o  p r o v id e  g u a r a n te e s  f o r  
c l i e n t s  i n  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m a r k e t .  F in a l ly ,  c o n d i t i o n s  w e r e  c r e a t e d  f o r  m o r e  
b a n k s ,  b o t h  n a t i o n a l  a n d  f o r e ig n ,  t o  e n t e r  t h e  C h i l e a n  m a r k e t  a f te r  a  d e c a d e  o f  
c lo s u r e .15
A n o t h e r  i n n o v a t i o n  o f  t h e  1 9 9 0 s  w a s  w h a t  s o m e  b a n k i n g  e x p e r ts  c a l l  p r iv a te  
m o n i t o r i n g  (see  c h a p t e r  4 ) .  T h a t  is , s u p e r v i s io n  w a s  n o t  l i m i t e d  t o  g o v e r n m e n t  
a c t i v i t i e s ,  b u t  w a s  c o m p l e m e n t e d  b y  i n c r e a s e d  i n f o r m a t i o n  s o  t h a t  p o t e n t i a l  
c u s t o m e r s  c o u l d  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  a m o n g  c o m p e t i n g  b a n k s .  I n d i c a t o r s  o f  p r i v a t e
14. Held and Jimenez (2001).
15. See Budnevich (2000) on the 1997 modifications to the banking law.
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m o n i t o r i n g  in c lu d e  w h e t h e r  a n  e x te r n a l  a u d i t  is  r e q u i r e d ,  t h e  p e r c e n ta g e  o f  t h e  
l a r g e s t  b a n k s  t h a t  a r e  r a t e d  b y  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r a t i n g  a g e n c ie s ,  a n d  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  
a c c o u n t i n g  d is c lo s u r e  a n d  d i r e c t o r  l ia b il i ty .  C h i l e  h a s  b e e n  m o v in g  in  th i s  d i r e c ­
t i o n .  M o r e o v e r ,  t h e  m a r k s  i t s  b a n k s  r e c e iv e  f r o m  t h e  r a t i n g  a g e n c ie s  a r e  t h e  
h i g h e s t  i n  t h e  L a t in  A m e r i c a n  r e g io n  a n d  c o m p a r a b le  t o  t h o s e  o f  b a n k s  i n  t h e  
i n d u s t r i a l  c o u n t r i e s .16
T h e  b a n k i n g  s u p e r v i s o r y  a u th o r i t i e s  in  C h i l e  se e  s e l f - r e g u la t io n  b y  t h e  b a n k s  
th e m s e lv e s  as a  c r u c ia l  c o m p l e m e n t  t o  g o v e r n m e n t  r e g u la t i o n  a n d  s u p e r v i s io n .  
T h i s  is  c lo s e ly  r e la te d  to  t h e  n e w  s tre s s  o n  c o r p o r a te  g o v e r n a n c e ,  in v o lv in g  m o r e  
p r o f e s s i o n a l  m a n a g e m e n t ,  i n d e p e n d e n t  b o a r d s  d F c R r S r r d r s T e x te r n a l  a u d i t o r s  
( d o m e s t i c  o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l ) ,  a n d  g r e a t e r  t r a n s p a r e n c y  t h a n  i n  t h e  p a s t . 17T h e  
S B I F  h a s  a b a n d o n e d  i t s  p r a c t i c e  o f  t e l l i n g  t h e  b a n k s  e x a c t ly  h o w  t o  e v a lu a t e  
c r e d i t  r i s k .  N e a r l y  a l l  b a n k s  n o w  h a v e  t h e i r  o w n  m o d e l s  f o r  r i s k  e v a l u a t i o n —  
w h i c h  m u s t  b e  a p p r o v e d  b y  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s — i n  p r e p a r a t i o n  f o r  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  
o f  t h e  n e w  B a s e l  I I  r e g u l a t o r y  s y s te m .  N o n e t h e l e s s ,  g o v e r n m e n t  s u p e r v i s i o n  
c o n t i n u e s  t o  b e  q u i t e  s t r ic t ;  e x te n s iv e  q u a r t e r ly  i n f o r m a t i o n  m u s t  b e  m a d e  p u b ­
l ic ,  a n d  a n n u a l  s u p e r v i s o r y  v is i ts  t o  e a c h  b a n k  a re  r o u t in e .  M o s t  e x p e r ts  b e lie v e  
t h a t  th i s  c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  p u b l i c  a n d  p r iv a te  r e g u la t i o n  h a s  m a d e  C h i l e  a  m o d e l  
f o r  o t h e r  e c o n o m ie s  i n  t h e  r e g i o n .18
Beyond the Banking Sector
W h i l e  t h e  m a i n  t h r u s t  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s e c t o r  r e f o r m s  c e n t e r e d  o n  b a n k i n g ,  
a t t e n t i o n  w a s  a ls o  d e v o te d  t o  t h e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s .  C h i l e a n  m a r ­
k e ts  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  w e r e  v e r y  u n d e r d e v e lo p e d ,  b u t  t h e  m i l i t a r y  g o v e r n m e n t  t e c h ­
n o c r a t s  w a n t e d  t o  p r o m o te  t h e m  a s  a  c o m p l e m e n t  t o  t h e  b a n k in g  s y s te m .19 N e w  
i n s t r u m e n t s — e s p e c ia l ly  th o s e  r e la t in g  t o  m o r tg a g e  f in a n c e — w e r e  i n t r o d u c e d  in  
t h e  l a t e  1 9 7 0 s ,  b u t  i t  w a s  n o t  t i l l  1 9 8 0 - 8 1  t h a t  t h e  b a s i c  l e g i s l a t i o n  w a s  
a p p r o v e d  t o  c r e a te  a  n e w  S u p e r in te n d e n c y  o f  S e c u r i t ie s  a n d  I n s u r a n c e  (S V S , in  
S p a n is h )  t o  r e g u la te  is s u e r s  a n d  t r a d e r s  a n d  t o  r e q u i r e  t h e  q u a r t e r l y  p u b l i c a t i o n  
o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  b y  p u b l i c l y  l i s t e d  c o m p a n ie s .  T h e  t e c h n o c r a t s  a ls o  d e v e lo p e d  a  
s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  C h i l e ’s i n f l a t i o n  r a t e ,  w h i c h  w a s  f a r  a b o v e  i n t e r n a ­
t i o n a l  le v e ls .  I t  i n v o l v e d  a  u n i t  o f  a c c o u n t ,  k n o w n  a s  t h e  U n i d a d  d e  F o m e n to  
( U F ) ,  w h i c h  w a s  i n d e x e d  t o  t h e  i n f l a t i o n  r a te  a n d  c h a n g e d  v a lu e  d a i ly . O r i g i ­
n a l ly  c r e a te d  i n  t h e  1 9 6 0 s  f o r  u s e  b y  sa v in g s  a n d  m o r tg a g e  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  t h e  U F  
w a s  e x t e n d e d  t o  f i n a n c i a l  a c t iv i t i e s  i n  g e n e r a l  i n  t h e  1 9 7 0 s ,  s o  a s  t o  s i m u l a t e  a
16. See various reports from Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch Ratings.
17. On corporate governance in Chile, see Agosin and Pastin (2003).
18. Marshall (2004b) provides a recent statement of policies on bank regulation and supervi­
sion. On the IMF’s positive evaluation of the Chilean financial system, see IMF (2004a). Despite 
positive external evaluation, some experts argue that Chile’s regulation and supervision are too 
strict and that the country should move much further in the direction of private monitoring; see 
Carkovic and Levine (2002).
19. On the state of the capital markets at the beginning of the military government, see Gre- 
goire and Ovando (1974).
c r u c i a l  p r e r e q u i s i t e  to  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t  d e v e l o p m e n t .  F in a l ly , a  m a j o r  r e f o r m  o f  
t h e  p e n s io n  s y s te m  t o o k  p la c e  i n  1 9 8 1 ,  w h ic h  w a s  i n t i m a t e l y  c o n n e c t e d  t o  c a p i ­
ta l  m a r k e t  d e v e lo p m e n t ,  as e x p la in e d  b e lo w .
P r ic e s  o n  t h e  S a n t i a g o  S t o c k  E x c h a n g e  p l u n g e d  b y  t w o - t h i r d s  d u r i n g  t h e  
f i n a n c i a l  c r is is  o f  t h e  e a r ly  1 9 8 0 s ,  a n d  t h e y  d i d  n o t  r e g a in  t h e i r  1 9 8 0  le v e l  t i l l  
t h e  e n d  o f  th e  d e c a d e .  T h e  p r o b le m s  c r e a te d  w e re  n o t  n e a r ly  a s  s e r io u s  a s  th o s e  
i n  t h e  b a n k i n g  s e c to r ,  h o w e v e r .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  t h e  o n l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  c h a n g e  i n  
c a p i ta l  m a r k e t  le g i s la t io n  i n  t h e  1 9 8 0 s  w a s  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  t h a t  in v e s tm e n t s  e l i ­
g ib l e  f o r  p e n s i o n  f u n d  p u r c h a s e  h a v e  r a t i n g s  b y  tw o  s p e c ia l i z e d  a g e n c ie s ;  t h i s  
g a v e  r is e  t o  t h e  c o u n t r y ’s r i s k  r a t i n g  in d u s t r y .  I n  t h e  m i d - 1 9 9 0 s ,  c h a n g e s  w e r e  
m a d e  t o  l ib e r a l iz e  p e n s i o n  f u n d  p o r t f o l i o  l im i ts  f o r  s to c k  a n d  b o n d  o w n e r s h ip .  
O n l y  a t  t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  1 9 9 0 s  d i d  t h e  f in a n c e  m i n i s t r y  i n t r o d u c e  m a j o r  m o d i f i ­
c a t io n s t© „ th e  s e c u r i t ie s  le g is la t io n .
T h e  p u b l i c  t e n d e r  l a w  o f  2 0 0 0  i m p r o v e d  c o r p o r a t e  g o v e r n a n c e ,  e s p e c ia l ly  
t h r o u g h  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  m i n o r i t y  s h a r e h o ld e r  r ig h ts ,  a n d  p r o v id e d  g r e a te r  f le x ib il ­
i t y  f o r  i n v e s tm e n t  f u n d s .  A t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e ,  t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  p o w e r s  o f  t h e  S V S  
w e r e  in c r e a s e d ,  a n d  c a p i ta l  r e q u i r e m e n t s  w e re  r a is e d  f o r  b a n k s  w i t h  a  h i g h  c o n ­
c e n t r a t i o n  o f  a s se ts . T h e  c a p i ta l  m a r k e t  r e f o r m  la w  o f  2 0 0 1 w e n t  f u r t h e r  b y  t r y ­
i n g  t o  in c r e a s e  a c c e ss  f o r  s m a ll  a n d  m e d iu m - s i z e d  f i rm s ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  e s ta b l is h ­
m e n t  o f  a  n e w  s to c k  e x c h a n g e  g e a r e d  t o  t h e i r  n e e d s .  I t  a ls o  r e d u c e d  c a p i ta l  g a in s  
a n d  o t h e r  ta x e s  f o r  c e r t a i n  g r o u p s  o f  in v e s to r s  a n d  f u r t h e r  l ib e r a l iz e d  r e s t r i c t io n s  
o n  p e n s i o n  f u n d s .  T h e  s e c o n d  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t  r e f o r m  l a w  w a s  i n t r o d u c e d  in  
2 0 0 3  t o  p r o m o t e  v e n t u r e  c a p i t a l ,  l o w e r  t r a n s a c t i o n  c o s t s ,  i m p r o v e  c o r p o r a t e  
g o v e r n a n c e  a n d  t r a n s p a r e n c y ,  a n d  s e t  u p  v o l u n t a r y  r e t i r e m e n t  a c c o u n t s  t o  c o m ­
p l e m e n t  t h e  o b l ig a to r y  p e n s io n  s y s te m . A  s c a n d a l  t h a t  h i t  t h e  c a p i ta l  m a r k e t s  in  
2 0 0 3  t e m p o r a r i l y  s lo w e d  t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  a s  m e t h o d s  w e r e  s o u g h t  t o  p r e v e n t  
s u c h  o c c u r r e n c e s  i n  t h e  f u t u r e . 20 A n  i m p o r t a n t  a s p e c t  is  b e t t e r  c o o r d i n a t i o n  
a m o n g  t h e  s u p e r i n t e n d e n c i e s  o f  b a n k i n g  a n d  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  s e c u r i t i e s  
a n d  in s u r a n c e ,  a n d  p e n s i o n  f u n d  a d m in i s t r a to r s .  A l t h o u g h  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  d o e s  
n o t  c u r r e n t l y  p l a n  t o  c o n s o l id a te  s u p e r v i s io n ,  a n  i n f o r m a l  c o o r d i n a t i n g  s y s te m  
h a s  b e e n  i n t r o d u c e d .  T h e  s e c o n d  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t  r e f o r m  la w  p r o p o s e s  t o  e s t a b ­
l i s h  a  f o r m a l  c o m m i t t e e ,  s e rv ic e d  b y  a  t e c h n ic a l  s e c r e ta r ia t .
Changes in Structure
L ik e  o t h e r  L a t in  A m e r i c a n  e c o n o m ie s ,  C h i l e  h a d  a  b a n k - b a s e d  f in a n c ia l  s y s te m  
i n  t h e  1 9 8 0 s ,  g iv e n  t h e  d o m i n a n t  p o s i t i o n  o f  b a n k s  i n  t h e  i n t e r m e d i a t i o n  o f  
f u n d s .  T h e  b a n k i n g  s e c t o r  c o n t i n u e d  t o  e x p a n d  i n  t h e  1 9 9 0 s ,  b u t  b o n d s  a n d  
e s p e c ia l ly  s t o c k  m a r k e t  c a p i t a l i z a t i o n  a ls o  r o s e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  ( s e e  f i g u r e  6 - 1 ) .
20. This scandal, which was small by international or even regional standards, concerned theft 
by rogue traders in a private firm (Inverlink) and the government’s main development agency 
(Corfo). In addition, Inverlink had illegally acquired information from the secretary of the central 
bank president, leading to the latter’s resignation.
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F ig u re  6 - 1 .  C h ile : C o m p o s itio n  o f  F in a n c ia l  M a r k e ts , 1 9 9 0 —2 0 0 3
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Sources: Tables 6-1 and 6-3.
I n d e e d ,  t h e r e  is  n o w  a n  o n g o i n g  d e b a t e  o n  w h e t h e r  C h i l e  is  m o v i n g  t o w a r d  a  
c a p i t a l - m a r k e t - b a s e d  s y s te m .21 O n e  o f  t h e  m a i n  r e a s o n s  f o r  t h e  in c r e a s in g  r o le  o f  
c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s  i n  C h i l e ’s f i n a n c i a l  s y s te m  w a s  t h e  r a p i d  e x p a n s i o n  o f  t h e  s iz e  
a n d  r o le  o f f r in s t i tu t io n a l in v e s to r s ,  e s p e c ia l ly  t h e  p r iv a t iz e d  p e n s i o n  f u n d s .  I n  a  
v e r y  s h o r t  p e r i o d , t h e y  a c q u i r e d  s i g n i f i c a n t v o i u m e s  o t  s e c u r i t i e s  a l ^  p r o f i t e d  
f r o m  a  b u o y a n t  m a r k e t .  A t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e ,  c h a n g e s  i n  r e g u l a t i o n  a n d  a  b e t t e r  
b u s i n e s s  e n v i r o n m e n t  l e d  t o  t h e  g r o w t h  o f  m u t u a l  a n d  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t m e n t  
f u n d s ,  w h ic h  c r e a te d  a  v i r tu o u s  c i r c le  b e tw e e n  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  in v e s to r s  a n d  t h e  
e x p a n s i o n  o f  t h e  s e c u r i t i e s  m a r k e t s .  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t s  a l s o  w e l ­
c o m e d  C h i l e a n  f i rm s .
The Banking Sector
T h e  b a n k i n g  s e c to r  e x p a n d e d  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  i n  t h e  tw o  d e c a d e s  b e tw e e n  t h e  e a r ly  
1 9 8 0 s  a n d  t h e  e a r ly  2 0 0 0 s .  I n  n o m i n a l  d o l l a r  t e r m s ,  t o t a l  s y s t e m  a s s e ts  r o s e  
f r o m  $ 2 0  b i l l i o n  i n  1 9 8 0  t o  $ 3 4  b i l l i o n  i n  1 9 9 0  t o  $ 1 5 9  b i l l i o n  i n  2 0 0 3 .  I n  
c o m p o u n d  t e r m s ,  t h i s  in c r e a s e  a v e r a g e d  n e a r l y  7  p e r c e n t  a n n u a l l y  o v e r  t h e  
t w e n t y - t h r e e - y e a r  p e r i o d  f r o m  1 9 8 0  t o  2 0 0 3 .  A s s e ts  a l s o  g r e w  a s  a  s h a r e  o f  
G D P — f r o m  7 4  t o  1 8 8  p e r c e n t  ( s e e  t a b l e  6 - 1 ) .  G i v e n  t h e  c r i s i s  o f  t h e  e a r ly  
1 9 8 0 s ,  g r o w th  o f  a s s e ts  w a s  s lo w e r  .in  t h e  1 9 8 0 s  t h a n  i n  t h e  1 9 9 0 s .22 L o a n s  a n d  
d e p o s i t s  f o l lo w e d  s im i la r  t r e n d s .
21. See Gallego and Loayza (2001).
22. The jump in assets in 1982—85, which declined only gradually, was connected with the 
bank rescue program.
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1980 74.0 52.1 5.7 16.2 32.8 41.2
1981 77.8 57.8 4.5 15.6 33.7 44.1
1982 129.1 81.9 11.5 35.7 38.7 90.3
1983 147.0 70.2 32.3 44.5 52.1 94.8
1984 202.7 78.9 46.9 76.9 35.4 167.3
1985 218.8 68.2 69.4 81.2 38.1 180.7
1986 191.4 60.2 61.6 69.5 38.7 152.7
1987 163.7 57.3 49.6 56.9 41.2 122.5
1988 132.6 53.8 34.4 44.3 40.1 92.5
1989 123.0 57.8 25.3 39.9 41.6 81.4
1990 124.2 54.5 27.8 41.9 43.0 81.2
1991 99.4 50.9 25.6 22.8 45.4 54.0
1992 96.3 54.6 19.2 22.5 45.6 50.7
1993 103.4 59.7 17.3 26.4 46.8 56.6
1994 118.7 57.3 16.9 44.4 46.1 72.5
1995 120.1 60.5 15.3 44.3 49.1 71.0
1996 118.3 59.5 14.2 44.5 49.2 69.1
1997 133.2 64.3 14.2 54.6 48.2 85.0
1998 133.1 66.8 13.7 52.6 54.5 78.6
1999 160.1 69.2 16.8 74.0 57.9 102.2
2000 178.9 69.2 17.8 91.9 60.6 118.3
2001 192.1 69.5 18.4 104.1 59.6 132.5
2002 181.8 68.4 18.9 94.6 60.2 121.7
2003 188.3 66.0 17.2 105.1 55.4 133.0
Sources: SBIF, Información Financiera for 1980-89; SBIF website (www.sbif.cl) for 1990-2003.
W h ile  grow th was taking place on  a fairly steady basis, im portant changes 
were occurring am ong the actors involved. Table 6 -2  shows the ow nership char­
acteristics o f  the banking sector in  terms o f  the num ber o f  institutions, em ploy­
ees, branches, and share o f  assets. Foreign banks grew substantially during the  
period at the cost o f  private dom estic banks, especially in  term s o f  assets. T h is  
pattern occurred because foreign  banks, other than those setting  up branches, 
entered the market through the purchase o f  local institu tions. M eanw hile, the 
sing le  pu b lic  sector in stitu tio n  h eld  its ow n . As o f  the en d  o f  2 0 0 3 , private 
dom estic banks represented 4 6  percent o f  all institutions, 4 4  percent o f  em ploy­
ees, and 32  percent o f  assets; foreign banks had 50 percent, 3 7  percent, and 57  
percent, respectively, w hile the public sector bank had 19 percent o f  all em ploy­
ees and 11 percent o f  assets.23
23. After 2000, the definition of a foreign bank was changed so that only branches of foreign 
banks are included; subsidiaries are counted as domestic banks. Our analysis in table 6-2 and else­
where continues to use the previous definition, which is the common one in other countries.
Table 6-2. Chile: Characteristics o f the Banking System, 1990-2003
Privatd P ublié Foreignc Finance companies Total
Indicator and year Number % Number % Number % Num ber % Number %
Number o f  institutions 
1990 14 35 1 3 21 53 4 11 40 100
1995 13 38 1 3 17 50 3 9 34 100
2000 9 31 1 3 18 62 1 4 29 100
2003 12 46 1 4 13 50 0 0 26 100
Number o f  employees 
1990 20,756 58 8,124 23 4,117 12 2,490 7 35,487 100
1995 23,299 52 8,471 19 5,242 12 7,847 17 44,959 100
2000 15,152 37 7,625 19 16,467 41 1,281 3 40,525 100
2003 16,131 44 7,132 19 13,887 37 0 0 37,150 100
Number o f  branches 
1990 556 58 182 19 147 16 89 7 974 100
1995 724 59 198 14 179 12 136 15 1,237 100
2000 532 38 294 21 526 37 56 4 1,408 100
2003 611 41 310 21 560 38 0 0 1,481 100
Volume o f  assetsd 
1990 6,626 58 1,941 17 2,780 24 143 1 11,491 100
1995 18,937 61 2,404 13 7,667 25 503 2 31,069 100
2000 22,391 31 6,424 9 43,367 404 1 72,624 100
2003 30,561 32 10,618 11 54,372 . / 0 0 95,550 100
Source: SBIF, Información Financiera.
a. Private, domestically owned banks.
b. Government-owned banks.
c. Foreign-owned banks (branches and subsidiaries); 2003 data use the old definition of foreign banks, based on ownership rather than legal status in Chile.
d. Billions of current pesos.
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T h e share o f  total assets held  by foreign banks increased rapidly after 1993 , 
w hen they held on ly  2 0  percent. By 2 0 0 0 , the Chilean banking sector had one  
o f  the h ighest levels o f  foreign  participation  in  the region: foreign -contro lled  
banks held 60  percent o f  total assets and m ade 45  percent o f  all loans, although  
these shares d ipped  slightly  by 2 0 0 3  as a result o f  several mergers. As in  other  
Latin Am erican countries, the m ain foreign presen«yjn C hile com es from  «8pgp| 
(55 percent o f  foreign-ow ned assets) and the United-Sffites (30  p ercen t).’©frier 
countries represented include Canada, Japan, several E uropean countries, and  
f r a z i l ,24 C h ile  was a prim e target o f  foreign  fearrfc“expaiTSiOTrTTme 199 0 s  
because o f  its strong and sustained m acroeconom ic perform ance and its political 
stability.
W h ile  the m ost ob v iou s sign  o f  increased foreign p articip ation  in  C h ile ’s 
financial markets is th e expansion  in  the size and pow er o f  foreign banks, the  
hold ings o f  foreign assets by C hilean  financial in stitu tions also increased from  
around $ 5 0 0  m illion  in  1990  to over $2  billion  in  2 0 0 3 . U nlike the situation in  
som e neighboring econom ies, this rise in  foreign assets was n ot overw helm ed by  
the rise in  foreign liabilities. Indeed, the gap narrowed substantially from  a 6:1 
ratio o f  liab ilities to  assets in  1 9 9 0  to o n ly  2 .5 :1 .0  in  2 0 0 3 .25 T h is  trend is 
im portant for the stab ility  o f  the banking system , since currency m ism atches 
have becom e one o f  the m ain destabilizing factors associated w ith  banking crises 
in  the region and elsewhere. T h e healthier trend in  C hile is due in  large part to  
the relatively high savings rate in  the country, such that the banks can fund  m ost 
o f  their activities domestically.
C hile has on ly  one p u b lic  sector com m ercial bank, the Banco del Estado de  
C hile (now  called BancoEstadd). T h e share o f  public ownership o f  the financial 
system  is thus on e or the sm allest in  the Latin A m erican region (11 percent o f  
total bank assets in  2 0 0 3 ). T h e  role o f  this bank was redefined throughout the 
1990s, and it n ow  plays a significant role in  supporting SM Es, either directly or 
through credit insurance m echanism s. It also has an especially large branch net­
work, extending in to  areas that private banks do n ot consider sufficiently prof­
itable. As table 6 -2  show s, B ancoE stado represents on ly  4  percent o f  banking  
in stitu tions and 11 percent o f  assets, but it nonetheless controls 21 percent o f  
branches. Supporting sm aller firm s and provid ing financial services to d istant 
clients are tw o o f  the ways that the bank tries to  serve a social function  befitting  
a pu b lic  sector in stitu tion , at the sam e tim e that it com p etes w ith  the private 
sector. Its p rofitab ility  (approxim ately  equal to  the before-tax average for all 
banks) shows that it is com petitive and that its long-term  sustainability is based  
on  its ow n perform ance, rather than support from  the governm ent.26
24. Data are from Salomon Smith Barney (2001); see also Calderon and Casilda (2000) on 
Spanish banks.
25. IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook (2000, 2004, lines 7.a.d. and 7.b.d).
26. On BancoEstado, see Mena (2005). Beyond the 17 percent corporate tax paid by all firms, 
public sector firms (including BancoEstado) pay an additional 40 percent of profits, so an after-tax 
comparison would be misleading.
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C hile also continues to m aintain three developm ent institutions that provide 
a lim ited  am ount o f  funding to vulnerable groups o f  clients, although they are 
n o t com m ercia l banks in  that th ey  do n o t take d ep osits. T h ese  in clu d e the  
N a tio n a l D ev e lo p m en t C orporation  (C orfo), w h ich  specializes in  credit and  
other services for SMEs; the N ational M in in g  C orporation (Enam i), w hich  sup­
ports sm all m in in g  firms; and the N ational Institute for Agricultural D evelop - 
m ent (Indap). C orfo is a second tier bank that works through the private bank­
in g  system , w h ile  the other tw o m ake sm all am ounts o f  direct loans. In 2 0 0 3 , 
C orfo  d isbursed around $ 6 0  m illio n  in  loans plus an ad d itional $ 1 3  m illio n  
through leasing and factoring operations. Indap in  2 0 0 1 , the last year for w hich  
data are available, m ade $ 15 m illio n  in  lon g -term  loans and $ 2 4  m illio n  in  
short-term  credits.27
Table 6 -2  indicates that C hile’s banking sector is relatively sm all as measured 
by the num ber o f  dep osit-tak ing institu tions. M oreover, the num ber declined  
from  forty  in  19 9 0  to  tw en ty-six  in  2 0 0 3 . T h e  reduction  in  the num ber o f  
financial in stitu tion s resulted from  the w ave o f  mergers and  acquisitions that 
took  place in  the last decade, as w ell as from  the exit o f  several foreign banks 
w ith  sm all market shares. Sim ultaneously, the finance com panies were absorbed 
in to the new  universal banks w hen  the 1997  banking law perm itted the latter to  
m ove in to  n on trad ition al financial activ ities such  as factoring, cu stod y  and  
transfer o f  securities, insurance, underwriting, and securitization.
N o t  surprisingly, the shrinkage in  the num ber o f  institu tions was accom pa­
nied by a rise in  concentration . T h e  share in  loans and investm ents o f  the five 
largest banks fell slightly during the 1980s, from  58 percent in  1981 to 55 per­
cent in  1990. It then rose to 6 0  percent in  2 0 0 0 , and it jum ped to 7 2  percent in  
2 0 0 3  due to  tw o very large mergers. Spains Banco Santander com bined  its flag­
ship bank in C hile w ith  Banco Santiago, a large local bank it already controlled; 
the resulting in stitu tion  becam e the largest bank in  the country. A t alm ost the 
sam e tim e, B anco de C h ile , lo n g  the d om in an t d om estica lly  ow n ed  private 
institution , m erged w ith  a m id-sized local bank, Banco Edwards, to  becom e the  
second largest bank. BancoEstado em erged as the third-ranking institu tion . By 
2 0 0 3 , the ten largest banks represented 91 percent o f  all loans and investm ents, 
w hile the top three alone accounted for over half.28
C a p ita l  M a rk e ts
C h ile’s capital markets con tin u e to  be shallow  com pared w ith  industrial cou n ­
tries, but their recent expansion is noteworthy. U nlike other experiences in  Latin 
A m erica, the expansion  has b een  prim arily  in  the form  o f  private securities  
rather than governm ent debt. T h is  pattern has to do  w ith  the su p p ly  and  
dem and  characteristics o f  the financial deep en in g  in  the 1990s. T h e  fact that 
investm ent, in clu d in g  infrastructure and other con stru ction , played a central
27. Calculated from Rivas (2004, appendix).
28. Calculated from the SBIF website (www.sbif.cl).
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Table 6 -3 . Chile: Stock and Bond Markets, 1981—2003 
Percent of G D P
Year Stock m arket B o n d i Government Mortgaged Corporatee Total
1981 2 1 .6 9.2 4.9 4.0 0.3 30.8
1982 20.7 15.7 9.3 4.7 1.7 36.4
1983 1 2 .1 25.3 17.3 6.5 1.5 37.4
1984 9.9 31.2 23.2 6.5 1.5 41.1
1985 13.9 60.2 51.8 6 .8 1.5 74.1
1986 24.4 57.3 49.5 6.9 0 .8 81.7
1987 28.0 51.1 43.6 6 .1 1.4 79.1
1988 28.6 42.9 35.1 5.7 2 .0 71.5
1989 38.7 38.4 29.5 5.5 3.5 77.1
1990 49.7 46.9 36.2 6 .1 4.6 96.6
1991 8 6.7 46.9 34.7 6.7 5.5 133.6
1992 74.6 46.2 34.3 6.9 5.0 12 0 .8
1993 107.0 46.1 33.0 8 .2 4.9 153.1
1994 128.8 48.8 33.6 10.5 4.6 177.6
1995 1 1 2 .0 46.3 31.5 1 1 .0 3.8 158.3
1996 89.6 46 .7 30.0 13.5 3.1 136.3
1997 91.0 47.8 31.6 13.8 2.4 138.8
1998 67.2 46.4 30.8 12.7 2.9 113.6
1999 97.3 47.5 30.3 13.6 3.7 144.8
2 0 0 0 85.4 49.2 31.1 12.9 5.1 134.6
2 0 0 1 85.5 53.3 31.0 13.0 9.3 138.8
2 0 0 2 70.6 53.8 29.9 12.5 11.5 124.4
2003 119.2 51.0 25.7 1 2 .1 13.2 170.2
Sources: IFC (1990, 1995) and Standard and Poor's (2005) for market capitalization; Informe 
Financiero del Sector Publico for government bonds; SVS, Revista Valores for corporate and mortgage 
bonds.
a. Market capitalization.
b. Sum of government, mortgage, and corporate bonds outstanding.
c. Central Bank bonds outstanding.
d. Mortgage bonds outstanding.
e. Public and private corporate bonds outstanding.
role in  the b o o m in g  e co n o m y  explains the increasing d em an d  for lon g-term  
financing. A t the sam e tim e, the 1990s were a period o f  rapid growth o f  institu­
tional investors, w ho were eager to acquire long-term  assets.
T h e  value o f  th e  four m ain  types o f  securities traded in  C h ile  increased  
tw elvefold in  nom inal dollar terms betw een 1981 and 2 0 0 3 ; at the sam e tim e, 
they  rose from  31 to  170  percent o f  G D P  (see table 6 -3 ). W h ile  all categories 
expanded  in  absolute term s, the co m p o sitio n  o f  the capital m arkets changed  
substantially. In 1981 , stock  m arket capitalization accounted  for 70  percent o f  
the market total and bonds for on ly  3 0  percent. A  decade later, their respective 
shares were nearly even, on ly  to  return toward their initial distribution by 2 0 0 3 . 
W ith in  the bond  category, governm ent bonds were around h a lf o f  total bonds
Chile: Mixed Ownership Provides a New Model 159
in  1 9 8 1 , the h e igh t o f  an ti-govern m en t ideology. T h ey  rose to over three- 
quarters in  the early 1990s and then declined over the next decade. A  significant 
p o in t for the capital markets is that, unlike bank lend ing, they reached a peak  
both  in  absolute terms and as a share o f  G D P  in  the m id -1990s and then started  
to shrink, especially after the A sian crisis began in  1997 . O n ly  in  2 0 0 3  d id  the 
trend reverse itself; by 2 0 0 4  they had finally exceeded their earlier peak. A  good  
deal o f  atten tion  has been  devoted  recently to trying to explain the shrinkage 
and other problem s in  the markets; w e return to this question below.
B eyond trends in  the total value o f  securities, several other market character­
istics need  to be h ighlighted . T h e change in  the value o f  securities over tim e is 
the result o f  tw o factors: new  issues and price changes. T he form er represent the  
primary_maEkets, w hile the latter em erge ou t o f  the secondary markets. In addi­
tion , w e are interested in  the liquidity o f  the markets and the num ber and type 
o f  participants.
For the stock  m arket (B olsa de C om ercio  de Santiago), changes in  m arket 
cap ita lization  have m ain ly  resulted from  changes in  prices o n  the secondary  
m arket, on  b oth  the up and dow n  sides (see table 6 -4 ) . N e w  issues have been” 
v efy  sfnall relative to  th e overall m arket size, w h ich  is sim ilar to  stock  m arket 
trends in  m ost countries. M oreover, the num ber o f  listed firms actually shrank 
from  its peak in  the late 1990s, falling from  29 5  in  1997  to  2 4 0  in  2 0 0 3 . Partic­
ipants are a sm all group o f  very large firms for the C hilean context; the average 
assets o f  listed  firm s were over $ 6 0 0  m illion  in  2 0 0 4 .29 L iqu id ity  in  the stock  
m arket, as m easured by the turnover ratio (transactions in  a particular period  
divided by market capitalization), has been very low  by international standards 
and falling in recent years; this is also a source o f  concern.
T he bond markets differ from  the stock market in  several ways. As noted  pre­
viously, the outstanding stock o f  governm ent bonds (m ainly central bank notes) 
is m uch  larger than corporate issues. N onetheless, the ratio has been declin ing  
because the central bank has floated  far few er issues recently  as a result o f  a 
change in  m onetary policy, w h ile  corporate issuance has surged fo llow in g  the 
drop in interest rates. Table 6-5  illustrates this shift very clearly. T h e num ber o f  
issuers has increased, bu t participants in  the b on d  m arkets are an even m ore  
elite group than firms listed on  the stock exchange. In 2 0 0 3 , for exam ple, on ly  
thirty-nine new  corporate issues were listed w ith  an average flotation o f  around  
$ 7 5  m illion . L iqu id ity  in  the b on d  m arkets is m uch  higher than in  the stock  
market, but this is m ainly due to h igh  turnover in  central bank paper. Trading in  
corporate bonds has exceeded that o f  stocks, but it is nevertheless low  by inter­
national standards.30
T h e  purchasers o f  stocks and bon d s in  C h ile , unlike m ost o ther em erging  
m arket countries, are m ain ly  in stitu tional investors, in clu d in g  p ension  funds,
29. Calculated from the Bolsa de Comercio website (www.bolsantiago.cl).
30. Cifuentes, Desormeaux, and González (2002).
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Table 6 -4 . Chile: Characteristics of the Stock Market, 1980—2003
Year
















1980 265 9,400 198 548 5.8 100 n.a.
1981 242 7,050 192 375 5.3 76 -25
1982 212 4,395 170 114 2.6 68 -59
1983 214 2,599 159 59 2.3 57 -42
1984 208 2,106 127 40 1.9 63 -10
1985 228 2,012 150 50 2.5 110 -32
1986 231 4,062 290 298 7.3 262 126
1987 209 5,341 935 498 9.3 344 15
1988 205 6,849 550 650 9.5 460 30
1989 213 9,587 274 826 8.6 758 45
1990 215 13,645 253 785 5.8 1,167 40
1991 221 27,984 183 1,907 6.8 2,484 102
1992 245 29,644 480 2,061 7.0 2,734 8
1993 263 44,622 819 2,765 6.2 3,916 31
1994 279 68,195 926 5,263 7.7 5,425 45
1995 284 73,860 892 11,072 15.6 5,740 5
1996 283 65,940 1,372 8,460 12.8 4,903 -19
1997 295 71,832 1,922 7,426 10.3 4,794 -6
1998 287 51,809 872 4,417 8.5 3,595 -33
1999 285 68,193 1,461 6,874 10.1 5,168 32
2000 258 60,514 1,408 6,083 10.1 4,869 14
2001 249 56,734 411 4,220 7.4 5,398 4
2002 254 48,110 89 3,120 6.5 5,020 16
2003 240 85,534 212 6,544 7.7 7,337 62
Sources: IFC (1990, 1995); Standard and Poor's (2005).
n.a. Not available.
a. Millions of dollars.
b. Volume traded as share of market capitalization (%).
c. Indice General de Precios de Acciones, IGPA (1980=100).
d. Change in dollar terms (%).
insurance com panies, m utual funds, and investm ent funds. T h e mere existence 
o f  in stitu tion a l investors— m any o f  w h ich  are lon g-term  investors by  nature, 
ow ing  to the long-term  structure o f  their contingent liabilities— creates dem and  
for securities. T h u s, the sim ultaneous grow th o f  all in stitu tional investors had  
profound effects on  the dem and for securities, their price, and the developm ent 
o f  th is market, bu t the pen sion  funds (AFPs, by their Spanish acronym ) have 
been the m ost im portant.31
31. On the impact of Chilean pension funds on the financial markets, see Uthoff (2001); Walker 
and Lefort (2002); Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003). Insurance company assets have risen 
together with the pension funds, since AFP administrators must purchase policies for their clients, 
but mutual funds are smaller in relative terms than in many other emerging market countries.
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Table 6 -5 . Chile: Characteristics of Bond Market, 1980—2003
Number of
Number of Amount new listed Amount of
Year issuers outstanding1 issues Corporateb Government placement* Corporate1,b Government‘
1980 7 n.a. 4 4 0 0 0 0
1981 7 1,698 13 13 0 0 0 0
1982 12 2,677 9 9 0 0 0 0
1983 13 3,717 2 2 0 44 44 0
1984 15 4,751 5 5 0 66 66 0
1985 16 8,787 3 3 0 4 4 0
1986 8 8,915 3 3 0 32 32 0
1987 14 9,312 13 13 0 122 122 0
1988 20 8,961 12 12 0 267 267 0
1989 23 9,091 10 10 0 329 329 0
1990 27 12,372 16 15 1 294 294 0
1991 37 13,929 19 17 2 499 365 134
1992 39 16,460 12 12 0 154 152 2
1993 40 16,856 5 4 1 295 279 16
1994 46 19,451 14 13 1 447 406 41
1995 46 23,021 5 5 0 69 69 0
1996 47 22,696 5 4 1 175 135 41
1997 42 25,597 7 6 1 104 83 21
1998 41 24,622 7 6 1 809 798 11
1999 44 24,836 13 12 1 703 693 10
2000 44 27,336 21 20 1 2,312 2,292 20
2001 64 26,779 40 36 4 3,033 2,962 71
2002 70 27,890 40 35 5 3,065 2,160 905
2003 81 28,169 41 39 2 2,957 2,733 224
Sources: SYS, Revista Valores for number of issuers., new issues, and placements; table 6--3 for amount
outstanding.
n.a. Not available.
a. In millions of dollars.
b. Public and private companies.
T h e pension  fund reform in  1981 led  to  a significant transfer o f  resources to  
the new ly created^-FP^, and the fund administrators began to seek investm ents. 
Initially, they concentrated their grow ing resources in  central bank paper, m ort­
gages, and bank deposits; later th ey  were authorized to  invest m ore heavily  in  
stocks and bonds o f  C hilean corporations and, still later, to  expand in to  foreign  
investm ents. By the end o f  2 0 0 3 , pension  fund  assets exceeded $4 9  b illion  (58  
percent o f  G D P ). T h e share o f  A FP holdings o f  securities in  relation to the total 
stock  o f  securities increased from  axcumd 2 percent in  1981 to  4 3  percent in  
2 0 0 3 . T h e  largest shares were in  gQ w rn m |n t, m ortgage, and corporate bonds; 
their role in  the equity market was m uch less pronounced.32 Table 6 -6  show s the 
evolving allocation o f  AFP investm ents by type o f  asset.
32. Superintendency of Pension Fund Administrators website (www.safp.cl).
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Table 6-6. Chile: Size and Allocation of Pension Fund Porfolios, 1981—2003
Year
Billions o f  
dollars
Share o f  
GDP
Investment allocation (percent)
Government F inancial Corporate': Foreignd Total
1981 0.3 0.9 28.1 71.3 0.6 0.0 100
1982 0.7 3.6 26.0 73.4 0.6 0.0 100
1983 1.3 6.4 44.5 53.4 2.2 0.0 100
1984 1.8 8.6 42.1 55.7 1.8 0.0 100
1985 1.5 10.7 42.4 56.0 1.1 0.0 100
1986 2.1 12.7 46.6 48.7 4.6 0.0 100
1987 2.7 14.2 41.4 49.4 8.8 0.0 100
1988 3.6 15.1 35.4 50.1 14.5 0.0 100
1989 4.5 18.2 41.6 39.2 19.2 0.0 100
1990 6.7 24.4 44.1 33.4 22.4 0.0 100
1991 10.0 31.2 38.3 26.7 34.9 0.0 100
1992 12.4 31.2 40.9 25.2 33.8 0.0 100
1993 15.9 38.1 39.3 20.7 39.4 0.6 100
1994 22.3 42.1 39.7 20.1 39.3 0.9 100
1995 25.4 40.0 39.4 23.1 37.2 0.2 100
1996 27.5 37.4 42.1 24.6 32.8 0.5 100
1997 30.8 39.0 39.6 30.1 29.0 1.3 100
1998 31.1 40.3 41.0 32.1 21.2 5.7 100
1999 34.5 49.2 34.6 33.7 18.3 13.4 100
2000 35.9 50.9 35.7 35.6 17.6 10.9 100
2001 35.4 55.0 35.0 33.1 18.5 13.4 100
2002 35.8 55.8 30.0 35.0 18.4 16.4 100
2003 49.2 58.2 24.7 27.3 24.0 23.8 100
Source: Superintendency of Pension Fund Administrators website (www.safp.cl).
a. Government and Central Bank notes and bonds.
b. Time deposits, mortgage securities, bonds and shares of banks.
c. Bonds and shares of corporations, investment fund quotas, commercial paper.
d. Investments in mutual funds, bonds, shares, derivatives in foreign markets.
W ith  regard to foreign participation in  the financial sector, most of the atten­
tion  has been directed to the banking industry, given its dom inant role, but for­
eign  participation has also been im portant in  the capital markets. O n e indicator  
is the share o f  foreign  ow nership  in  the C hilean  p en sion  funds: 65 percent o f  
total assets under m anagem ent in  20 0 1  corresponded to  foreign  participation  
(largely Spanish), and over h a lf  o f  the investm ents represented contro l o f  the 
respective institutions.33
W h ile  developm ents in  the capital markets were significant in  and o f  them ­
selves, they also played an im portant role in  sustaining the growth o f  loans and 
the m aturities o f  assets h eld  by banks. O n e  reason lies in  the fact that, after 
1991, banks were allowed to interm ediate m ortgage-backed securities, obtain ing  
fees from  such operations. Banks thus becam e im portant m arket makers, plac­
in g  m ost o f  their m ortgage-backed securities w ith  institutional investors. T h is is
3 3 . S a lo m o n  S m ith  B a rn e y  (2 0 0 1 ) .
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Table 6-7 . Chile: International Finance, 1991—2003
Percent o f  GDP
Year Bank? Bonds ADRsh Total
1991 34.3 0.9 0.0 35.2
1992 34.2 0.7 0.3 35.2
1993 32.9 1 .8 0.9 35.6
1994 37.2 1.4 2.4 41.0
1995 32.9 1 .1 2 .2 36.2
1996 39.0 2.9 2.5 44.4
1997 45.1 4.1 3.1 52.3
1998 55.2 4.6 3.2 63.0
1999 60.0 6 .6 3.2 69.8
20 0 0 6 6 .0 6 .6 3.1 75.7
2 0 0 1 6 6 .1 10 .0 3.6 79.7
2 0 0 2 63.9 13.1 3.5 80.5
2003 67.0 14.3 3.3 84.6
Sources: BIS website (www.bis.org/statistics/hcsv/hanx9a_for.csv) for bank loans, (www.bis.org/ 
statistics/qcsv/anxl2a.csv) for bonds; IMF, Global Financial Stability Report (September 2004) and 
unpublished data for ADRs.
a. Bank loans include cross-border and foreign currency loans from local offices of foreign banks.
b. ADRs are the sum of cumulative equity emissions since 1991.
another exam ple o f  the virtuous circle relating the growth o f  banks, institutional 
investors, and capital markets as a consequence o f  specific policies undertaken  
by C hilean authorities in  the period.
In te rn a t io n a l F in a n c e
C h iles  dom estic financial system  is the largest in  the Latin Am erican region, but 
eco n o m ic  actors nevertheless tap th e  in ternational m arkets for add ition a l 
resources. O f  course, on ly  the largest borrowers can do so; in  C hile’spaserun like  
that o f  M exico  or Brazil, such borrow ers are m ain ly  from  th e private sector. 
O n ly  about one-th ird  o f  the total international financial activity corresponds to  
the governm ent, and som e o f  that share consists o f  sovereign bonds issued by  
the governm ent to help establish a yield  curve and thus open  the w ay for private 
firms to enter the markets.
Table 6 -7  show s trends in  international finance betw een 1991 and 2 0 0 3 . It 
also disaggregates th e  to ta l in to  three co m p o n en t parts— syn d icated  bank  
loans, foreign  and in tern ation a l b on d s, and  A m erican  d ep ository  receipts 
(A D R s). T ogether they  am ou n ted  to  85  percent o f  G D P  in  2 0 0 3 . B y far the  
largest com p on en t was bank loans, representing about 80  percent o f  the total. 
W h ile  b on d s co n stitu ted  a m u ch  sm aller share (1 7  p ercent), th ey  have been  
grow ing m uch  faster than bank loans. A D R s were n o t very significant, and no  
n ew  issues have been  floated since the late 1990s. N onetheless C hile does have 
a presence in  international equ ity  markets. S ixteen C hilean firm s are listed  on
the N ew  York Stock  E xchange, and seventeen  have issued A D R s; n o t surpris­
ingly, the overlap betw een  the tw o is very strong.34 T h e  largest sectoral repre­
sentation  in  A D R s is beverages and tobacco (16  percent) and utilities (13  per­
cen t). O th er sectors that are p rom in en t in c lu d e  m erch an d isin g  and  retail, 
chem icals, and the m ultisector h old ing  com panies. A n  additional source o f  for­
eign capital is investm ent in  the local stock  market. In 2 0 0 4 , about 2 3  percent 
o f  the shares in  the top  forty com panies were in  foreign hands ($ 1 7  b illion  ou t 
o f  $75  billion  market capitalization).35
Finance, Investment, and Growth
C h iles  banks and capital markets have perform ed im pressively since 1990 , and  
they were very supportive o f  the grow th process w itnessed  over the last fifteen  
years. H aving described the m ain characteristics o f  the financial system , w e now  
w ant to  iden tify  the factors that were especially  p ositive in  the v irtuous circle 
betw een finance and growth in  C hile during this period. In particular, w e focus 
on  finance o f  investm ent, w hich  in  turn is a key determ inant o f  the expansion  
o f  output. Table 6 -8  provides an overview o f  sources o f  finance for the corporate 
sector according to am ounts outstanding. In 2 0 0 3 , w hile stock  market capital­
ization dom inated, other dom estic sources accounted for 2 7  percent o f  the total 
and international sources for 16 percent. Som e very tentative data are also avail­
able for n ew  finance, as opposed  to am ounts outstanding. W h ile  those data are 
consistent w ith  table 6 -8  in  terms o f  the greater significance o f  dom estic versus 
international finance, they indicate that new  equity issues are far less im portant 
than the market capitalization figures w ould  lead us to believe.36
Bank Credit
T h e  banking sector w as m arked by  rapid grow th , increased efficiency, and  a 
h igh  degree o f  stability. In n om in a l dollar term s, total claim s in  the system  
tripled from $15  b illion  in  1991 to around $ 4 4  b illion in  2 0 0 3 . Moreover, lend­
in g  as a share o f  G D P  rose from  51 to 6 6  percent (as was show n in  table 6 -1 ). 
A lm ost all o f  this credit w en t to  the private sector, since th e  governm en t had  
ceased to require finance as a result o f  budget surpluses. Business firms were the 
principal recipients, accounting for about 53 percent o f  the grow ing volum e o f  
credit. O ther im portant users o f  credit were m ortgage holders (19 percent), con ­
sum ers (9 percent), and those engaged in  in ternational trade (9  percent); the  
rem aining 10 percent was shared by smaller users.37
34. Information on the NYSE comes from their website (www.nyse.com); ADR information is 
from the Universal Issuance Guide on the Citibank website (wwss.citissb.com/adr/www/brokers/ 
mn_uni.htm).
35. Data are from the Bolsa de Comercio de Santiago website (www.bolsantiago.cl).
36. IMF (2003a, p. 86). The IMF data are only available through 2002, so they do not capture 
the upswing of new issues of corporate bonds and stocks beginning in 2003.
37. Calculated from the SBIF website (www.sbif.cl); data are for 2003.
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Corporate Stock market 
bondsb capitalization
International finance 
Loansc Bondfi E q u it f Total
1993 42.2 4.9 107.0 9.0 0.9 0.9 164.9
1994 40.7 4.6 128.8 11.2 0.8 2.4 188.6
1995 43.6 3.8 112.0 1 1 .0 0.6 2.2 173.2
1996 39.6 3.1 89.6 14.3 2.9 2.5 152.1
1997 41.6 2.4 91.0 20.8 3.5 3.1 162.4
1998 43.9 2.9 67.2 23.9 4.0 3.2 145.1
1999 44.2 3.7 97.3 23.8 5.3 3.2 177.5
2000 43.7 5.1 85.4 21.2 5.2 3.1 163.8
2001 48.9 9.3 85.5 25.0 7.4 3.6 179.7
2002 44.7 11.5 70.6 24.9 9.3 3.5 164.5
2003 41.3 13.2 119.2 22.5 7.9 3.3 207.4
Sources: SBIF, Información Financiera for bank loans; Table 6-3 for corporate bonds outstanding, 
stock market capitalization; BIS website (www.bis.org/statistics/hcsv/hanx9a_priv.csv) for international 
bank loans, (www.bis.org/statistics/qcsv/anxl2c.csv) for international bonds; table 6-7 for international 
equity.
a. Claims by banks on business customers.
b. Outstanding bonds issued by corporations.
c. Claims by international banks on private sector.
d. Outstanding bonds issued by corporations in international markets.
e. ADRs.
Figure 6 -2  show s that the annual grow th rates o f  bank credit, investm en t, 
and  G D P  were c losely  lin ked  during the 1990s. D esp ite  its greater volatility , 
investm ent was synchronized w ith  G D P  growth throughout the period. A t the  
sam e tim e, changes in  the vo lum e o f  credit were strongly correlated w ith  both  
variables pertain ing to econ om ic activity. Peaks and troughs co incided  exactly  
until the last few  years, w ith  no  lag, m aking it hard to decipher the causal m ech­
anisms at work.
Figure 6 -3  uses m on th ly  data, w hich  provide som e additional insights. T h is  
figure— w hich  plots the six -m onth  m ovin g  average o f  the grow th rate o f  com ­
m ercial bank len d in g  to  the private sector and the m o n th ly  ind icator o f  eco ­
n om ic  activity (IM A C E C )— show s tw o interesting characteristics o f  the credit 
cycle in  C hile. First, the grow th rate o f  bank credit was generally h igher than  
that o f  econ om ic activity. Second, the growth o f  lend ing follow ed the growth o f  
eco n o m ic  activ ity  w ith  a short lag. T h at is, th e  supply  o f  credit w as qu ite  
responsive to dem and during the h igh grow th years. In the period o f  lower eco­
n om ic growth after 1999 , however, the relationship shifted, and finance appears 
to have becom e less supportive o f  the growth process. T h e sam e divorce betw een  
credit and the real econ om y after 1999  appeared in  figure 6-2; this raises a ques­
tion  as to  w hether the credit-grow th relationship changes significantly in  peri­
ods o f  low  growth or recession. W e return to this p o in t later w hen  w e exam ine
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Figure 6-2 . Chile: G row th  Rates o fG D P , Investment, and, Credit, 1 9 9 1 —2 0 0 3
Investment; GDP (percent) Loans (percent)
Sources: ECLAC website (www.eclac.cl) for GDP and investment; SBIF website (www.sbif.cl) 
for loans.









Sources: SBIF website (www.sbif.cl) for credit; Central Bank website (www.bcentral.cl/eng/ 
infoeconomic/seriesofindicators/seriesOl.htm) for IMACEC.
a. Credit is total credit; IMACEC is monthly indicator of economic activity. Both are six-month 
moving averages.
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the quite different patterns in  the dom estic capital markets and in  international 
finance.
B oth  m acroeconom ic and m icroecon om ic factors played a role in  the virtu­
ous circle betw een credit and grow th in  the 1990s. Institu tions have also been  
im portant. T h e stable m acroeconom ic context is one o f  the m ain characteristics 
d istin gu ish in g  C h ile  from  its n eighbors in  the past fifteen  years. Several e le­
m ents have been positively linked w ith  financial developm ent. First, stable, h igh  
grow th  rates (w h ich  slacked o f f  tow ard the en d  o f  the 1990s) called  forth  
finance and were supported  by it, as w e just illustrated in  figures 6 -2  and 6 -3 . 
Second, the lack o f  fiscal deficits m ade it easier to control inflation and avoided  
crow ding out the private sector. Third, capital account m anagem ent m eant that 
less vo la tility  was im ported  from  abroad than w ou ld  otherw ise have been  the  
case. T h is third p o licy  has been quite controversial, but the benefits appear to  
have outw eighed the costs, given the serious dam age that volatility has caused in 
C hile’s ow n past and in  other regional econom ies.38
A  m anifestation o f  the links betw een m acroeconom ics and finance is evident 
in  the relationsh ip  betw een  u n em p loym en t levels and n on p erform in g  loans. 
Figure 6 -4  show s that nonperform ing loans as a share o f  total bank credit were 
already low  in  the early 1990s, attributable to the strict regulation and supervi­
sion  and the steady econ om ic recovery in  the second h a lf o f  the 1980s.39 From  
1990  onwards, there was a strong correlation betw een nonperform ing loans and  
the u n em p loym en t rate. As w ou ld  be expected , the decline in  n onp erform ing  
loans was reflected in  a reduction o f  the provisions m ade by banks, ow in g  to the 
low er risk im p lic it in  len d in g . W h ile  the relationsh ip  w ith  u n em p loym en t  
trends is a direct on e w ith  respect to  consum er lending, it is indirect for m any  
business firms through their ability to  sell in  dom estic markets; for exporters it is 
not im portant. A ll three variables increased w ith  the decline in  growth, but they  
remain at low  levels in  comparative terms.
T h e  secon d  part o f  the v irtuous circle is related to m icroecon om ic factors, 
especially the overall cost o f  financing provided by banks. Table 6 -9  show s a sig­
nificant reduction in  nom inal lend ing rates and spreads from  1990 to 2 0 0 3 . A t 
the sam e tim e, real loan  rates have fluctu ated  w ith o u t an overall trend. T h e  
falling interest rates and spreads were due to significant cost-reducing im prove­
m en ts and greater e ffic ien cy  in  the 199 0 s as overall expenses w ere reduced  
throughout, and com petition  forced banks to translate this decline o f  costs into
38. The two sides of the argument can be found in Agosin and Ffrench Davis (2001); De Gre­
gorio, Edwards, and Valdes (2000).
39. The Chilean definition of nonperforming loans is more lenient than international stan­
dards: only the portion of a loan whose payment is overdue is included in the nonperforming loan 
category, rather than the whole loan. The IMF (2002a, p. 72) estimates that under international 
standards, Chilean nonperforming loans would be roughly double the current ratio—which is still 
comparatively low.
Figure 6 -4 . Chile: Unemployment, Nonperforming Loans, and Provisions, 
1990-2003*
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Nonperforming loans; provisions (percent) Unemployment (percent)
Sources: ECLAC website (www.eclac.cl) for unemployment rate; SBIF website (www.sbif.cl) for 
nonperforming loans and provisions.
a. Provisions are share of GDP; nonperforming loans are share of total loans; unemployment is 
urban unemployment.
lower lending rates and operating margins. T h e lower cost increased the dem and  
for loans, w hich  fed back in to  higher investm ent and grow th rates.
Institutions have also played an im portant role in  help ing the banking sector 
im prove its perform ance in  recent years. Fuentes and M aquieira, for exam ple, 
argue that in stitu tion a l d evelopm ent explains the low  level o f  nonperform ing  
loans in  C h ile . In a d d ition  to  regu lation  and supervision , they  cite  the legal 
fram ew ork, in c lu d in g  the ju d icia l system  and bankruptcy cod e, and the  
increased use o f  credit bureaus.40 H ernández and Parro also argue that institu ­
tions have m ade an im portant contribution  to  the dynam ism  o f  C hile’s financial 
sector m ore generally. T h ey  pay particular atten tion  to  the governance factors 
that w e discussed in  chapters 3 and 5, including effective governm ent perform ­
ance, adherence to rule o f  law, control o f  corruption, and strong regulation.41
A nother w ay to study the relationship betw een credit and ou tput growth is to  
m ove to the sectoral level. T h e  supply  o f  credit to  businesses, consum ers, and  
h o m e ow ners all rose rapidly in  1 9 9 0 -2 0 0 3 . W h ile  business loans grew  at a 
strong 8 .3  percent a year, the grow th o f  loans for con su m p tion  and m ortgages
40. Fuentes and Maquieira (2001).
41. Hernández and Parro (2005).
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1990 54.5 48.2 1 1 .8 8.5 49.5 19.9 1.7 2 .1
1991 50.9 28.3 16.4 6.3 61.3 15.3 1.3 1 .8
1992 54.6 23.8 8 .0 5.7 6 8 .6 17.0 1.3 1 .2
1993 59.7 24.0 10.5 6 .0 63.2 2 0 .6 1.5 0.8
1994 57.3 20.3 10.5 5.3 6 8 .0 19.1 1.5 1 .0
1995 60.5 18.1 9.2 4.4 6 8 .0 13.9 1.3 0.9
1996 59.5 17.3 1 0 .1 3.9 66.5 16.6 1 .2 1.0
1997 64.3 15.6 9.1 3.6 66.4 13.7 1 .0 1.0
1998 6 6 .8 18.4 13.2 4.5 61.4 11.5 0.9 1.4
1999 69.2 11.9 8 .6 3.7 60.2 9.4 0.7 1.7
20 0 0 69.2 13.9 1 0 .1 5.1 60.8 12.7 1 .0 1.7
2 0 0 1 69.5 11.3 7.7 5.3 56.2 17.7 1.3 1 .6
20 0 2 68.4 7.5 5.0 3.8 55.2 14.4 1 .1 1 .8
2003 6 6 .0 5.6 2 .8 3.3 53.6 16.7 1.3 1 .6
Sources: Table 6-1 for loans as share of GDP; Central Bank CD (2000) and website (www.bcentral.cl) 
for loan rates and spread; SBIF website (www.sbif.cl) for efficiency ratio, return on equity, return on 
assets, and nonperforming loans.
a. Total loans as share of GDP.
b. Rate for 30—89 day nonadjustable loans.
c. Nominal loan rate deflated by consumer price index.
d. Nominal loan rate minus 30—89 day nonadjustable deposit rate.
e. Operating expenses as a share of gross operational margin.
f. Profits as a share of equity.
g. Profits as a share of assets.
h. Nonperforming loans as a share of total loans.
was even m ore im pressive at 13 .4  percent and 11.9  percent, respectively.42 D is- 
aggregating the figures for business loans indicates that w hile the pace o f  growth  
differed significantly across sectors, credit as a share o f  production  value rose in  
m ost cases (see table 6 -1 0 ) . T h is is a g ood  indicator that bank credit has been  
playing an increasing role in  the financing o f  productive activities.
T h e  im portance o f  bank credit, however, varied substantially across sectors. 
T h e sectors in  table 6 -1 0  can be d ivided  in to  three groups. First are the fastest 
grow ing (transport and com m unications, m in ing, and electricity and gas). Since 
they are m ain ly  foreign ow ned , they do n ot rely on  local bank credit and have 
the low est ratios o f  credit to output. T h e second group (com m erce, finance, and  
agriculture) had the secon d  h ighest grow th rates and  received the m ost credit 
per u n it o f  ou tp u t. T h e  third group (industry, con stru ction , and general ser­
vices) grew  m ost slowly. T h ey  received less credit than the secon d  group, but
42. Data are from the SBIF website (www.sbif.cl).
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1 9 9 0 -9 4 a
Average 
1 9 9 5 -9 9 a
Average 






A gricu lture 56.1 55.9 67.9 59.0 4.8
M in in g 9.8 8.8 9.1 9.2 6.7
In d u stry 34.7 33.8 34.0 34.2 4.0
E lectric ity  and  gas 9.0 19.9 26.6 17.5 7.3
C o n stru c tio n 53.5 48.4 45.6 49.6 4.5
C o m m e rce 79.7 77.9 8 8 .1 81.1 6.3
C o m m u n ic a t io n s/  transport 19.2 23.1 22.3 21.4 8 .1
Finance 55.3 58.7 57.0 57.0 5.4
Services 27.5 44.9 49.5 39.5 3.3
Total 42.4 45.4 46.9 44.6 5.2
Sources: SBIF website (www.sbif.cl) for credit; ECLAC website (www.eclac.cl) for GDP. 
a. Credit to a sector, divided by GDP in that sector.
m ore than the first. In short, bank credit is related to  sectoral grow th rates for 
sectors that are n ot dom inated  by large, foreign-ow ned firms.
C a p ita l  M a rk e ts  a n d  In te r n a t io n a l F in a n c e
Trends in  the capital markets were both similar to and different from  those just 
described for banks. S ign ifican t grow th occurred in  the value o f  ou tstan d in g  
securities: in  nom inal dollar term s, stock market capitalization and bonds ou t­
stand ing  co m b in ed  rose m ore than  fou rfo ld  betw een  1 9 9 0  ($ 2 9  b illion ) and  
2 0 0 3  ($ 1 2 3  b illion ). T h is  grow th was n o t m o n o to n ic , however, especially  for 
th e  stock  m arket. A s n o ted  earlier, m arket cap italization  rose from  1 9 9 0  to  
1 9 9 5 -9 7 , then fell o f f  sharply, and has on ly  recently begun to recover. (Market 
cap ita lization  was sh ow n  in  table 6 -3  as a share o f  G D P  and  in  table 6 -4  in  
absolute values.)
T h e  decline o f  the markets was a major concern for C hilean authorities. Two 
m ain  exp lanations w ere p u t forw ard. O n e  was based on  a K eynesian  type o f  
analysis and focused on  the dem and for finance. It argued that m acroeconom ic  
events, especially  the in ternational financial crises o f  th e  late 199 0 s and  the  
resulting slow dow n o f  econom ic growth in  C hile, were the m ain reason that the  
markets were less active. T hus, even i f  the governm ent were to introduce policies 
to  strengthen the stock  and bon d  markets, a return to previous levels o f  activity  
w ould  depend on  increased dem and for finance.
T h e  alternative, supply-side approach p o in ted  ou t that the slow dow n began 
before the international crisis struck and searched for explanations in  the mar­
kets them selves, together w ith  p olicies alleged to  be erroneous. Exam ples were
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said to in clu d e overregulation  o f  d om estic  m arkets, taxation  o f  secondary  
A D R s, capital controls that lim ited  the entry o f  foreign investors, overly strict 
rules on  p en sion  fu n d  in vestm en t, and h igh  transaction  costs to  enter the  
d om estic  m arkets. A ccord in g  to  th is approach, the govern m en t cou ld  take 
im portant steps that w ou ld  im prove and revive the markets, and the additional 
finance w ou ld  help stim ulate grow th.43
T h e  lin k  b etw een  securities markets and in vestm ent is less straightforward  
than that betw een bank credit and investm ent. C hile’s stock  market— like those 
o f  other develop ing econom ies— is dom inated  by a sm all num ber o f  large cor­
porations. A n even smaller num ber o f  firms have floated bonds on  the dom estic  
market. M ost o f  these firms also have access to international financial markets, 
and all can tap local bank finance w hen  they need it. In other words, this small 
group o f  large firms— w hich accounts for the vast m ajority o f  all investm ent—  
moves am ong sources o f  finance, depending on  market conditions.
Caballero’s analysis o f  this p h enom en on  gives a good  idea o f  the m echanism s 
at w ork in  the financial m arkets.44 H e argues that C h ile  rem ains vulnerable to  
external shocks, especially those deriving from  terms o f  trade, despite having its 
m acroecon om ic h ouse in  order. T h ese  shocks require finance to  keep the real 
eco n o m y  from  b e in g  affected , bu t in ternational sources generally  p u ll back  
under such  circum stances. Large C h ilean  firm s then  sh ift to d om estic  capital 
markets and especially  to  banks, b u t the latter do  n o t w ant to increase credit. 
Flight to  quality results, w hich  essentially crowds smaller firms ou t o f  the mar­
ket. W e return to the im plications for equality in  the next section, but here the 
poin t is the negative im pact on  output and em ploym ent.
A  study by G allego and Loayza com p lem en ts C aballero’s w ork by focu sing  
on  investm ent decisions by large firms in  C h ile .45 T h e  authors report that the  
largest firm s (those in  w h ich  the AFPs can invest) are n o t fin an cia lly  c o n ­
strained, a lth ou gh  th is co n c lu sio n  h olds o n ly  for the h igh est quality  group. 
T h ey  also find  that large firms’ revenue growth is positively related to the depth  
o f  the banking sector, but negatively related to stock market capitalization. T his 
surprising result changes, however, w hen  they  lo o k  at the real value o f  market 
capitalization, that is, w hen  they strip ou t the rise in  value from  price increases. 
T hese results reinforce those o f  Caballero in  that the b est-positioned  firms can  
always get access to  finance, bu t their sm aller counterparts have sign ifican tly  
greater problem s.
O ther sources rem ind us that very large firms have m any interests, and the  
financial resources they  seek (and obtain) m ay be used for m any purposes, o f
43. See Cifuentes, Desormeaux, and Gonzalez (2002) for an analysis by three central bank offi­
cials. They present a mixture of the above arguments, although leaning toward the supply-side 
approach.
44. Caballero (2002).
45. Gallego and Loayza (2001).
w h ich  in vestm en t in  C h ile  is o n ly  on e. For exam ple, C alderón  and G riffith - 
Jones find  that A D R s issued by large C hilean firms in the m id -1990s were used  
alm ost exclusively for investm ent abroad.46 Likewise, the large volum e o f  bonds 
issued in  the dom estic market in  2 0 0 2 —03 were n ot used for investm ent, but to  
take advantage o f  low  interest rates to refinance older, h igh-cost debt.47
G iven these myriad com plicating factors, it is n ot clear ex ante w hat k ind o f  
relationship  m igh t exist betw een  in vestm en t and finance through  the capital 
m arkets. Figure 6 -5  provides em pirical data on  grow th o f  in vestm en t and the 
dollar value o f  new  stock and b ond  issues. Since the tw o are alternative form s o f  
raising capital for essentia lly  the sam e group o f  firm s, it seem s reasonable to  
com b in e them . T h e  variables disp lay little  relationship  in  the first part o f  the  
1990s. A ctivity in  the markets was quite lim ited , and no  particular correlation  
w ith  investm ent trends is apparent. A  close relationship em erged w ith  dom estic  
capital markets after 1 999 , however, as the C hilean  econ om y lost its m o m en ­
tu m  fo llow in g  the A sian  crisis. T h is  is exactly  th e  op p osite  o f  the trend w ith  
investm ent and bank loans, as show n in  figure 6 -2 . In that case, bank loans and  
in vestm en t were tig h tly  lin k ed  u n til 1 9 9 9 , and th en  th e  relationsh ip  d isap­
peared. A  possible explanation is that on ly  the largest com panies were investing  
in  the low  growth years, and they were getting their external resources primarily 
from  the capital m arkets. A  very sim ilar pattern occurs w ith  in tern ation al 
finance, in  that the link  w ith  investm ent also becam e m uch closer as o f  the late 
1990s (see figure 6 -6 ).
Sectoral data for m arket cap ita lization  reinforce the hyp oth esis o f  a lin k  
betw een  finance and  grow th. T h e  five sectors in  w h ich  grow th  exceeded  the  
overall G D P  rate in  the period 1 9 9 0 -2 0 0 2  were transportation and com m u n i­
cations (an annual com pound  rate o f  increase o f  6 .9  percent), electricity and gas 
(6 .3  percent), m in in g  (5 .9  percen t), com m erce (5 .8  p ercen t), and banking  
(4 .9  percent). Four o f  these sectors were the m ost active on  the local stock  mar­
ket, w ith  the highest capitalization and turnover. O n ly  m in ing— w hich is d om i­
nated  by  foreign  enterprises and the huge state firm , C O D E L C O — w as n o t  
heavily  represented .48 M in in g  firm s ob ta in  the large am ou n ts o f  in vestm en t  
finance they need  alm ost exclusively on  the international markets, w h ile  firms 
from  the other four sectors use both  markets, as Caballero indicated.
W h ile  the private sector has had m ore com petition  from  the public sector in 
the capital than in  the credit markets, crow ding ou t o f  the form er by the latter 
has n o t been a problem  in C hile. G overnm ent bonds— m ain ly  attributable to  
th e  central bank p o licy  o f  steriliz in g  capital flow s— d ou b led  in  absolute  
am ounts during the 1990s, bu t th ey  fell sign ifican tly  in  relative term s (from
46. Calderón and Griffith-Jones (1995).
47. Christian Vinacos and Montserrat Sal vat, “Bajas tasas impulsaron mercado de valores,” El 
Mercurio, January 3, 2004.
48. Calculated from data on the Bolsa de Comercio de Santiago website (www.bolsantiago.cI), 
with GDP growth from the ECLAC website (www.eclac.cl).
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Figure 6 -5 . Chile: Growth Rate of Investment and New Issues of Equity and 
Corporate Bonds, 1991—2003
Percent Billions of 1990 pesos
Sources: ECLAC website (www.eclac.cl) for investment; SBIF website (www.sbif.cl) for new 
issues of stocks and bonds.
Figure 6-6 . Chile: Growth Rates of Investment and International Finance, 
1991-2003
Percent
Sources: ECLAC website (www.eclac.cl) for investment; BIS website (www.bis.org), Standard 
and Poor’s (2005), IMF (unpublished) for international finance.
7 7  percent o f  the total in  1990  to 50 percent in 2003; see table 6 -3 ). T h e  sam e 
was true in the international markets, as w e have discussed. In dom estic and for­
eign  markets alike, th en , the governm ent’s austere m acroecon om ic stance left 
plenty o f  space for the private sector to  finance itself and thus contributed to the 
successful econ om ic  grow th process. T h is situation  stands in  stark contrast to  
m any other countries in  the region, where governm ents still absorb a m ajority o f  
bank loans and especially o f  bond  issues.
Access to Finance for Small Firms
C hile’s financial system  has m ade an im portant contribution  to overall growth  
rates since 1 990 , but to  get a m ore com p lete  understanding o f  the im pact on  
grow th, em p loym ent, and equity, w e need  to  explore the question  o f  w h o  has 
had access to finance. T here are various ways to approach the question o f  access; 
here w e concentrate on  access for the business sector, exam in ing  different size 
categories am ong firms (large, m edium , sm all, and m icro). M ost o f  the em pha­
sis is on  formal sector credit from  the banking sector, but w e also touch briefly 
on  the capital markets.49
As noted  earlier, the expansion o f  the credit supply was far superior to that o f  
G DP. T h e  total vo lu m e o f  credit in  constant pesos m ore than tripled betw een  
1990 and 2 0 0 3 . D ata on  the num ber o f  borrowers and average volum e o f  loans 
present a picture o f  h o w  the credit m arket in  C h ile  ch an ged  after 1 9 9 0 . T h e  
num ber o f  bank debtors rose from  1.6 m illion  in  1990 to 4 .5  m illion  in  1997, 
before fa iling  to 3 .4  m illio n  in  2 0 0 1  as grow th  rates fell and  defaults drove  
debtors from  the m arket. A  substantia l recovery then  to o k  p lace. T h is  trend  
contrasts w ith  the total am ou n t o f  credit, w h ich  con tin u ed  to  rise in  term s o f  
constant pesos, m eaning that the average size o f  loans increased. T he overall p ic­
ture for the period  is quite positive. As seen in  figure 6 -7 , the num ber o f  bor­
rowers w ith  access to  the form al credit market m ore than doubled  betw een the  
early 1990s and the early 2 0 0 0 s .50
A  recent study by R om an, based on  data from  the SBIF, enables us to probe 
beneath these aggregate figures to analyze trends in  access to  finance by size o f  
firm s in  the 1 9 9 0 s .51 T h e  stud y defines firm  size in  the standard C hilean  way, 
according to volum e o f  sales: m icro firms are classified as those w ith  sales under 
$ 6 0 ,0 0 0 , sm all firm s from  $ 6 0 ,0 0 0  to $ 6 2 5 ,0 0 0 , m ed iu m -sized  firm s from
49. Pollack and García (2004) contribute a useful study on access to finance for SMEs. While 
most of the paper deals with Latin America in general, a chapter on Chile includes data from an 
unpublished study by García.
50. Many additional sources of consumer lending have become available. Credit from depart­
ment stores is particularly important. According to the SBIF, the number of nonbank credit cards 
is around 8 million, more than three times the number of credit cards issued by banks.
51. Roman (2003).
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Figure 6 -7 . Chile: Number of Debtors and Volume of Debt, 1990—2003
Billions of 1990 pesos Millions
Source: SBIF website (www.sbif.cl).
$ 6 2 5 ,0 0 0  to $2 .5  m illion , and large firms as those w ith  sales over $2 .5  m illion .52 
In 2 0 0 0 , 83  percent o f  all firms qualified as m icro, 15 percent as sm all, 2  per­
cen t as m ed iu m  sized, and less than 1 percen t as large. In turn, m icro firm s 
accounted for 4  percent o f  sales, sm all firms for 10 percent, m edium -sized  firms 
for 9 percent, and large firms for 77  percent.
Large firms, as w ou ld  be expected, were m uch  more likely than their smaller 
counterparts to  have access to  bank credit. As table 6 -1 1  show s, large firm s, 
despite representing less than 1 percent o f  all firms, received over 6 0  percent o f  
the banking credit go in g  to the business sector. N onetheless, the results o f  the 
stud y are u n expected  in  at least tw o ways. First, the table show s that m icro, 
sm all, and m edium -sized  firms received a larger share o f  total credit than their 
sales share w o u ld  predict. Large firm s, b y  contrast, received less than their  
expected  share. A t the tw o extrem es, m icro firm s (4 percent o f  sales) received  
10 percent o f  credit in  2 0 0 0 , w hile large firms (77  percent o f  sales) accounted  
for 6 4  percent o f  credit.
A  secon d  un exp ected  fin d in g  concerns trends d uring  the period  stu d ied  
(1 9 9 4 - 2 0 0 0 ) .  Table 6 -1 2  show s th at 78  percent o f  large firm s had  access to  
credit in  2 0 0 0 , but this represented a decline from  the 84  percent that had had  
access in  1994 . Likewise, the share o f  sm all and m edium -sized  firms w ith  access
52. These categories are based on the UF accounting unit, which is used to index financial 
transactions to inflation in Chile. The value of the UF varies from day to day; the size ranges 
reported above assume a UF equal to $25, which is an average for recent years.
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Table 6-11 . Chile: Allocation of Bank Debt by Size of Firm, 1994—2000 
Percent
Year M icrd S m a lt M edium c Largei Totale
1994 9.1 15.6 13.7 61.7 10 0 .0
1995 9.0 15.0 12.7 63.3 10 0 .0
1996 10 .0 16.6 13.7 59.7 10 0 .0
1997 9.9 15.6 12 .8 61.8 10 0 .0
1998 9.6 15.2 13.0 62.2 10 0 .0
1999 1 0 .1 15.0 12.4 62.4 10 0 .0
2000 9.9 15.0 11.5 63.6 10 0 .0
Source: Calculated from Román (2003, table 20).
a. Firms with sales less than U.S.$60,000.
b. Firms with sales from U.S.$60,000 to U.S.$625,000.
c. Firms with sales from U.S.$625,000 to U.S.$2.5 million.
d. Firms with sales over U.S.$2.5 million.
e. Excludes “tramo 0,” which represents firms with debt but no sales; the share of tramo 0 was 14—15
percent in 1994-96 and 7-9 percent in 1997-2000.
fell slightly. By contrast, the share o f  m icro firms w ith  access to  bank credit rose 
from  3 2  percent in  1 9 9 4  to  39  percent in  2 0 0 0 . O n  b o th  ind icators, m icro  
firms do very w ell w h en  com pared w ith  sm all and m edium -sized  firms. As w e  
suggest below , this m ay be due to certain govern m en t program s that target 
m icro firms in  an especially effective way.
Before m oving to  programs for micro and sm all firms, however, w e return to  
the situation o f  large firms. W h ile  the above suggests that these firms have done  
less w ell than m igh t have been expected in  obtain ing bank credit, this is m ore 
than offset by other sources o f  finance. W e com b in ed  the R om án stu dy w ith  
data from  the IM F and calculated that the 1 percent o f  large firms receive nearly 
85  percent o f  total finance g o in g  to firm s (64  percent o f  dom estic  bank credit 
plus all resources from  international banks and dom estic and international capi­
tal m arkets).53 M oreover, C aballero’s analysis show s that large firm s d isp lace  
sm aller firms from  the credit markets w hen  econ om ic problem s arise.54 It is in 
th is sense that the large firm s are n o t credit constrained , w h ile  their sm aller 
counterparts n o t on ly  have trouble accessing finance in  norm al tim es, but can 
be squeezed ou t o f  the markets altogether in  m ore d ifficu lt periods. U n d o u b t­
ed ly  a larger-than-usual nu m ber o f  sm aller firm s goes bankrupt w h en  such a 
credit crunch occurs.
53. IMF (2003a, p. 86). There is an important inconsistency here regarding the definition of 
large firms. In terms of bank credit, Román considers the 6,000 largest firms, while fewer than 350 
are listed on the Chilean stock exchange. The latter make up the really privileged group in terms of 
access to finance. The SBIF recently defined a new category, mega firms, encompassing the top 
1,000.
54. Caballero (2002).
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No. o f  
firm s




M ic r o a 435,852 139,621 32.0 533,479 21 0,35 4 39.4
Sm a ll6 80,099 50,815 63.4 93,842 58,041 61.8
M e d iu m c 11,217 8,422 75.1 13,159 9,492 72.1
Large6 4,950 4,165 84.1 6,065 4,750 78.3
Tota l 532,118 203,023 38.2 646,549 28 2,63 7 43.7
Source: Calculated from Román (2003, table 16).
a. Firms with sales less than U.S.$60,000.
b. Firms with sales from U.S.$60,000 to U.S.$625,000.
c. Firms with sales from U.S.$625,000 to U.S.$2.5 million.
d. Firms with sales over U.S.$2.5 million.
T h e h igh  degree o f  inequality  in  C h ile  was recognized as a serious problem  
by th e  cen ter-left p o litica l coa lition  that cam e to  pow er in  C h ile  w ith  the  
restoration  o f  dem ocracy in  1 9 9 0 . In ad d ition  to  direct m easures to  com bat 
in eq u ality  and poverty, th e n ew  governm ent estab lished  several types o f  pro­
grams to provide sm all and m icro firms w ith  greater access to  credit and finan­
cial services. C entral to  these efforts were tw o  govern m en t financial in s titu ­
tions— the N ational D evelopm ent C orporation (Corfo) and BancoEstado.
In the 1980s, C orfo  m ade loans directly to  firms. T h is process proved very  
costly  to  the governm ent, generating over $ 5 0 0  m illion  in  losses, and the w in ­
d ow  was c losed  in  1 9 9 0 .55 S ince th en , C orfo  has acted as a second-tier  bank, 
p rov id in g  resources to  com m ercia l banks, w h ich  on -len d  th em  to  firm s and  
hou seh o ld s. Som e o f  these fun ds com e from  C orfo ’s govern m ent-provided  
budget, w h ile  others com e from  don or governm ents in  industrial countries. A  
num ber o f  programs w ith  d ifferent characteristics are geared to  sm aller firm s’ 
needs for investm ent funds and w orking capital. T h e  three largest together pro­
vided  around $6 0  m illion  in  2 0 0 3 , a figure that had been declin ing in  previous 
years. A nother im portant C orfo initiative was providing funds to  the banks to  
restructure the debts o f  m icro, sm all, and m edium -sized  firms, w hich  had go t­
ten in to  financial problem s as growth slowed in  the late 1990s.56
T h ese programs have been  useful, but they suffer from  at least tw o kinds o f  
problem s. First, they  have b een  relatively sm all. T h e  $ 6 0  m illio n  m en tio n ed  
above represents on ly  a little over 3 percent o f  the com m ercial bank credit that 
goes to SM E s.57 T h e restructuring initiative was larger, w ith  original projections
55. Foxley (1998).
56. A description of the programs can be found in Foxley (1998); Dini and Stumpo (2002); 
Rivas (2004).
57. The 3 percent figure is calculated by multiplying the total credit flows (from IMF, 2003a, p. 86) 
by percentage of debt held by micro, small, and medium-sized firms (from Román, 2003, table 20).
of $ 1 b illion . H ow ever, w h ile  C orfo  provided $ 3 0 0  m illion  and BancoEstado  
contributed $ 2 0 0  m illion , the private sector share o f  $5 0 0  m illion  never materi­
alized. A  second  problem  concerns the d efin ition  o f  SM E s in  the C orfo  pro­
grams. T h e agency violates its ow n guidelines in  m any programs by substantially  
broadening the universe o f  firm s that can participate. For exam ple, the largest 
C orfo program for SM Es— a m ultisectoral fund for investm ent financing— can 
be accessed by firm s w ith  annual sales up to  $ 3 0  m illio n  (and large firm s are 
d efin ed  as having sales over $ 2 .5  m illio n ). C orfo  w ill n o t co m m en t on  this  
inconsisten cy , bu t experts hyp oth esize  that the agency is try ing  to  avoid  the  
stigm a o f  new  losses by p rovid in g  funds o n ly  to  h ig h ly  cred itw orthy  
enterprises.58
B ancoE stado is a first-tier com m ercial bank— although  w ith  som e un iqu e  
characteristics v is-à-vis its private sector counterparts. Specifically, it  tries to  
com bine a profitable portfolio  w ith  services to  disadvantaged parts o f  the pop u ­
lation . BancoEstado has taken a leading role in  serving sm all and m icro firms, 
both  in  its role as a lend ing institu tion  and in  coordinating activities by private 
sector banks. It has innovative programs for small and m icro firms, serving over
1 0 0 ,0 0 0  clients betw een  the tw o. Especially w ith  m icro firm s, the em phasis is 
on  providing a h o listic  so lu tion  to problem s o f  sm all entrepreneurs, inclu d in g  
technical assistance, training, and netw orking in  addition  to credit. U se o f  the 
Internet and telephone for com m unication  w ith  clients helps to keep overhead  
costs low .59
E qually im portant is BancoEstado’s role in  providing support to encourage 
private sector banks to  serve sm all firms. S ince a major reason that such firms 
lack access is that they do n ot have collateral or guarantees, the bank administers 
a program called Fogape (Guarantee Fund for Small Entrepreneurs), w hich  auc­
tions governm ent funds to com m ercial banks to be used for guaranteeing credit 
to sm all firms. Such firm s cannot have sales o f  m ore than $ 6 2 5 ,0 0 0  and m ust 
fu lfill the norm al standards o f  eligibility. T h e program started in  1980; it was 
revam ped in  1 9 9 7 , after w h ich  its operations accelerated rapidly. T h u s, there 
were 2 0 0  operations w ith  three banks in 1998 and m ore than 3 0 ,0 0 0  operations 
w ith  seventeen banks in  2 0 0 3 ; in  the latter year, the program  provided about 
$ 2 5 0  m illio n .60 T h ese  am ounts are larger than those provided  by C orfo , and  
they go to firms that really m atch the targeted group o f  sm all firms. A t the other 
end o f  the spectrum , however, BancoEstado also makes loans to very large firms. 
Indeed, BancoEstado has a very different profile o f  clients than its private sector 
com p etitors, focu sin g  on  the sm allest and largest segm ents. Table 6 -1 3  illu s­
trates this p o in t w ith  data on  size o f  loans for BancoEstado, Banco de C hile (the
58. Dini and Stumpo (2002).
59. BancoEstado website (www.bancoestado.cl); see also Mena (2005).
60. Fogape website (www.fogape.cl).
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Table 6 -13 . Chile: Loan Portfolios of Public, Private, and Foreign Banks, 2003 
B illio n s  o f  pesos and  percent
Bank
Micro1 S m a lt M edium c Large'1 Total
A m ount % A m ount % A m ount % A m ount % A m ount %
B an c o E stad o ' 1,615 31.2 1,080 2 0 .8 32 6  6.3 2,159  41.7 5,180 100
B an co  C h ile 1 431 7.1 2 ,120 34.8 1,427 23.4 2,115 34.7 6,094 100
Santander8 7 1 7  8.9 3 ,034  37.6 1,503 18.6 2,815 34.9 8,069 10 0
Total 2,763  14.3 6 ,234  32.2 3,256  16.8 7,089 36.6 19,343 100
Source: SBIF, Información Financiera (December 2003).
a. Less than U.S.$10,000; original source in UF, calculated as UF = U.S.$25.
b. From U.S.$10,000 to U.S.$250,000.
c. From U.S.$250,000 to U.S.$5,000,000.
d. More than U.S.$5,000,000.
e. Public bank.
f. Largest private domestically owned bank.
g. Largest foreign bank.
largest private d om estic  bank), and B anco Santander (the largest foreign  
bank).61
In C hile, w here the hallmark o f  the econ om y is private sector leadership, the 
m ain source o f  finance for sm all and m edium -sized  firms is private banks. V ir­
tually all the private banks are now  com peting  for SM E  clients in  order to shore 
up their businesses and m aintain  profit margins under h igh ly  com petitive con ­
ditions. T here are tw o m ain reasons. T h e margins on  SM E loans are higher than  
those for larger clients, and large firms are increasingly using the dom estic capi­
tal markets and international finance.62 A  variety o f  new  m echanism s are being  
used to service smaller clients in  addition to the traditional types o f  bank loans. 
Prom inent examples include leasing, factoring, and securitizing. A nother type o f  
to o l— credit scoring— has com e in to  use for all k inds o f  banking transactions 
w ith  sm all firm s and  ind ividuals to  enable banks to  m ake lo w -co st d ecisions  
about the creditworthiness o f  potential borrowers.
M ed iu m -sized  firm s generally  have n o  prob lem  ob ta in in g  bank loans, 
although there were tem porary credit shortages in  the low -grow th period after 
1 9 98 .63 Small firms have greater difficulties, in  part because o f  lack o f  collateral; 
here the Fogape program is very useful. A n additional problem  is that credit to  
SM Es, like credit in  general in  C hile, is typically in  the form  o f  very short-term  
loans (less than n inety  days). U nder norm al circum stances, these loans are rolled 
over, but the practice provides the context for a credit crunch to develop in  hard 
tim es.
61. We are using size of loan here as a proxy for size of firm (that is, large loans are referred to as 
loans to large firms).
62. Personal interviews with bankers and entrepreneurs in Chile.
63. Personal interviews.
Interestingly, m icro firms are better positioned  than sm all firms w ith  respect 
to loan maturities. Indeed, R om án’s argum ent as to  w h y  the form er fared better 
than the latter in  the late 1990s is based largely on  this d istinction . A  program  
o f  particular interest is the IFIS (Financial Institutions) program , adm inistered  
by the C h ilean  govern m en t’s Solidarity  and Social In vestm en t Fund (Fosis). 
O perating in a w ay analogous to Fogape, Fosis auctions funds to  com m ercial 
banks, in  this case as a subsidy  for the h igh  transaction  costs associated  w ith  
loans to m icro enterprises. T h e  guarantees are good  for on ly  three loans to  any  
on e client, since after that tim e the banks should have the relevant inform ation  
and the firms should  becom e norm al clients. Two private com m ercial banks in i­
tially took  the lead in  the IFIS program: Banco de D esarrollo, a bank connected  
to  the C atholic C hurch, and Banco Santander, the large Spanish bank through  
its subsidiary Banefe. B oth  used IFIS to develop their ow n programs o f  lending  
to  m icro firms, and they were then replaced by BancoEstado as the leading part­
ner. In its first ten years o f  existence, the IFIS program m anaged to incorporate
1 2 3 ,0 0 0  m icro firm s, g iv in g  th em  access to  som e k in d  o f  bank ing  services.64 
M oreover, the fact that the guarantees require banks to m ake loans that are o f  
longer duration than are typically provided to SM Es (and at fixed interest rates) 
makes micro enterprises the beneficiaries o f  a m ore stable source o f  finance.
O verall, the current C h ilean  govern m en t has taken th e  issue o f  access to  
credit seriously, and  a num ber o f  program s have been  develop ed  to  try to  
expand access to  sm aller firm s. Som e o f  th em  have been m ore successful than  
others. B ancoE stado is arguably the m ost im portant agent in  the a ttem p t to  
broaden access, b u t C orfo  and other agencies also play an im p ortant role. In  
add ition , the private sector has becom e m ore involved  in  p rovid ing credit for 
sm aller firms, based on  the banks’ ow n business m otives. In the last few  years, 
for exam ple, several n iche banks devoted  specifically  to  sm all firm s have been  
authorized to begin operations. Indeed, the governm ent argues that the problem  
for SM E s currently is n o t lack  o f  credit, bu t the term s o n  w h ich  it is offered  
(such as h igher interest rates than for larger firm s, shorter m aturities, greater 
dem ands for collateral, and lack o f  trained personnel to  handle their particular 
needs).65 G overnm ent agencies have a num ber o f  proposals on  the table, since  
credit problem s for sm all and especially m icro firm s— w hether quantitative or 
qualitative— do remain serious, and all agree that m uch m ore needs to be done  
to deal w ith  them .
Conclusions
T h e C hilean  financial system — both  the banking system  and the capital mar­
kets— expanded sign ifican tly  and perform ed w ell in  the past fifteen  years. In  
th is final section , w e h igh ligh t the m ain  reasons that the C h ilean  system  has
64. In 2002, the number of formal sector micro firms was around 533,000 (Román, 2003, p. 9).
65. Marshall (2004a).
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outperform ed its counterparts in  the region. W e also p o in t to  som e challenges 
that are still on the horizon.
First, the stab ility  and g ood  perform ance o f  the banking sector since 1990  
were a direct consequence o f  the thorough cleanup o f  the banking industry after 
th e  finan cia l crisis o f  1 9 8 1 —83 and  th e  im proved  system  o f  regu lation  and  
supervision. A t the beginning o f  the 1990s, C hile already had a solid and m od ­
ern system  o f  prudentia l regulation  and supervision . Few  changes w ere m ade  
during the decade, m ostly  to  com ply w ith  the specific rules set by BIS standards 
for capital adequacy, risk assessm ent, and disclosure. M ore self-regulation and  
better corporate governance w ere also in troduced . M oreover, banks were 
allow ed to  expand in to  a w ider range o f  activities, and foreign banking institu ­
tions increased their presence in  the C hilean market.
Second , a v irtuous circle w as created b etw een  capital m arkets and in stitu ­
tion a l investors. T h e  p en sion  reform  o f  1981 led  to  sign ifican t transfers o f  
resources to  the new ly created private p ension  funds, w hose con tin gen t liabili­
ties are, by defin ition , long-term . Insurance com pany assets grew in  tandem , as 
ob ligatory policies were issued for p en sion -fu n d  beneficiaries, and changes in  
regulation and a better business environm ent also perm itted a rapid grow th o f  
m utual funds and  foreign  in vestm ent funds. Finally, the C h ilean  governm ent 
created in cen tives for the d evelop m en t o f  sp ecific  m arkets, particularly o f  
m ortgage-based securities, and provided the necessary legal fram ework for the  
markets to function .
T hird , the good  perform ance o f  the banking and capital markets was aided  
by the con text in  w hich  m arket operations took  place. M acroeconom ic p o licy  
contributed to a stable and grow ing econom y, w hich  had a strong positive inter­
action  w ith  the financial sector, and the capital account o f  the balance o f  pay­
m ents w as m anaged so as to  lim it vo la tility  from  in ternational m arkets. T h e  
favorable m acroecon om ic en vironm ent (w hich  resulted in  econ om ies o f  scale 
and a decline in  default rates), the reduction o f  public debt and deficits, and the 
interrelated im provem en t o f  m icroecon om ic variables led  to the reduction  o f  
interest rates, spreads, and thus the cost o f  credit. It also m eant that the public  
sector was n ot crow ding the private sector out o f  financial markets. Institutions 
m ade an im p ortan t co n tr ib u tio n , to o . S ince th e  restoration o f  dem ocracy in  
1990 , C hile has been know n for respect for the rule o f  law and an independent 
judiciary, and corrup tion  is m u ch  low er than in  m ost d eve lop in g  countries. 
Institu tions specifically  related to the financial sector have also been strength­
ened through several pieces o f  legislation.
Fourth, in  this environm ent o f  grow th and stability, the international op en ­
in g  o f  the credit and capital m arkets in  the 1990s had a com plem entary  role. 
N o t on ly  has foreign ow nership increased in  both  the banking and nonbanking  
financial sectors, but C hilean firms have becom e im portant participants in  the 
markets for syndicated loans, international and foreign bonds, and, to  a lesser 
extent, A D R s and other form s o f  international equity. T h e  hold ings o f  foreign
assets by C h ilean  financial in stitu tion s have also risen substantially. N otab ly , 
financial op en in g  and in te g ra tio n  took  place in  the c on tex t o f  lo w  increase in  
exchange-risk exposure— an im portant factor in  m itigating the im pact o f  exter­
nal shocks that typically lead to currency m ism atches and constitute a source o f  
financial crisis.
D esp ite  these obvious successes, C hile faces several challenges in  the com in g  
years. First, the financial stability for w hich  the country is justifiably recognized  
m ust be m aintained. T h is m ay sound  sim ple, but new  problem s w ill inevitably  
arise as the country’s financial sector becom es m ore integrated in to  international 
m arkets, especially since the international financial system its e lf  is con tinually  
changing. M oreover, C h ile ’s floating  exchange rate has increased volatility , as 
have m ore relaxed policies on  capital flows and the decision  to  w ean the econ ­
o m y  away from  in d exation . In organizational term s, the Basel II accord w ill 
pose n ew  challenges for banking regulators and supervisors. N ew  instrum ents, 
including various types o f  derivatives, require m ore sophistication on  the part o f  
users and regulators alike, and the challenge is heightened by the presence o f  a 
num ber o f  large foreign  banks in  the C h ilean  m arket. A t the sam e tim e, this 
presence m ay be an advantage i f  partnerships can be form ed w ith  foreign regula­
tors. Overall, the m ain task is to ensure that macro- and m icroeconom ic policies 
continue to w ork together— as they have in the past— to  prom ote a stable finan­
cial environm ent.
Second, i f  the financial sector is to provide adequate support for investm ent 
and grow th, increasing long-term  finance m ust be a priority. C h ile  has m oved  
away from  the m odel o f  relying on  public sector developm ent banks, so private 
sector alternatives m ust be nurtured, in c lu d in g  public-private partnerships. 
W hile it m ay be possible to create incentives to encourage the banks to  lengthen  
maturities, equal attention  should  be focused on  strengthening the capital mar­
kets. O n e  issue is low erin g  transaction  costs so that m ed iu m -sized  firm s can  
access the m arkets, b u t liq u id ity  m ust also be raised to  attract investors. T h e  
pen sion  funds have been a great boon  for the m arkets, b u t th ey  have low ered  
liquidity, requiring new  initiatives to  com pensate. Som e analysts have suggested  
im proving the market infrastructure, standardizing contracts, and increasing the 
availability o f  derivatives. Finally, an agenda for investm ent finance w ou ld  n o t  
be com plete w ith ou t addressing the need  for venture capital. Finance for start­
ups is essential i f  C h ile  is to  m ove tow ard h ig h -tech n o lo g y  sectors. T h is  w ill 
probably require the public and private sectors to w ork together in  new  ways.
T hird , the issue o f  access to finan ce is a vital co m p o n en t o f  th e  goal o f  
increased equality in  C hilean society. As it  currently stands, the financial sector 
is com pounding problem s o f  inequality o f  w ealth and incom e, rather than help­
ing to resolve them , insofar as the share o f  finance accruing to  large firms is even  
higher than their share o f  ou tp ut. Som e creative and efficient policies (such as 
Fogape and IFIS) have been devised by governm ent agencies, and the private
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institutions have also begun to see opportunities through expanding into lower- 
in com e markets. B ut m uch  remains to be done. T h e  banking system  lost over 
on e m illion  custom ers during the econ om ic dow nturn o f  the early 2000s. W hile  
m ost have been  w o n  back, a sizable num ber o f  C h ileans still lack access to  
financial services. M ore im portant from  our perspective, additional efforts are 
needed  to expand finance for sm all and m icro firms. Large and m edium -sized  
firms can generally obtain  access to  finance o f  various sorts that fit their needs, 
but their smaller counterparts face serious obstacles— including som e o f  the very 
regulations that have helped  m aintain  stability  in  the financial sector. A  good  
starting p oin t w ould  be a thorough inventory o f  existing programs and policies 
to  see w hich  are w orking w ell, h ow  they can be im proved, and how  they can be 
expanded to serve the obvious u nm et needs.
A  final, m ore general p o in t concerns the w ay the C h ilean  governm ent and  
financial sector perceive the challenges that face them . A  com fortable tendency  
is to m easure their perform ance w ith  respect to  other L atin A m erican  
econom ies. C hile com es out extrem ely well in  this com parison on  m ost counts. 
A  view  toward the future and the need  for im proving com petitiveness, however, 
suggests that C hile should raise its sights beyond the neighborhood. Som e o f  the 
h igh-perform in g East A sian countries cou ld  provide a usefu l benchm ark and  
possib ly provide som e ideas about n ew  directions, as the earlier chapters o f  the 
b ook  have discussed.
] _
M e x i c o :  
F o r e i g n  B a n k s  A s s u m e  C o n t r o l
M exico in itiated  its financial reforms m ore than a decade after C h ile .1 In 
the late 1980s, the M exican governm ent began to elim inate the controls 
that had characterized the financial sector during m uch o f  the postwar period; 
the reforms accelerated in  the early 1990s. Liberalization and a resulting lend ing  
boom  occurred in  the absence o f  new  prudential regulations, however, and they  
w ere com b in ed  w ith  m acroecon om ic p o lic ies that u ltim ately  led  to  a foreign  
exchange crisis and devaluation at the end o f  1994 . T h e decline in  the currency’s 
value u n d erm ined  an already w eak  b anking sector, and  the govern m en t was 
forced to intervene to  prevent a w holesale m eltdow n. T h e intervention was car­
ried ou t in  conjunction  w ith  a large loan from  the U .S . Treasury and the Inter­
national M onetary  Fund (IM F) to  support the foreign  exchange reserves. 
A lthough the im m ediate crisis was brought under control, the damage was sig­
nificant, and deep problem s remain today.
T h e  period after 19 9 0  can be divided in to  three parts. From 1990  to  1994 , 
the new ly privatized banks expanded credit rapidly, m ain ly  directing it toward  
the private sector. A fter the crisis o f  1 9 9 4 -9 5 , credit to  the private sector fell 
steadily, but in  tw o different contexts. D uring the second h a lf  o f  the 1990s, the  
banks were trying to  rebuild their capital, restructure their operations, and m eet 
new  regulatory requirem ents. T hus little lending took  place, despite robust eco-
1. We would like to thank Celso Garrido, Professor of Economics at Mexico’s Universidad 
Autonoma Metropolitana Azcapotzalco, for the document he prepared as an input to this chapter. 
It has been expanded in his own book; see Garrido (2005).
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n om ic  grow th. In the first h a lf o f  the 2 0 0 0 s , tw o changes occurred sim ultane­
ously: growth slowed, and foreign banks m ade a massive entry in to  the M exican  
m arket. O n ly  by  m id -d ecad e d id  loans b eg in  to recover, b u t m ain ly  for c o n ­
sum ption  rather than production; lending as a w hole remains far below  precrisis 
levels. Capital markets follow ed similar patterns.
T h e  M exican econ om y has serious problem s in  com parison  w ith  the other  
countries w e are studying. In particular, it has very low  levels o f  bank credit to 
the corporate sector, and the capital markets m ake on ly  a m inim al contribution  
to  funds for investm en t. O verall, d om estic  fin ance for firm s in  M exico  is 28  
percent o f  G D P  (m easured by am ounts outstanding in  2 0 0 3 ), whereas the com ­
parable figures for Brazil and C h ile  are 82 percent and 174  percent, respectively. 
Finance in  East Asia is even m ore abundant. T h is does n o t m ean that no  M exi­
can firm s have access to  finance. O n  the contrary, a very sm all group o f  very  
large firm s has excellen t access. T h e  problem  concerns the great m ajority  o f  
firms, w hich  are lim ited  to retained earnings and fragile nonbank funding. U ntil 
M exico  has a deeper d om estic  financial system  and  provides broader access, 
lon g-term  grow th  that encom passes the d om estic  eco n o m y  as w ell as exports  
w ill be hard to generate.
T h is chapter assesses the problem s in  M exico’s financial system  and h ow  to  
convert it into a m ore dynam ic force in  the M exican econ om y and society. T he  
first section  looks at financial liberalization, the crisis, and the afterm ath. T h e  
second  turns to structural changes in  the financial sector— banks, capital m ar­
kets, and the links to  international finance, w h ich  are especially im portant for 
M exico given its close ties to the U n ited  States. T h e  third section  analyzes the 
relationship am ong finance, investm ent, and growth in  the M exican case; this is 
closely  linked  to the question  o f  w h o  has access to finance (section  four). T h e  
final section  concludes by analyzing the challenges that con front M exico w ith  
respect to  im proving the perform ance o f  finance for production  and its role in  
the econom y m ore generally.
Liberalization, Crisis, and Response
T h e M exican financial system  has experienced unusual turbulence in  the last 
tw o  decades: n ation a liza tion , reprivatization , and deregu lation  all occurred  
w ith in  a relatively short period  o f  tim e. N o t  surprisingly, the process has n o t  
been a sm ooth  one. W h ile  sign ificant efforts have been  m ade recently to  b ut­
tress the system and increase the availability o f  credit, they have n o t yet achieved  
success. T his history provides the crucial background for understanding the cur­
rent financial problem s M exico  faces. W e b eg in  w ith  th e  steps lead ing  to  the  
bank nationalization, follow ed by the liberalization process and the disequilibria  
it created. W e th en  turn to  th e  crisis and the governm ent response, b o th  the  
short-term  rescue and  the longer-term  in stitu tion a l changes. W e fin ish  by
Mexico: Foreign Banks Assume Control 185
extending the analysis beyond the banks to include the capital markets and how  
they, too , have changed as a result o f  financial liberalization and the crisis.
F in a n c ia l  L ib e ra liz a tio n  a n d  Its  Consequences
B y the early 1980s, M exico  w as con sid ered  to  be on e o f  the m ost successfu l 
develop ing  countries and was frequently com pared w ith  the n ew ly  industrial­
ized econom ies (N IEs) o f  Brazil, Korea, and Taiwan. As in  other N IE s, the state- 
ow ned  developm ent banks were crucial instrum ents in M exico’s postwar indus­
tria lization  drive. T h e  national d evelop m en t bank (N acion a l Financiera, or 
N afin ), in particular, played a key role in interm ediating betw een international 
finance and dom estic firms, both public and private. State banks serving specific 
groups o f  clients were also prom inent actors, including a foreign trade bank, an 
infrastructure bank, and several agricultural banks. Together, they controlled  a 
substantial, but varying, share o f  M exican bank loans over the years; at som e  
p o in ts, their share exceeded  5 0  percen t o f  total d om estic  credit. B eyon d  its 
direct ownership o f  the developm ent banks, the M exican governm ent exercised 
tight control over private com m ercial banks through high reserve requirem ents, 
interest rate regulation, and directed credit.2
T h e  M exican  eco n o m y  also relied on  in ternational capital (both  private  
banks and m ultilateral in stitu tions), w hich  was especially im portant in  financ­
ing state-ow ned firms in  petroleum , energy, and transportation, as w ell as indus­
try. T h e resulting buildup o f  foreign debt in  the 1970s, together w ith  the drop  
in  o il prices in  the early 1980s, created the con d ition s w hereby M exico nearly 
defaulted  on  its ob ligation s and in itiated  the so-called lost decade o f  the debt 
crisis in  Latin Am erica. In M exico’s case, the external financial crisis was linked  
to the dom estic  financial sector w h en  the ou tgo in g  governm ent o f  José L ópez  
Portillo nationalized the private banks in  1982  in  an attem pt to  bring the crisis 
under control; state ow nership was w ritten into the constitu tion . T h is act con ­
stituted a last attem pt at state control o f  the M exican econom y. A  m ove toward 
greater reliance on  th e  m arket began under the successor ad m in istra tion  o f  
M iguel de la M adrid (1 9 8 2 —8 8 ).3
O n e o f  the m ost im portant sets o f  m arket-oriented reforms was centered on  
the financial sector. Since privatizing the banks w ould  have required a constitu ­
tional change, the de la M adrid governm ent worked around the margins by sell­
ing nonbank financial institutions, such as brokerage houses and insurance com ­
panies. It also diverted governm ent borrowing from banks to the capital markets 
by increasing the issuance o f  short-term treasury bills. T he big changes, however, 
cam e under the adm inistration o f  Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1 9 8 8 —94). Interest
2. For a discussion of the financial sector in the early postwar period, see Goldsmith (1966); 
Del Angel-Mobarak (2005). On the relationship between finance and investment in the early 
period, see FitzGerald (1978).
3. On the bank nationalization, its causes, and its ramifications, see Del Angel-Mobarak, Baz- 
dresch, and Súarez (2005).
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rates were liberalized on  both  assets and liabilities, directed lend ing quotas were 
elim inated, and reserve requirements were lowered and then abolished. T h e con ­
stitu tion  was am ended  to perm it the reprivatization o f  the banks, w h ich  took  
place in  on ly  fourteen m onths between m id -1991 and m id -1992. Buyers had to 
be M exican nationals; m ost had little  or no  banking experience; and they paid  
very h igh prices for their new  properties. T h e last tw o factors w ould  later be rec­
ognized as highly problem atic for banking performance.4
T h e  b ank ing  system ’s response to  liberalization  was as exp ected . L end ing  
grew rapidly (around 30  percent per year in  real terms from  1989  to 1994), and  
the share o f  loans to the private sector rose from  10 to  4 0  percent o f  G D P .5 
M ost analysts agree, however, that the first years o f  privatization were character­
ized by “reckless— som etim es fraudulent— len d in g  as a result o f  poor supervi­
sion  and underdeveloped regulations. Poor credit-analysis procedures and few  
internal controls characterized the sector during this tim e. Banks put them selves 
in  a precarious p o sitio n  as their len d in g  ou tp aced  their d ep osits, and  they  
fu n d ed  the shortfall throu gh  interbank borrow ing— m ain ly  from  foreign  
banks.”6 As a consequence, nonperform ing loans increased from  around 2  per­
cent o f  total loans in  1990 to 9 percent in  1994 , but these official figures should  
be taken as a lower b ou n d  given the governm ent’s w eak accounting procedures 
at the tim e.7
In  ad d itio n  to  th ese m icro eco n o m ic  p rob lem s, m a cro eco n o m ic  p o lic ie s  
also con trib u ted  to  th e  bu ild u p  o f  a financial crisis. T h e  use o f  an exchange  
rate anchor to  con tro l in fla tion  led  to  overvaluation  o f  the p eso , large trade 
and  current account deficits , and  strong capital in flow s. Initially, m ost o f  the  
in flow s w ere foreign  d irect in v estm en t, thanks to  th e  s ig n in g  o f  th e  N o r th  
A m erican  Free Trade A greem en t (N A F T A ) w ith  th e  U n ite d  States and  
C anada. Political shocks during the election  year o f  1994 , however, triggered a 
sharp drop in  lon g -term  capital flow s and  thus d w in d lin g  reserves. To lim it  
the declin e, the governm ent issued short-term  d eb t that was payable in  pesos 
b u t ind exed  to  the dollar (tesobonos). W h ile  th e  p o licy  w as tem porarily  su c­
cessfu l, th e  h em orrh ag in g  resum ed, and  by  th e  en d  o f  th e  year, as th e  n ew  
Z ed illo  ad m in istration  prepared to  take o ffice , it was clear that drastic steps 
w o u ld  have to  b e taken . T h e  peso  w as floa ted  in  D ecem b er, resu ltin g  in  a 
large devaluation.
4. For useful summaries of the buildup to the crisis, see Gruben and McComb (1997); Haber 
(2005).
5. Marcos Yacaman (2001).
6. EIU (2001, p. 7) • Gruben and McComb (1997) contrast two theories about the nature of 
the problems in Mexico’s banking sector: insufficiently competitive or hypercompetitive. The sec­
tor appears to have switched from the first to the second in a short time in 1993-94. See also 
Gruben and McComb (2003).
7. Data are from McQuerry (1999), but see Haber (2005) on different ways to calculate non­
performing loans.
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T h e  F in a n c ia l  Crisis a n d  the G o v e rn m en t Response
T h e devaluation o f  the M exican peso set o f f  a crisis that severely dam aged the 
country’s banking system , as w ell as its econom y m ore generally. Because M exi­
can regulations lim ited  banks’ foreign exchange exposure, the direct problem s 
created by the devaluation  were less significant than in m ost other coun tries.8 
Several indirect consequences were m ore serious. T hese included a sharp drop in  
econ om ic  activity, a substantial h ike in  interest rates in  an attem pt to control 
in flation , and an increase in  the dem and for dollars. T h e resulting inability  o f  
debtors to service their ob ligations increased the already h igh  level o f  nonper­
form ing loans, w h ich  put the banks them selves in danger.
M exico’s response to  the tw in  crises it faced was p iecem eal. T h e  authorities 
feared that open  recogn ition  o f  the fu ll exten t o f  the ban k in g  crisis w o u ld  
w orsen the external crisis, so they did n ot deal w ith  the banking crisis com pre­
hensively.9 In the short run, help cam e from  the new  N A F T A  partners. D espite  
op p osition  from  the U .S . C ongress, the C lin ton  adm in istration  and the IM F  
orchestrated w hat was then  the largest financial rescue package in  h istory—  
som e $5 0  b illio n .10 M uch  o f  the package w en t to redeem  the tesohonos, w h ich  
m ade som e observers q u estion  the m otives o f  the rescue op eration , bu t it 
enabled  the governm ent to  restore its foreign exchange reserves and to  regain  
control o f  its p o licy  instrum ents. T h e  stringent econ om ic policies w orked ou t 
betw een the M exican governm ent and the IM F perm itted the tam ing o f  infla­
tion  and the resum ption o f  econom ic growth, m ainly through increased exports 
to  the U n ited  States as a result o f  the n ew ly  com p etitive  exchange rate. T h e  
recovery was very uneven, however, partially because o f  con tin u in g  problem s in  
the financial sector.
A  n um ber o f  m easures were in trodu ced  to  aid the banks in  the short run. 
First, an in ternational liq u id ity  facility  was established to  enable the banks to  
m eet their foreign  exchange ob liga tion s. Second , a recapitalization  program  
(Procapte) was set up to help banks m eet the 8 percent capital-asset ratio set by 
the Bank for International Settlem ents. Banks cou ld  raise their capital ratio by  
creating convertible subordinated bonds, selling them  to  the deposit insurance 
agency (Fobaproa), and using the proceeds to augm ent their capital. I f  the banks 
becam e insolvent, the bonds w ou ld  be converted to  equ ity  under governm ent 
ow nersh ip .11 T hird , banks were allow ed to exchange nonperform ing loans for 
ten-year zero-coupon governm ent bonds. (T his plan was com m on ly  referred to
8. Some loopholes did exist, however, to get around the regulations; see O ’Dougherty and 
Schwartz (2001).
9. This argument is convincingly made by Krueger and Tornell (1999). In addition, as others 
have pointed out, a lack of timely information made it hard to grasp the full extent of the crisis; see 
McQuerry (1999).
10. All monetary figures cited in this chapter are in U.S. dollars.
11. This program was not used much because the market considered participation to be a sign 
of weakness. See Mackey (1999).
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as Fobaproa, since that agency was in  charge o f  taking over the nonperform ing  
loans.) T h e  quid  pro quo was that bank shareholders had to inject one peso o f  
new  capital for every tw o pesos o f  nonperform ing loans shifted o f f  their balance 
sheets. T h ey  also had to  m ake provisions for 25  percent o f  the debt transferred 
and to hold , n ot trade, the bonds. Fourth, debtor relief programs were offered to  
various categories o f  borrowers— such as credit card and m ortgage holders, the 
agriculture sector, and  SM E s— to stretch o u t loan  paym ents, reprice th em  in  
U D Is , and subsidize interest paym ents.12 Subsequently, a program o f  discounts  
on  loan  principal was added to  en d  the process (and was thus referred to  in  
Spanish as punto  f in a l) .
T h e cost o f  these programs rose each year since the banks’ problem s were not 
fu lly  resolved and n ew  n on perform ing loans qu ick ly  replaced those m oved  to  
Fobaproa. In addition, the governm ent bent its ow n rules by broadening the cat­
egories o f  loans that could  be sold to Fobaproa. In 1995 the cost was estim ated at 
5 .5  percent o f  G D P ; by 19 9 6  it had risen to  8 .4  percent; and by  1998  it had  
reached 16.2 percent. M ore recent estimates run around 20  percent o f  G D P.13
A  com plem entary aspect o f  the rescue program involved both  tem porary and  
perm anent changes in  bank ownership. T h e tem porary changes centered on  the 
governm ent’s takeover o f  tw elve banks, because o f  either capitalization problem s 
or fraud. T h e twelve institutions— all quite sm all— accounted for about 12 per­
cent o f  the total assets o f  the banking industry. In general, other banks bought 
the branch networks o f  the intervened banks, leaving the assets and liabilities for 
Fobaproa to dispose o f.14 T h e m ore perm anent ownership changes involved the  
expansion o f  foreign banks. W h ile  the op en in g  o f  the m arket to  foreign banks 
was part o f  the N A F T A  agreement, it was initially m eant to be very gradual and  
was to  be capped at 25  percent foreign ownership. T h e  need for recapitalization, 
in  the absence o f  local partners w ith  deep pockets, led to  an acceleration o f  the 
o p en in g  process. Foreigners n o w  ow n  the vast m ajority o f  M ex ico ’s banking  
industry. T h e governm ent h oped  that the n ew  foreign ow ners w ou ld  n o t on ly  
bring additional capital, but w ou ld  also in troduce n ew  technology— hard and  
soft— that w ou ld  m ake the eco n o m y  m ore com p etitive and h elp  avoid future 
crises.
T h e  N e w  System o f  R eg u la tio n  a n d  Supervision
As th e sale o f  M exican banks was taking place, other changes were also occur­
ring in  the financial sector. P resident E rnesto Z ed illo  presented  a package o f
12. The UD1 is a unit of account, indexed to the inflation rate. It was modeled after the 
Chilean UF.
13. See Krueger andTornell (1999, table 12) for 1995-98; OECD (2002, p.7) for the recent 
figure.
14. See Graf (1999) for a list of the individual banks and the way each participated in the vari­
ous programs for bank rescue. La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, and Zamarripa (2002) provide a slighdy 
different list.
banking reforms to the congress in  M arch 1998 . T h e  package consisted o f  tw o  
elem ents. T h e first was a set o f  proposals to strengthen the regulation and super­
v is ion  o f  the banking sector. In in stitu tion a l term s, the package prop osed  to  
grant a u ton om y to  th e  bank regulatory agency, th e  B an k in g  and Securities 
C om m ission  (C N B V , by its Spanish acronym ), and to m ove it from  the finance 
m in istry  to  the B ank o f  M exico . It further sou gh t to d isso lve Fobaproa and  
replace it w ith  tw o n ew  institutions to carry ou t its tw o functions: reselling the 
assets it had acquired and serving as the nation’s deposit insurance agency. T h e  
operational changes included the following: (i) a new  deposit insurance system, 
w h ich  w ou ld  end  the de facto u n lim ited  d eposit insurance that existed previ­
ou sly  and increase the oversight o f  the dep osit insurance agency; (ii) stricter  
accou n tin g  standards, w h ich  w o u ld  increase the transparency o f  credit opera­
tions for both  supervisors and the public, im pose stricter standards for handling  
past-due loans, and substantially increase loan-loss provisions; (iii) measures to  
im prove lend in g  practices and n ew  laws on  credit transactions, aim ed at speed­
in g  the process o f  asset foreclosure and broadening the range o f  property to  be 
used as collateral; and (iv) stricter rules on  quality o f  capital. To reduce possible  
future exchange rate m ism atching, the Bank o f  M exico low ered the existing ceil­
ings on  foreign  currency liab ilities and im p osed  com p u lsory  liq u id ity  co effi­
cients in  foreign currency.15
T h e second aspect o f  the Z edillo  package was m uch m ore controversial. T he  
president proposed to  add the liabilities held  by Fobaproa to M exico’s national 
debt. T h is m ove w o u ld  effectively  legalize the status q u o , bu t it required the 
approval o f  the congress to  change the general law  on  public debt. O p ponents  
claim ed that m any o f  the loans turned over to Fobaproa represented poor busi­
ness judgm ents and that som e were fraudulent. T h ey  argued that it was inap­
propriate to  force taxpayers to  assum e the cost— especia lly  w h en  they  had  
already paid for the crisis w ith  unem ploym ent and lost in com e.16
Because o f  the controversy generated by this second proposal, it took  m any  
m onths to gain approval for the reform package as a w hole. A  com prom ise was 
reached at the end o f  1998  after n ine m onths o f  debate. N o  definitive solu tion  
was agreed on  the d eb t nationalization ; rather, the annual costs w ere to be 
included  in  each year’s budget. A udits were to  be carried o u t on  the loans that 
were assumed by Fobaproa, and the loans were to be returned to the banks i f  it 
were determ ined that they had been im properly handled .17 T h e  bonds issued by
15. See Marcos Yacamdn (2001) for details; also EIU (2001).
16. McQueriy (1999) argues that the situation was especially charged because it came at a time 
of political transition in Mexico. For the first time in decades, opposition parties in Congress were 
able to challenge the long-ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) effectively.
17. An audit report was commissioned from a Canadian expert, Michael Mackey; see Mackey 
(1999). In mid-2004, an agreement was finally reached. The banks’ current owners agreed to take 
back $826 million in bad loans and allow a limited audit of another $600 million. See Elizabeth 
Malkin, “Deal in Mexico Makes Four Banks Absorb Losses from Loans,” New York Times, July 16,
2004.
190 The Impact o f the New Financial System in Latin America
Mexico: Foreign Banks Assume Control 191
Fobaproa were to be replaced by n ew  ones that the banks w ou ld  hold, remuner­
ated at com petitive interest rates, w hich  m any experts believe is on e o f  the major 
causes o f  the financial sector’s problem s today. W e discuss this issue at length  
below . Fobaproa was d isbanded , as p roposed , and replaced by  a n ew  dep osit  
insurance agency (Ipab, by its Spanish acronym ), but autonom y was n ot granted  
to  C N B V , the regulatory agency, w hich  continued  to  operate as a dependency o f  
the finance ministry.
W h ile  these changes clearly im proved the regulatory and supervisory capacity  
o f  the M exican authorities, m any problem s rem ained. A t the m acroeconom ic  
level, rule o f  law  and con tract en forcem en t w ere n o t w id e ly  accepted . A t the  
m icroeconom ic level, poor corporate governance continued  to characterize both  
banks and nonfinancial corporations. Moreover, M exico’s regulators face a par­
ticular set o f  problem s that have yet to be adequately addressed, either in  the lit­
erature on  banking or in  practice. Five o f  the six largest banks and over 80  per­
cent o f  bank assets are in  the hands o f  giant foreign institutions. H o w  does this 
affect the ability o f  local regulators and supervisors to  act? D oes it require close 
cooperation w ith  the regulators in  the banks’ hom e countries? I f  so, h ow  should  
this be carried out? I f  M exican regulators are to take sole responsibility, how  can 
th ey  deal w ith  in stitu tio n s that are larger and m ore pow erfu l than th ey  are? 
T hese questions w ill require m ore consideration in  the future.18
B eyo n d  the B a n k in g  Sector
T h e financial liberalization process and the resulting crisis were m ainly centered  
o n  the banking sector, but there were also im plications for the capital markets. 
W h ile  the stock  m arket goes back to  the late n in eteen th  century, the m odern  
version o f  the b ond  market dates to the introduction  o f  short-term  treasury bills 
(cetes) in  1 978 . T h e  stock  m arket to o k  o f f  w ith  the financial reform s, and by  
1993  it had reached the largest capitalization that it has ever attained (50  per­
cent o f  G D P ). T h e num ber o f  listed firms rose: an average o f  eighteen new  pub­
lic offerings were m ade each year betw een 1991 and 1994 . T h e bond  market, by  
contrast, languished, since m any in stitu tion al requirem ents were still lacking. 
T h e crisis h it the capital markets hard, but the governm ent soon  began a m ulti­
faceted program to prom ote th em .19
A  key step was the pension  reform law, w hich  was passed in  1995 and began 
operation in  1997 . Largely based on  the C hilean  reform , the law  provided for 
fu lly  funded  pension  accounts (siefores) to  be m anaged by fu n d  adm inistrators 
(,afores). T h e  change greatly expanded  th e p o ten tia l base o f  in stitu tion a l 
investors. W h ile  the initial rules governing the afores required them  to invest in 
governm en t securities, a relaxation o f  these restrictions later allow ed  th em  to
18. Out interviews conducted at the Bank of Mexico indicate that the authorities are aware of 
this problem and are considering how to deal with it, but it is not a high priority.
19. For information on the capital markets before the crisis, see Martinez and Werner (2002).
m ove in to  corporate debt. N onetheless, governm ent paper still accounts for the 
vast m ajority o f  their assets. Legal in itia tives also expanded  the scope for the  
operation  o f  m utual funds and stim ulated  the form ation  o f  rating agencies to  
evaluate potential issuers in  the capital markets. T h e m ost recent changes, w hich  
took  effect in  January 2 0 0 5 , allow ed Afores to  invest up to 15 percent o f  their 
assets in  M exican and international equities.20
A  second im portant step was the im provem ent o f  the legal fram ework w ith in  
w h ich  the markets operate. As part o f  a large package o f  in stitu tion a l reforms 
approved in  A pril 2 0 0 1 , corporate governance was strengthened  through  the 
establishm ent o f  independent board m em bers, auditing com m ittees, protection  
o f  m inority shareholders, and greater transparency in  the corporate sector more 
generally. T h e governm ent reforms were com plem ented  by a private sector in i­
tiative to draw up a voluntary cod e o f  corporate best practices, w h ich  em pha­
sizes im provem ents in  corporations’ adm inistrative procedures and inform ation  
transparency.21 In 2 0 0 5 , th e  govern m en t prop osed  a n ew  capital m arket law  
design ed  to  tigh ten  corporate governance further by increasing p u b lic ity  for 
sanctions by regulators, extending the reach o f  insider trading rules, and chang­
in g  the role o f  corporate boards. It w ould  also expand the pow er o f  the Banking  
and Securities C om m ission  and m ake it easier for m edium -sized firms to list on  
the m arket. T h e  reform , however, was delayed by op p osition  in  the congress, 
although it is expected to be approved in 2 0 0 6 .22
M arket regulation  and su pervision  is headed  by  the m in istry  o f  finance, 
aided by three agencies o f  particular relevance for the securities m arkets— the  
Banking and Securities C om m ission , the Insurance C om m ission , and the Pen­
sion  Funds C om m ission . T h e M exican Stock Exchange is a self-regulating cor­
poration , operating under a charter from  the finance m in istry  and ow n ed  by  
local brokerage houses. W h ile  these agencies generally have a good  reputation, 
they need  m ore resources and autonom y, as w ell as greater coordination , i f  the  
markets are to develop m ore fu lly  in  the com in g  years.23
Changes in Structure
T h e m ost salient characteristic o f  M exico’s d om estic  financial sector in  recent 
years has been its sm all size in  relation to the m agnitude o f  the country’s econ­
omy. D ebates as to  w hether the system  is bank or market based stem  n ot from  
the fact that the markets are large and strong, but from  the fact that bank credit 
as a share o f  G D P  is so  sm all.24 T h e  stock  and bon d  m arkets are w eak in  part
20. See Reynoso (2004) on the possible consequences of the new law.
21. The document can be found on the website of the Mexican Stock Exchange 
(www.bmv.com.mx).
22. See John Authers, “Lobbying Delays Mexico Securities Bill,” Financial Times, June 20,
2005.
23. See, for example, IMF (2001); OECD (2002); Bank of Mexico (2003).
24. See discussion in Copelman (2000).
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Figure 7 -1 . M exico: Composition o f  F in a n c ia l M arkets, 1 9 9 0 —2 0 0 3
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Sources: Tables 7-1 and 7-3.
because o f  the lack o f  institu tional investors and an adequate legal fram ework. 
A t the sam e tim e, M exico is closely  integrated into the U .S . financial markets, 
both  for governm ent agencies and large firms, m aking dom estic markets som e­
w hat redundant for these key borrowers. Figure 7-1 shows the relative shares o f  
bank credit, bonds outstanding, and stock  market capitalization and h ow  these 
have varied since 1990.
T h e  B a n k in g  Sector
T h e structure o f  the M exican banking system  changed in  three crucial w ays in  
the last quarter century: assets and loans increased and then shrank dramatically 
in  b o th  th e  198 0 s and 1990s; con tro l was passed from  the state to  private 
d om estic  ow ners and then  to  foreign  banking in stitu tions; and concentration  
am on g  banks increased  substan tia lly  a lthou gh  it w as already very h igh . T h e  
three trends are intim ately interrelated.
Table 7-1 show s the evo lu tion  o f  com m ercial and d evelopm en t bank loans 
and deposits in  th e l9 8 0 -2 0 0 3  period. A t the beginning o f  the 1980s, the com ­
m ercial banks were private, dom estica lly  ow ned  institu tions; their loans were 
expanding, although from  a low  base. T his trend reversed w ith  the bank nation­
alization in  late 1982: loans fell from  21 percent o f  G D P  in  1982  to 15 percent 
in  1 988 . T h e trend reversed again as financial liberalization began, and loans 
reached a new  peak (39 percent) in  19 9 4  before the financial crisis. S ince that 
tim e, the loan ratio has rem ained more or less constant, but at a rather low  level 
in  com parative term s. M oreover, even the current 34  percent figure is inflated
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Table 7-1. Mexico: Assets, Loans, a n d  Deposits o f  the B anking  System, 1 9 8 0 —2 0 0 3  
Percent o f GDP
Commercial banks Development banks A ll banks
Loans to Loans to Loans to
Total private Total private Total private
Year loans sector* Depositsh loans sector* Depositsh loans sectoA Depositi
1980 17.6 16.2 23.8 13.4 4.1 2.9 31.0 20.3 26.7
1981 19.4 17.2 26.0 15.9 3.6 3.4 35.4 20.8 29.4
1982 21.3 13.7 24.9 26.3 3.0 2.8 47.5 16.7 27.7
1983 18.4 11.1 22.2 21.0 3.0 2.8 39.5 14.1 25.0
1984 19.2 12.2 22.8 18.8 3.3 2.9 38.0 15.5 25.7
1985 16.7 10.3 19.8 22.1 3.7 2.8 38.7 14.0 22.6
1986 22.2 10.2 21.0 31.5 4.3 2.9 53.7 14.5 24.0
1987 22.2 10.3 20.6 33.5 4.2 3.1 55.7 14.6 23.7
1988 15.1 8.4 5.8 18.1 3.6 2.2 33.3 12.0 8.0
1989 19.1 13.2 12.5 14.9 3.4 0.9 34.1 16.6 13.4
1990 21.9 16.3 18.1 11.6 3.7 1.2 33.5 20.1 19.3
1991 26.9 20.4 21.5 10.4 4.3 1.3 37.3 24.7 22.8
1992 29.8 27.3 23.7 10.8 5.3 1.2 40.6 32.6 24.9
1993 32.0 30.9 24.9 12.5 7.4 1.7 44.5 38.3 26.5
1994 39.2 37.6 26.5 18.5 10.2 2.0 57.8 47.8 28.5
1995 32.4 27.6 27 A 19.7 9.3 2.5 52.1 36.8 29.9
1996 24.9 16.7 25.5 14.2 6.3 2.8 39.1 23.0 28.2
1997 41.8 20.7 32.3 14.4 6.0 2.8 56.2 26.8 35.1
1998 39.4 19.0 30.9 13.2 5.1 2.6 52.6 24.1 33.5
1999 39.4 16.6 30.2 11.5 4.3 3.0 50.9 21.0 33.2
2000 34.4 13.4 23.6 9.7 3.4 2.4 44.2 16.9 26.0
2001 32.7 12.0 25.4 9.7 3.8 2.5 42.3 15.9 28.0
2002 32.7 12.3 25.4 1 1 .0 4.1 3.0 43.7 16.3 28.4
2003° 34.0 14.0 25.7 11.4 4.2 2.3 45.4 18.2 28.0
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook (2001, 2004).
a. Claims on private sector (IFS lines 22d, 22f, 22g for commercial banks; 42d, 42e, 42g for develop­
ment banks); includes nonperforming loans, Fobaproa securities, and other items related to bank rescue 
programs.
b. Demand, time, savings, and foreign currency deposits (IFS lines 24—25 for commercial banks, 
44-45 for development banks).
c. Estimate based on CNBV data.
by the inclusion  o f  overdue loans, as w ell as a substantial vo lu m e o f  securities 
that are the counterpart o f  the nonperform ing loans elim inated from  the banks’ 
balance sheets and other forms o f  debt restructuring. Loans to the private sector 
show  the sam e pattern, but the shifts are o f  an even greater m agnitude; private 
sector credit has fallen by alm ost tw o-thirds since the crisis, am ounting to on ly  
14 percent o f  G D P  in  2 0 0 3 .
T h e  sources o f  fu n d in g  for com m ercia l bank activ ities also changed  over 
tim e. D em and  and tim e deposits increased from  6 0  percent o f  liabilities in  1980  
to 6 6  percent in  1 9 95 . By 2 0 0 3 , the situation  had changed direction , and the
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deposit share had fallen to on ly  45  percent. T h is change was partially due to the 
diversification o f  financial instrum ents. For exam ple, m oney market funds now  
account for 18 percent o f  bank funding. As w ith  assets, however, it is d ifficult to  
get an accurate picture o f  bank liabilities because o f  the restructured item s that 
were added to the balance sheets.
A  group o f  governm ent-ow ned developm ent banks operates parallel to  M ex­
ico’s com m ercial banks. D uring the 1980s, total loans o f  the developm ent banks 
were as large as or som etim es larger than those o f  the com m ercial banks; their 
volum e fluctuated according to  governm ent financial needs. U nder the Salinas 
adm inistration, however, they shrank in line w ith  the new  m arket-oriented phi­
losophy. T he crisis led to a brief recovery, but they soon  began to  fall again and  
currently total around 11 percent o f  GDP. T h e  single m ost im portant source o f  
fu n d in g  for the d evelop m en t banks has b een  in ternational credits, reflecting  
their con tinu ing  role in  interm ediating betw een international creditors, the gov­
ernm ent, and selected private borrowers.
W h ile  the co m b in ed  loans o f  th e  com m ercia l and d evelop m en t banks are 
currently 4 5  percent o f  G D P, loans to the private sector are o n ly  18 percent; 
both  figures include the remainder o f  the Fobaproa debt and other rescue opera­
tions. T h is figure is extraordinarily low  in com parison w ith  other Latin A m eri­
can countries, as w ell as those in  other developing regions. For exam ple, private 
sector credit in  C h ile  is four tim es as h igh , and in  East A sia it is six  tim es as 
high. Moreover, as m ention ed  above, credit as a share o f  G D P  has been falling  
in  M exico since the crisis.
Table 7 -2  shows additional characteristics o f  the com m ercial banks as o f  2 003 . 
A  first message o f  the table is that the num ber o f  banks in  M exico is relatively  
low. It declined  sharply in the years after the bank nationalization, falling from  
sixty  in  1982  to o n ly  tw en ty  in  1 9 91 , w h en  the reprivatization began. T h e  
tw enty included the eighteen institutions that survived the period o f  governm ent 
control, plus tw o  that had n o t been  nationalized— C itibank, the on ly  foreign- 
ow ned bank in the country, and Banco Obrero, affiliated w ith  the trade unions. 
Shortly  before the crisis, n ew  banks were authorized  to begin  operations; this 
process continued for several years before consolidation was reinitiated, resulting 
in  the current thirty com m ercial banks plus six developm ent banks.25
M ore im portant than the d eclin ing  num ber o f  banking in stitu tions was the 
change in  ownership. N o t on ly  d id  shifts occur betw een public and private ow n­
ers o f  M exican nationality, b u t bank ow nership was opened  to  foreign institu ­
tions. N o t since the 1880s had foreigners been allowed to  ow n banks, except for 
representative offices that cou ld  n o t engage in  retail operations.26 Initially, the
25. Gruben and McComb (2003).
26. The exception was Citibank, which has been in Mexico since 1929. Since the bank had 
been helpful to the country in difficult periods, it was allowed special privileges unavailable to 
other institutions. See Stallings (1987).
Table 7-2. Mexico: Characteristics o f the Banking System, 2003
Domestic private banks Foreign banks Commercial banks Development banks Total banks
Indicator Absolute Percent Absolute Percent Absolute Percent Absolute Percent Absolute Percent
No. o f institutions 13 36.1 17 47.2 30 83.3 6 16.6 36 100
No. o f employees 27,950 23.1 87,091 95.3 115,041 95.3 5,665 4.7 120,706 100
No. o f branches 2,051 24.1 5,689 67.0 7,740 91.1 754 8.9 8,494 100
Total assets2 339 13.6 1,518 60.8 1,857 74.4 639 25.6 2,496 100
Total loans2 234 16.1 754 52.0 988 68.1 462 31.9 1,450 100
Loans/assets 69.0 n.a. 49.7 n.a. 53.2 n.a. 67.6 n.a. 58.1 n.a.
Nonperforming loans/ 
total loans6,0
5.7 n.a. 4.1 n.a. 4.4 n.a. 7.1 n.a. 5.1 n.a.
Return on equity0 -19.7 n.a. 11.3 n.a. 5.6 n.a. -44.3 n.a. -5 .4 n.a.
Sources: Calculated from World Bank (2002) for nonperforming loans and return on equity; CNBV website (www.cnbv.gob.mx) for all other data, 
n.a. Not available.
a. Assets and loans in billion of pesos (including Fobaproa/Ipab notes).
b. Declared nonperforming loans as share of loans outstanding (including Fobaproa/Ipab notes).
c. Bital is still included as a domestic bank. Data for 2002.
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regulations exem pted  the three largest banks, but by 19 9 7  they, too , cou ld  be 
acquired. M exico’s tw o  N A F T A  partners led  the w ay as C itiban k  and  B ank o f  
N ova  Scotia purchased tw o m id-sized  institu tions in  1996 . A t about the sam e 
tim e, the tw o largest Spanish banks— BBVA and Santander, w hich  had already 
begun w hat w ou ld  be a broad-based entry into Latin Am erica— also entered the 
m arket. T h ese  in itia l in vestm ents accelerated over the n ext several years, as 
BBVA, Santander, and C itibank  b ought the three largest M exican  banks and  
H S B C  acquired the fourth-ranking local in stitu tion . By the end  o f  2 0 0 2 , on ly  
on e o f  the five largest com m ercial banks in  the country rem ained in  local hands. 
Foreigners ow ned over 80 percent o f  com m ercial bank assets— by far the largest 
share in  any major Latin Am erican country.
As w ou ld  be expected , the con centration  index  increased as a result o f  the  
decline in  the num ber o f  banks, but the m ore im portant factor was the particu­
lar pattern o f  mergers that added capacity to the banks already at the top o f  the  
league table. T h u s, in  1 9 9 7 , before the foreign  purchases began, th e  top  five  
banks already represented 72  percent o f  total assets; this figure rose to 81 per­
cent by  2 0 0 3 .27
Table 7 -2  also provides data on  the developm ent banks. D uring m ost o f  the  
1980—2 0 0 3  period, there were six banks. By far the m ost im portant was N afin , 
w hich was a crucial player in  M exico’s postwar industrialization drive. A bout the  
size o f  the third-largest com m ercial bank in  M exico, it was the key interm ediary  
in  o b ta in in g  foreign  exchange from  in ternational banks and  o n -len d in g  it to 
several local clienteles: the M exican governm ent and state-ow ned  firm s, local 
financial in stitu tion s, and som e private sector enterprises w ith  g ood  co n n ec­
tions. In the new  environm ent, it has been transformed in to  a second-tier bank  
w ith  special responsibility for SM Es. Five other developm ent banks carried ou t  
m ore specific m andates: B ancom ext (foreign trade, especially export finance), 
Banobras (infrastructure), Banrural (agriculture), Fina (sugar), and Banejercito  
(banking services for m ilitary personnel).28
Table 7 -2  reveals som e im portant differences am ong the three types o f  banks. 
T h e first concerns the deploym ent o f  assets: foreign banks have been especially  
prone to curtail len d in g  in  com parison w ith  either type o f  dom estic  bank; the 
counterpart is a greater share o f  assets dedicated to ho ld ing  securities.29 Second, 
the developm ent banks are m uch  leaner than either type o f  com m ercial bank. 
Productivity, as measured by the num ber o f  personnel and branches as a ratio to  
assets or loans, is high. T his perhaps surprising finding stem s from the fact that
27. Calculated from CNBV data. The 2003 figure considers Banco Serfin and Santander Mexi­
cano to be a single institution, since they were already under the same ownership.
28. There are also a number of development trusts, whose functions overlap those of the devel­
opment banks. They differ in their source of funding and the fact that the latter are regulated by 
CNBV, while the former are under the direct control of the ministry of finance.
29. See Haber and Musacchio (2003) for an econometric analysis, which demonstrates that for­
eign banks have a lower propensity to lend than do domestic banks. A similar trend is also found in 
Chile, although the loan-to-asset ratios are much higher for all banks in Chile than in Mexico.
the d evelop m en t banks n o w  lack  large retail operations as a result o f  their  
restructuring as secon d -tier  in stitu tio n s .30 T hird , the p a in fu l cleanup process 
after the 1 9 9 4 -9 5  crisis, encom passing both  the restructuring and the entry o f  
foreign institutions, returned the foreign and m ost o f  the dom estic com m ercial 
banks to  a healthy situation  w ith  respect to  profits and non perform in g loans. 
T h e sam e cannot be said o f  the developm ent banks, w h ich  suffered from  their 
broad mandates and the need  to  cater to various governm ent needs.
A t the urging o f  the IM F  and W orld  Bank, the governm en t recently  
launched a process o f  revam ping the developm ent banking system: closing som e  
banks, adding others, and redesigning their m andates and m eth od s o f  opera­
tion . T h e m ain problem  is that the banks have been expected to fo llow  tw o con ­
tradictory logics: a socia l log ic  and a p rofit-m aking one. T h e  goal, then , is to  
separate the tw o, w ith  the form er served by developm ent agencies that w ill be 
funded by the governm ent budget in  a transparent way. Fina and Banrural have 
been closed, but several new  banks have been created. Bansefi supports the new  
Popular Savings A ssociations, geared to providing banking services to the low - 
incom e population; SH F  is a second-tier bank that is supposed to help develop  
the m ortgage market; and Financiera Rural w ill assum e the banking and other  
functions o f  Banrural. T h e aim  is n ot to remove the governm ent from  the finan­
cial sector, but to  m ake it operate m ore e ffic ien tly  and transparently. P ublic  
banks are also being  encouraged to  help  develop  markets in  various sectors o f  
the econom y.31
C a p ita l  M a rk e ts
T h e capital markets in M exico have never been very robust, although som e ana­
lysts posit that they are on  the verge o f  significant expansion and im provem ent 
in  perform ance.32 Table 7 -3  show s the m ain com p on en ts o f  the markets since  
the late 1980s. T h ey  include the outstanding value o f  governm ent and corporate 
bonds and the capitalization o f  the M exican Stock Exchange (BM V, by its Span­
ish acronym ). T h e  tw o  markets displayed opp osite  trends in  term s o f  size over 
the last tw o decades. Stock market capitalization rose steadily from  7  percent o f  
G D P  in 1986— as financial liberalization began— to a peak o f  50  percent just 
before the crisis; it th en  p lu n ged  to  o n ly  2 0  percent at the en d  o f  the sam ple  
period. T h e volum e o f  bonds outstanding was larger than stock  market capital­
ization in the late 1980s (22 percent o f  G D P ), but fell to  on ly  8 percent by the  
m id -1990s. B onds then underw ent a slow  recovery, com in g to  represent slightly  
over 2 0  percent o f  G D P  in 2 0 0 3 . T h e stock and bond markets com bined  grew
30. Banrural, now closed, was the most bloated of the development banks, with over 25,000 
employees, 500 branches, and responsibility for some 40 percent of finance in agriculture; see 
World Bank (2002).
31. For a general critique of the operation of the development banks, see OECD (2002) and 
World Bank (2002). The revamping of the system is being financed by World Bank loans.
32. Personal interviews with bankers and capital market officials in Mexico.
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Table 7-3 . Mexico: Stock a n d  B ond  M arkets, 1 9 8 6 —2 0 0 3  
Percent of GDP
Year Stock market BondF Government Corporatec Total
1986 7.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1987 9.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1988 12.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1989 11.8 22.4 21.2 1.2 34.2
1990 13.9 22.6 21.2 1.4 36.5
1991 34.6 20.0 17.9 2.1 54.6
1992 41.9 14.4 12.0 2.4 56.3
1993 49.7 13.8 11.1 2.7 63.5
1994 45.1 9.7 I F 2.0 54.8
1995 38.0 8.4 6.3 2.2 46.4
1996 33.2 8.1 5.7 2.4 41.3
1997 39.8 10.2 8.1 2.1 50.0
1998 23.6 9.6 7.5 2.1 33.2
1999 31.8 12.3 10.2 2.1 44.1
2000 21.9 15.0 12.6 2.4 36.9
2001 19.9 20.8 18.2 2.6 40.7
2002 16.8 20.6 18.4 2.2 37.4
2003 20.0 23.6 20.9 2.7 43.6
Sources: Banco de México website (www.banxico.org.mx) for stock market; BIS website (www.bis.org/ 




c. Corporate and financial sector bonds.
from  the late 1980s to 1993; afterward they experienced a gradual, fluctuating  
decline. As o f  the en d  o f  2 0 0 3 , the com b in ed  markets represented around 4 4  
percent o f  G D P, again a very lo w  figure in  com parison  w ith  other em erging  
market econom ies.
T h e  M exican  S tock  E xchange saw  its n om in a l cap ita lization  in  pesos rise 
spectacularly after 1990: a m ore than tw entyfold  increase occurred from  January 
1990 through D ecem ber 2 0 0 3 . T h e vast m ajority o f  the increase, however, came 
from  price rises in  the secondary market, rather than n ew  issues in  the primary 
market. D eflating by the stock market price index show s real growth from  1990  
through 1994  (76 percent), but a contraction thereafter ( - 4 2  percent). Indeed, 
the real value o f  market capitalization at the end  o f  2 0 0 3  was alm ost exactly the 
sam e as it was at the end  o f  1 990 . In n om inal dollar term s, as show n in  table 
7 -4 , the m arket m ore than trip led  in  value (a lthough  the m ajority  o f  the  
increase cam e in  1 9 9 0 -9 1 ) . N ew  issues dropped off, however, both in  num ber  
and in  value. T h e stock  m arket’s relative lack o f  im portance is reflected in  the  
low  level o f  participation. O n ly  159 firms were listed on  the B M V  at the end o f  
2 0 0 3 , d ow n  from  over 2 0 0  just before the crisis. N o t  surprisingly  g iven  the
200 The Impact ofthe New Financial System in Latin America
Table 7-4. Mexico: Characteristics o f  Stock a n d  B ond  M arkets, 1 9 9 0 —2 0 0 3
Year





No. o f  listed 
firm s
No. o f  
new issues




No. o f  
issuers
1990 32.7 44 199 11 0.14 3.5 n.a.
1991 98.2 48 209 24 0.87 5.3 n.a.
1992 139.1 37 195 17 0.19 7.7 n.a.
1993 200.7 37 190 19 4.50 9.6 n.a.
1994 130.2 45 206 24 1.79 5.3 n.a.
1995 90.7 33 185 1 0.01 3.0 n.a.
1996 106.5 43 193 14 0.79 2.6 n.a.
1997 156.6 43 198 18 1.33 4.4 15
1998 91.7 29 194 0 0.01 5.3 19
1999 154.0 29 188 4 0.44 5.5 30
2000 125.2 32 179 4 0.10 8.2 67
2001 126.3 32 168 4 n.a. 10.2 66
2002 103.1 24 166 6 n.a. 9.3 70
2003 122.5 20 159 5 0.03 12.9 82
Sources: Standard and Poor's (2000, 2005) for stock market capitalization, turnover ratio, and num­
ber of listed firms; BIS website (www.bis.org/statistics/qcsv/anxl6b.csv) for amount outstanding of cor­
porate bonds; Bank of México (2001, 2003) for number of new stock issues and number of bond 
issuers; BMV, Anuario Bursátil (various years) for value of new stock issues.
n.a. Not available.
a. Billions of dollars.
b. Amount traded as a share of market capitalization (percent).
characteristics o f  the market, there is little  liquidity. T h e  turnover ratio (value 
traded as a share o f  cap italization) averaged about 3 0  percent in  recent years, 
w ell below  international averages.
T h e bond market has been and remains dom inated  by governm ent debt. At 
the end  o f  2 0 0 3 , on ly  about 11 percent o f  the market consisted o f  private sector 
paper— n ot m uch different from  the early 1990s, although the absolute volum e  
increased significantly in  the last few  years o f  the period. T h e  m ain issuers are 
the central governm ent, state and local governm ents, and the rem aining public  
sector enterprises. W ith in  the private sector, the banks have been the major par­
ticipants. O n ly  e igh ty-tw o  private firm s— financial and n on fin an cia l— issued  
debt in 2 0 0 3 . T h e  instrum ent o f  choice was a n ew  m edium -term  b on d  (certifi­
cado bursátil) that has breathed som e new  life into the market.33 L iquidity is low  
in  the long-term  segm ent, especially the private segm ent. T here is virtually no  
secondary market for corporate debt, w hich  m eans that investors w ho w ant to  
get ou t o f  the market m ust find  their ow n buyers.34
A  brief com parison o f  the M exican experience w ith  the relatively successful 
history o f  the C hilean  capital markets reveals tw o im portant differences in  the
33. Bank of Mexico (2003).
34. Navarrette (2001).
Mexico: Foreign Banks Assume Control 201
Table 7-5 . M exico: Size a n d  A llocation o f  Pension F u n d  Portfolios, 1 9 9 8 —2 0 0 3
Year Totala
Percent 
o f  GDP
Investment allocation (percent)
Government Corporatec Banksi OtheY Total
1998 5.7 1.5 96.8 3.1 0.2 0.0 100
1999 11.4 2.4 97.4 2.5 0.1 0.0 100
2000 17.1 3.0 91.1 5.4 2.0 1.5 100
2001 27.1 4.3 87.8 7.8 2.4 2.0 100
2002 31.4 5.3 83.1 12.3 2.1 2.4 100
2003 35.7 6.2 82.3 11.0 4.5 2.2 100
Source: CONSAR website (www.consar.gob.mx).
a. Obligatory and voluntary contribution to retirement funds managed by Afores; billions of dollars.
b. Government notes and bonds.
c. Corporate bonds.
d. Financial sector paper.
e. Repurchase agreements (repos) and municipal/state securities.
dom estic  environm ent in  M exico. T h e  first is the lack o f  governm ent effort to  
d evelop  the m arkets, w h ich  seem s to  have b ecom e a priority  o n ly  in  th e last 
few  years. W h ile  ad m ittin g  th at there is a lo n g  w ay to  go , th e  central bank  
em phasizes n ew  steps to provide proper m acroeconom ic and legal fram eworks 
to  encourage capital m arkets. M ost im portant for the form er is a lo w  sin g le­
d ig it in fla tion  rate, w h ile  the latter in clu d es better regu lation , greater trans­
parency, and the m od ern iza tion  o f  financial infrastructure. T h e  governm ent 
has also been trying to increase private access to the bond  market by creating a 
lon g -term  y ie ld  curve, eq u a liz in g  tax treatm en t, and  red u cin g  bureaucratic  
requirem ents.35
T h e  second  d istin ction  w ith  respect to  C h ile  is the relative lack o f  in stitu ­
tional investors in  M exico. Securities are generally  h eld  by  a sm all num ber o f  
com m ercial banks, rather than individuals or institu tional investors, a lthough  
this factor is also changing. As noted  earlier, M exico has a new  private pension  
system  that w en t into effect in  1997 . T h e  individual accounts are m anaged by a 
sm all num b er o f  fu n d  adm inistrators (A fores). Table 7 -5  ind icates that the  
Afores grew rapidly, increasing from  1.5 percent o f  G D P  in  1998  to 6 .2  percent 
in  2 0 0 3 . A t the end  o f  the period, they held about 22  percent o f  all governm ent 
debt and 2 7  percent o f  private debt.36 W h ile  they have slow ly been sh ifting away 
from  investm ent in  governm ent paper, such holdings still accounted for over 80  
percent o f  total pension fund assets in  2 0 0 3 . T h e restrictions on  the hold ing  o f  
private sector assets have n o w  been  elim in ated , bu t such h o ld in gs m u st be 
in vestm en t grade, and  o n ly  a sm all num ber o f  M exican  firm s are so rated. 
N on eth e less , the presence and strong grow th o f  the p en sion  funds and other  
institutional investors (such as insurance com panies and m utual funds) prom pts
35. Bank of Mexico (2002, 2003).
36. Bank of Mexico (2003).
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Table 7-6 . Mexico: In te rn a tio n a l Finance, 1 9 9 0 —2 0 0 3  
Percent o f  G D P
Year Bank/ Bondi' ADRsc Stock marked Total
1990 19.6 2.2 0.8 0.8 23.4
1991 18.1 2.7 4.4 1.5 26.7
1992 15.4 3.5 5.8 2 .1 26.8
1993 15.1 6 .1 8.4 5.1 34.8
1994 15.8 7.4 5.0 3.1 31.3
1995 21.5 1 0 .2 5.3 3.2 40.3
1996 20.5 1 2 .6 4.5 4.8 42.4
1997 20.9 12.3 5.8 6.5 45.5
1998 20.5 1 2 .6 4.4 3.5 41.0
1999 18.2 13.0 8 .6 5.2 45.0
20 0 0 24.8 11.4 5.5 3.4 45.1
2 0 0 1 34.6 10.5 5.4 3.4 53.9
2 0 0 2 33.2 1 0 .1 4.3 2 .6 50.3
2003 34.0 1 1 .8 5.5 3.5 54.8
Sources: BIS website (www.bis.org/statistics/qcsv/anxl2a.csv) for bank loans, (www.bis.org/statistics/ 
hcsv/hanx9a_for.csv) for bonds; BMV website (www.bmv.com.mx) for ADRs and stock market investment.
a. Loans from international banks.
b. Outstanding bonds and notes issued in international markets.
c. American depository receipts.
d. Investment in Mexican Stock Exchange by foreigners.
analysts, the governm ent, and the private sector to expect better perform ance by  
the capital markets in  com in g  years.37
In te rn a t io n a l F in a n c e
Because o f  its geographical proxim ity to the U n ited  States, M exico has a m uch  
longer and deeper relationship to  international financial markets (especially U .S. 
markets) than its counterparts in  South  Am erica. Several channels are relevant: 
in ternational bank loans, in ternational b o n d  issues, A m erican  d ep ository  
receipts (A D R s), and foreign  in vestm en t in  the M exican  stock  m arket. T h e  
num ber o f  borrowers w ith  access to  these sources is extrem ely sm all, however, 
being lim ited  to  the central and local governm ents, the rem aining state-ow ned  
enterprises, and a sm all num ber o f  large private sector firm s.
A lthough  data are hard to obtain and to put into a com parable form at, table 
7 -6  provides a rough idea o f  the relative m agnitudes o f  the four sources in terms 
o f  am ounts ou tstan d in g . T h e  m ost im portant m essage from  the table is that 
international finance for M exican borrowers w ith  access fo llow ed  a very differ-
37. M u tu a l funds are slightly larger than pension funds in  Mexico, while they are m uch smaller 
in  Chile. Th e  difference is im portant because pension funds tend to create liqu id ity  problems w ith  
their buy-and-hold strategies, whereas m utual funds trade more actively.
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ent trajectory than dom estic loans, bonds, or stock  market capitalization. W hile  
dom estic  sources peaked just preced ing the crisis and stagnated  or d eclin ed  
thereafter, international finance increased on  a relatively continuous basis from  
1 9 9 0  to  2 0 0 3 ; the n o m in a l dollar value rose b y  over 5 .5  tim es in  the sam e 
period.
A t the b eginn ing o f  the 1990s, the largest source o f  foreign financial invest­
m en t was lon g-term  loans from  in ternational banks. A lth o u g h  negatively  
affected  by  the 198 0 s debt crisis in  M exico  and elsew here in  L atin A m erica, 
international loans nonetheless am ounted  to around $5 0  b illion  (20  percent o f  
G D P ) in  1 9 9 0 . B y contrast, in tern ation al b o n d  issues w ere o n ly  $ 6  b illion , 
w hile A D R s and foreign investm ent in  the local stock  market were about $2  b il­
lio n  each. In total, in ternational finance am ou n ted  to  2 3  percent o f  G D P  in  
1990.
T h is  share increased stead ily  u n til 1 9 9 3 , bu t it  fell som ew h at as the crisis 
struck. U n lik e  d om estic  finance, how ever, in ternational finan ce exceeded  its 
previous peak in  19 9 5  and con tin u ed  advancing. M exico’s investors were 
affected  by  the c lim ate in  1 9 9 8 , as stock  m arket prices p lu n ged  around the  
globe. N onetheless, by 2 0 0 3 , international finance as a share o f  G D P  stood  at 
55 percent, its h ighest level ever. T h e w eight o f  bank loans in  total international 
finance has declined , but they rem ain the dom in an t source, accoun ting  for 34  
percent o f  GDP, follow ed by bonds w ith 12 percent, A D R s w ith  5 percent, and  
stock  m arket investm en t w ith  3 percent. T h e latter tw o com ponents fluctuate  
substantially, w hile the former are m ore stable.
W h en  w e consider M exico’s com bined  financial structure— as represented by 
dom estic bank credit, dom estic capital markets, and international finance— the 
third com p on en t stands ou t as unusually im portant in  com parison  w ith  other  
Latin Am erican countries. In addition, international finance has been the m ost 
dynam ic type o f  finance, together w ith  dom estic bonds. W e discuss the im plica­
tions o f  this pattern for growth and equality in  the next tw o sections.
Finance, Investment, and Growth
To understand the relationship betw een finance and growth in  recent tim es in  
M exico requires tw o separate logics. In the first h a lf o f  the 1990s, the close posi­
tive relationship  portrayed in  m ost o f  the literature h eld  true in  th e  M exican  
case, as dom estic finance and the econ om y expanded sim ultaneously. In the sec­
ond  h a lf o f  the decade, by contrast, G D P  growth rates were am ong the highest 
in  Latin A m erica, b u t traditional sources o f  finance contracted  year after year. 
A fter 2 0 0 0 , the earlier relationship reappeared in  a negative way: as the econ ­
om y  stagnated, credit was n ot m ade available to  support a recovery.
W e are particularly concerned in this book  about investm ent as a key com po­
nent o f  econom ic growth and the role o f  the formal financial system in providing
firms w ith  the necessary financial resources. As discussed in  the previous section, 
M exico in  recent decades had three m ain sources o f  corporate finance external 
to  the firms them selves: the private and pub lic  banking system , the d om estic  
capital markets, and international finance. Table 7 -7  provides an overview o f  the 
shifts that have taken place in  their relative im portance. A t the end o f  the finan­
cial boom  in 1994 , d om estic com m ercial banks and the stock  market were the 
d om in an t sources; in ternational finance accounted  for less than 15 percent o f  
total corporate finance. Eight years later, the picture had changed significantly. As 
dom estic sources shrank, international finance cam e to represent nearly 35  per­
cent o f  the total.38 Since relatively few  large firms have access to  international 
finance, this pattern has major im plications for the growth o f  smaller enterprises.
B a n k  C re d it
Bank credit has traditionally been the dom inant source o f  finance in  M exico as 
in  the rest o f  Latin Am erica, so w e begin there. Figure 7 -2  plots the relationship  
betw een G D P  grow th, investm ent, and bank credit from both  com m ercial and  
developm ent banks betw een 1991 and 2 0 0 3 . T h e subperiods m entioned  above 
can be iden tified . From  1991 through  1 9 9 5 , all three variables rose in  a syn ­
chronized  way. In th e  secon d  h a lf o f  the decade, a substantial gap op en ed  up  
betw een credit and investm ent. After 2 0 0 0 , the link  becam e closer again.
To g o  b eyond  th is d escrip tion , w e n eed  to  refine th e  in d icator  used  for  
dom estic  credit. Tw o m ain  clarifications are im portant. First, w h ile  the public  
sector did not borrow m uch from  the com m ercial banks in  the early 1990s— as 
budget deficits were slashed and state-ow ned enterprises were sold— such bor­
row ing increased after 1995 . M ost o f  the n ew  credit w ent to  the central govern­
m ent. In addition to  the increase in  com m ercial bank credit, the large m ajority 
o f  developm ent bank credit con tin ued  to go to the public sector. Second, from  
1995  on  and especially  after 1 997 , large additional item s began to  in flate the 
balance sheets o f  the com m ercial banks. T h ese  involved  the com plicated  han­
dling o f  the rescue programs for the banks and their custom ers. Each o f  the four 
programs developed to help the banks— the short-term  liquidity facility, capital­
ization funds, swaps for nonperform ing loans, and subsidies for debtors— led to  
increases in  bank assets and liabilities. W h ile  som e were originally recorded o ff  
the books, in 1997  n ew  accounting rules required them  to be incorporated. T his  
explains the large jum p in  “credit” in that year, as show n in figure 7-2 .39
Figure 7 -3 , then, reveals the underlying relationship betw een investm ent and  
credit to the private sector from  the com m ercial banks by elim inating both  pub­
lic sector loans and the counterpart item s related to  the rescue packages. W ith  
these sim plifications, w e fin d  credit grow ing m ore rapidly than investm ent in
38. Comparable figures for Brazil and Chile are 12 percent and 16 percent, respectively.
39. Haber (2005) provides an excellent discussion of the accounting issues. A crucial point is 
that Fobaproa/Ipab bonds are included as part of banks’ credit portfolios, since they are the coun­
terpart of loans passed to the deposit insurance agency.
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Table 7-7 . M exico: F inance fo r  the Corporate Sector; 1 9 9 4 —2 0 0 2  
Percent o f  G D P
Year
Domestic banks* Domestic capital markett Internationalfinancep
TotalCommercial Development Stock market Bonds Loans Bonds Equity
1994 30.8 3.7 45.1 2 .0 5.4 3.3 5.0 95.3
1995 20.9 3.5 38.0 2 .2 7.8 4.4 5.3 82.1
1996 14.6 3.8 33.2 2.4 7.9 3.7 4.5 70.1
1997 1 2 .1 3.0 39.8 2 .1 7.3 4.2 5.8 74.5
1998 11.3 2.9 23.6 2 .1 8 .2 4.8 4.4 57.3
1999 9.3 3.0 31.8 2 .1 7.5 4.6 8 .6 66.9
2 0 0 0 8.5 1.7 21.9 2.4 6 .6 3.8 5.5 50.4
2 0 0 1 7.4 1.7 19.9 2 .6 7.5 3.7 5.4 48.2
2 0 0 2 7.4 1.9 16.8 2 .2 7.1 3.1 4.3 42.8
Sources: World Bank (2002) for domestic banks; table 7-3 for domestic capital markets; BIS website (www.bis.org/statistics/hcsv/hanx9a_priv.csv) for international bank 
loans, (www.bis.org/statistics/qcsv/anxl2c.csv) for international bonds; table 7-6 for international equity (ADRs only).
a. Direct lending to corporate sector (excluding nonperforming loans and Fobaproa/Ipab notes) by commercial and development banks.
b. Capitalization of Mexican Stock Exchange and corporate bonds outstanding.
c. International bank loans to nonbank private sector, corporate bonds outstanding, and ADRs.
Figure 7-2 . M exico: G row th Rates o f  GDP, Investment, a n d  Total Credit, 
1991-2003*
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Investment; GDP Total credit (percent)
Sources: ECLAC website (www.eclac.cl) for GDP and investment; IMF, International Financial 
Statistics Yearbook (2000 and 2004) for total credit.
a. Total credit includes credit to government and private sector, nonperforming loans, 
Fobaproa/Ipab notes.
the early 1990s, but contracting from  1995 through 2 0 0 0 , despite the contin u­
ing growth in  investm ent. From 2 0 0 1 , both  variables tended to stagnate.
A ll three o f  the subperiods show n in  figures 7 -2  and 7 -3  represent problem ­
atic relationships b etw een  cred it and in vestm en t, a lth ou gh  the nature o f  the  
problem s changed over tim e. T h e sim ultaneous expansion o f  credit and invest­
m ent in 1 9 9 0 -9 4 — typical o f  the postliberalization credit boom s in m ost cou n­
tries— was faster than the banks (and probably the owners o f  the firms d oin g  the 
investm ent) cou ld  manage. A nnual rates o f  increase on  the order o f  2 0 -3 0  per­
cen t precluded adequate cred it analysis, esp ecia lly  by in stitu tio n s w ith  little  
experience in  th is activity; n on p erform in g  assets rose rapidly as a result. A n  
im p ortant reason for the expansion  was that the n ew  ow ners had to  increase  
their revenues to  com p en sate  for th e  very h igh  prices th ey  had paid  for the  
banks in the reprivatization process. Ex post analysis indicates that the banking  
system  was in  serious trouble w ell before the devaluation  o f  D ecem b er 1 9 94 . 
T h e latter was m erely the detonator o f  the crisis.40
T h e  situ ation  ch an ged  dram atically  in  1 9 9 5 -2 0 0 0 .  B ank credit began to  
contract, m aking an ever sm aller contribution  to the financing o f  still-buoyant 
investm ent. T h is n ew  phase was clearly related to the crisis and its afterm ath,
40. H aber (2005).
Figure 7-3 . M exico: G rowth Rates o f  Investment a n d  C red it to the Private  Sector, 
1992-20033
Mexico: Foreign Banks Assume Control 2 0 7
Percent
Sources: ECLAC website (www.eclac.cl) for investment; Haber (2005) for credit to private sector.
a. Credit to private sector excludes nonperforming loans and Fobaproa/Ipab notes.
but at least three hypotheses have been suggested to explain the negative correla­
tion . A lth ou gh  freq uently  presented  as m u tu a lly  exclusive, th ey  are actually  
com plem entary. A  first h yp oth esis is that the banks w ere so undercapitalized  
that they cou ld  n ot make new  loans; rather, they had to  reduce assets to  restore 
their capital ratios, especially since they faced stringent new  regulatory require­
m ents.41 T his explanation was undoubtedly  true in  the im m ediate aftermath o f  
the crisis, and on e o f  the governm en t program s to  aid th e  banks w as focused  
precisely on  recapitalization. Later, however, capital adequacy was no  longer a 
sign ificant issue for m ost banks, especially  after the foreign banks entered the  
market.
A  second hypothesis concerns the defective legal framework w ith in  w hich  the 
banks operate. In general, the legal system has been weak in  enforcing contracts. 
In particular, the difficulty in  repossessing collateral w hen a borrower cannot or 
w ill n ot service its loans makes the banks reluctant to  lend. W hile  these problem s 
have always existed in  M exico , they  becam e m ore serious after the crisis since  
prim e borrowers shifted to the international capital markets, and those seeking  
loans dom estically presented a m ore risky profile than they had earlier o n .42 T h e  
authorities also recognized this second problem , and a new  bankruptcy law  was
41. Thorne (1998).
42. Krueger andTornell (1999). The banks themselves emphasize this explanation.
approved in April 2 0 0 0 , but it on ly  partially resolved the underlying issues. T h e  
m ore general problem  is one o f  contract enforcem ent, w hich m ay account for the 
fact that consum er lend ing— w here enforcem ent is relatively easy— is the m ain  
area where credit has increased.43
T h e  third hyp oth esis is a M exican  variant o f  a m ore general prob lem  in  
em erging market econom ies: th e crow ding o u t o f  private firm s by the pub lic  
sector. W h ile  crow ding ou t is usually th ought o f  as a flow  problem — in w hich  
governm ents absorb m ost o f  the available credit in  any given period— the M exi­
can case involved crow ding ou t based on the stock o f  assets. T h e  m echanism  by  
w hich  the nonperform ing loans were rem oved from  the banks’ books left them  
w ith  com petitively  rem unerated assets that tem pered the need  to  deal w ith  the 
costs and risks o f  m aking loans. Indeed, the M exican banks have becom e quite 
profitable, despite their lack o f  lend ing.44 In the m ore traditional sense o f  crowd­
in g  out, governm ent debt w ith  relatively h igh  interest rates floods the market, 
desp ite low  deficits, because authorities are trying to replace external deb t by  
internal debt.45 H o ld in g  governm ent securities, together w ith  charging h igh  fees 
for financial services, continues to dam pen enthusiasm  for lending.
T h e m ost recent period for w hich  w e have com plete data— 2001  to 2 0 0 3 —  
w itnessed the stagnation o f  GDP, investm ent, and credit. T h e decline in  growth  
rates was largely due to  the recession in  the U nited  States, w hich  buys som e 90  
percent o f  M exican exports and w hich  had provided the basis for the rapid post­
crisis recovery. T h e lack o f  credit, however, elim inated the possibility  o f  an off­
setting increase in  the dom estic econom y. T h e issue becam e m uch m ore urgent 
w h en  grow th began to  p ick  up in  2 0 0 4 —05 . W h ile  credit started to recover in  
2 0 0 4 , it was m ain ly  to finance con sum ption . C om m ercial len d in g  rem ains far 
below  its earlier levels.46
In addition  to these structural argum ents about w h y  credit is so low , other  
relevant factors include interest rates, spreads, and profitability. In our analysis 
o f  C hile, these links were positive: lending and profitability grew w hile interest 
rates and spreads w ere low  or fa lling. C o m p etitio n  was an im p ortan t factor, 
since it prom oted  increased bank effic iency  and enabled the virtuous circle to  
continue. In M exico, this set o f  relationships has been m uch  m ore com plex and 
problem atic.
W e have already described h ow  len d in g  d id  n o t increase con tin u ou sly  as it 
did  in  Chile; rather, it rose in itially and then  fell. Table 7 -8  show s the relation-
43. Haber and colleagues have produced several papers analyzing the impact of poor contract 
enforcement; see Haber (2004, 2005); Haber and Musacchio (2005).
44. See Gonzalez-Anaya (2003) for an elaboration of this hypothesis and a critique of the other 
two.
45. John Authers, “Staying the Course.” Latin Finance, September 2004, p. 74.
46. Mexico’s president, central bank governor, and other officials have been highly critical of 
the banks’ failure to lend; see Jennifer Galloway, “Another Wake Up Call,” Latin Finance, 
April-May 2004, pp. 30-32.
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1990 n.a. 42 .4 15.3 5.3 n.a. n.a. 2.3
1991 2 0 .0 28.6 5.3 6 .0 n.a. n.a. 4.1
1992 24.0 23.9 8.5 5.1 n.a. n.a. 5.7
1993 28.0 2 2 .0 1 2 .2 3.4 n.a. n.a. 7.4
1994 30.0 20.4 13.4 4.9 n.a. n.a. 7.4
1995 24.0 58.6 23.6 13.5 n.a. n.a. 7.7
1996 16.0 36.9 2.4 6 .2 n.a. n.a. 7.8
1997 8.0 24.6 4.0 5.5 n.a. n.a. 11.3
1998 8 .0 28.7 1 2 .8 7.6 64.0 25.6 11.3
1999 6.0 25.9 9.3 6 .2 83.2 10.9 8.9
2 0 0 0 7.0 18.2 8.7 4.5 85.6 6.8 5.8
2 0 0 1 7.0 13.9 7.5 3.8 64.0 8 .6 5.1
2 0 0 2 7.0 9.4 4.4 4.0 87.0 - 1 0 .2 4.6
2 0 03 8 .0 6.9 2.4 1 .8 74.2 14.2 3.2
Sources: Haber (2005) for loans ratio; IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook (2004) for loan 
rate, deposit rate, and CPI; CNBV website (www.cnbv.gob.mx) for nonperforming loans, efficiency ratio, 
and return on equity.
n.a. Not available.
a. Loans to private sector as share of GDP; excludes nonperforming loans and restructuring credits.
b. Rate for loans to medium-sized firms; this is proxied for 1990-92 by money market rate plus 5 per­
centage points (average premium).
c. Deflated by consumer price index.
d. Difference between nominal loan rate and deposit rate.
e. Operating expenses as a share of gross operational margin.
f. Profits as a share of equity.
g. Officially declared nonperforming loans as share of total loans outstanding.
ship betw een lend ing and other variables. N om in a l interest rates fell in  the early 
1990s, perhaps stim ulating dem and for credit. After spiking in  1995 because o f  
the crisis, however, th ey  also generally fell in  the period  o f  credit contraction . 
Real rates did  n ot show  a clear trend earlier, but they too have been falling after 
a tem porary increase during the w orldw ide crisis o f  1998 . Spreads ranged from  
4  to  8 percent during the period  since 19 9 0  (w ith  the excep tion  o f  a spike in  
1995), and they recently fell to a new  low  o f  on ly  2 percent. Profits becam e neg­
ative in  the im m ediate aftermath o f  the crisis, but then increased substantially—  
although in  a volatile fashion. A  review o f  the data in  table 7 -8  thus h ighlights 
several variables that m ight have predicted an increase in credit in  the late 1990s  
and early 2000s, but this did  n o t occur, in  part for the reasons discussed earlier. 
In ad d ition , how ever, n eith er co m p etitio n  nor e ffic ien cy  rose in  the recent 
period; their absence m ay be another explanation for the lack o f  lending.
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Figure 7 -4 . M exico: Composition o f  Com m ercial a n d  Developm ent B ank Loans, 
1 9 9 4  a n d 2 0 0 2
C o m m e rc ia l b a n k  loans, 1 99 4  D e v e lo p m e n t b a n k  loans, 1 994
Nonbank financial Public sector
/-'w  Corporate




C o m m e rc ia l b a n k  loans, 2 0 0 2  D e v e lo p m e n t b a n k  loans, 2 0 0 2
Restructuring
Restructuring^ X  ^''XCorporate
. Corporate
Or "MortgagePublic sector I —• ConsumerNonbankPublic sector ̂ - J ^ M o r t g a g e  ^ f i n a n c i a l
Nonbank financial Consumer 
Source: CNBV website (www.cnbv.gob.mx).
A lthough  credit contracted in  the aggregate, som e credit was provided, and  
its allocation is central for understanding the process. Figure 7 -4  com pares the 
com position  o f  the perform ing loan portfolios o f  the com m ercial and develop­
m en t banks in  19 9 4  and 2 0 0 2 . For th e com m ercial banks, the m ost dram atic 
change was the increase in  restructuring credits at the clear expense o f  corporate 
loans (w hich fell from  6 9  to 3 5  percent o f  total finance) and h ou sin g  finance  
(from  16 to 5 percent). C onsum er credit accounted for about the sam e share in  
the tw o years (7 -8  percent), but the 2 0 0 2  figure actually represented a substan­
tial increase from  a low  o f  less than 3 percent in  1 9 9 7 -9 9 . Indeed, the upsw ing  
in  credit show n in  figure 7 -3  was alm ost entirely exp lained  by  increased co n ­
sum er credit. Public sector loans also rose slightly in  the afterm ath o f  the crisis 
(from 4  to 7 percent). D evelop m en t banks, by contrast, saw very little change in  
their portfolios. T h e  pub lic  sector con tin u ed  to receive the m ajority o f  credit 
(around 6 0  percent), w h ile  corporate borrowers accounted  for the next largest 
share (around 2 5  percen t), and th e rem ain ing 15 p ercent w as a llocated  to  
sm aller users. T h e  loan  restructuring o f  the developm ent banks was less trans­
parent than that o f  com m ercial banks, being im plem ented  o f f  the books. T hus  
on ly  a sm all share o f  their portfolios appears as restructured credits.47
47. An institution similar to Fobaproa was created to handle nonperforming loans in the devel­
opment banks (Fideliq, in Spanish). Fideliq exchanged nonperforming loans for promissory notes, 
but the treasury was more directly liable since the government guaranteed development bank loans. 
Fideliq was unable to recover much from the nonperforming loans and was paying high rates of 
interest on them, so in late 2000 the government paid off many of the notes held by the banks.
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Agriculture 50.8 35.4 16.6 38.5 -0 .8
Mining 27.6 11.4 6.5 16.4 -0 .5
Manufacturing 37.1 25.2 15.0 28.5 1.8
Electricity and gas 28.1 27.2 46.5 32.1 3.5
Construction 53.3 52.5 11.5 47.2 6.2
Commerce 29.9 16.9 7.1 21.1 1.8
Other services 39.9 21.4 13.2 27.7 5.9
Total 37.9 23.5 12.7 27.8 3.4
Source: ECLAC (unpublished data).
a. Credit to a sector from commercial and development banks, divided by GDP in that sector.
Finally, d isaggregating the corporate sector loans m ay provide add ition al 
insights in to  the relationship betw een grow th and credit. As table 7 -9  d em o n ­
strates, sectoral trends w ith  respect to  credit generally  fo llow ed  those for the  
econ om y as a w hole: h ighest across the board in  the early 1990s, falling in  the 
second  h a lf o f  the decade, and reaching the low est levels after 2 0 0 0 . W ith  one  
exception , every sector’s cred it-to -G D P  ratio fell by large am ounts. T h e excep­
tion  was electricity  and gas, w h ich  m aintained  its credit ratio in  the first tw o  
periods and saw a b ig  increase in  the third. T h e  explanation m ost probably lies 
in  the ow nership characteristics o f  the sector: som e o f  the m ost im portant firms 
that remain under governm ent ow nership are in gas and electricity.
Table 7 -9  also presents sectoral growth rates, b u t they show  n o  close relation­
ship w ith  the cred it-to-G D P  ratios. W hether levels or growth rates o f  credit are 
m ore likely to affect sectoral growth rates is an empirical question. G row th rates 
o f  credit d id  seem  to  have som e correlation  w ith  sectoral grow th rates in  the  
early 1990s. For exam ple, agriculture and industry had low er grow th rates o f  
b oth  credit and ou tp u t, w h ile  con stru ction  and the services were h igher w ith  
respect to  both. D urin g  the period w hen credit was falling, it is hard to identify  
any relationships, nor is it clear w hether credit falling at a slower rate in  one sec­
tor than another has the sam e effect as credit grow ing faster.
Capital Markets and International Finance
In principle, bank credit is available to  all kinds o f  borrowers (large firms, small 
firm s, exporters, im porters, consum ers, m ortgage holders, and so on ), bu t the 
capital markets and international finance are the purview  o f  a select few. T h is  
situation  is n ot un iqu e to  M exico , although the latter group m ay be especially  
sm all in  relative term s in  the M exican case. D esp ite  the sm all num ber o f  bor­
rowers w ith  access to the capital markets and international finance, these sources 
help  to  explain  the unusual pattern fo u n d  in  the secon d  h a lf o f  th e 19 9 0 s—
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Figure 7-5 . M exico: G row th  Rates o f  Investment, Stocks, a n d  Bonds, 1 9 9 0 —2 0 0 3 P
Percent
Sources: ECLAC website (www.edac.cl) for investment; BIS website (www.bis.org) for bonds; 
Bank of Mexico website (www.banxico.org.mx) for stocks and deflator.
a. Stock market capitalization and total bonds outstanding, deflated by stock market price index.
bu oyan t in vestm en t and G D P  grow th , togeth er w ith  rapidly shrink ing  bank  
credit for the private sector.48
Figure 7 -5  p lots real grow th  rates o f  in vestm en t against grow th o f  finance  
from  the dom estic capital markets, show ing bonds and stocks separately. Stock  
market capitalization— w hen stripped o f  the value added by price increases— is 
fairly closely correlated w ith  investm ent.49 T h e now -expected  pattern o f  finance 
exceeding investm ent before the crisis and trailing afterward continues, but it is 
n o t as p ron ou n ced  as w ith  bank credit. T h e relationship  b etw een  bond s and  
investm ent, by contrast, was quite different. H ere, for the first tim e, w e find  a 
finance source lagging in  the early part o f  the decade and rising in  the later part. 
T h e reason is n o t hard to discover; the vast m ajority o f  lon g-term  bonds were 
issued by  the p u b lic  sector, especially  the central governm ent. C onsequently , 
th is type o f  finan ce w as m ore c lose ly  lin k ed  to  the p u b lic  sector borrow ing  
requirem ent than to  investm ent. As m entioned, the budget was in  surplus in  the 
early 1990s, but fell in to  deficit after the crisis.
48. The role of nonbank finance was very significant for smaller firms. We discuss this source of 
credit in the next section.
49. This conclusion is similar to that of Gallego and Loayza (2001) in their analysis of Chile. 
They find no relationship between growth (in that case, of revenues of large firms) and stock mar­
ket capitalization unless the portion explained by price increases is eliminated.
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A  m ore precise w ay o f  analyzing the link  between investm ent and the capital 
m arkets is to  focu s on  the prim ary m arkets, that is, th e  con tr ib u tion  o f  n ew  
issues o f  deb t and equity. T h e  pattern is sim ilar to  that o f  bank finance: h igh  
grow th in  the early 1990s was follow ed by a sharp falloff. In the case o f  the mar­
kets, the peak cam e in  1993 , w h en  they contributed  2 .5  percent o f  GDP. T h e  
average con tr ib u tion  thereafter was nearer to  0 .5  percent throu gh  2 0 0 0 .50 In  
other w ords, the capital markets have been  an extrem ely sm all source o f  new  
finance, even com pared w ith  the poor perform ance o f  the banks. Betw een 1998  
and 2 0 0 3 , there were tw en ty -on e new  p ub lic  offerings on  th e  M exican  Stock  
Exchange (B M V ), or an average o f  three and a h a lf per year. T his compares w ith  
128 n ew  offerings betw een  19 9 0  and 1997 , or an average o f  sixteen  per year. 
T h e long-term  debt market has been m ore active. W h ile  the m ain participants 
have been  p ub lic  sector actors— nam ely, states, m unicipalities, the rem aining  
p u b lic  sector enterprises, and the central governm ent— corporate issues have 
becom e m ore dynam ic in  the last few  years (see table 7 -4 ). B etw een shares and  
b on ds, th e  co n tr ib u tio n  o f  th e  capital m arkets is n o w  around 1.5 percen t o f  
GDP, still below  its precrisis peak.51
T he sectoral com position  o f  the firms w ith  shares listed on  the stock exchange 
was quite different than those relying on  bank credit, although com parisons are 
com plicated because o f  the different categories in  w hich data are available in the 
tw o cases. As o f  year-end 2 0 0 3 , the largest share o f  stock  market capitalization  
was in the com m unications and transportation area, w hich  accounted for 36  per­
cent o f  the total. In descending order, the others were com m erce (17  percent), 
m anufacturing (14  percent), construction  (12  percent), other services (11 per­
cent), “other” (7 percent), and extractive industries (3 percent). T h is pattern has 
changed dramatically in  the last tw o decades. In 1986 , for example, manufactur­
in g  represented by  far the largest share (nearly 3 9  percent), w h ile  com m u nica­
tion s and transportation played a m inuscu le role (less than 3 p ercen t). C o m ­
merce has increased its share, w hile the others have declined in im portance.52
Trying to correlate these data w ith  sectoral growth produces on ly  a few  clear 
links. T ransportation and co m m u n ica tion s was the largest beneficiary  o f  the  
stock  market, and it was the fastest-grow ing sector u ntil the recent slow dow n. 
A t the other extreme, agriculture was the laggard in  growth and has had little or 
no access to  the stock market (there m ay be som e agricultural finance included  
in “other”). In betw een, the situation is m ore difficult to disentangle. M anufac­
turing is the m ost problem atic sector on  this d im ension . W h ile  its grow th rate 
has been strong in  relative terms, especially since the crisis, it is on e o f  the few  
cases in  w hich  market capitalization as a share o f  G D P  was lower in  2 0 0 3  than  
in  1 9 9 0 . T h is  is probably because the m a q u ila  (assem bly) p lants, the fastest
50. BMV (2003) and website (www.bmv.com.mx).
51. BMV (2003) and website (www.bmv.com.mx).
52. Bank of Mexico website (www.banxico.org.mx).
grow ing part o f  the m anufacturing  sector, get m ost o f  their  finance through  
intrafirm channels.
T h e  relationsh ip  b etw een  the d om estic  capital m arkets and  in tern ation al 
finance is a c lose on e , w ith  m an y areas o f  overlap. O n e  such  area is foreign  
investm ent in M exican firms. T he B M V  reports that 43  percent o f  market capi­
talization was held  by foreigners at the end o f  2 0 0 3 , although less than 10 per­
cent o f  bonds were foreign ow n ed .53 O ther foreign investm ent sources include  
international bank loans, international bond  issues, and participation in  inter­
national equity markets through the p lacem ent o f  A D R s. Figure 7 -6  provides 
relevant data for assessing h ow  international finance correlates w ith  investm ent 
in  M exico. T his is by far the closest relationship w e have found . Investm ent and  
in ternational finan ce track each other w ith  few  deviations th rou gh ou t the  
period— in the buoyant years o f  the early 1990s, the crash in  1995 , the recovery 
in  the late 1 9 9 0 s, and  the lagging  perform ance in  the last few  years o f  the  
period. T he graph provides a clear dem onstration o f  the role o f  the sm all group 
o f  large corporations w h o  do the m ajority o f  the investing in  M exico and obtain  
a substantial am ount o f  their finance from  international markets.
W hile com plete data are not available on  recipients o f  international finance, we 
do have som e information on  bond issues and A D R s.54 O f  the 3 6  percent o f  M ex­
ico’s international bonds that were issued by private sector firms, nearly half were in 
the telecoms sector. M anufacturing (especially construction materials) accounted  
for a similar share, and services for the remainder. W ith  respect to  A D R s, the 
telecom m unications and broadcasting industries were even more dom inant, repre­
senting 70  percent o f  the total. C onstruction and com m erce also participated, as 
did m anufacturing and services. A lthough partial, this inform ation suggests addi­
tional reasons for the com m unications and transportation sectors’ leading eco­
nom ic growth in M exico. T h e A D R s were also concentrated in  terms o f  num ber o f  
firms w ith  access. A  mere thirty-seven firms were responsible for M exico’s forty- 
eight main public offerings in the U .S . market between 1990 and 2003 . Moreover, 
tw o firms (Telmex and Grupo Televisa) represented 62  percent. T his finding leads 
directly to the issue o f  access to finance, the topic o f  the next section.
Access to Finance for Small Firms
A  num ber o f  the p o in ts  already m ade about m arket segm en tation  in  M exico  
have im plications for unequal access to  finance betw een  large firm s and their 
sm all and m edium -sized  counterparts (SM Es). To address this question further, 
w e analyze a un ique data set on  sources o f  finance by size o f  firm , based on  a 
quarterly survey carried ou t by the Bank o f  M exico since 1998 . N ext, w e exam-
53. BMV (2002) and personal interviews at the BMV. This percentage is two to three times the 
amount held by foreigners in the Brazilian and Chilean stock markets; see chapters 6 and 8.
54. ADR information is from the Universal Issuance Guide on the Citibank website 
(wwss.citissb.com/adr/www/brokers/mn__uni.htm).
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Figure 7 -6 . M exico: G row th Rates o f  Investment a n d  In tern atio na l Finance, 
1 9 9 1 -2 0 0 3
Percent
Sources: ECLAC website (www.eclac.cl) for investment; BIS website (www.bis.org), Standard 
and Poors (2000, 2005), IMF (unpublished) for international finance.
ine the scope o f  finance from  nonbank sources, w hich  have becom e increasingly 
im portant in  M exico in  the past decade as banks have curtailed credit. Finally, 
w e consider attem pts by the governm ent itse lf to  support SM Es and assess their 
potential to narrow the gap betw een large and sm all firms.
T h e  starting p o in t for understanding differential access to finance in  M exico  
is the sm all num ber o f  w orld-class firms that stand apart from  all others— n ot 
on ly  sm all and m edium -sized firms, but other large firms, as w ell. For example, 
o f  the fifty largest locally ow ned private firms in  Latin America, tw enty-nine are 
from  M exico  (versus sixteen  from  Brazil and three from  C hile); their average 
sales in  2 0 0 3  were over $ 7  b illion. Likewise, seven o f  the top  ten m ultinational 
operations in  Latin A m erica are located  in M exico, as are six o f  the ten largest 
state-ow ned  enterprises.55 Leaving aside ow nersh ip  characteristics, 116  o f  the  
20 0  firms in  Latin Am erica w ith  sales over $1 billion  are from  M exico.56
T h e  Bank o f  M exico  survey recognizes th is situation  w h en  it d ivides firms 
into four categories: small, m edium , large, and AAA.57 Table 7 -1 0  com pares the
55. “Las mayores empresas de América Latina en 2003,” América Economía, July 9-29, 2004.
56. “Las mayores empresas de América Latina en 2002,” América Economía, July 9—31, 2003-
57. Data from the survey are found on the Bank of Mexico website; see www.banxico.org.mx/ 
elnfoFinanciera/FSinfoFinanciera.html. Size definitions are based on volume of sales in 1997: 
small (less than about $12.5 million in sales), medium ($12.5 to $65 million), large ($65 to $650 
million), and AAA (more than $650 million). The survey is based on a national random, stratified 
sample of around 1,500 firms, including branches of multinational corporations but not state-
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T a b le  7 -1 0 . Mexico: Sources of Finance, by Size of Firm, 1998 and2003 
Percent
Source
Small firmi Medium firmi Large firms*' AAA firmi
1998 2003 1998 2003 1998 2003 1998 2003
Suppliers 50.0 64.4 42.0 58.2 28.5 49.5 17.8 28.5
Commercial banks 23.9 16.0 26.6 18.5 31.6 22.4 32.1 39.8
Foreign banks 3.7 1.1 8.4 2.8 15.4 6.1 34.2 13.1
Developm ent banks 5.2 2.2 4.1 2.1 3.6 3.0 3.4 2.6
Intra-firm  credit 15.8 15.7 17.7 17.5 16.5 16.7 5.7 8.9
O ther 1.4 2.6 1.3 1.0 4.4 2.5 6.9 7.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Bank of Mexico website (www.banxico.org.mx).
a. Sales in 1997 less than U.S.$12.5 million.
b. Sales in 1997 between U.S.$12.5 million and U.S.$65 million.
c. Sales in 1997 between U.S.$65 million and U.S.$650 million.
d. Sales in 1997 over U.S.$650 million.
fo u r  g ro u p s ’ f in a n c ia l  so u rc e s  in  1 9 9 8  a n d  2 0 0 3 .  T h e  A A A  g r o u p  s ta n d s  o u t  as 
d if fe re n t  f ro m  all th e  o th e rs . M o re o v e r, th e  d iffe re n ce s  b e tw e e n  A A A  a n d  o th e r  
la rg e  f irm s  w id e n e d  d u r in g  th e  p e r io d . I n  1 9 9 8 , th e  A A A  firm s  g o t  a b o u t  tw o - 
th ird s  o f  th e ir  f in a n c e  f ro m  fo re ig n  a n d  lo ca l c o m m e rc ia l  b a n k s . T h e  r e m a in d e r  
w a s  m o s t ly  f ro m  s u p p l ie r s ,  a l t h o u g h  th e  “o t h e r ” c a te g o ry , w h ic h  in c lu d e s  
d o m e s tic  b o n d  issues, r e p re se n te d  a b o u t  7  p e rc e n t.  F ive y ears  la te r, f in a n c e  fro m  
in te r n a t io n a l  b a n k s  h a d  f a lle n  s h a rp ly , t o  b e  r e p la c e d  m a in ly  b y  in c re a s e d  
a m o u n ts  f ro m  su p p lie rs  a n d  lo ca l b a n k s— a t  a  t im e  w h e n  th e  la t te r  w e re  c u t t in g  
lo a n s  d ra stica lly . T h u s ,  th e  b e h a v io r  o f  th e  A A A  g r o u p  in  M e x ic o  is c o n s is te n t  
w i th  th e  f in d in g s  o f  C a b a l le ro  in  h is  a n a ly s is  o f  C h i le .58 C a b a l le ro  id e n t i f ie d  a 
p a t t e rn  in  w h ic h  th e  la rg e s t f irm s , in  th e  p re se n c e  o f  e x te rn a l sh o c k s , w i th d ra w  
(o r  a re  d r iv e n )  f ro m  in te r n a t io n a l  m a rk e ts . T h e y  th e n  d isp la c e  sm a lle r  f irm s  in  
lo ca l c re d it  m a rk e ts , le a v in g  th e  d isp la c e d  f irm s  in  p re c a r io u s  s tra its .
T h e  d a ta  fo r  la rg e  f irm s  in  th e  ta b le  su g g e s t th is  is e x ac tly  w h a t  h a p p e n e d  in  
M e x ico . In  1 9 9 8 , th e  la rg e  f irm s ’ f in a n c in g  p a t te rn  w as m o re  s im ila r  to  th e  A A A  
f i rm s  th a n  to  th e  S M E s . B o th  la rg e  a n d  A A A  f irm s  re c e iv e d  a b o u t  th e  s a m e  
s h a re  o f  t h e i r  f in a n c e  f r o m  lo c a l  c o m m e rc ia l  b a n k s ,  a n d  b o t h  g o t  s ig n i f ic a n t  
a m o u n ts  f ro m  in te r n a t io n a l  b a n k s . A t  th e  sa m e  tim e , la rg e  f irm s  d if fe re d  f ro m  
A A A  firm s  in  th e i r  g re a te r  u se  o f  su p p lie rs ’ c re d its  a n d  s u p p o r t  f ro m  o th e r  f irm s  
in  th e ir  c o rp o ra te  g ro u p s . B y 2 0 0 3 ,  h o w ev er, th e  la rg e  f irm s  h a d  m o v e d  to w a rd  
th e  S M E  p a t te rn .  N o t  o n ly  h a d  th e i r  in te r n a t io n a l  lo a n s  fa llen , b u t  th e i r  lo ca l 
b a n k  f in a n c in g  h a d  a lso  d e c lin e d . S u p p lie rs  p ro v id e d  h a l f  th e ir  fu n d s .
owned enterprises. W hile serious problems exist with the survey, especially the sample based on 
1997 sales data, its conclusions seem to be corroborated by qualitative evidence.
58. Caballero (2002).
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S m a ll a n d  m e d iu m  firm s , d e s p ite  m in o r  d iffe re n c e s  b e tw e e n  th e m , s h a re d  a 
f in a n c in g  p a t t e rn  th a t  re lie d  m a in ly  o n  su p p lie rs , to g e th e r  w i th  so m e  lo a n s  f ro m  
lo c a l b a n k s .59 T h e y  h a d  v ir tu a l ly  n o  access  to  th e  in te r n a t io n a l  m a rk e ts ,  e sp e ­
c ia lly  b y  2 0 0 3 ,  b u t  t h e y  c o u ld  d r a w  o n  t h e i r  c o r p o ra te  g r o u p s .  T h e  d e v e lo p ­
m e n t  b a n k s  a c c o u n te d  fo r  o n ly  a  sm a ll, a n d  fa llin g , sh a re  o f  f in a n c e — e v en  fo r  
th e  sm a lle s t  f irm s  in  th e  s a m p le .60
T h e  su rv e y  a lso  p ro v id e s  in f o r m a t io n  o n  th e  re a so n s  fo r  se e k in g  b a n k  c re d it  
a n d  w h y  i t  w as f re q u e n t ly  n o t  u se d . T h e  m a in  u se  o f  fu n d s  w as  fo r  w o rk in g  c a p ­
i ta l ,  r e f le c t in g  th e  s h o r t - t e r m  n a tu r e  o f  b a n k  c r e d i t  in  M e x ic o  a n d  e ls e w h e re ; 
in v e s tm e n t  a n d  r e s t r u c tu r in g  o f  l ia b ili t ie s  w e re  a  d i s ta n t  se c o n d . T h e  e x p la n a ­
t io n  fo r  n o t  u s in g  b a n k  c re d it  v a r ie d  o v e r t im e  a n d  b y  size o f  f i rm . F o r  e x am p le , 
h ig h  in te re s t  ra te s  w e re  c ite d  b y  la rg e  a n d  sm a ll  f irm s  a lik e  in  1 9 9 9  a n d  2 0 0 0 ,  
b u t  less so  in  re c e n t  y e a rs .61 U n c e r ta in ty  a b o u t  th e  e c o n o m ic  s i tu a t io n  w as  a lso  
m e n t io n e d  b y  a ll k in d s  o f  f irm s , w h ile  re je c t io n  b y  b a n k s  w as a n  im p o r ta n t  re a ­
so n  fo r  S M E s b u t  m u c h  less im p o r ta n t  fo r  la rg e r f irm s . T h e  fo rm e r  re a so n s  su g ­
g es t a  la c k  o f  lo a n  d e m a n d ,  w h ile  th e  la t te r  c lea rly  im p lie s  a  s u p p ly  c o n s t r a in t  o r  
c re d i t  ra tio n in g .
I f  f irm s  a n d  h o u s e h o ld s  c a n n o t  g e t access to  d o m e s tic  b a n k  c re d it— th e  u su a l 
w a y  to  f in a n c e  c u r re n t  as w e ll as so m e  c a p ita l  e x p e n d itu re s— th e n  o th e r  so u rces  
s h o u ld  a p p e a r  to  fill th e  g ap . T h is  h as  in d e e d  b e e n  th e  case in  M e x ico . N o n b a n k  
f in a n c e  re fe rs  to  d i f f e r e n t  i n s t i t u t io n s  a n d  in s t r u m e n t s  a m o n g  d i f f e r e n t  c a te ­
g o r ie s  o f  b o r ro w e rs ,  b u t  i t  in c re a s e d  in  a ll cases a f te r  th e  c ris is . F o r  th e  la rg e s t 
f i rm s , n o n b a n k  f in a n c e  ty p ic a l ly  m e a n s  f o re ig n  f in a n c e  a n d — to  a  le s se r  
e x te n t— th e  d o m e s tic  c a p ita l  m a rk e ts .  F o r  S M E s  a n d  h o u s e h o ld s ,  b y  c o n tr a s t ,  
n o n b a n k  f in a n c in g  re fe rs  to  a  g r o w in g  p a n o p ly  o f  in s t i t u t io n s ,  r a n g in g  f ro m  
f in a n c e  c o m p a n ie s  ( k n o w n  in  M e x ic o  as sofoles) t o  th e  c o n s u m e r  f in a n c e  d iv i­
s io n s  o f  re ta il  s to re s  to  in v e s tm e n t  c o m p a n ie s . C o n s u m e r  f in a n c e  is re le v a n t  to  
th e  a n a ly s is  b e ca u se  o w n e rs  o f  sm a ll  f irm s  f re q u e n t ly  seek  c re d i t  as in d iv id u a ls , 
th u s  b lu r r in g  th e  d is t in c t io n  b e tw e e n  c o n s u m e r  a n d  c o m m e rc ia l  c red it.
T h e  sofoles, w h ic h  c a n  le n d  b u t  n o t  ta k e  d e p o s i ts ,  f u n d  th e m s e lv e s  m a in ly  
f ro m  b a n k  lo an s , in c lu d in g  lo a n s  f ro m  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t  b a n k s . T h e y  h a v e  b e en  
e x tre m e ly  a g ile  in  m o v in g  in to  th e  sp a c e  v a c a te d  b y  th e  b a n k s  w i th  re s p e c t  to  
c re d i t  fo r  h o u s e h o ld s  a n d  m ic ro , sm a ll, a n d  m e d iu m -s iz e d  e n te rp r is e s . T h e  to ta l
59. The definition of small firms varies enormously across countries. In the Mexican survey, for 
example, small is defined as sales o f less than $12.5 million, while in Chile small means sales o f less 
than $650,000. These kinds of differences make comparisons across countries very difficult.
60. Unfortunately, the published information from the survey does not provide absolute figures 
on the amount o f finance provided to each category of firm, nor does it reveal information on the 
share of finance from internal versus external sources. Based on its detailed study o f the Mexican 
financial sector in 2001, the IMF believes that internal resources (retained earnings) were an 
increasing share o f finance and key to the survival o f many firms; see IMF (2002b, p.36).
61. In reality, the highest interest rates were in 1998, so respondents may have been thinking of 
the past when they answered that question.
n u m b e r  o f  c re d its  g ra n te d  b y  sofoles ro se  f ro m  v ir tu a l ly  ze ro  in  1 9 9 5  to  7 .3  m il ­
l io n  in  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 3 ,  w h ile  th e  v o lu m e  o f  th e i r  c re d its  re a c h e d  2 .2  p e rc e n t  o f  
G D P  in  th e  s a m e  p e r io d .  M o s t  o f  th e s e  f u n d s  w e n t  f o r  m o r tg a g e s  a n d  a u to  
f in a n c e . S M E s a c c o u n te d  fo r  1 7  p e rc e n t  o f  th e  to ta l  n u m b e r  o f  c re d its  in  2 0 0 3 , 
b u t  o n ly  1 p e rc e n t  o f  th e  lo a n  p o r tfo lio .  T h e y  h a v e  b e e n  th e  fa s tes t g ro w in g  c a t­
e g o ry  o f  lo a n s  f ro m  sofoles, h o w e v e r , b e c a u se  o f  th e  e n t r y  in to  th e  m a r k e t  o f  a  
la rg e  n e w  p ro v id e r  o f  c re d its  to  m ic ro  f irm s .62
T h e  success o f  re ta il s to re  c re d i t  is b e s t  i l lu s tra te d  b y  th e  M e x ic o -b a se d  e lec ­
tro n ic s  m u lt in a t io n a l ,  G r u p o  E le k tra , w h o se  c o n s u m e r  c re d it  d iv is io n  w as t r a n s ­
fo rm e d  in to  th e  f irs t  n e w  b a n k  to  rece ive  a  lic e n se  a f te r  1 9 9 4 . B a n c o  A z te c a  h as 
th e  sp e c if ic  a im  o f  p r o v id in g  f in a n c ia l  se rv ices to  th e  e s t im a te d  7 0 - 8 0  p e rc e n t  
o f  th e  M e x ic a n  p o p u la t io n  n o t  c u r re n t ly  se rv ed  b y  b a n k s . O n e  y e a r a f te r  b e g in ­
n in g  o p e r a t io n s  in  O c t o b e r  2 0 0 2 ,  i t  h a d  s o m e  4  m il l io n  c l ie n ts  a n d  a  c r e d i t  
p o r t f o l i o  o f  $ 5 0 0  m il l io n .  T h is  r a n k e d  B a n c o  A z te c a  n i n t h  o u t  o f  t h e  t h i r t y  
M e x ic a n  c o m m e rc ia l  b a n k s  in  te rm s  o f  lo a n  p o r t fo l io ,  b u t  o n ly  s e v e n te e n th  in  
assets— re fle c tin g  th e  b ias  a g a in s t le n d in g  a t  m o s t  b a n k s .63
A  th i r d  g r o u p  o f  n o n b a n k  in s t i t u t io n s  t h a t  c o u ld  b e  i m p o r t a n t  fo r  S M E  
f in a n c e  in  th e  f u tu re  a re  m u tu a l  fu n d s  (sociedades de inversión). T h e y  o p e ra te  in  
th re e  fo rm s: e q u ity  tr a d in g ,  b o n d  t ra d in g , a n d  v e n tu re  c a p ita l .  F irm s  o p e ra t in g  
in  th e  t h i r d  a rea  (sincas) w e re  c re a te d  to  p ro m o te  n e w  p ro je c ts  t h a t  w o u ld  la te r  
b e  b r o u g h t  to  th e  s to c k  m a rk e t,  m u c h  as v e n tu re  f irm s  d o  in  o th e r  c o u n tr ie s .  T o  
d a te ,  h o w e v e r , th e  o n ly  f u n d s  t h a t  h a v e  b e e n  s ig n if ic a n t  in  q u a n t i t a t iv e  te rm s  
a re  th o s e  t r a d in g  in  d e b t ,  e sp e c ia lly  g o v e r n m e n t  p a p e r . T o g e th e r ,  th e  a sse ts  o f  
th e  m u tu a l  f u n d s  r e p re s e n t  a r o u n d  5 p e r c e n t  o f  G D P , b u t  o v e r  8 5  p e r c e n t  is 
in v e s tm e n t in  b o n d s .64
T h e  b e h a v io r  o f  th e  p r iv a te  b a n k s  in  M e x ic o  s in c e  1 9 9 4  re p re s e n ts  a  c le a r  
case  o f  m a r k e t  f a ilu re  w i th  re s p e c t  to  f in a n c e  fo r  S M E s  a n d  h o u s e h o ld s .  T h e  
g o v e rn m e n t  h a s  t r ie d  to  fill th e  g ap . T h e  k e y  a c to r  c o n tin u e s  to  b e  N a f in ,  b u t  its 
a p p ro a c h  u n d e r w e n t  sev e ra l c h a n g e s  b e fo re  i ts  c u r r e n t  m o d e  o f  o p e r a t io n  w as 
e s ta b lis h e d . I n  th e  p r e re f o r m  p e r io d ,  N a f in  b o r ro w e d  m o n e y  a b r o a d  a t  p r iv i ­
le g e d  ra te s  a n d  p a s s e d  it  d i r e c t ly  o n  to  f i rm s — m a in ly  la rg e  f irm s  in  b o th  th e  
p u b l ic  a n d  p r iv a te  se c to rs . In  th e  19 9 0 s , N a f in  b e c a m e  a  s e c o n d - t ie r  b a n k , still 
o b ta in in g  fu n d s  in  th e  i n te r n a t io n a l  (a n d  d o m e s tic )  c a p i ta l  m a rk e ts ,  b u t  d is ­
b u r s in g  th e m  th r o u g h  a  n e tw o r k  o f  p r iv a te  in te r m e d ia r i e s ,  s u c h  as f irm s
62. Asociación Mexicana de Sociedades Financieras de Objeto Limitado website 
(www.amsfol.com.mx); AMSFOL is the national association o f sofoles. The new microcredit insti­
tution is Financiera Compartamos (www.compartamos.com).
63. For a summary o f Banco Aztecas brief history, see Lucy Conger, “A Bold Experiment at 
Banco Azteca,” Outlook Journal, May 2003. Comparative data are from CNBV website 
(www.cnbv.gob.mx). The bank is still very closely connected to the Elektra department stores and 
is frequently criticized for charging extremely high interest rates on its loans.
64. Calculated from CNBV website (www.cnbv.gob.mx). O ther types o f nonbank finance 
include suppliers’ credit, leasing, factoring, and credit unions. The CNBV website describes and 
provides statistics on those sources that it regulates.
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e n g a g e d  in  le a s in g  a n d  f a c to r in g ,  c r e d i t  u n io n s ,  a n d  s a v in g  a n d  lo a n  a s so c ia ­
tio n s . T h is  n e tw o r k  g re w  v e ry  rap id ly , as d id  th e  n u m b e r  o f  f irm s  se rv ed . In e ff i­
c ie n c y  a n d  c o r r u p t i o n  r e s u l te d  f r o m  th e  r a p id  g r o w th — s im ila r  to  w h a t  
o c c u r re d  a m o n g  th e  p r iv a te  b a n k s  in  th e  sa m e  p e r io d — a n d  e v e n tu a lly  le d  to  a  
$5  b i l l io n  c h a rg e  to  th e  p u b l ic  treasury .®
A  th i r d  e p o c h  b e g a n  w i th  th e  in a u g u r a t io n  in  2 0 0 0  o f  th e  F o x  g o v e rn m e n t,  
w h ic h  h a d  a  sp ec ia l in te re s t  in  th e  p r iv a te  se c to r  in  g e n e ra l a n d  S M E s in  p a r t ic u ­
lar. T h e  a d m in i s t r a t i o n  d r e w  u p  a  n a t io n a l  p la n  fo r  e n t r e p r e n e u r ia l  d e v e lo p ­
m e n t ,  a n d  th e  n e w  m in is t ry  o f  th e  e c o n o m y  in c lu d e d  a  v ice  m in is te r  fo r  S M E s. 
A n  a t t e m p t  w as  a lso  m a d e  to  c o o r d in a te  t h e  m a n y  p r o g r a m s  to  a id  S M E s  
th o u g h  th e  in te r d e p a r tm e n ta l  c o m m it te e  o n  in d u s t r ia l  p o lic y . I n  th is  c o n te x t ,  
th re e  m a in  p ro g ra m s  w e re  d e v e lo p e d  b y  a  re c o v e r in g  N a f in :  (1 ) a  “p r o d u c t io n  
c h a in s” p ro g ra m , w h ic h  o p e ra te s  th r o u g h  th e  I n te r n e t  a n d  lin k s  fa c to r in g  c o m ­
p a n ie s  to  la rg e  f i rm s  a n d  t h e i r  S M E  s u p p l ie r s ;  (2 )  l e n d in g  p r o g r a m s ,  w h ic h  
m a in ly  p ro v id e  w o rk in g  c a p ita l  fo r  S M E s; a n d  (3) a  lo a n  g u a ra n te e  p ro g ra m . I n  
2 0 0 3 ,  th e se  p ro g ra m s  d isb u rse d  o v e r $ 9  b il l io n ,  8 5  p e rc e n t  o f  w h ic h  w e n t  to  th e  
p r iv a te  s e c to r . O f  th e  p r iv a te  s e c to r  p o r t io n ,  9 0  p e r c e n t  o p e r a t e d  th r o u g h  
s e c o n d - t ie r  p ro c e d u re s ,  w h i le  th e  r e m a in d e r  w a s  g u a ra n te e s  (9  p e rc e n t)  a n d  a 
sm a ll a m o u n t  o f  f i r s t- t ie r  le n d in g  (1 p e rc e n t) .  E x te n s iv e  te c h n ic a l  a ss is ta n ce  w as 
a lso  p ro v id e d  to  sm a ll firm s.®
W h ile  th e  p ro g ra m s  a re  to o  r e c e n t  to  e v a lu a te , sev e ra l p o in ts  c a n  b e  ra ised . 
F irs t ,  N a f in  e n g ag es  in  a  la rg e  n u m b e r  o f  a c tiv it ie s  t h a t  m a y  d iv e r t  e n e rg y  a n d  
re so u rce s  f ro m  its  S M E  p ro g ra m s . F o r  e x a m p le , i t  o p e ra te s  as th e  g o v e rn m e n t’s 
f in a n c ia l  a g e n t ,  m a k e s  f i r s t - t ie r  lo a n s  to  th e  p u b l ic  se c to r, h e lp s  to  d e v e lo p  th e  
c a p i ta l  m a r k e t  t h r o u g h  v a r io u s  k in d s  o f  i n te r v e n t io n ,  a c ts  as a n  i n v e s tm e n t  
b a n k , p ro m o te s  v e n tu re  c a p ita l, a n d  en g ag es in  c o n su ltin g . S e c o n d , as o f  2 0 0 3 ,  
o n ly  a b o u t  9 0 ,0 0 0  f irm s  h a d  re c e iv e d  c re d i ts  o r  g u a ra n te e s  u n d e r  th e  s e c o n d -  
t ie r  p ro g ra m s . (A  la rg e r  g ro u p  rece iv ed  o th e r  b e n e fits ,  su c h  as t r a in in g  p ro g ra m s  
a n d  h e lp  th r o u g h  N a f in ’s I n te r n e t  s ite .)  T h ir d ,  a  s ig n if ic a n t a m o u n t  o f  th e  fu n d s  
a p p e a r  to  g o  to  la rg e r  f i rm s . T h e  a v e ra g e  lo a n  w a s  a b o u t  $ 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,  a n d  th e  
av erag e  g u a ra n te e  w as a b o u t  $ 6 0 ,0 0 0  in  2 0 0 3 .  W h ile  th e  la rg e  m a jo r i ty  o f  c re d ­
its  g o  to  m ic ro ,  sm a ll ,  a n d  m e d iu m -s iz e d  e n te rp r is e s ,  m e d iu m - s iz e d  f i rm s  a re  
d e f in e d  as h a v in g  u p  to  2 5 0  e m p lo y e e s  a n d  $ 5 0  m il l io n  o f  sa les .67 F o u r th ,  o n  
th e  p o s i t iv e  s id e , th e  n u m b e r  o f  f i rm s  r e c e iv in g  c r e d i t  ro se  r a p id ly  in  r e c e n t  
y ears , w h ile  th e  av erag e  size o f  lo a n  d e c re a se d . N a f in  a lso  sc a le d  d o w n  i ts  la rg e
65. As discussed in note 47, the rescue of the development and commercial banks was carried 
out by separate institutions. Fideliq, the fund set up to handle the problem loans o f the former, was 
under financial pressure, and the government decided to cut its losses and pay off the notes before 
they matured. This was the source o f the $5 billion charge, which was described in the press as the 
bankruptcy of Nafin. See interview with the then-president o f the CNBV, in Israel Rodriguez, 
“Rechazan que el traspaso de las perdidas de Nafin al gobierno haya sido un acto ilegal,” La Jor­
nada, October 28, 2001.
66. Nafin (2003).
67. Nafin (2003) and personal interviews.
lo a n s  to  th e  g o v e rn m e n t  a n d  p u b l ic  s e c to r  firm s ; o n  a  n e t  basis , th e s e  flo w s w ere  
n e g a tiv e  in  2 0 0 3 .  F ina lly , N a f in ’s f in a n c ia l  s i tu a t io n  im p ro v e d  d ra m a tic a l ly  as a  
re su lt  o f  th e  r e s t ru c tu r in g  fo llo w in g  th e  cris is . N o n e th e le s s , th e  N a f in  p ro g ra m s  
n e e d  to  b e  th o r o u g h ly  e v a lu a te d  as s o o n  as p o ss ib le  to  d e te r m in e  w h a t  g ro u p s  
th e y  are  re a c h in g  a n d  w h a t  im p a c t  th e y  are  h a v in g .
Conclusions
T h e  M e x ic a n  f in a n c ia l  sy s te m  c le a r ly  h a s  se r io u s  p ro b le m s .  B a n k  lo a n s  to  th e  
p r iv a te  s e c to r , e s p e c ia l ly  th o s e  to  e n te r p r is e s ,  r e m a in  e x tr a o r d in a r i ly  lo w  a  
d e c a d e  a f te r  th e  f in a n c ia l c ris is o f  1 9 9 4 - 9 5 .  I n  a d d it io n ,  th e  c a p ita l  m a rk e ts  a re  
v e ry  sm a ll  in  a b s o lu te  te rm s . T h e  s to c k  m a r k e t  is t h in  a n d  e x tre m e ly  v o la t i le ,  
w i th  m a rk e t  c a p ita l iz a tio n  th a t  is o n ly  4 0  p e rc e n t  o f  its p re v io u s  p e ak . T h e  b o n d  
m a rk e ts  a re  a lso  sm a ll, a l th o u g h  th e y  h a v e  b e e n  e x p a n d in g  in  th e  las t few  years. 
B o th  m a rk e ts  a re  l im i te d  to  a  sm a ll n u m b e r  o f  la rg e  f irm s , a n d  b o n d s  a re  d o m i­
n a te d  b y  g o v e rn m e n t  ag en c ies .
A s a  c o n se q u e n c e , th e  t ra d i t io n a l  d o m e s tic  so u rc es  o f  f in a n c e  h a v e  n o t  b e e n  
p ro v id in g  m u c h  s u p p o r t  fo r  in v e s tm e n t  a n d  g ro w th . A  q u ic k  r e b o u n d  f ro m  th e  
c ris is  d id  o c cu r . I n d e e d ,  th e  M e x ic a n  e c o n o m y  w as e v en  m o r e  d y n a m ic  in  th e  
f iv e  y e a rs  f r o m  1 9 9 6  to  2 0 0 0  th a n  i t  h a d  b e e n  d u r in g  th e  f in a n c ia l  b o o m  o f  
1 9 9 0 - 9 4 .  T h is  reco v ery , h o w ev er, w as p a r tia l ly  b a se d  o n  id le  c ap a c ity ; in  a d d i ­
t io n ,  n e w  in v e s tm e n t  w as  f in a n c e d  b y  n o n t r a d i t io n a l  so u rc e s . F o r  t h e  la rg e s t  
f irm s , th is  m a in ly  m e a n t  in te rn a t io n a l  f in a n c ia l  m a rk e ts . T h e i r  sm a lle r  c o u n te r ­
p a r ts  f o u n d  s u p p o r t  in  n e w  p r iv a te  se c to r  in s t i tu t io n s  a n d  th e  g o v e rn m e n t  itself, 
a n d  th e y  a lso  d re w  o n  in te rn a l  fu n d s  a n d  m o n e y  av a ilab le  f ro m  n o t  p a y in g  fu ll 
se rv ice  o n  th e ir  d e b ts .
W h ile  th e s e  a lte rn a t iv e s  p r o v id e d  so m e  te m p o r a r y  re lie f , th e y  h a v e  a t  le a s t 
tw o  i m p o r t a n t  s h o r tc o m in g s .  F irs t ,  th e y  h a v e  n o t  b e e n  s u f f ic ie n tly  b r o a d  a n d  
d e e p  to  s t im u la te  a  ro b u s t  e x p a n s io n  o f  th e  d o m e s tic  m a rk e t.  S e c o n d , th e y  h av e  
b e e n  e x tre m e ly  b ia se d  in  fa v o r  o f  th e  la rg e s t f i rm s  a n d  h a v e  th u s  e x a c e rb a te d  a n  
a lre a d y  se r io u s  p r o b le m  o f  in e q u a l i ty  in  M e x ic a n  so c ie ty . T h e  b a n k in g  sy s te m  
u rg e n tly  n e e d s  to  re su m e  i ts  le n d in g  to  p r iv a te  b o rro w e rs  in  th e  n e a r  fu tu re .  N o t  
o n ly  d o  firm s  n e e d  c re d it ,  b u t  h o u se h o ld s  m u s t  a lso  g a in  access— fo r  c o n s u m p ­
t io n  a n d  m o r tg a g e s — i f  th e  e c o n o m y  is n o t  to  re ly  so  h e a v ily  o n  e x p o r ts .  T h e  
p r o b le m  w i th  s u c h  d e p e n d e n c e  w as c le a r ly  m a n if e s te d  w h e n  p r o d u c t io n  s ta g ­
n a te d  in  th e  face  o f  th e  rece ss io n  in  M e x ic o ’s la rg e s t e x p o r t  m a rk e t.
S o  w h a t  is to  b e  d o n e ?  O n e  a n sw e r— p e r h a p s  b a se d  o n  th e  C h i le a n  e x p e r i­
e n ce  in  th e  1 9 8 0 s— is s im p ly  to  w a it. T h e  s i tu a t io n  seem s to  b e  im p ro v in g . T h e  
b a n k s  a re  s tro n g e r ,  w e ll c a p i ta l iz e d , a n d  p ro f i ta b le .  I n s t i tu t i o n a l  in v e s to rs  a re  
g ro w in g  rap id ly . M o re o v e r , in te re s t  ra te s  a re  fa llin g , w h ic h  h a s  tw o  a d v an tag e s : 
i t  lo w e rs  th e  c o s t  o f  c r e d i t ,  a n d  i t  im p ro v e s  th e  b a n k s ’ in c e n t iv e  to  le n d  s in c e  
h o ld in g  se c u ritie s  b e c o m e s  less a ttrac tiv e .
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T h is  an sw er, h o w ev er, is in su f f ic ie n t  in  th e  c u r re n t  c irc u m s ta n c e s  in  M ex ico . 
R a p id  g r o w th  is n e c e s sa ry  fo r  b o th  so c ia l  a n d  p o l i t ic a l  re a so n s , b u t  i t  c a n n o t  
ta k e  p la c e  i f  t h e  f in a n c ia l  s y s te m  is n o t  p u l l in g  i ts  fu l l  w e ig h t .  W ag e s  a re  s ti ll  
b e lo w  th e i r  p re c r is is  lev e l, a n d  in e q u a l i ty  is r is in g — a l th o u g h  p o v e r ty  m a y  b e  
f a l l in g .68 T h e  n e w ly  in v ig o r a te d  d e m o c r a c y  is e n d a n g e r e d  b y  a  s i t u a t i o n  in  
w h ic h  o n ly  a  few  v e ry  p r iv ile g e d  a c to rs  h a v e  access to  f in a n c e  a n d  g ro w th .
T h e  g o v e rn m e n t  s h o u ld  ta k e  a n u m b e r  o f  s tep s; sev en  seem  p a r t ic u la r ly  re le ­
v a n t.  F irs t, th e  Ip a b  b o n d s  s h o u ld  n o t  be  ro lle d  o v e r as th e y  m a tu re .  E l im in a t in g  
th e m  f ro m  b a n k  b a la n c e  sh e e ts  w o u ld  in c re ase  th e  b a n k s ’ w illin g n e ss  ( a n d  n e e d )  
t o  le n d . S e c o n d , c o m p e t i t io n  fo r  c o n s u m e r  c re d i t  a n d  lo a n s  to  S M E s s h o u ld  b e  
s t im u la te d  b y  p r o v id in g  m o r e  b a n k  l ic e n se s  to  f i rm s  w h o s e  m a in  g o a l is to  
in c re a s e  th e  s u p p ly  o f  c r e d i t  to  lo w e r  in c o m e  g ro u p s .  T h i r d ,  m o re  s h o u ld  b e  
d o n e  to  e n c o u ra g e  th e  d o m e s tic  c a p ita l  m a rk e ts  to  p ro v id e  a  so u rc e  o f  fu n d s  fo r  
la rg e  a n d  m e d iu m - s iz e d  f i rm s  ( th o s e  b e lo w  th e  A A A  c a te g o ry ) .  F o u r th ,  th e  
d e v e lo p m e n t b a n k s  s h o u ld  b e  m a n a g e d  in  a  w a y  th a t  is e f fic ie n t a n d  t r a n s p a re n t  
e n o u g h  so  t h e y  c a n  h e lp  s m a ll  a n d  m ic r o  e n te r p r is e s ,  b u t  t h e  p r iv a te  s e c to r  
s h o u ld  a lso  b e  e n c o u r a g e d  to  e n te r  th is  m a r k e t .  F if th ,  d e a l in g  w i th  th e  le g a l 
im p e d im e n ts  to  l e n d in g  s h o u ld  b e  a  h ig h  p r io r i ty .  S e v e ra l sp e c if ic  s te p s  h a v e  
b e e n  ta k e n ,  b u t  th e y  a re  n o t  s u f f ic ie n t  to  o v e rc o m e  th e  g e n e ra l  p ro b le m s  o f  a  
d e f ic ie n t  ju d ic ia ry  a n d  a  la c k  o f  c o n tr a c t  e n fo rc e m e n t.  S ix th , th e  f in a n c ia l  re g u ­
la to r y  a g en c ie s  n e e d  g re a te r  a u to n o m y  a n d  m o re  re so u rc e s . R e la t io n s h ip s  w ith  
f o re ig n  r e g u la to r s  s h o u ld  a lso  b e  s t r e n g th e n e d  a n d  c la r if ie d ,  g iv e n  th e  o v e r ­
w h e lm in g  ro le  o f  fo re ig n  b a n k s  in  M e x ico . S e v e n th , in te re s t  ra te s  s h o u ld  b e  k e p t  
as lo w  as p o ss ib le  to  re in fo rc e  th e  o th e r  m ea su re s . M a in ta in in g  m a c ro e c o n o m ic  
s ta b il i ty  in  g e n e ra l is a  p re re q u is i te  fo r  f u r th e r  f in a n c ia l  d e e p e n in g .
T h e  d e ta i ls  o f  th e s e  m e a s u re s  a re  o b v io u s ly  c r u c ia l  a n d  m u s t  b e  c a re fu lly  
t h o u g h t  o u t  b y  e x p e r ts  w h o  a re  fa m il ia r  w i th  lo c a l in s t i tu t io n a l  a r ra n g e m e n ts .  
N o n e th e le s s ,  th e  o v e ra ll d i r e c t io n  is c lear, a n d  m o s t  o f  th e s e  p o lic y  r e c o m m e n ­
d a tio n s  p o in t  in  th e  sa m e  d ir e c t io n  t h a t  M e x ic a n  a u th o r i t ie s  h a v e  b e e n  m o v in g . 
T h e  m a in  m e ssa g e  h e re  is t h a t  m u c h  m o r e  n e e d s  to  b e  d o n e .  A  r a p id — a n d  
b ro a d -b a s e d — re co v e ry  o f  f in a n c e  is e ssen tia l to  th e  o th e r  g o a ls  th e  g o v e rn m e n t  
is t ry in g  to  ach iev e .
68. See the recent World Bank (2004b) study on this topic.
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B r a z i l :  
P u b l i c  B a n k s  C o n t i n u e  
to  P l a y  a  K e y  R o le
B ra z i l’s e c o n o m ic  r e fo rm s  d a te  to  th e  la te  1 9 8 0 s  a n d  e a r ly  1 9 9 0 s ,  m a k in g  
th e  c o u n t r y  p a r t  o f  th e  t h i r d  r e fo rm  w a v e  in  L a t in  A m e r ic a .  E v e n  th e n ,  
h o w ev er, th e  re fo rm  p ro c ess  in  B razil w as m o d e ra te  a n d  p ra g m a tic  in  c o m p a r i­
so n  w i th  th e  m o re  a b r u p t  a n d  id eo lo g ica lly  b a se d  c h an g e s  o f  so m e  o f  its  n e ig h ­
b o rs .  A t  th e  s a m e  t im e ,  th e  g o v e r n m e n t  h a d  to  d e a l  w i th  g r o w in g  m a c r o e c o ­
n o m ic  d is e q u il ib r ia  t h a t  in c lu d e d  la rg e  f isca l d e f ic its ,  a  g r o w in g  p u b l ic  s e c to r  
d e b t ,  a n d  p r ic e  rises t h a t  th re a te n e d  to  re a c h  h y p e r in f la t io n a ry  levels. T h e  c o m ­
b in e d  s t r u c tu r a l  a n d  m a c r o e c o n o m ic  c h a n g e s  w e re  i n te n d e d  to  r e o r i e n t  th e  
e c o n o m y  so  as to  s t im u la te  a  r e tu r n  to  ra p id  g ro w th .
B ra z il’s f in a n c ia l  l a n d s c a p e  h a d  b e e n  s h a p e d  b y  f i f ty  y e a rs  o f  a  re la tiv e ly  
c lo sed , s ta te - le d  d e v e lo p m e n t  s tra teg y . T h e  m a in  fe a tu re s  in c lu d e d  a n  im p o r ta n t  
ro le  fo r  p u b lic  se c to r  b a n k s  in  f in a n c in g  la rg e  d e v e lo p m e n t  p ro je c ts  a n d  p u b l ic  
a n d  p r iv a te  c o rp o ra t io n s ;  a  l im ite d  ro le  fo r  fo re ig n  p o r t fo lio  in v e s tm e n t,  o w in g  
to  s t r ic t  c a p ita l  c o n tro ls  a n d  m in im a l  access to  in te r n a t io n a l  f in a n c ia l  m a rk e ts  
u n t i l  th e  1 9 7 0 s; p r iv a te  in te rm e d ia r ie s  th a t  p ro v id e d  m a in ly  s h o r t - te r m  f in a n c ­
in g ,  a  s ig n if ic a n t  p o r t i o n  o f  w h ic h  w as d i r e c te d  to  th e  g o v e r n m e n t;  d o m e s tic  
c a p ita l  m a rk e ts  th a t ,  d e sp ite  th e i r  s o p h is t ic a t io n , p la y e d  o n ly  a  sm a ll ro le  in  th e  
f u n d in g  o f  p r o d u c t iv e  a c t iv it ie s ;  a n d  th e  t r a d i t i o n  o f  u s in g  in f la t io n  as a n  
im p o r ta n t  so u rc e  o f  f in a n c in g .1
1. A historical analysis o f the financial sector is found in Lees, Botts, and Cysne (1990). On 
the role o f the financial sector in Brazils industrialization process, see Studart (1995).
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D o u b ts  a b o u t  th e  a p p ro p ria te n e s s  o f  th is  s t ru c tu re  in  a n  in c re a s in g ly  g lo b a l­
ize d  w o r ld  le d  th e  g o v e rn m e n t  to  e m b a rk  o n  a  s ig n if ic a n t  p ro c ess  o f  c h a n g e . A  
su c c ess fu l s ta b il iz a t io n  p r o g r a m  ( th e  Plano Real) w as  i n t r o d u c e d  in  1 9 9 4 , a n d  
i n f la t io n  fe ll a b r u p t ly  f r o m  f o u r -  to  o n e - d ig i t  lev e ls . T h e  v e ry  su c c ess  o f  th e  
Plano Real, h o w e v e r , c o n t r ib u t e d  to  se r io u s  b a n k in g  p ro b le m s  in  1 9 9 5 , w h ic h  
tr ig g e re d  a  g o v e rn m e n t- s p o n s o re d  r e s t ru c tu r in g  t h a t  d e e p e n e d  p r iv a t iz a tio n  a n d  
f in a n c ia l  o p e n in g  b y  a llo w in g  fo re ig n  f in a n c ia l  in s t i tu t io n s  to  e n te r  th e  d o m e s ­
t ic  c re d it  a n d  c a p ita l  m a rk e ts . I n  a d d it io n ,  th e  m o n e ta ry  a u th o r i t ie s  p r o m o te d  a 
s ig n if ic a n t im p ro v e m e n t  in  re g u la tio n  a n d  su p e rv is io n .
A s a  re su lt  o f  th e se  re fo rm s , th e  f in a n c ia l  s e c to r  ev o lv ed  in  m a n y  w ays. C o m ­
p e t i t io n  a n d  th e  c o m p e t i t iv e n e s s  o f  n a t io n a l  f in a n c ia l  i n s t i t u t io n s  in c re a s e d , 
le a d in g  to  im p r o v e m e n ts  in  m ic r o e c o n o m ic  e ffic ien cy . F o re ig n  b a n k s  e n te r e d  
th e  f in a n c ia l  s e c to r  (a lth o u g h  to  a  lesser e x te n t  th a n  in  m o s t  o f  L a tin  A m e ric a ) , 
w h i le  th e  s h a re  o f  p u b l ic  s e c to r  b a n k s  w a s  r e d u c e d  b u t  r e m a in e d  s u b s ta n t ia l .  
C a p ita l  m a rk e ts  e x p a n d e d  th r o u g h  th e  g ro w th  o f  in s t i tu t io n a l  in v es to rs  a n d  th e  
d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  m y r ia d  n e w  f in a n c ia l  in s t r u m e n t s .  P r iv a te  i n v e s tm e n t  fu n d s  
a lso  f lo u r is h e d  in  th e  1 9 9 0 s  a n d  b e c a m e  a n  i m p o r t a n t  in d u s try .  P a ra d o x ic a lly , 
ho w ev er, c re d i t  g re w  m u c h  less th a n  e x p e c te d , a n d  p r im a r y  issues o f  b o n d s  a n d  
s e c u ri t ie s  r e m a in e d  v e ry  sm a ll .  I n  c o m p a r is o n  w i th  d e v e lo p e d  e c o n o m ie s  a n d  
so m e  in  th e  d e v e lo p in g  w o r ld ,  B ra z il’s p r iv a te  f in a n c ia l  s e c to r  re m a in e d  a  re la ­
tiv e ly  p o o r  so u rc e  o f  fu n d s  to  f irm s  a n d  h o u s e h o ld s  a lik e . L o n g - te rm  f in a n c in g  
a n d  sm a ll a n d  m e d iu m -s iz e d  f irm s’ access c o n t in u e d  to  b e  scarce; m o s t  w as p r o ­
v id e d  b y  p u b l ic  b a n k s .
W h ile  s o m e  o f  th e s e  t r e n d s  a n d  c h a ra c te r is tic s  a re  s im ila r  to  th o s e  w e  h a v e  
d e sc r ib e d  fo r  C h ile  a n d  M e x ico , th e y  a lso  r e p re se n t  so m e  m a jo r  d iffe ren ces . T h e  
m o s t  o b v io u s  is th e  d if fe re n c e  in  o w n e r s h ip  s t r u c tu r e .  T h e  c o n t in u in g  im p o r ­
ta n c e  o f  p u b l ic  b a n k s , c o m b in e d  w i th  e x tre m e ly  c o m p e t i t iv e  p r iv a te  d o m e s tic  
in s t i tu t io n s ,  h a s  l im ite d  o p p o r tu n it ie s  fo r  fo re ig n  b a n k s  in  B razil. A n o th e r  c r u ­
c ia l d if fe re n c e  is th e  la c k  o f  a  s y s te m ic  b a n k in g  c ris is . S e r io u s  p r o b le m s  a ro se  
a f te r  th e  s ta b i l i z a t io n  p r o g r a m  in  1 9 9 4 ,  b u t  th e  a u th o r i t ie s  t o o k  p r e v e n t iv e  
a c t io n s  a n d  a v o id e d  th e  d e c a d e - lo n g  t r a u m a  e x p e r ie n c e d  b y  C h i le  a n d  M e x ico . 
A t  th e  sa m e  t im e , B raz il c o n f ro n ts  p ro b le m s  th a t  a re  n o t  as re le v a n t in  th e  o th e r  
tw o  cases. I n  p a r t ic u la r ,  f i ia Q ro c c o n o m ic  d i s e q u i l ib r ia  a re  m o r e  s ig n i f ic a n t  in  
B ra z il, m a n i f e s t in g  th e m s e lv e s  in  IaTge' b t ld g e t  d e f ic its ,  h ig h  d e b t  ra t io s ,  h ig h  
in te re s t  ra te s , a n d  s lo w  a n d  v o la t i le  g ro w th . S im ila r it ie s  a re  f o u n d  m a in ly  w i th  
re sp e c t to  M e x ico  in  te rm s  o f  th e  sm a ll size o f  th e  f in a n c ia l  se c to r  (as a  sh a re  o f  
G D P ) ,  i ts  o r i e n ta t io n  to w a rd  g o v e r n m e n t  f in a n c e ,  a n d  th e  i n s t i tu t io n a l  p r o b ­
lem s  t h a t  in h ib i t  its  g ro w th .
W e  d iscu ss  a ll o f  th e s e  issues in  th e  c h ap te r . In  th e  f irs t  s e c tio n , w e  re v ie w  th e  
f in a n c ia l  re fo rm s  im p le m e n te d  in  th e  1 9 9 0 s  (n am ely , l ib e ra liz a tio n  a n d  th e  n e w  
r e g u la tio n s )  a n d  w h a t  w a s  e x p e c te d  f ro m  th e m . T h e  s e c o n d  s e c t io n  e x a m in e s  
th e  c h a n g e s  in  th e  s t r u c tu r e  o f  th e  f in a n c ia l  se c to r , in c lu d in g  b o th  b a n k s  a n d
c a p ita l  m a rk e ts . T h e  th i r d  an a lyzes th e  e ffec ts  o f  th e  re fo rm s  a n d  th e  m a c ro e c o ­
n o m ic  c o n te x t  o n  th e  s u p p ly  o f  f in a n c e  fo r  g ro w th ,  w h ile  th e  f o u r th  lo o k s  a t  
w h o  h a s  h a d  access to  f in a n c e . T h e  f in a l s e c tio n  c o n c lu d e s  w i th  a  d isc u ss io n  o f  
th e  c h a lle n g e s  f a c in g  B ra z il  to d a y  in  th e  a t t e m p t  t o  b r o a d e n  a n d  d e e p e n  th e  
f in a n c ia l  sec to r.
Liberalization, Crisis, and Response
F in a n c ia l  p o lic ie s  in  B raz il in  th e  la te  1 9 8 0 s  a n d  th e  1 9 9 0 s  w e re  m o tiv a te d  b y  
th re e  e v o lv in g  g o a ls . F ro m  1 9 8 8  to  1 9 9 5 , th e y  a im e d  a t  d e re g u la t in g  d o m e s tic  
m a rk e ts  a n d  o p e n in g  th e m  to  fo re ig n  in v es to rs . I n  1 9 9 5 , th e  b a n k s  fa ce d  severe  
d if f ic u ltie s ,  w h ic h  le d  to  a  s e c o n d  r o u n d  o f  c h a n g e s  m o tiv a te d  b y  th e  n e e d  to  
s t r e n g th e n  th e  f in a n c ia l  s e c to r  a n d  p r o m o te  i ts  s ta b ili ty . P o lic ie s  in c lu d e d  th e  
r e s t ru c tu r in g  o f  th e  b a n k in g  sy s te m , f u r th e r  p r iv a t iz a tio n  o f  p u b l ic  b a n k s , a  n e w  
w e lc o m e  fo r  f o re ig n  b a n k s ,  a n d  a  s ig n i f ic a n t  im p r o v e m e n t  o f  r e g u la t io n  a n d  
su p e rv is io n . I n  1 9 9 9 , a  fo re ig n  e x c h a n g e  c ris is  e r u p te d ,  b u t  th e  e a r lie r  re fo rm s  
h e lp e d  th e  c o u n tr y  a v o id  a  tw in  cris is . T h e  g o v e rn m e n t th e n  b e g a n  to  in tro d u c e  
m ic ro e c o n o m ic  re fo rm s , a im e d  a t  in c re a s in g  th e  su p p ly  o f  c re d i t  a n d  o f  c a p ita l  
in  g e n e ra l.
From Liberalization to Severe Banking Problems
T h e  fin a n c ia l  re fo rm s  in  th e  la te  1 9 8 0 s  a n d  e a rly  1 9 9 0 s  w e re  s tro n g ly  m o tiv a te d  
b y  th e  lib e ra l w av e  th a t  p e rm e a te d  p o lic y m a k in g  in  d i f fe re n t  p a r ts  o f  th e  d ev e l­
o p in g  w o r ld ,  p a r t i c u l a r ly  L a t in  A m e r ic a .2 T h e s e  c h a n g e s  w e re  im p le m e n te d  
to g e th e r  w i th  o th e r  p o lic ies , su c h  as th e  lo o se n in g  o f  c a p ita l  c o n tro ls , p r iv a tiz a ­
t io n ,  a n d  m a r k e t  l ib e r a l i z a t io n .  T h e  s im u l ta n e o u s  c h a n g e s  in  th e  m a c r o e c o ­
n o m ic  a n d  re g u la to ry  e n v iro n m e n ts  h a d  im p o r ta n t  c o n se q u e n c e s  fo r  th e  f in a n ­
c ia l s e c to r  th a t  B raz il in h e r i te d  f ro m  th e  1 9 8 0 s .
T h e  1 9 8 0 s  m a c ro e c o n o m ic  e n v iro n m e n t  w as v e ry  d e tr im e n ta l  to  th e  le n d in g  
p ro c e ss , s in c e  h ig h  in f la t io n  a n d  v o la t i le  g r o w th  in c re a s e d  c r e d i t  r is k  s u b s ta n ­
tially . T h is  w as, h o w ev er, a  p e r io d  o f  e x p a n s io n  a n d  c o n c e n tr a t io n  in  th e  b a n k in g  
sec to r, w h ic h  w as b y  fa r  th e  m o s t  p ro f i ta b le  in d u s t r y  in  th e  c o u n t r y  d u r in g  th e  
d e c a d e . T h e  e x p la n a t io n  f o r  th is  p a r a d o x  lie s  in  th e  f a c t  t h a t  B ra z il ia n  b a n k s  
a d a p te d  w ell to  th e  se e m in g ly  ad v erse  m a c ro e c o n o m ic  e n v iro n m e n t .  T h e y  d id  so  
b y  sp e c ia liz in g  in  tre a s u ry  o p e ra t io n s  a n d  e a rn in g  s u b s ta n t ia l  p ro f i ts  f ro m  in f la ­
tio n a ry  g a in s  a sso c ia ted  w ith  th e  in te rm e d ia t io n  o f  th e  p u b l ic  d e b t,  as w as ty p ic a l 
o f  B raz ilian  b a n k s  d u r in g  th e  lo n g  p e r io d  o f  h ig h  in f la t io n  a n d  in d e x a tio n .3
2. On this process in the Latin American region, see Stallings and Peres (2000). On the reforms 
in Brazil, see Baumann (2002); Pinheiro, Bonelli, and Schneider (2004).
3. See Studart and Hermann (2001). The “addiction” to inflationary gains is well explained by 
the OECD (2001, p. 117): “In the inflationary environment, which from the 1950s had become a 
feature of the Brazilian economy, banks were able to collect substantial intermediation margins. At 
the same time, borrowers’ default rates were kept low by the reduction of their repayment obliga-
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B y  1 9 8 8 , th e  s e c to r  w as a lre a d y  d o m in a t e d  b y  la rg e  d e  fa c to  f in a n c ia l  c o n ­
g lo m e ra te s  t h a t  f lo u r is h e d  as a  re su l t  o f  h ig h  in f la t io n . A s a n  o ffic ia l re c o g n itio n  
o f  th e  c o n s o l id a t io n  t r e n d ,  a  b a n k in g  re fo rm  w as im p le m e n te d  a n d  a  u n iv e rsa l 
b a n k in g  sy s te m  w a s  e s ta b l is h e d . T h is  r e fo rm  t r a n s f o r m e d  c o m m e rc ia l  b a n k s ,  
in v e s tm e n t  b a n k s , a n d  f in a n c e  c o m p a n ie s  in to  u n iv e rsa l b a n k s , in s t i tu t io n s  th a t  
c o n t in u e  to  d o m in a te  B ra z il’s f in a n c ia l  sy s te m  to d ay . B a n k  c re d i t  w as n o t  o n ly  
r a t io n e d ,  b u t  a lso  h a d  v e ry  s h o r t  m a tu r i t ie s  a n d  w as v e ry  costly . P o lic y m a k e rs  
n a tu ra lly  a sso c ia te d  su c h  r a t io n in g  w i th  th e  la c k  o f  c o m p e t i t io n .  T h u s ,  th e  early  
re fo rm s  s ig n if ic a n tly  re d u c e d  e n tr y  b a rrie rs , w h ic h  s t im u la te d  a  r a p id  g ro w th  in  
th e  n u m b e r  o f  in s t i tu t io n s .  B e tw ee n  1 9 8 8  a n d  1 9 9 4 , th e  n u m b e r  o f  b a n k s  m o re  
th a n  d o u b le d  f ro m  1 0 6  to  2 4 2 . L e n d in g  e x p a n d e d  in  1 9 9 0 - 9 4 ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  to  
c o n su m e rs  a n d  b u sin esse s. T h e  e x p a n s io n  a c c e le ra te d  in  th e  f ir s t  m o n th s  o f  th e  
Plano Real, as th e  a b r u p t  d e c l in e  o f  i n f la t io n a r y  g a in s  le d  b a n k s  to  s e a rc h  fo r  
n e w  so u rc es  o f  in c o m e .
T h e  1 9 8 8  re fo rm s  in c re a s e d  c o m p e t i t i o n  s u b s ta n t ia l ly ,  w h ic h  in  t u r n  
in c re a s e d  le n d in g ,  b u t  th is  o th e r w is e  p o s i t iv e  r e s u l t  h a d  u n e x p e c te d  p e rv e rse  
c o n se q u e n c e s  fo r  a t  lea s t tw o  reaso n s . F irs t, c o m p e t i t io n  in  th e  b a n k in g  s e c to r  in  
t h e  1 9 9 0 s  w as b a se d  o n  th e  p h y s ic a l e x p a n s io n  o f  th e  b a n k s— t h a t  is, th e  n u m ­
b e r  o f  b ra n c h e s , A T M s , a n d  p e rso n n e l— w h ic h  a llo w e d  th e  b a n k s  g re a te r  access 
to  d e p o s its .  S u c h  d e p o s its ,  in  tu r n ,  c o u ld  b e  a llo c a te d  w i th  s ig n if ic a n t  p ro f i ts  to  
th e  r e f in a n c in g  o f  th e  la rg e  p u b l ic  d e b t  a n d  o th e r  s h o r t - t e r m  o p e ra t io n s .  T h e  
b a n k s  th u s  h a d  h ig h  fix ed  c o s ts  w h e n  th e i r  in f la t io n  g a in s  fe ll d ra m a tic a lly . Sec­
o n d ,  a f te r  l a u n c h in g  th e  Plano Real, th e  m o n e ta r y  a u th o r i t ie s  t r ie d  to  r e s t r ic t  
c re d i t  e x p a n s io n  b y  s e t t in g  v e ry  h ig h  levels o f  re serv e  re q u ire m e n ts .  T h e  c o m b i­
n a t io n  c re a te d  a n  in c re a s in g ly  d a n g e ro u s  m ix  o f  c re d it  e x p a n s io n  a n d  h ig h  le n d ­
in g  r a te s ,  p r o v o k in g  a  r ise  o f  n o n p e r f o r m in g  lo a n s  a n d  a r re a rs .  D u r i n g  th is  
p e r io d ,  s ig n i f ic a n t  s t r u c tu r a l  w e a k n e sse s  in  so m e  m a jo r  p r iv a te  b a n k s  b e c a m e  
a p p a re n t .  S e r io u s  p ro b le m s  o f  g o v e rn a n c e , t ra n s p a re n c y , a n d  r isk  m a n a g e m e n t  
e m e rg e d  a t  B a n co  E c o n o m ic o  a n d  B a n co  N a c io n a l,  fo r  e x a m p le , w h ic h  h a d  p iv ­
o ta l  ro les  in  t r ig g e r in g  g o v e rn m e n t  a c t io n . S o m e  o f  th e se  p ro b le m s  c o u ld  h a v e  
b e e n  s p o t te d  w i th  g o o d  su rv e illa n c e . In d e e d , th e s e  cases c le a r ly  re fle c t th e  p r e ­
v a il in g  lo w  s ta n d a r d s  o f  b a n k in g  s u p e r v is io n  a n d  r e g u la t io n ,  w h ic h  w e re  th e  
m a in  in s p ir a t io n  o f  th e  p o lic y  c h a n g e s  f ro m  1 9 9 5  o n w a rd s .
dons in real terras. The lucrative float, from revenues earned on temporary reinvestment o f low- 
cost liabilities (such as tax receipts, demand deposits, collateral against loans) in highly remuner­
ated short-term securities, led to an explosive expansion in the number o f commercial banks and 
bank branches. Substantial profits were also earned from treasury operations based on arbitrage of 
interest rates and currencies. An additional source of earnings was the significant share o f current 
account balances generated via wage payments or maintained for transaction purposes, which did 
not earn any compensation for inflation. In short, inflation provided multiple sources o f windfall 
gains to the banks. Encouraged by widespread indexation, the public continued to maintain funds 
in the domestic banking system. As a result, in contrast to other countries experiencing high infla­
tion, currency substitution never developed in Brazil.”
P u b lic  b a n k s  fa ce d  a d d it io n a l  p ro b le m s . T h e y  w e re  b y  fa r th e  la rg e s t s u p p l i ­
ers o f  lo an s  in  th e  sy s te m , w ith  a ro u n d  tw o - th ird s  o f  th e  to ta l  in  th e  e a rly  1 9 9 0 s . 
I n  a d d i t io n ,  th e i r  a b il i ty  to  a d ju s t  to  sm a lle r  m a rg in s  w a s  c o n s t r a in e d  b y  th e i r  
h ig h  o p e ra t io n a l  c o s ts  ( in  v iew  o f  th e  jo b  s ta b il i ty  o f  a  s ig n if ic a n t  sh a re  o f  th e ir  
em p lo y e es) a n d  th e i r  l im ite d  c a p a c ity  to  re s t ru c tu re  th e ir  p o r tfo lio s  (w h ic h  w ere  
d o m in a te d  b y  s ta te  g o v e rn m e n t  d e b t) .  T h e  in te re s t  ra te  h ik es  o f  th e  e a r ly  1 9 9 0 s  
a n d  th e  e x p a n s io n  o f  p r im a r y  d e f ic its  in c re a s e d  s ta te  a n d  m u n ic ip a l  d e b ts  s u b ­
s ta n tia lly  a f te r  1 9 9 2 , a n d  p u b l ic  b a n k s  b e c a m e  th e  m a in  f in a n c ie rs  o f  su c h  d e b ts  
in  B razil.
T h e  M e x ic a n  c ris is  o f  1 9 9 4 —9 5  w as th e  las t s tra w  in  a  p ro c ess  o f  a c c e le ra tin g  
b a n k  p ro b le m s , s in ce  th e  m o n e ta ry  a u th o r i t ie s  re sp o n d e d  to  th e  rev ersa l o f  c a p i­
ta l  flo w s w i th  a n  a d d i t io n a l  in c re a se  in  in te re s t  ra te s  a n d  m o n e ta ry  t ig h te n in g ,  
p a r tic u la r ly  th r o u g h  h ig h  levels o f  reserve  re q u ire m e n ts .  T h is  p o lic y  le d  to  a  fu r ­
th e r  d e te r io ra t io n  o f  th e  p a y m e n t  c a p a c ity  o f  th e  g o v e rn m e n t,  th e  c o rp o ra te  sec­
to r ,  a n d  in d iv id u a l  b o r ro w e rs .  N o n p e r f o r m in g  lo a n s , fo r  e x a m p le ,  ro se  to  17 
p e r c e n t  in  la te  1 9 9 5 .4 T h e  in c re a se  in  b a d  asse ts o f  severa l in s t i tu t io n s  c a u s e d  a 
r ise  in  th e  d e m a n d  fo r  l iq u id i ty  in  th e  b a n k in g  s e c to r  as a  w h o le ,  l e a d in g  to  
s h r in k a g e  in  th e  i n te r b a n k  m a rk e t .  B raz il w as o n  th e  c u sp  o f  a  b a n k in g  c ris is , 
b u t  th a t  c ris is— e sp e c ia lly  th e  d a n g e ro u s  tw in  crises d isc u sse d  in  c h a p te r  2 — w as 
a v e r te d  b y  sw if t  g o v e r n m e n t  a c t io n .  T h is  e x p e r ie n c e  in d ic a te s  t h a t  p o l ic y  
re sp o n se  c a n  m a k e  a d if fe re n c e  in  a v o id in g  th e  c o s tly  c rises th a t  m a n y  c o u n tr ie s  
h av e  su ffe red .
Response to a Near-Crisis in the Banking Sector
T o  a v e r t  a  fu ll-sca le  b a n k in g  cris is , th e  B ra z ilia n  a u th o r i t ie s  fo llo w e d  s te p s  s im i­
la r  to  th o se  w e  h a v e  a lre a d y  d is c u s se d  in  d e a l in g  w i th  b a n k in g  c rises , b u t  th e y  
to o k  th e m  a t  a  re la tiv e ly  e a r ly  s ta g e . T h e  f ir s t  m e a su re  w a s  d i r e c t  in te r v e n t io n  
th r o u g h  l iq u id a t io n  a n d  th e  p la c in g  o f  b a n k s  u n d e r  n e w  a d m in i s t r a t io n .  T h is  
w as fo llo w e d  b y  th e  r e s t r u c tu r in g  o f  th e  b a n k in g  sy s te m  a n d  th e n  b y  th e  i n t r o ­
d u c t io n  o f  m o re  re s tr ic tiv e  re g u la tio n  a n d  su p e rv is io n .
D u r in g  th e  f i r s t  th r e e  y e a rs  o f  th e  Plano Real, f o r ty  b a n k s ,  o u t  o f  a  to ta l  o f  
2 4 2 ,  w e re  in te r v e n e d  b y  th e  c e n t r a l  b a n k .  O f  th e s e ,  t w e n ty - n in e  w e re  l iq u i ­
d a te d ,  f o u r  fa ile d ,  s ix  w e re  p la c e d  u n d e r  t e m p o r a r y  a d m in i s t r a t i o n ,  a n d  o n e  
c o n t in u e d  to  o p e ra te . T w o  o f  th e  la rg e s t b a n k s  in  B razil, B a n c o  E c o n o m ic o  a n d  
B a n c o  N a c io n a l,  w e re  l iq u id a te d  in  1 9 9 5 , r e q u ir in g  c ash  d is b u r s e m e n ts  b y  th e  
g o v e r n m e n t  o f  $ 5  b i l l io n  a n d  $ 7  b i l l io n ,  re sp e c tiv e ly .5 B a n c o  d o  B ra s il,  th e  
la rg e s t p u b lic  se c to r  b a n k , h a d  to  b e  re c a p ita liz e d  w ith  a lm o s t  $ 8  b i ll io n  in  A p r il  
1 9 9 6 .6
4. Baer and Nazmi (2000, p. 11).
5. All monetary figures cited in this chapter are in U.S. dollars.
6. Central Bank of Brazil website (www.bcb.gov.br).
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R e s tru c tu r in g  w as c a r r ie d  o u t  th r o u g h  tw o  se p a ra te  p ro g ra m s , o n e  fo r  p r iv a te  
b a n k s  (P R O E R )  a n d  o n e  fo r  p u b l ic  b a n k s  (P R O E S ) . P R O E R  w a s in t r o d u c e d  
b y  d e c re e  in  N o v e m b e r  1 9 9 5 . I ts  m a in  g o a ls  w e re  to  p r o t e c t  d e p o s i to r s  w h ile  
h e lp in g  b a n k s  to  c le an  u p  th e ir  b a la n c e  sh e e ts  a n d  re d u c in g  th e  n u m b e r  o f  in s t i ­
tu t io n s .  T h e  k e y  in s t r u m e n t  w as c e n tra l  b a n k  c re d i t  lin e s  to  p ro v id e  l iq u id i ty  to  
t ro u b le d  b a n k s  a n d  h e lp  f in a n c e  m erg e rs  w i th  h e a lth ie r  in s t i tu t io n s .  T h e  b a n k s  
h a d  to  p le d g e  c o lla te ra l  o f  1 2 0  p e rc e n t  o f  a  lo a n ’s v a lu e  a n d  to  o b ta in  p e rm is s io n  
fo r  a n y  p r o p o s e d  m erg e r. A t  th e  sam e  tim e , th e  g o v e rn m e n t  p ro v id e d  in c e n tiv e s  
fo r  h e a l th y  b a n k s  to  a c q u ire  t ro u b le d  in s t i tu t io n s .  T o  a v o id  m o ra l  h a z a rd  p r o b ­
le m s  in  th e  f u tu r e ,  a  c h a n g e  o f  o w n e r s h ip  w a s  in s t i t u t e d ,  a n d  m a n a g e r s  a n d  
s h a re h o ld e rs  o f  i n s t i tu t io n s  t h a t  w e re  s o ld  r e m a in e d  leg a lly  l ia b le  fo r  p re v io u s  
a c t io n s . T h i r ty - tw o  b a n k s  w e n t  th r o u g h  r e s t r u c tu r in g  th a t  re s u l te d  in  m e rg e rs  
a n d  a c q u is it io n s , so m e  o f  th e m  w i th  th e  fe d e ra l g o v e rn m e n t  s u p p o r t  m e n t io n e d  
a b o v e .7
P R O E S , i n t r o d u c e d  in  1 9 9 7 ,  fo c u s e d  o n  r e s t r u c tu r in g  th e  s ta te - o w n e d  
f in a n c ia l  i n s t i t u t io n s ;  fe d e ra lly  o w n e d  b a n k s  w e re  n o t  in c lu d e d .  C r e d i t  l in e s  
w e re  a g a in  p ro v id e d  b y  th e  c e n tra l  b a n k , b u t  m o re  e x p lic it  in c e n tiv e s  w e re  p r o ­
v id e d  to  th e  b a n k  o w n e rs — th e  s ta te  g o v e r n m e n ts — to  re d u c e  th e  n u m b e r  o f  
in s t i tu t io n s .  T h e  c e n tr a l  b a n k  p ro v id e d  1 0 0  p e rc e n t  o f  th e  n e c e ssa ry  f u n d s  fo r  
s ta te s  t h a t  o p t e d  to  l iq u id a te ,  p r iv a t iz e ,  o r  t u r n  th e  b a n k s  i n to  d e v e lo p m e n t  
a g en c ie s ; th o se  t h a t  c h o se  to  k e e p  th e  b a n k s  f u n c t io n in g  re c e iv e d  o n ly  5 0  p e r ­
c e n t .  S in c e  1 9 9 7 ,  t e n  p u b l ic  b a n k s  h a v e  b e e n  p r iv a t iz e d  (se v e n  b y  th e  s ta te s  
th e m se lv e s  a n d  th re e  b y  th e  fe d e ra l g o v e rn m e n t) ,  six  h a v e  b e e n  l iq u id a te d , a n d  
th r e e  h a v e  h a d  t h e i r  o p e r a t in g  a u th o r i z a t io n s  c a n c e lle d .  B e tw e e n  1 9 9 5  a n d  
2 0 0 3 ,  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  p u b l ic  b a n k s  w a s  r e d u c e d  f r o m  t h i r t y - tw o  to  f o u r te e n ,  
w h ile  th e  n u m b e r  o f  b a n k s  w i th  fo re ig n  c o n tr o l  in c re a s e d  f ro m  tw e n ty - o n e  to  
f if ty - th re e .8
T h is  th o r o u g h  r e s t ru c tu r in g  o f  o w n e rsh ip  in  th e  b a n k in g  se c to r  w as  c o m p le ­
m e n te d  b y  re g u la to ry  m e a su re s  in t r o d u c e d  in  la te  1 9 9 5 , w h ic h  w e re  m o tiv a te d  
b y  th e  se a rc h  fo r  g re a te r  f in a n c ia l  s ta b ility . T h e s e  in c lu d e d  th e  e s ta b l is h m e n t o f  
a  d e p o s i t  in s u r a n c e  f u n d ,  in c re a s e d  c a p i ta l  r e q u i r e m e n ts  f o r  s e t t i n g  u p  n e w  
b a n k s ,  a n d  n e w  re g u la t io n s  t h a t  p r o m o te d  a c c o u n ta b i l i ty .  F u r th e r  e f fo r t  w as 
m a d e  to  c o m p ly  w i th  th e  r e c o m m e n d a t io n s  o f  th e  1 9 8 8  B ase l A c c o rd  a n d  its  
1 9 9 5  re v is io n s .  T h i s  le d  to  a n  in c re a s e  in  m in im u m  c a p i ta l  r e q u i r e m e n ts ,  a  
t ig h te n in g  o f  o p e ra t io n a l  l im its ,  a n d  th e  in tr o d u c t io n  o f  c o m p re h e n s iv e  c o n so li­
d a te d  s u p e r v is io n  o f  f in a n c ia l  c o n g lo m e ra te s ,  i n c lu d in g  b r a n c h e s  a n d  s u b ­
s id ia rie s  a b ro a d  a n d  n o n f in a n c ia l  f irm s  l in k e d  to  b a n k  c o n g lo m e ra te s .
7. On PROER, see Baer and Nazmi (2000); McQuerry (2001); Goldfajn, Hennings, and Mori 
(2003).
8. O n PROES, see Baer and Nazmi (2000); Ness (2000b); Goldfajn, Hennings, and Mori 
(2003); Beck, Crivelli, and Summerhill (2005).
W it h  re sp e c t to  su p e rv is io n , p e r h a p s  th e  m o s t  s ig n if ic a n t  o f  th e  n e w  m e a s ­
u re s  w as th e  law  a u th o r iz in g  th e  c e n tra l  b a n k  to  in it ia te  p re v e n ta t iv e  r e s t ru c tu r ­
in g  in  f in a n c ia l in s t i tu t io n s  t h a t  w e re  n o t  m e e t in g  sy s te m  re q u ire m e n ts  o r  w e re  
d e m o n s tr a t in g  f in a n c ia l  p ro b le m s . A n  e a rlie r  v e rs io n  o f  th is  law  a u th o r iz e d  th e  
c e n tra l  b a n k  to  p lac e  b a n k s  u n d e r  o n e  o f  th re e  fo rm s  o f  sp ec ia l re g im e — sp e c ifi­
cally, a  te m p o ra ry  sy s te m  o f  sp e c ia l a d m in is t r a t io n ,  in te rv e n t io n ,  o r  e x tra ju d ic ia l  
l iq u id a tio n — b u t  th e  law  la c k e d  a p re v e n ta tiv e  c h a ra c te r. T h e  n e w  ru le s  e m p o w ­
e re d  th e  c e n tra l  b a n k  to  p re sc r ib e  p re v e n ta tiv e  re m e d ie s  fo r  fa lte r in g  b a n k s  (fo r 
e x a m p le ,  in c re a s e d  c a p i ta l iz a t io n ,  t r a n s f e r  o f  s to c k h o ld e r  c o n t r o l ,  o r  m e rg e rs  
a n d  a c q u is it io n s ) , a n d  c e r ta in  assets o f  fa il in g  b a n k s  c o u ld  b e  c o n fis c a te d .
Response to a Foreign Exchange Crisis
D e s p i te  th e  su c c ess fu l s ta b i l iz a t io n  p ro g ra m  a n d  th e  i m p o r t a n t  c h a n g e s  in  th e  
b a n k in g  sy s te m , B ra z il’s m a c r o e c o n o m ic  d i f f ic u l t ie s  c o n t i n u e d  in  th e  s e c o n d  
h a l f  o f  th e  1 9 9 0 s . I n f la t io n  w as lo w e red  to  s in g le  d ig its  b y  1 9 9 7 , b u t  th e  d e p re ­
c ia t io n  b u i l t  in to  th e  c ra w lin g  p e g  ex ch a n g e  ra te  re g im e  w as in su ff ic ie n t  to  p re ­
v e n t  o v e rv a lu a tio n . M o re o v e r , th e  d e f ic it  p ro b le m  h a d  n o t  b e e n  re so lv e d  fu lly . 
A l th o u g h  p r im a ry  d e f ic its  w e re  sm a ll, th e  p u b l ic  s e c to r  b o r ro w in g  re q u ir e m e n t  
a d d e d  to  a n  a lre a d y  s u b s ta n t ia l  p u b l ic  s e c to r  d e b t .  I n  th e  c o n te x t  o f  th e  A s ia n  
c r is is  o f  1 9 9 7  a n d  th e  R u s s ia n  c r is is  o f  1 9 9 8 , B ra z il’s c u r re n c y  c a m e  u n d e r  
a tta c k . A  n e w  fiscal p a ck a g e  a n d  a  la rg e  IM F  lo a n  in  la te  1 9 9 8  d id  n o t  l im i t  th e  
o u tf lo w s , a n d  th e  c u r re n c y  w as f lo a te d  in  J a n u a ry  1 9 9 9 .
T h e  c ru c ia l p o i n t  fo r  o u r  p u rp o s e s  is t h a t  th e  s t r e n g th e n in g  o f  th e  b a n k in g  
se c to r  in  1 9 9 5 —9 7  m e a n t  t h a t  th e  b a n k s  w ere  n o t  in v o lv e d  to  a n y  g re a t e x te n t  in  
th e  1 9 9 9  fo re ig n  e x c h a n g e  c ris is . T h e i r  in c re a s in g  e ffic ien cy , to g e th e r  w i th  th e  
lo a n  r e tr e n c h m e n t  fo l lo w in g  s ta b il iz a tio n  a n d  th e  d r a w n - o u t  p e r io d  b e fo re  th e  
d e v a lu a t io n  (w h ic h  gave  b o rro w e rs  t im e  to  h e d g e  th e i r  fo re ig n  e x c h a n g e  e x p o ­
su re ) , p ro te c te d  th e  b a n k s  f ro m  th e  fu ll e ffec ts  o f  th e  d e v a lu a t io n . T h a n k s  to  th e  
s t ro n g  b a n k in g  sec to r, th e  g o v e rn m e n t  c o u ld  p u rs u e  a  t ig h t  m o n e ta ry  p o lic y  to  
a v o id  a n  in f la t io n a ry  su rg e  a f te r  th e  d e v a lu a tio n . T h e  la c k  o f  h ig h  in f la t io n , a n d  
th e  $ 4 1  b i ll io n  in te r n a t io n a l  a ss is ta n ce  p a c k a g e  n e g o tia te d  in  la te  1 9 9 8 , h e lp e d  
to  m a in ta in  in v e s to r  a n d  c o n s u m e r  c o n f id e n c e  a n d  so  p re v e n t  a  s te ep  fa ll in  o u t ­
p u t . 9 I n  se v e ra l w a y s , t h e n ,  B ra z il w as  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  C h i le ,  M e x ic o , a n d  th e  
E a s t A s ia n  cases w e  h av e  s tu d ie d . N o n e th e le s s , g ro w th  n e e d e d  to  b e  s t im u la te d ,  
a n d  th e  f in a n c ia l  s e c to r  w as a  k e y  in s t ru m e n t .
F u r th e r  s u p p o r t  th u s  fo llo w e d . I t  in c lu d e d  a  th i r d  g o v e rn m e n t  r e s t r u c tu r in g  
p ro g ra m , th is  o n e  fo r  th e  fe d e ra lly  o w n e d  b a n k s  (P R O E F ) . T h is  p ro c ess  b e g a n  
d e  fa c to  w i th  th e  r e c a p ita l iz a t io n  o f  B a n c o  d o  B ra s il in  1 9 9 6 , a n d  th e  s e c o n d  
p h a s e  in v o lv e d  a n  e s p e c ia l ly  r ig o r o u s  s u p e r v is io n  o f  th e  b a n k s  in  1 9 9 9  a n d  
2 0 0 0 .  T h e  a d d i t io n a l  w e a k n e sse s  u n c o v e re d  le d  to  th e  c r e a t io n  o f  P R O E F  in
9. Gruben and Welch (2001). They make an argument very similar to ours with respect to the 
banks and the 1999 crisis in Brazil.
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J u n e  2 0 0 1  to  in c re a s e  th e  c a p i ta l  a d e q u a c y  o f  f o u r  p u b l ic  b a n k s ,  in c lu d in g  
B a n c o  d o  B rasil a n d  C a ix a  E c o n ò m ic a  F e d e ra l (C E F ) , th e  g o v e rn m e n t  m o r tg a g e  
b a n k . T h e  p r o g r a m  r e s u l te d  in  th re e  m e a su re s : th e  t r a n s f e r  o f  c r e d i t  r isk s  to  a  
sp e c ia l-p u rp o s e  c o m p a n y  (E M G E A ), th e  e x c h a n g e  o f  a sse ts w i th  lo w  l iq u id i ty  
a n d  lo w  r e tu r n  fo r  m o re  l iq u id  in s t r u m e n ts  p a y in g  m a rk e t  in te r e s t  ra te s , a n d  a 
c a p ita l  in c re ase  fo r  th re e  o f  th e  fo u r  b a n k s .10
Beyond the Banking Sector
A lth o u g h  m o s t  a t t e n t i o n  w a s  fo c u s e d  o n  th e  b a n k s ,  th e  c a p i ta l  m a rk e ts  w e re  
a lso  se e n  as a  p o te n t ia l ly  im p o r ta n t  so u rc e  o f  f in a n c e  in  B raz il. In d e e d ,  B ra z il’s 
c a p ita l  m a rk e ts  s ta n d  o u t  a m o n g  e m e rg in g  m a rk e ts  fo r  b o th  th e i r  size a n d  th e ir  
lo n g  h is to ry . T h e  s to c k  m a rk e t  d a te s  b a c k  to  th e  m id - n in e te e n th  c e n tu ry , b u t  i t  
s ta g n a te d  in  th e  y ears o f  h ig h  in f la t io n  a f te r  1 9 3 0 . O n ly  a f te r  th e  m il i ta ry  c o u p  
o f  1 9 6 4  w as in te re s t  re n e w e d , as th e  n e w  g o v e rn m e n t  s o u g h t  to  q u e ll  in f la t io n  
a n d  rev ive th e  m a rk e ts  as a  so u rc e  o f  f in a n c e . W h ile  less w as a c c o m p lish e d  th a n  
p r o p o s e d ,  th e  m a r k e ts  p ic k e d  u p  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  o v e r  th e  e n s u in g  f i f te e n  y e a rs , 
p a r t l y  in  r e s p o n s e  to  th e  in d e x a t io n  s c h e m e  t h a t  a im e d  to  c o u n te r  in f la t io n .  
I m p o r ta n t  leg a l c h a n g e s  in c lu d e d  th e  law  t h a t  c r e a te d  th e  S e c u r it ie s  C o m m is ­
s io n  (C V M , b y  its  P o r tu g u e se  a c ro n y m ) a n d  a n  u p d a t in g  o f  th e  1 9 4 0  c o m p a n y  
law .11
T h r e e  im p o r ta n t  d e v e lo p m e n ts  in  th e  la s t tw o  d e ca d es  fe d  th e  g ro w th  o f  th e  
m a rk e ts . F irs t ,  i n s t i tu t io n a l  in v e s to rs  c a m e  to  p la y  a  s ig n if ic a n t  ro le . A l th o u g h  
B ra z il h a s  n o t  p r iv a t iz e d  i ts  so c ia l  s e c u r i ty  sy s te m , as h a v e  C h i le  a n d  M e x ic o , 
tw o  se ts  o f  fu n d s  t h a t  r e p re s e n t  v o lu n ta r y  p r iv a te  r e t i r e m e n t  s a v in g  a re  q u i te  
l a r g e .12 M o r e  i m p o r t a n t  in  th e  B ra z il ia n  case  a re  m u tu a l  f u n d s ,  w h ic h  w e re  
a b o u t  tw ice  th e  size o f  th e  p e n s io n  fu n d s  as o f  2 0 0 2 . T h e  in s t i tu t io n a l  in v e s to rs  
to g e th e r  a c c o u n te d  fo r  3 5  p e rc e n t  o f  G D P .
A  s e c o n d  e le m e n t  b e h in d  th e  g r o w th  o f  c a p i ta l  m a r k e ts  in v o lv e d  r e c e n t  
a t te m p ts  to  m o d e rn iz e  th e  lega l c o n te x t  in  w h ic h  th e y  o p e ra te .  F u r th e r  rev is io n s  
o f  th e  c o m p a n y  la w  in  1 9 8 9  a n d  1 9 9 7  l im i te d  m in o r i t y  s h a r e h o ld e r  r ig h ts  as 
p a r t  o f  th e  p r iv a t iz a t io n  p ro c ess . I n  2 0 0 1 ,  th e  B ra z ilia n  c o n g re ss  a p p ro v e d  tw o  
k e y  c h a n g e s :  o n e  m a d e  th e  C V M  in d e p e n d e n t  o f  th e  f in a n c e  m in is t r y ,  w i th  
b o a r d  m e m b e rs  s e rv in g  f ix e d  te rm s ;  th e  s e c o n d  re v is e d  th e  c o m p a n y  la w  y e t  
a g a in  to  re s to re  th e  r ig h ts  o f  m in o r i ty  sh a re h o ld e rs  to  rece ive  a t  lea s t 8 0  p e rc e n t  
o f  th e  v a lu e  p e r  sh a re  rece iv ed  b y  c o n tro l l in g  in te re s ts  in  th e  e v e n t  o f  a n  o u ts id e  
ta k e o v e r . M o re  g en era lly , B ra z il h a s  w i tn e s s e d  a n  o n - a n d - o f f  b a t t le  to  im p ro v e
10. According to Goldfajn, Hennings, and Mori (2003, p. 16), PROEF added $4 billion to the 
treasury debt, and $20 billion in bonds were issued. They estimate total costs for the three bank 
restructuring programs to be 8—9 percent o f GDP, substantially less than in the twin crisis coun­
tries (see chapter 2 in this volume).
11. O n the history o f the capital markets, see Welch (1993).
12. The two sets are closed company funds and open private funds, which anyone can join. 
Both are managed by private firms; the assets o f the former are many times the size o f the latter.
c o rp o ra te  g o v e rn a n c e  p ro c e d u re s . A  p o te n t ia l ly  im p o r ta n t  a c h ie v e m e n t w as th e  
fo u n d in g  o f  th e  so -c a lle d  N e w  M a rk e t  (Novo Mercado in  P o r tu g u e se ) , a  se c tio n  
o f  th e  S ao  P a u lo  S to c k  E x c h a n g e  (B ovespa) t h a t  is o p e n  o n ly  to  c o m p a n ie s  th a t  
e n fo rc e  in te rn a t io n a l  s ta n d a rd s  o f  g o v e rn a n c e .13
A  th i r d  c h a n g e  t h a t  p r o m o te d  th e  c a p ita l  m a rk e ts  w as B ra z il’s o p e n in g  to  fo r ­
e ig n  p o r t fo l io  in v e s tm e n t.  W h ile  th e  c o u n tr y  h a d  lo n g  b e e n  a  m a jo r  re c ip ie n t  o f  
fo re ig n  d ir e c t  in v e s tm e n t ,  p o r t f o l io  in v e s tm e n t  h a d  b e e n  m o re  r e s t r ic te d .  T h e  
f ir s t  im p o r t a n t  e a s in g  o c c u r r e d  in  1 9 8 7 , w h ic h  a llo w e d  fo re ig n e rs  to  p u rc h a s e  
sh a re s  in  m u tu a l  fu n d s  a d m in is te re d  b y  B raz ilian  f in a n c ia l  in s t i tu t io n s .  I n  1 9 9 1 , 
fo re ig n  in s t i tu t io n a l  in v e s to rs  w e re  p e r m i t te d  to  a d m in is te r  th e i r  o w n  p o r tfo lio s  
o f  B ra z il ia n  s e c u r i t ie s .  T h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  c h a n g e  c a m e  s h o r t l y  th e re a f te r ,  
w h e n  B raz ilian  f irm s  w e re  a llo w e d  to  l is t  th e i r  sh a re s  o n  fo re ig n  s to c k  ex ch a n g es  
t h r o u g h  g lo b a l  o r  A m e r ic a n  d e p o s i to r y  re c e ip ts  ( G D R s  a n d  A D R s ) .14 A s d is ­
c u sse d  in  c h a p te r  5 , th is  c h a n g e  ra is e d  a  m a jo r  c o m p e tit iv e  c h a lle n g e  fo r  B raz il’s 
o w n  e q u ity  m a rk e ts .
Changes in Structure
O f  th e  th re e  c o u n tr ie s  s tu d ie d  in  th is  b o o k , B raz il h a s  th e  la rg e s t c a p ita l  m a rk e ts  
in  r e la t io n  to  th e  r e s t  o f  i ts  f in a n c ia l  s e c to r . S to c k  m a r k e t  c a p i t a l iz a t io n  a n d  
b o n d s  o u ts ta n d in g  fa r  ex ceed  c la im s  b y  th e  p r iv a te  a n d  p u b l ic  b a n k s  c o m b in e d , 
as i l lu s tra te d  in  f ig u re  8 -1 . T h is  p a t t e rn  e m e rg e d  in  th e  p o s ts ta b il iz a t io n  p e r io d , 
w h e n  c a p ita l  m a rk e ts  g re w  r a p id ly  w i th  th e  t e r m in a t io n  o f  h y p e r in f la t io n  a n d  
b a n k s  fa ile d  to  k e e p  p a c e  in  t e rm s  o f  c r e d i t  su p p ly . B a n k  a sse ts  te ll a  d i f f e r e n t  
s to ry , h o w e v e r. W i t h i n  th e  L a t in  A m e r ic a n  re g io n , B ra z ilia n  b a n k s  a re  s e c o n d  
o n ly  to  C h ile ’s in  te rm s  o f  asse ts (as a  sh a re  o f  G D P ) ,  b u t  o n ly  a b o u t  o n e - th i r d  
o f  a sse ts  a re  d e p lo y e d  as lo a n s , v e rsu s  tw o - th ir d s  in  C h i le .  A s w e  d isc u ss  la te r, 
th e  tw o  m a in  re a so n s  fo r  th e  lo w  sh a re  o f  lo a n s  a re  b o th  c o n n e c te d  to  th e  fiscal 
d e f ic it  in  B razil. O n  th e  o n e  h a n d ,  th e  g o v e rn m e n t  o ffers la rg e  a m o u n ts  o f  w e ll- 
r e m u n e ra te d  b o n d s  to  f in a n c e  its  d e fic its . T h e s e  a t t r a c t  th e  b a n k s  to  b u y  se c u ri­
t ie s  r a th e r  t h a n  m a k e  lo a n s , t h u s  fe e d in g  c a p ita l  m a r k e t  g ro w th . O n  th e  o th e r  
h a n d ,  th e  d e fic its  a lso  le a d  to  p r ic e  in creases a n d  th e  n e e d  fo r  h ig h  in te re s t  ra tes , 
w h ic h  d isc o u rag e s  lo a n  d e m a n d  b y  h o u se h o ld s  a n d  f irm s .
The Banking Sector
T h e  B ra z ilia n  b a n k in g  s e c to r  u n d e r w e n t  s ig n if ic a n t  t r a n s fo rm a tio n s  in  th e  la s t 
f if te e n  years. S o m e  o f  th e  c h a n g e s  a re  sh o w n  in  ta b le  8 -1 , f ro m  w h ic h  w e  e x tra c t 
th re e  im p o r ta n t  c o n c lu s io n s . F irs t ,  th e  b a n k in g  sy s te m  to d ay , w h e n  m e a su re d  b y  
lo a n s  as a  sh a re  o f  G D P , is v e ry  sm a ll; in  2 0 0 3  th e  f ig u re  w a s  o n ly  a r o u n d  2 5
13. See Armijo and Ness (2002, 2004) on attempts to introduce corporate governance in 
Brazil.
14. Armijo and Ness (2002, 2004).
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F ig u re  8 -1 . Brazil: Composition of Financial Markets, 1990-2003
Percent of GDP
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1993 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Sources: Tables 8-1 and 8-3.
T ab le  8 -1 . Brazil: Loans and Deposits from the Banking System, 1988—2003 
Percent o f G D P
Year
All banks Private banks Public banks
Total loan/ Loans to private sector Deposits Total loan/ Total loanl
1988 33.0 23.6 11.4 11.4 21.6
1989 29.1 21.1 16.1 9.4 19.7
1990 22.6 16.1 12.8 7.5 15.0
1991 24.7 17.8 13.1 8.8 16.0
1992 26.4 20.0 17.9 9.6 16.8
1993 28.3 21.9 21.5 10.8 17.5
1994 32.6 26.6 23.3 13.9 18.7
1995 35.9 30.6 24.0 15.9 20.1
1996 32.8 27.3 23.6 14.5 18.3
1997 31.5 25.7 24.3 13.9 17.6
1998 29.1 26.4 26.8 13.6 15.5
1999 28.1 25.9 27.3 13.5 14.6
2000 27.2 25.9 25.5 13.9 13.3
2001 27.4 26.5 25.2 17.1 10.3
2002 26.0 25.2 25.9 16.5 9.5
2003 24.5 23.6 26.1 14.8 9.8
Sources: Central Bank of Brazil website (www.bcb.gov.br/?timeseriesen) for loans; World Bank website 
(siteresources.worIdbank.org/DEC/DEC%20Data%20and%20Statistics/20487517/FinStructure_Data- 
base_60_03.xls) for deposits.
a. Loans to public and private sector.
p e rc e n t.  W h ile  th e  lo a n  ra tio  h a s  fa lle n  s o m e w h a t s in c e  1 9 8 8 , i t  w as o n ly  a b o u t  
te n  p e rc e n ta g e  p o in ts  h ig h e r  a t  its  p e a k  d u r in g  th is  p e r io d . A s n o te d  a b o v e , th e  
s e c to r  a p p e a rs  m u c h  la rg e r  w h e n  m e a s u re d  b y  asse ts. B a n k  a sse ts  a re  c u r re n t ly  
a b o u t  9 0  p e r c e n t  o f  G D P . D e p o s i t s  a lso  g re w  in  th e  1 9 8 8 —9 5  p e r io d ;  u n l ik e  
lo a n s , h o w ev er, th e y  in c re a s e d  s l ig h tly  f ro m  th e ir  1 9 9 5  level. I n  2 0 0 3 ,  d e p o s its  
r e p re se n te d  2 6  p e rc e n t  o f  G D P , e x ce ed in g  th e  lo a n  sh a re  b y  a  sm a ll  a m o u n t .
A  s e c o n d  c o n c lu s io n  c o n c e rn s  th e  re la tiv e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  p u b l ic  a n d  p r iv a te  
b a n k s .  B y  p u b l ic  b a n k s ,  w e  a re  r e fe r r in g  h e re  to  th e  tw o  la rg e  fe d e ra lly  o w n e d  
c o m m e rc ia l  b a n k s  (B a n c o  d o  B ra s il a n d  C a ix a  E c o n o m ic a  F e d e ra l) ,  as w e ll as 
th e  N a t io n a l  B a n k  fo r  E c o n o m ic  a n d  S o c ia l D e v e lo p m e n t  ( B N D E S )  a n d  th e  
r e m a in in g  s ta te - o w n e d  b a n k s .  T h e  p u b l ic  b a n k s  t r a d i t io n a l ly  d o m in a t e d  th e  
f in a n c ia l  sy s te m  in  B razil, b u t  in  2 0 0 0  p r iv a te  b a n k s  ( in c lu d in g  fo re ig n  in s t i tu ­
t io n s )  o v e r to o k  th e i r  rivals in  te rm s  o f  lo a n s  b y  a  s ig n if ic a n t  a m o u n t .  T h e  th ir d  
p o i n t  h a s  to  d o  w i th  lo a n  r e c ip ie n ts .  W h i l e  th e  p r iv a te  s e c to r  re c e iv e d  th e  
m a jo r i ty  o f  lo a n s  th r o u g h o u t  th e  p e r io d ,  its  sh a re  in c re a s e d  s ig n if ic a n tly  in  th e  
la s t  y ea rs  o f  th e  s a m p le  p e r io d .  I n  1 9 9 5 , fo r  e x a m p le , p r iv a te  s e c to r  b o rro w e rs  
a c c o u n te d  fo r  85  p e r c e n t  o f  to ta l  lo an s ; th e i r  sh a re  ro se  to  9 6  p e rc e n t  in  2 0 0 3 .  
T h e  p r iv a t iz a tio n  p ro c ess , b o th  o f  th e  b a n k s  th em se lv es  a n d  o f  th e  n o n f in a n c ia l  
sec to r, p ro fo u n d ly  a f fe c te d  t re n d s  a m o n g  le n d e rs  a n d  b o rro w e rs  a like .
T ab le  8 -2  p ro v id e s  a d d it io n a l  in fo r m a t io n  o n  c h an g e s  a m o n g  p u b l ic  a n d  p r i ­
v a te  b a n k s . T w o  m a jo r  sh if ts  o c c u r re d  in  o w n e rs h ip  o f  c a p ita l .  F irs t ,  w h ile  th e  
to ta l  n u m b e r  o f  b a n k s  fe ll f ro m  2 4 2  to  1 6 4  b e tw e e n  1 9 9 5  a n d  2 0 0 3 ,  th e  n u m ­
b e r  o f  p u b l ic  b a n k s  s h r a n k  m o re  t h a n  p r o p o r t io n a l ly ,  as s o m e  w e re  p r iv a t iz e d  
a n d  o th e rs  w e re  c lo se d . T h e  c h a n g e  in  o w n e rsh ip  a lso  a f fe c te d  th e  d is t r ib u t io n  
o f  d e p o s its  h e ld  a n d  lo a n s  a d v a n c e d  b y  th e  b a n k in g  sec to r. W i th  th e  N o v e m b e r  
2 0 0 0  sale o f  B a n esp a , th e  b a n k  o w n e d  b y  th e  s ta te  o f  S ao  P a u lo , th e  p u b l ic  sh a re  
o f  lo a n s  a n d  d e p o s i ts  fe ll b e lo w  5 0  p e r c e n t  f o r  th e  f i r s t  t im e  in  th e  p o s tw a r  
p e r io d .
S e c o n d , a m o n g  p r iv a te  b a n k s ,  f o r e ig n - c o n tr o l l e d  in s t i t u t io n s  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  
in c re a s e d  th e i r  access to  b o th  lo a n s  a n d  d e p o s its .  E u r o p e a n  b a n k s  (p a r t ic u la r ly  
th o s e  f r o m  S p a in )  w e re  th e  la rg e s t  b u y e rs  o f  d o m e s t ic  b a n k s  in  B ra z il  in  th e  
1 9 9 0 s . T h e y  a im e d  a t  e x p a n d in g  th e i r  m a rk e t  sh a re  to  o b ta in  th e  e c o n o m ie s  o f  
sca le  re q u ire d  to  c o m p e te  a t  th e  in te rn a t io n a l  level. T h is  w as th e  case o f  S p a in ’s 
S a n ta n d e r ,  w h ic h  a c q u i r e d  p r iv a te  d o m e s t ic  b a n k s  s u c h  as N o r o e s te ,  B o z a n o  
S im o n s e n ,  M e r id io n a l ,  a n d ,  m o r e  re c e n tly , B a n e s p a , o n e  o f  th e  la rg e s t  o f  t h e  
fo rm e r ly  g o v e rn m e n t-o w n e d  b a n k s . S p a in ’s o th e r  m a jo r  b a n k , B B V A , a c q u ire d  
E x c e l-E c o n o m ic o ; th e  D u tc h  A B N -A m ro  b o u g h t  B a n co  R eal a n d  B a n ep e , a  fo r ­
m e r  g o v e rn m e n t  b a n k ; a n d  tw o  P o rtu g u e se  b a n k s  a c q u ire d  B a n co  B a n d e ira n te s  
a n d  B a n co  B o a v is ta .15 T h e  U .S . b a n k s  th a t  a lre a d y  p a r t ic ip a te d  in  th e  re ta il m a r ­
k e t  (n a m e ly , C i t i b a n k ,  J .  P. M o r g a n ,  B a n k B o s to n ,  a n d  C h a s e  M a n h a t t a n )
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T ab le  8 -2 . Brazil: Characteristics of the Banking System, 1995—2003 
Percent
Indicator and year Public banks Private banks Foreign banks Total
Number of institutions 
1995 32 172 38 242
1998 22 123 59 204
2000 17 105 70 192
2003 14 88 62 164
Assets (percent) 
1995 52.3 39.3 8.4 100.0
1998 46.0 35.5 18.5 100.0
2000 36.9 35.5 27.6 100.0
2003 37.7 41.4 21.0 100.0
Deposits (percent) 
1995 58.1 36.5 5.4 100.0
1998 51.5 33.3 15.2 100.0
2000 44.4 34.3 21.4 100.0
2003 43.2 38.9 17.9 100.0
Loans (percent) 
1995 62.3 31.9 5.7 100.0
1998 53.7 31.3 15.0 100.0
2000 39.6 35.0 25.5 100.0
2003 33.4 42.3 24.3 100.0
Source: Central Bank of Brazil website (www.bcb.gov.br/itimeseriesen).
a d o p te d  th e  s t r a te g y  o f  s t r e n g th e n in g  th e i r  ro le  as n ic h e  b a n k s  b y  a c q u i r in g  
in v e s tm e n t  b a n k s  a n d  se c u ritie s  b ro k e rs .
T h e  sh a re  o f  p u b l ic  b a n k s  in  assets, d e p o s its ,  a n d  lo an s  w as re d u c e d , b u t  th e y  
c o n tin u e  to  o c c u p y  a  c e n tra l  ro le  in  th e  f in a n c in g  o f  in v e s tm e n t  a n d  g ro w th  in  
t h e  e c o n o m y . T h e  la rg e s t b a n k  c o n t in u e s  to  b e  th e  fe d e ra lly  o w n e d  B a n c o  d o  
B ras il (w i th  o v e r  1 6  p e r c e n t  o f  to ta l  a sse ts o f  th e  sy s te m ) , w h ic h  is c u r r e n t ly  a  
c o n g lo m e ra te  w i th  a  v a s t  n u m b e r  o f  sp e c ia liz e d  in te r m e d ia r ie s .  T h e  s e c o n d  
la rg e s t is th e  p u b l ic  m o r tg a g e  b a n k , C a ix a  E c o n o m ic a  F e d e ra l (w ith  o v e r 10  p e r ­
c e n t  o f  to ta l  a sse ts). B N D E S  is n o t  a  d e p o s i t- ta k in g  in s t i tu t io n ,  b u t  i t  is b y  fa r 
t h e  m a in  p r o v id e r  o f  in v e s tm e n t  f in a n c e  in  th e  c o u n try .  T h e s e  th r e e  p u b l ic  
f in a n c ia l in s t i tu t io n s  a lo n e  re p re se n t  3 8  p e rc e n t  o f  th e  to ta l  asse ts o f  th e  c o n so li­
d a te d  b a n k in g  sy s te m . I n  t e r m s  o f  size  a m o n g  c o m m e rc ia l  b a n k s ,  B a n c o  d o  
B rasil a n d  C E F  are  fo llo w e d  b y  th re e  la rg e  d o m e s tic a l ly  o w n e d  b a n k s  (B rad esco , 
I ta u ,  a n d  U n ib a n c o ) ;  th e  la rg e s t fo re ig n -o w n e d  b a n k  (S a n ta n d e r  B a n esp a ) ra n k s  
s ix th .16
T h is  s i t u a t io n  r e p re s e n ts  a n  in te r e s t in g  p u z z le .  D e s p i te  th e  s ig n i f ic a n t  
r e s t ru c tu r in g , in te rn a t io n a l iz a t io n ,  a n d  p r iv a t iz a tio n  o f  B raz il’s b a n k s , th e  la rg es t
16. Calculated from the central bank’s website (www.bcb.gov.br). For a political-economic 
analysis o f Brazil’s federally owned banks, see von Mettenheim (2005).
in s t i tu t io n s  c o n t in u e  to  b e  e i th e r  g o v e rn m e n t-o w n e d  o r  p r iv a te  d o m e s tic  b a n k s . 
T h is  is v e ry  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  th e  s i t u a t io n  in  C h i le  a n d  M e x ic o , w h e re  p u b l ic  
b a n k s  h av e  a  m u c h  lo w e r  p ro f ile  a n d  fo re ig n  b a n k s  a re  m o re  d o m in a n t .  T h e  re a ­
so n  lies in  th e  c o m p e tit iv e  d y n a m ic s  tr ig g e re d  b y  th e  re fo rm s . T h e  ra p id  e x p a n ­
s io n  o f  fo re ig n  b a n k s  fo rc e d  th e  la rg e  p r iv a te  b a n k s  to  p la y  a n  a c tiv e  ro le  in  th e  
p r iv a t iz a t io n  p ro c e ss  f r o m  1 9 9 8  o n  a n d  to  in c re a se  th e i r  c o m p e t i t iv e  p o s i t io n  
v is -à -v is  U .S . a n d  E u r o p e a n  b a n k s  in  th e  s e c u r i t ie s  m a r k e ts .  T h e i r  size  a n d  
s t r e n g th  a llo w e d  th e m  to  c o m p e te  in  w a y s  t h a t  C h i le a n  a n d  M e x ic a n  b a n k s  
c o u ld  n o t .
T h e  in c re a s e d  c o m p e t i t io n  a n d  d if f e r e n tia te d  s tra te g ie s  a re  tw o  o f  th e  m a in  
d e te r m in a n ts  o f  th e  r e c e n t  re su lts  o n  th e  e ffic ie n c y  o f  B ra z il’s b a n k in g  sy s te m . 
Several in d ic a to rs  sh o w  th a t  e ffic ie n c y  in c re a se d  a f te r  th e  su ccess fu l s ta b il iz a tio n  
p ro g ra m . F o r  in s ta n c e , th e  ra tio s  o f  assets p e r  b ra n c h  a n d  o f  asse ts p e r  e m p lo y e e  
b o th  ro se  as b ra n c h e s  w e re  c lo sed  in  th e  re s t ru c tu r in g  p ro c ess . L ik ew ise , o p e ra t­
in g  c o s ts  as a  s h a re  o f  n e t  in c o m e  fe ll fo r  th e  b a n k in g  s y s te m  as a  w h o le ,  
a l th o u g h  th e  p r iv a te  b a n k s  (p a r t ic u la r ly  th e  p r iv a te  d o m e s tic  b a n k s )  m a d e  th e  
g re a te s t  s t r id e s .17 T h e  in c re a s e  in  m ic r o e c o n o m ic  e ffic ie n c y , h o w e v e r , d id  n o t  
in c re a se  c re d i t  o r  lo w e r  in te r e s t  ra te s ; t h a t  is, m ic ro -  a n d  m a c r o e c o n o m ic  e ffi­
c ie n c y  c a n  m o v e  in  d if fe re n t  d ir e c t io n s .18
Capital Markets
C a p ita l  m a rk e ts  a re  m u c h  m o re  f ra g ile  i n s t i t u t io n s  th a n  b a n k s .  A  s u s ta in a b le  
e x p a n s io n  a n d  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  c a p i ta l  m a r k e ts  r e q u ir e s  a t  le a s t  f o u r  m a in  
m a c ro e c o n o m ic  a n d  in s t i tu t io n a l  c o n d it io n s :  re la tiv e  p r ic e  s ta b il i ty  to  s t im u la te  
lo n g - te r m  h o ld in g  o f  a sse ts a n d  th e  is su in g  o f  se c u rit ie s ;  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  lo n g ­
te r m  sa v e rs  in  th e  f o r m  o f  b o th  in d iv id u a l  a n d ,  p a r t ic u la r ly ,  i n s t i t u t io n a l  
in v es to rs ; l iq u id i ty  o f  s e c o n d a ry  m a rk e ts , w h ic h  re q u ire s  th e  e x is te n ce  o f  a  larg e  
n u m b e r  o f  m a rk e t  m a k e rs  o r  sp e c u la to rs ;  a n d  th e  p r o te c t io n  o f  p r o p e r ty  r ig h ts , 
in  th is  case  s h a re h o ld e r  r ig h ts . S o m e  o f  th e se  fe a tu re s  w e re  in  p la c e  in  B raz il in  
th e  e a r ly  1990s. P r ic e  s ta b il i ty  w as a c h ie v e d  a f te r  1 9 9 4 , a n d  g ro w th  ra te s  w e re  
p o s i t iv e .  F in a n c ia l  o p e n in g  s t im u la te d  in te r e s t  in  B ra z il’s c a p i ta l  m a rk e ts — in  
p a r t ic u la r ,  th e  s to c k  m a rk e ts — a n d  th e  n u m b e r  o f  in v e s tm e n t  f u n d s  in c re a s e d  
s ig n if ic a n tly . T h u s ,  th e  asse ts u n d e r  th e  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  in s t i tu t io n a l  in v e s to rs , 
e sp e c ia lly  th e  p e n s io n  a n d  m u tu a l  fu n d s ,  ro se  su b s ta n tia lly , as d id  th e  l iq u id i ty  
in  th e  s e c o n d a ry  m a rk e ts .
In  m o s t  cases, th e  e x p a n s io n  o f  p r im a ry  m a rk e ts  ( th e  so u rc e  o f  n e w  f in a n c e )  
fo llo w s  a  s u s ta in e d  e x p a n s io n  o f  s e c o n d a r y  m a rk e ts .  S e c o n d a r y  m a r k e ts  d id  
g ro w  s ig n if ic a n tly  u n t i l  1 9 9 8 , a n d  th is  g ro w th  s t im u la te d  a n  in c re a se  in  th e  size
17. Calculated from “Latin Banking Guide and Directory,” Latin Finance, August issues 
(1997-2003).
18. Carvalho, Studart, and Alves (2002). Belaisch (2003) provides a more pessimistic view of 
the efficiency of Brazilian banks.
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T ab le  8 -3 . Brazil: Stock and Bond Markets, 1992—2003 
Percent o f  G D P
Year Stock market Bondi1 Government Corporate Total
1992 11.6 4.5 1.9 2.6 16.0
1993 22.7 17.7 13.2 4.4 40.4
1994 34.7 31.7 18.6 13.1 66.4
1995 21.0 32.8 21.3 11.5 53.8
1996 28.0 38.3 28.1 10.2 66.3
1997 31.6 42.6 32.7 9.9 74.3
1998 20.4 49.6 36.3 13.3 70.0
1999 43.1 55.6 45.1 10.5 98.7
2000 37.6 49.6 41.3 8.2 87.1
2001 36.6 61.3 51.5 9.9 97.9
2002 26.9 45.9 37.0 8.9 72.8
2003 47.6 61.0 50.1 10.8 108.6
Sources: Standard and Poor's (2000, 2005) for stock market; BIS website (www.bis.org/statistics/ 
qcsv/anxl6a.csv) for total and government bonds, (www.bis.org/statistics/qcsv/anxl6b.csv) for corporate 
bonds.
a. Market capitalization.
b. Public and private bonds outstanding.
c. Corporate and financial sector bonds outstanding.
o f  th e  p r im a r y  m a rk e ts .  F ro m  th e  1 9 9 8  R u ss ia n  c ris is  th r o u g h  2 0 0 2 ,  h o w ev er, 
th e  t r e n d  w as re v e rse d . A l th o u g h  th e  c a p i ta l iz a t io n  o f  th e  s to c k  m a rk e t  re c o v ­
e re d  in  1 9 9 9 , th e  issu es a n d  e v en  th e  n u m b e r  o f  l is te d  c o m p a n ie s  fe ll, as la rg e  
f irm s , in c lu d in g  so m e  o f  th e  n e w ly  p r iv a t iz e d  o n e s , b e g a n  to  issu e  a b ro a d . T h e  
v o la t i le  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  th e  s e c o n d a r y  m a r k e ts ,  in  t u r n ,  w as  o n e  o f  th e  k e y  
d e te r m in a n ts  o f  t h e  s h r in k in g  n u m b e r  o f  l is te d  c o m p a n ie s  in  d o m e s t ic  s to c k  
m a rk e ts .
T a b le  8 -3  p ro v id e s  d a ta  o n  th e  size  o f  th e  s to c k  a n d  b o n d  m a rk e ts  b e tw e e n  
1 9 9 2  a n d  2 0 0 3 .  I n  s h a r p  c o n t r a s t  to  th e  b a n k in g  s e c to r , b o t h  e q u i t ie s  a n d  
b o n d s  g re w  tre m e n d o u s ly  s ta r t in g  in  th e  e a r ly  1 9 9 0 s , a l th o u g h  th e y  c o n tr a c te d  
in  1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 2 .  S to c k  m a rk e t  c a p ita l iz a tio n  q u a d r u p le d  in  n o m in a l  d o lla r  te rm s  
in  th e  e le v en  y e a rs  a f te r  1 9 9 2 , w h i le  b o n d s  o u t s t a n d in g  g re w  e v e n  fa s te r— a n  
im p re ss iv e  th ir te e n f o ld  in c rease  in  th e  sam e  p e r io d . T h e  tw o  m a rk e ts  n o w  re p re ­
s e n t  4 8  p e rc e n t  a n d  61  p e rc e n t  o f  G D P , resp ec tive ly , v e rsu s o n ly  2 5  p e rc e n t  fo r  
b a n k  c la im s . T h e  s t r o n g  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  b o n d s ,  h o w e v e r , w a s  c o n c e n t r a te d  
m a in ly  o n  g o v e rn m e n t  se c u rit ie s  is su e d  to  f in a n c e  la rg e  d e f ic its .  I n  1 9 9 2 , g o v ­
e r n m e n t  s e c u r i t ie s  a c c o u n te d  fo r  4 2  p e r c e n t  o f  th e  to ta l ,  b u t  th e  s h a re  h a d  
re a c h e d  8 2  p e rc e n t  b y  2 0 0 3 . T h is  p a t t e rn  is r e m in is c e n t  o f  M e x ic o , b u t  su b s ta n ­
tia lly  d if fe re n t  f ro m  C h ile , w h e re  g o v e rn m e n t  su rp lu se s  le f t sp a c e  fo r  th e  p r iv a te  
s e c to r  to  ra ise  m o n e y  f ro m  b o th  b a n k s  a n d  th e  b o n d  m a rk e ts .
T ab le  8 -4  h ig h lig h ts  o th e r  c h a ra c te ris tic s  o f  th e  tw o  m a rk e ts . T h e  n u m b e r  o f  
l is te d  f irm s  o n  th e  B ra z ilia n  s to c k  e x c h a n g e  fo l lo w e d  p a t t e rn s  s im ila r  to  th o se
Table 8-4. Brazil: Characteristics o f  Stock and Bond Markets, 1995—2 0 0 3
Year

















1995 543 31 2.1 147.6 47.9 93 7.5 81.2
1996 551 24 9.2 217.0 61.1 99 8.3 78.0
1997 536 23 3.7 255.5 85.5 57 7.0 75.8
1998 527 20 3.5 160.9 71.0 62 8.4 102.1
1999 478 10 1.5 228.0 53.0 38 3.6 53.1
2000 459 6 0.7 226.2 43.5 42 4.8 46.2
2001 428 6 0.6 186.2 34.5 41 6.6 47.3
2002 399 4 0.4 123.8 32.0 25 4.7 39.5
2003 367 2 0.2 234.6 32.4 17 1.8 50.6
Sources: Standard and Poor's (2000, 2005) for number of listed firms, market capitalization, and turnover ratio; CVM website (www.cvm.gov.br) for new issues; BIS website 
(www.bis.org/ statistics/qcsv/anx!6b.csv) for bonds outstanding.
a. Billions of dollars.
b. Volume traded divided by market capitalization (percent).
c. Corporate bonds only.
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id e n tif ie d  p rev io u sly . D e lis tin g s  su b s ta n tia l ly  e x ce ed e d  n e w  e n tr a n ts ,  so  t h a t  th e  
n u m b e r  o f  lis te d  f irm s  fe ll sh a rp ly  f ro m  5 4 3  in  1 9 9 5  to  o n ly  3 6 7  in  2 0 0 3 .  S o m e  
o f  th is  w a s  d u e  to  t h e  n e w  la w  g r a n t in g  f i rm s  p e r m is s io n  to  l is t  a b r o a d ,  b u t  
m o s t  w as  p ro b a b ly  th e  r e su lt  o f  h a r d  t im e s  in  th e  e c o n o m y . A t  th e  s a m e  tim e , 
m a r k e t  c a p i ta l iz a t io n  ro se  f ro m  $ 1 4 8  b i l l io n  in  1 9 9 5  to  $ 2 3 5  b i l l io n  in  2 0 0 3 ,  
m a k in g  B o v esp a  th e  tw e n tie th  la rg e s t s to c k  e x c h a n g e  in  th e  w o r ld  a n d  th e  sev­
e n th  la rg e s t  a m o n g  e m e r g in g  m a r k e t  e c o n o m ie s .19 T h e  tu r n o v e r  r a t io — th e  
u su a l m e a su re  o f  l iq u id i ty  in  th e  m a rk e ts — f lu c tu a te d  g re a t ly  b u t  g e n e ra lly  fe ll 
a f te r  th e  la te  19 9 0 s . A s in  th e  re s t  o f  L a tin  A m e ric a , th e  B ra z ilia n  tu r n o v e r  ra tio  
w as lo w  in  c o m p a r is o n  w ith  o th e r  re g io n s  o f  th e  w o rld .
M a r k e t  c a p i t a l iz a t io n  a n d  b o n d s  o u t s t a n d in g  a re  th e  r e s u l t  o f  c u m u la t iv e  
c h a n g e s  o v e r  t im e .  M a r k e t  c a p i t a l iz a t io n  is a  c o m b in a t io n  o f  n e w  issu e s  a n d  
p r ic e  c h a n g e s ;  th e  l a t t e r  w e re  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  m o re  i m p o r t a n t  t h a n  th e  fo rm e r .  
N e w  issu e s  w e re  q u i te  r o b u s t  i n  th e  m id - 1 9 9 0 s ,  a v e ra g in g  $ 4 .6  b i l l io n  a n d  
tw e n ty -f iv e  n e w  issu es a  y e a r  b e tw e e n  1 9 9 5  a n d  1 9 9 8 , b u t  th e y  fe ll th e re a f te r . 
T h e  p ic tu re  fo r  b o n d s  w a s  q u i te  s im ila r, as b o th  th e  n u m b e r  a n d  v o lu m e  o f  n e w  
issues fe ll b e tw e e n  1 9 9 5 —9 8  a n d  1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 3 .20 T h e  B o v esp a’s p r ic e  rise  in  2 0 0 3  
a n d  th e  n a t io n a l  a n d  in te r n a t io n a l  fa c to rs  b e h in d  i t ,  h o w e v e r , a p p e a r  to  h a v e  
s t im u la te d  n e w  issu es, as th e  2 0 0 4  p e r fo r m a n c e  in  b o th  m a rk e ts  sh o w e d  s u b ­
s ta n tia l  recovery .21
O n e  o f  th e  m a in  fa c to rs  in  s t im u la t in g  th e  c a p ita l  m a rk e ts  is th e  g ro w th  o f  
in s t i tu t io n a l  in v es to rs , as i l lu s tra te d  b y  th e  cases o f  C h ile  a n d , in creas in g ly , M e x ­
ico . B ra z il d if fe rs  f ro m  th e  o th e r  tw o  c o u n tr ie s  in  t h a t  i t  h a s  n o t  p r iv a t iz e d  its  
so c ia l s e c u ri ty  sy s te m . N o n e th e le s s ,  i t  d o e s  h a v e  c o m p le m e n ta r y  p e n s io n  fu n d s  
t h a t  h a v e  a c c u m u la te d  a  fa ir ly  la rg e  v o lu m e  o f  asse ts , a n d  th e se  h a v e  p la y e d  a n  
i m p o r t a n t  ro le  in  th e  c a p i ta l  m a r k e ts  in  r e c e n t  y e a rs . M u tu a l  f u n d s  a re  e v e n  
m o re  im p o r t a n t  t h a n  p e n s io n  fu n d s  in  B razil. T h e  e s tim a te s  p re s e n te d  in  ta b le  
8 -5  in d ic a te  t h a t  th e s e  in s t i tu t io n a l  fu n d s  e x c e e d e d  3 5  p e r c e n t  o f  G D P  ($ 1 6 0  
b ill io n )  b y  2 0 0 2 .  M u tu a l  fu n d s  a c c o u n te d  fo r  6 2  p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  to ta l ,  p e n s io n  
fu n d s  fo r  3 0  p e rc e n t,  a n d  in su ra n c e  reserves fo r  th e  re m a in d e r .
I n  J u ly  1 9 9 5 ,  B ra z il’s s e c u r i t ie s  c o m m is s io n  in t r o d u c e d  se v e ra l r e g u la to r y  
c h a n g e s  r e la te d  to  m u tu a l  f u n d s ,  e s ta b l i s h in g  h ig h  re se rv e  r e q u i r e m e n ts  fo r  
s h o r t - t e r m  a sse t h o ld in g s  a n d  s t im u la t in g  lo n g e r - te r m  o p e r a t io n s  w i th  lo w  o r  
n o  re se rv e  re q u ir e m e n ts .  A t th e  sa m e  t im e ,  f ix e d - in c o m e  f in a n c ia l  in v e s tm e n t  
f u n d s  w e re  c r e a te d  u n d e r  f o u r  d i s t in c t  m a tu r i ty  s t r u c tu r e s — th r e e  w i th  m in i ­
m u m  te rm s  o f  th ir ty ,  six ty , a n d  n in e ty  d ay s  a n d  o n e  w i th  n o  m in im u m  te rm . 
T h e  r e c e n t  e x p a n s io n  o f  th e s e  m u tu a l  f u n d s  w a s  e x tr a o rd in a ry :  t h e i r  s h a re  o f  
t o ta l  i n s t i t u t io n a l  in v e s to rs ’ a sse ts  w a s  o n ly  5 p e r c e n t  in  1 9 9 0 , b u t  i t  s te a d i ly
19. Standard and Poor’s (2005). Emerging market economies with larger stock exchanges 
include China, Hong Kong, India, Korea, South Africa, and Taiwan.
20. New issues include corporate bonds (debentures) only.
21. There were nine new stock issues in 2004 for a.total o f $2.1 billion and thirty-seven new 
bonds for $3.3 billion; calculated from the CVM website (www.cvm.gov.br).
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T ab le  8 -5 . Brazil: Assets of Institutional Investors, 1980—2002 






1980 0.3 0.6 0.2 1.1
1985 1.7 2.6 0.5 4.8
1990 0.2 2.8 0.0 3.0
1995 11.1 8.4 1.2 20.7
2000 25.2 11.1 2.5 38.8
2002 21.7 10.4 3.0 35.1
Source: Armijo and Ness (2004).
ro se  to  6 2  p e r c e n t  in  2 0 0 2 .  T h e i r  a b i l i ty  to  s u p p o r t  p r iv a te  s e c to r  in v e s tm e n t  
h a s  b e e n  u n d e r m in e d ,  h o w e v e r , b y  th e  s h o r t - t e r m  o r i e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  fu n d s .  
T h e i r  h o ld in g s  o f  p r iv a te  s e c u r i t ie s ,  w h ic h  h a d  r is e n  f r o m  6  p e r c e n t  o f  t h e i r  
to ta l  p o r tfo lio  in  1 9 9 4  to  13  p e rc e n t  in  1 9 9 7 , fe ll to  5 p e rc e n t  in  2 0 0 2 .  I n  c o n ­
tra s t, th e i r  h o ld in g s  o f  fe d e ra l p u b l ic  d e b t  g re w  f ro m  21  to  5 5  p e rc e n t  b e tw e e n  
1 9 9 4  a n d  2 0 0 2  (see ta b le  8 -6 ) .
P r iv a te  p e n s io n  fu n d s  a lso  g re w  s ig n if ic a n tly  in  th e  19 9 0 s . T h e s e  fu n d s  w ere  
fo rm a lly  e s ta b lish e d  in  1 9 7 7 , w h e n  th e  le g is la tio n  a llo w e d  fo r  th e  c o n s t i tu t io n  
o f  c o m p le m e n ta r y  p e n s io n  s c h e m e s .22 T w o  ty p e s  o f  p e n s io n  f u n d s  w e re  t h e n  
leg a lly  d e f in e d :  o p e n  a n d  c lo se d . T h e  o p e n  fu n d s  o p e r a te  as a d m in is t r a to r s  o f  
in d iv id u a l  sav ings, o b ta in in g  fu n d s  th r o u g h  th e  is su a n c e  o f  fu lly  fu n d e d  p e n s io n  
p o lic ie s . C lo se d  p e n s io n  fu n d s  a re  p ro v id e d  b y  c o rp o ra t io n s ,  w h ic h  a d m in is te r  
c o n tr ib u t io n s  m a d e  b y  b o th  e m p lo y e rs  a n d  e m p lo y e e s  in  o r d e r  to  p ro v id e  p e n ­
s io n s  in  a d d i t io n  to  th o se  o f  th e  so c ia l s e c u ri ty  f u n d  ( IN S S ) . S o m e  a re  d e f in e d  
b e n e f i t  fu n d s , w h ile  o th e r s  a re  d e f in e d  c o n tr ib u t io n  fu n d s .
A  s ig n if ic a n t c h a n g e  in  r e g u la tio n  to o k  p la c e  in  1 9 9 4 , w h e n  th e  c e n tra l  b a n k  
e s ta b l is h e d  u p p e r  ( r a th e r  t h a n  lo w e r)  l im its  fo r  th e  a l lo c a t io n  o f  p e n s io n  fu n d  
in v e s tm e n ts . T h e  in te n t io n  b e h in d  th is  re g u la to ry  c h a n g e  w as to  in c re a se  f lex i­
b i l i ty  a n d  e sp e c ia lly  to  s t im u la te  a  s h if t  f ro m  in v e s tm e n ts  in  t r a d i t io n a l  asse ts , 
su c h  as g o v e rn m e n t  b o n d s  a n d  real e s ta te , to w a rd  p r iv a te  sec u ritie s .
B y  th e  e n d  o f  2 0 0 0 ,  p e n s io n  fu n d s  h e ld  asse ts to ta l in g  $ 6 6 .5  b i ll io n ,  w h ic h  
fe ll to  $ 4 8  b i l l io n  in  2 0 0 2 .  I n  a d d i t io n  to  t h e i r  v o lu m e , w h ic h  re p re s e n te d  10  
p e rc e n t  o f  G D P , th e  a llo c a tio n  o f  th e  in v e s tm e n ts  is v e ry  im p o r ta n t .  M o re  in fo r ­
m a t io n  is av a ilab le  fo r  c lo sed  fu n d s  th a n  fo r  o p e n  fu n d s . T h e  c lo sed  fu n d s ’ a llo ­
c a t io n s  to  f ix e d  in c o m e  se c u r i t ie s — m o s t ly  g o v e r n m e n t  b o n d s — ro se  f r o m  16
22. The basic idea behind this regulatory change was to promote a smooth shift from a public 
pay-as-you-go system to a fully funded private pension system. This transition implied that the 
employees who joined the private pension schemes would obtain two pensions when they retired: 
one provided by the public sector (the Instituto Nacional de Seguridade Social, INSS) and one pro­
vided by a private pension fund. On Brazilian pension funds in general, see Studart (2000).
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corporate bonds Other Total
1991 17 21 6 0 56 100
1992 24 17 2 0 57 100
1993 31 47 2 11 10 100
1994 21 43 2 6 29 100
1995 29 26 16 6 23 100
1996 36 12 28 5 19 100
1997 37 12 23 13 15 100
1998 63 7 11 10 9 100
1999 70 6 9 10 5 100
2000 68 5 12 3 11 100
2001 62 7 13 4 13 100
2002 55 6 21 5 14 100
Source: Central Bank of Brazil website (www.bcb.gov.br/Ptimeseriesen).
p e r c e n t  o f  t h e i r  t o ta l  in v e s tm e n ts  in  1 9 9 4  to  5 7  p e r c e n t  in  2 0 0 2 .  E q u i ty  fe ll 
f ro m  3 9  to  2 9  p e r c e n t  in  th e  s a m e  p e r io d ,  a n d  o th e r  i te m s  (su c h  as re a l e s ta te  
a n d  t im e  d e p o s its )  a lso  s h r a n k  c o n s id e ra b ly .  In s u r a n c e  c o m p a n y  re se rv e s  a n d  
o p e n  p e n s io n  f u n d s  w e re  e v e n  m o re  c o n c e n t r a te d  in  g o v e r n m e n t  s e c u r i t ie s .23 
T h e  m a in  re a s o n  fo r  th e s e  c h a n g e s  is th e  d i f fe re n c e  in  r e tu r n  o n  th e s e  a sse ts . 
W h ile  th e  g o v e rn m e n t  p a id  h ig h  in te re s t  ra te s  o n  its  b o n d s ,  r e tu rn s  in  th e  s to c k  
m a rk e t  w e re  m e d io c re , e sp ec ia lly  a f te r  1 9 9 9 .
International Finance
C lo se ly  re la te d  to  d o m e s tic  c a p ita l  m a rk e ts  a re  th e  in te r n a t io n a l  f in a n c ia l  m a r ­
k e ts , w h ic h  in c lu d e  b a n k  lo a n s , b o n d s ,  a n d  eq u ity . A s in  o th e r  c o u n tr ie s ,  m a n y  
o f  th e  s a m e  a c to r s — a  v e ry  sm a ll  p o r t i o n  o f  th e  to ta l  n u m b e r  o f  f i rm s  in  
B razil— h a v e  access to  b o th .  B raz ilian  f irm s  h a v e  t ra d i t io n a lly  b e en  less o p e n  to  
in v o lv e m e n t w i th  th e  in te rn a t io n a l  m a rk e ts  th a n  th e i r  c o u n te rp a r ts  in  C h ile  a n d  
M e x ic o , b u t  t h a t  p a t t e r n  b e g a n  to  c h a n g e  o v e r  th e  p a s t  d e c a d e . T h e  leg a l 
c h a n g e s  m e n t io n e d  e a rlie r , w h ic h  a llo w e d  fo re ig n  in v e s to rs  g re a te r  e n t r y  in to  
B ra z ilia n  m a rk e ts , w e re  a  necessary , b u t  n o t  su ff ic ie n t, c o n d i t io n  fo r  g re a te r  p a r ­
t ic ip a t io n . O th e r  p re re q u is ite s  in c lu d e d  m a c ro e c o n o m ic  s tab ility , b e t te r  in s t i tu ­
t io n s ,  a n d  a b o v e  a ll th e  p o te n t ia l  fo r  h ig h  re tu rn s .
T h e  f o u r  m a in  c h a n n e ls  t h r o u g h  w h ic h  f o re ig n  c a p i ta l  e n te r e d  B ra z il w e re  
b a n k  lo a n s  to  B ra z ilia n  b o rro w e rs  (e ith e r  f ro m  th e  b a n k s ’ h o m e  o ffices o r  f ro m  
lo ca l su b s id ia r ie s ) , th e  p u rc h a se  o f  b o n d  issues f lo a te d  in  fo re ig n  o r  in te rn a t io n a l  
m a rk e ts , th e  p u rc h a se  o f  g lo b a l o r  A m e r ic a n  d e p o s i to ry  re ce ip ts , a n d  in v e s tm e n t
23. OECD (2005, pp. 71-75). Pension funds in Brazil are not allowed to invest abroad.
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T ab le  8 -7 . Brazil: International Finance, 1990—2003 
Percent o f G D P
Year BankI Bondi ADR! Total
1990 12.0 0.1 0.0 12.1
1991 12.0 0.2 0.0 12.2
1992 13.1 1.1 0.0 14.2
1993 12.4 2.2 0.0 14.6
1994 9.2 2.3 0.2 11.7
1995 8.2 2.4 0.2 10.8
1996 8.8 3.5 0.2 12.5
1997 9.4 4.5 0.5 14.4
1998 9.0 5.1 0.5 14.6
1999 12.0
00 0.8 21.2
2000 11.2 9.3 1.2 21.7
2001 13.5 12.4 1.7 27.6
2002 11.5 15.2 2.1 28.8
2003 11.5 17.9 2.0 31.4
Sources: BIS website (www.bis.org/statistics/hcsv/hanx9a_int.csv) for bank loans, (www.bis.org/ 
statistics/qcsv/anxl2a.csv) for bonds; IMF, unpublished data and Global Financial Stability Report (Sep­
tember 2004) for ADRs.
a. Claims outstanding by international banks.
b. Bonds outstanding issued in foreign and international markets.
c. Cumulative ADR emissions since 1991.
in  B ra z il’s s to c k  m a rk e t.  T a b le  8 -7  sh o w s th e  f irs t  th ree ; t im e -se rie s  d a ta  o n  th e  
f o u r th  a re  in su f f ic ie n t  to  in c lu d e  i t  in  th e  tab le .
T h e  ea rlie s t f o rm  o f  e n te r in g  th e  in te rn a t io n a l  m a rk e ts  in  th e  p o s tw a r  p e r io d  
w as  t h r o u g h  s y n d ic a te d  b a n k  lo a n s ,  w h ic h  b e c a m e  im p o r t a n t  in  B ra z il in  th e  
1 9 7 0 s  a n d  e v e n tu a lly  le d  to  th e  d e b t  c risis o f  th e  1 9 8 0 s . I n  th e  p e r io d  b e tw e e n  
1 9 9 0  a n d  2 0 0 3 ,  h o w e v e r , in te r n a t io n a l  b a n k  lo a n s  s ta g n a te d ;  th e y  r e p re s e n te d  
o n ly  1 1 .5  p e rc e n t  o f  G D P  a t  th e  e n d  o f  th e  p e r io d . B o n d s  g re w  m u c h  m o re  r a p ­
idly, b u t  f ro m  a  v e ry  lo w  s ta r tin g  p o in t .  T h e y  su rp a sse d  lo a n s  in  2 0 0 3 ,  a c c o u n t­
in g  fo r  18 p e rc e n t  o f  G D P . T h e  m a jo r i ty  o f  b o n d s  a n d  s o m e  o f  th e  lo a n s  w e re  
issu e d  b y  th e  g o v e rn m e n t,  a g a in  as p a r t  o f  d e f ic it  f in a n c in g  s tra te g ie s . I n  2 0 0 3 ,  
18  p e r c e n t  o f  in te r n a t io n a l  lo a n s  a n d  5 2  p e r c e n t  o f  i n te r n a t io n a l  b o n d s  w e re  
a c c o u n te d  fo r  b y  g o v e r n m e n t  d e b t .24 P r iv a te  a n d  p u b l ic  f i r m s  a lik e  is s u e d  
A D R s ,  w h ic h  a lso  in c re a s e d  in  r e c e n t  y e a rs . T h e  b ig g e s t  s in g le  is s u e r  w as  th e  
s ta te -o w n e d  o il  c o m p a n y , P e tro b ra s , w h ic h  a c c o u n te d  fo r  m o re  th a n  o n e - th i r d  
o f  th e  to ta l .  F o re ig n  in v e s tm e n t  in  th e  s to c k  e x c h a n g e  a v e ra g e d  a b o u t  o n e -  
q u a r te r  o f  to ta l  t r a d in g  in  r e c e n t  y e a rs . I n  2 0 0 3 ,  a  n e t  in f lo w  o f  a p p ro x im a te ly  
$ 2 .5  b i ll io n  w as re c o rd e d , th e  la rg e s t a m o u n t  in  B o vespa’s h is to ry .25
24. Calculated from the BIS website. For international bond issues, see www.bis.org/statistics/ 
qcsv/anxl2.csv; for international bank loans, see www.bis.org/statistics/hcsv/panx9a.csv.
25. Bovespa (2004, p. 19).
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T ab le  8 -8 . Brazil: Finance for the Corporate Sector, 1992—2003 










1992 20.0 2.6 11.6 3.7 n.a. 0.0 37.9
1993 21.9 4.4 22.7 3.9 0.9 0.0 53.8
1994 26.6 13.1 34.7 3.5 0.8 0.2 78.8
1995 30.6 11.5 21.0 3.3 0.7 0.2 67.2
1996 27.3 10.2 28.0 3.7 1.3 0.2 70.8
1997 25.7 9.9 31.6 4.3 1.7 0.5 73.7
1998 26.4 13.3 20.4 4.5 1.7 0.5 66.8
1999 25.9 10.5 43.1 6.5 2.3 0.8 89.0
2000 25.9 8.2 37.6 6.2 2.1 1.2 81.2
2001 26.5 9.9 36.6 8.0 2.4 1.7 85.1
2002 25.2 8.9 26.9 7.7 2.3 2.1 73.1
2003 23.6 10.8 47.6 6.7 2.8 2.0 93.5
Sources: Table 8-1 for bank loans; table 8-3 for corporate bonds and stock market capitalization; BIS 
website (www.bis.org/statistics/hcsv/hanx9a_priv.csv) for international loans, (www.bis.org/statistics/ 
qcsv/anxl2c.csv) for international bonds, table 8-7 for international equity.
a. For private sector only.
b. ADRs.
Finance, Investment, and Growth
B raz il’s v a u n te d  e c o n o m y , w h ic h  g re w  fa s t e n o u g h  in  th e  e a rly  p o s tw a r  y ears  to  
b e c o m e  th e  e ig h th  la rg e s t in  th e  w o r ld ,  h a s  s lo w e d  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  s in c e  th e  e a rly  
1 9 8 0 s . M a n y  fa c to rs  c o n t r ib u t e d  to  th e  s lo w d o w n ; o n e  w as  a n  a n e m ic  in v e s t­
m e n t  ra te . O u r  a r g u m e n t  is t h a t  p ro b le m a t ic  in c e n tiv e s  fo r  th e  f in a n c ia l sy s te m  
p la y e d  a n  im p o r ta n t  ro le  in  th e  d e c lin e  o f  in v e s tm e n t,  th u s  c o n tr ib u t in g  to  th e  
d e c l in e  in  g ro w th  ra te s . O v e ra ll ,  f in a n c e  fo r  th e  c o rp o ra te  se c to r  is low , a c c o u n t­
in g  fo r  a r o u n d  9 4  p e rc e n t  o f  G D P  in  2 0 0 3  (see ta b le  8 -8 ) . T h is  is la rg e r t h a n  in  
M e x ic o  (4 3  p e rc e n t) ,  b u t  m u c h  sm a lle r  t h a n  in  C h i le  (2 0 7  p e rc e n t) .  T h e  c h a r ­
a c te r is t ic s  o f  c o r p o ra te  f in a n c e  a lso  d if f e r  f r o m  th e  o th e r  tw o  c o u n tr ie s .  B a n k  
f in a n c e  c o n tr ib u te s  o n ly  a  sm a ll  sh a re , a n d  th e  p u b l ic  b a n k s  c o n t in u e  to  p la y  a n  
u n u s u a l ly  s ig n if ic a n t  ro le . C a p i ta l  m a rk e ts  a re  re la tiv e ly  la rg e  o v e ra ll, a l th o u g h  
m o s t  o f  th e  b o n d  s e g m e n t  se rves to  f in a n c e  g o v e rn m e n t  d e f ic its .  I n te r n a t io n a l  
f in a n c e , in  tu r n ,  tra ils  d o m e s tic  so u rc es  in  te rm s  o f  f in a n c e  fo r  th e  p r iv a te  sec to r.
Bank Credit
In  assess in g  th e  re la tio n s h ip  b e tw e e n  f in a n c e  a n d  g ro w th  in  B razil, w e  f irs t  hav e  
to  e m p h a s iz e  th e  v e ry  sm a ll a m o u n t  o f  c re d it  t h a t  is p ro v id e d  to  th e  p r iv a te  sec­
to r. A t  le a s t th re e  fa c to rs  c o n tr ib u te  to  a n  e x p la n a t io n  fo r  th e  sc a rc ity  o f  c r e d i t  
in  th e  B ra z ilia n  case . T h e  f ir s t  is th e  c o n te x t  in  w h ic h  le n d in g  t o o k  p la c e  o v e r
th e  la s t  f i f te e n  y ears . M a c ro e c o n o m ic  in s ta b i l i ty — in c lu d in g  la rg e  g o v e rn m e n t  
d e f ic its , h ig h  in f la t io n  ra te s , a n d  v o la t i le  g ro w th — w as a t  th e  c o re  o f  th e  p r o b ­
le m s . T h e s e  p ro b le m s  d id  n o t  e n d  w i th  th e  su c c ess fu l s ta b il iz a t io n  p r o g r a m  o f  
1 9 9 4 .  U n c e r t a in ty  c o n t in u e d ,  a lb e i t  in  a  d i f f e r e n t  fo rm . M a jo r  p o l i t ic a l  a n d  
e c o n o m ic  sh o c k s  o c c u r r e d  d u r i n g  th e  1 9 9 5 - 2 0 0 5  p e r io d .  G r o w th  r e m a in e d  
v o la ti le ,  a n d  e c o n o m ic  a g e n ts  w e re  n o t  su re  a b o u t  w h a t  k in d  o f  p o lic ie s  w o u ld  
b e  fo llo w ed . A  d e f ic ie n t  in s t i tu t io n a l  f ra m e w o rk  c re a te d  a d d it io n a l  u n c e r ta in ty  
re g a rd in g  th e  p ro te c t io n  o f  p r o p e r ty  r ig h ts  a n d  ju d ic ia l  e n fo rc e m e n t.  A s a  c o n ­
se q u e n c e , c re d it  w as n o t  o n ly  low , b u t  i t  d e c l in e d  s te a d ily  f ro m  its  p e a k  in  1 9 9 5 . 
O n ly  s in c e  m id - 2 0 0 3  h a s  i t  b e g u n  to  rise  a g a in , a n d  i t  re m a in s  to  b e  seen  i f  th e  
n e w  t r e n d  is su s ta in a b le .
A  s e c o n d  re a s o n  fo r  th e  lo w  v o lu m e  o f  f in a n c e  h a s  to  d o  w i th  a  p a r t i c u la r  
a sp e c t  o f  th e  m a c r o e c o n o m ic  c o n te x t :  n a m e ly , h ig h  in te re s t  ra te s  a n d  sp re a d s . 
K u m a r  d e v e lo p s  a  s u b je c t iv e  m e a s u re  o f  th is  p r o b le m  a n d  t h e n  d ra w s  o n  a 
W o r ld  B a n k  d a ta b a s e  o n  c r e d i t  c o n d i t io n s  to  assess i t .  W h ile  sh e  r e p o r ts  t h a t  
B ra z ilia n  f irm s  p e rc e iv e  o v e ra ll  c r e d i t  c o n d i t io n s  to  b e  n o  w o rs e  t h a n  in  m o s t  
d e v e lo p in g  e c o n o m ie s ,  c o m p la in ts  a b o u t  h ig h  in te re s t  ra te s  d o  d is t in g u is h  th e  
B ra z il ia n  e n v i r o n m e n t .26 T h is  p e r c e p t io n  is a  p e r f e c t ly  a c c u r a te  r e f le c t io n  o f  
re a lity , s in c e  in te r e s t  ra te s  a n d  sp re a d s  h a v e  b e e n  a n d  r e m a in  e x tr a o r d in a r i ly  
h ig h  in  B razil. T ab le  8 -9  p ro v id e s  d a ta  o n  n o m in a l  a n d  real ra te s  fo r  lo a n s  to  th e  
p r iv a te  s e c to r  a n d  fo r  th e  s p re a d  b e tw e e n  le n d in g  a n d  d e p o s i t  ra te s  f ro m  1 9 9 7  
to  2 0 0 3 . R ea l ra te s  o n  su c h  lo a n s  h o v e re d  a r o u n d  5 0  p e rc e n t  a  y e a r  f ro m  2 0 0 0  
to  2 0 0 3 ,  w h ile  sp re a d s  e x c e e d e d  4 0  p e rc e n ta g e  p o in ts .27 D a ta  in  th e  ta b le  a lso  
c o n f i r m  th e  in c re a s e d  e f f ic ie n c y  a n d  p r o f i ta b i l i ty  o f  th e  b a n k s  in  t h e  la s t  fe w  
y e ars , w h ic h  p a r t ly  re fle c ts  th e  h ig h  in te r e s t  sp re a d s . I n  th is  l ig h t ,  c r e d i t  f ro m  
p u b l ic  b a n k s  p ro v id e s  a  m a jo r  a d v a n ta g e  to  c l ie n ts  s in c e  t h e y  l e n d  a t  h e a v ily  
s u b s id iz e d  ra te s .  F o r  e x a m p le ,  B N D E S ’s n o m in a l  lo n g - te r m  le n d in g  r a te  in  
2 0 0 3  w as 11 p e rc e n t .28
A  th i r d  re a so n  fo r  lo w  c re d it  p a ra lle ls  a n  e x p la n a tio n  fo r  a  s im ila r  p ro b le m  in  
M e x ic o . I n  t h a t  c o u n try ,  a  d e v a s ta t in g  c r is is  le f t  m o s t  o f  th e  f in a n c ia l  i n s t i t u ­
tio n s  in  b a n k ru p tc y . T h e  p a r t ic u la r  w a y  th e  c ris is  w as re so lv e d — p ro v id in g  th e  
b a n k s  w ith  w e l l- r e m u n e ra te d  g o v e rn m e n t  se c u rit ie s  in  e x c h a n g e  fo r  th e i r  n o n ­
p e r fo rm in g  lo an s— lim ite d  th e ir  in c e n tiv e  to  le n d . I n  B razil, d e sp ite  th e  a b se n ce  
o f  a  m a jo r  c ris is , th e  n e e d  to  f in a n c e  g o v e rn m e n t  d e f ic its  le d  to  a  s im ila r  p h e ­
n o m e n o n .  W h e n  d e f ic i ts  c o u ld  n o  lo n g e r  b e  f in a n c e d  th r o u g h  in f la t io n a r y
26. Kumar (2005, chap. 1),
27. Great effort has been devoted to trying to account for high spreads. Different studies iden­
tify administrative costs, compensation for credit and other types o f  risk, high reserve require­
ments, taxes, and bank profits as parts of the explanation. See, for example, Central Bank of Brazil
(2003). The high tax on financial transactions is particularly notable; see Albuquerque (2001); 
Coelho, Erbril, and Summers (2001); Koyama and Nakane (2001).
28. See BNDES website (www.bndes.gov.br). This rate is known as the TJLP (taxa dejuros de 
longo prazo).
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1997 31.5 78.2 73.5 53.8 88.5 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1998 29.1 86.4 83.2 55.4 83.2 7.4 0.6 10.2
1999 28.1 80.4 75.5 54.4 83.5 18.9 1.6 8.7
2000 27.2 56.8 49.8 39.6 85.9 11.3 1.0 8.4
2001 27.4 57.6 50.8 39.8 86.9 2.4 0.2 5.7
2002 26.0 62.9 54.4 43.7 76.1 20.8 1.9 5.3
2003 24.5 67.1 52.4 45.1 59.7 21.0 1.9 5.7
Sources: Table 8-1 for total loans as share of GDP; IMF, Global Financial Stability Report (September 
2004) for ROE, ROA, and NPLs; IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook (2004) for nominal and 
real loan rates, deposit rates, and spreads; Latin Finance (August issues) for efficiency ratio.
n.a. Not available.
a. Total loans as share of GDP.
b. Average rate for short- and medium-term loans to the private sector.
c. Nominal loan rate deflated by consumer price index.
d. Difference between nominal loan rate and deposit rate.
e. Operating expenses as a share of gross operational margin.
f. Profits as a share of equity.
g. Profits as a share of assets.
h. Nonperforming loans as a share of total loans.
m e a n s , th e  a u th o r i t ie s  b e g a n  to  issu e  la rg e  a m o u n ts  o f  w e l l- r e m u n e ra te d  b o n d s  
t h a t  l im ite d  b a n k s ’ in c e n tiv e  to  le n d . T h is  p a t te rn  w as e sp ec ia lly  t r u e  fo r  th e  p r i ­
v a te  d o m e s tic  a n d  fo re ig n  b a n k s; th e  p u b lic  b a n k s  fo llo w e d  a  d if fe re n t  lo g ic , a t  
le a s t to  a  c e r ta in  e x te n t .29
T h e  v o lu m e  o f  c r e d i t  to  th e  p r iv a te  s e c to r  b e h a v e d  v e ry  e r ra t ic a lly .  T h e  
e x p a n s io n  o f  c r e d i t  w as  s ig n i f ic a n t  in  th e  h ig h - in f l a t i o n  p e r io d  o f  1 9 9 0 - 9 4 ,  
s t im u la te d  b y  th e  re la tiv e ly  h ig h  e c o n o m ic  g r o w th  a f te r  th e  lo s t  d e c a d e  o f  th e  
1 9 8 0 s . F ro m  1 9 9 4  to  1 9 9 7 , fo llo w in g  th e  su ccess fu l s ta b il iz a tio n , th e  s u p p ly  o f  
p r iv a te  c r e d i t  fe ll a lm o s t  s y m m e tr ic a l ly  t o  t h e  g r o w th  o f  t h e  f o u r  p r e c e d in g  
y ears . F ro m  1 9 9 7  o n w a rd s , th e  t r e n d  f lu c tu a te d  s tro n g ly , o w in g  to  th e  in c re a s ­
in g  u n c e r ta in t ie s  s u r r o u n d in g  th e  B raz ilian  e co n o m y . O n ly  s in c e  m id - 2 0 0 3  h as 
th e  p r iv a te  c re d i t  s u p p ly  b e g u n  to  in c re a se  a g a in , as seen  in  f ig u re  8 -2 .
W e  n o w  t u r n  to  th e  issues o f  w h o  w as  s u p p ly in g  c re d it  to  th e  p r iv a te  sec to r, 
t h e  c h a ra c te r is tic s  o f  th e  c r e d i t ,  a n d  its  r e la t io n s h ip  to  in v e s tm e n t .  T a b le  8 -1 0  
b e g in s  b y  d isa g g re g a tin g  th e  d a ta  o n  b a n k  lo a n s  in  ta b le  8 -8  to  id e n t i fy  th e  re la ­
t iv e  c o n t r i b u t io n s  o f  th e  p r iv a te  a n d  p u b l ic  b a n k s  s in c e  1 9 9 5 .  T h e  t e n - y e a r  
p e r io d  b re a k s  d o w n  i n to  tw o  c le a r  s u b p e r io d s :  1 9 9 5 - 2 0 0 0  a n d  2 0 0 1 - 0 4 .  I n
29. Gottschalk and Sodre (2005) suggest that the Basel rules may also have played a role in the 
decline in credit since 1994. In particular, the 0 percent risk weighting of public sector loans has 
made them attractive to the banks above and beyond the high interest rates on government debt.
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F ig u re  8 -2 . Brazil: Credit to Public and Private Sectors, 1988—2004
Percent of GDP
Source: Central Bank of Brazil website (www.bcb.gov.br/itimeseriesen).
b o th  cases, th e  p r iv a te  b a n k s  a c c o u n te d  fo r  th e  m a jo r i ty  o f  th e  av a ilab le  c re d it ,  
b u t  th e ir  sh a re  in c re a s e d  s h a rp ly  a f te r  2 0 0 0 ,  r is in g  f ro m  a n  av erag e  o f  5 3  p e rc e n t  
to  6 4  p e rc e n t .  M o re o v e r ,  c r e d i t  f ro m  th e  p r iv a te  b a n k s  in c re a s e d  s l ig h tly  as a  
p e rc e n ta g e  o f  G D P , f ro m  14 p e rc e n t  in  th e  f ir s t  s u b p e r io d  to  16  p e rc e n t  in  th e  
s e c o n d .  T h e  p u b l ic  b a n k s ,  b y  c o n t r a s t ,  sa w  th e i r  sh a re  o f  t o ta l  p r iv a te  s e c to r  
c r e d i t  fa ll f r o m  4 7  to  3 6  p e r c e n t ,  a t  th e  s a m e  t im e  t h a t  th e  v o lu m e  fe ll  f ro m  
n e a r ly  13 p e rc e n t  o f  G D P  to  o n ly  9  p e rc e n t .30 T o ta l c re d it  fe ll b y  tw o  p e rc e n ta g e  
p o in ts  b e tw e e n  th e  tw o  p e r io d s .31
T h e  p r iv a te  a n d  p u b l ic  b a n k s  d isp la y  q u a lita tiv e , as w e ll as q u a n ti ta t iv e ,  d i f ­
fe re n c e s . I n  p a r t ic u la r ,  th e  p r iv a te  b a n k s  m a in ly  p ro v id e  s h o r t - t e r m  w o r k in g  
c a p i ta l ,  w h i le  th e  p u b l ic  b a n k s  p ro v id e  lo n g e r - t e r m  in v e s tm e n t  f u n d s .  T h e  
in te r e s t  ra te s  a re  a lso  q u i te  d i s t in c t ,  as th e  p r iv a te  b a n k s  c h a rg e  th e  v e ry  h ig h  
ra te s  ju s t  d iscu ssed , w h ile  th e  p u b l ic  b a n k s  le n d  a t m u c h  low er, su b s id iz e d  ra tes . 
T h e  s e g m e n ta t io n  o f  th e  m a rk e t  is n o ta b le .
B razil h a s  a  p o w e rfu l p r iv a te  b a n k in g  sec to r, a l th o u g h  i t  d iffe rs  f ro m  th e  tw o  
c o u n tr i e s  e x a m in e d  p re v io u s ly . S p e c if ica lly , th e  f o re ig n  c o m p o n e n t  is m u c h  
w e a k e r  t h a n  in  o t h e r  m a jo r  c o u n tr i e s  in  th e  re g io n .  F o re ig n  b a n k s  w e re
30. One o f the reasons for the fall in public sector credit had to do with the restructuring of the 
federally owned banks, which took dubious credits off the banks’ books and transferred them to an 
asset management company.
31. These data are still highly aggregated, since they represent all credit to the private sector, 
including credit for consumption and mortgages. The IMF estimates that corporate credit consti­
tutes 65 percent o f total private sector credit.
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T a b le  8 -1 0 . Brazil: Private-Sector Credit from Private and Public Banks, 
1995-2004
Percent of G D P  and percent
Year
Credit from private banks Credit from public banks Total credit
Percent GDP Percent Percent GDP Percent Percent GDP Percent
1995 15.9 52 14.7 48 30.6 100
1996 14.5 53 12.8 47 27.3 100
1997 13.9 54 11.8 46 25.7 100
1998 13.6 52 12.8 48 26.4 100
1999 13.5 52 12.4 48 25.9 100
2000 13.9 54 12.0 46 25.9 100
2001 17.1 65 9.4 35 26.5 100
2002 16.5 65 8.7 35 25.2 100
2003 14.8 63 8.8 37 23.6 100
2004 15.4 63 9.1 37 24.5 100
Source: Banco Central do Brasil website (www.bcb.gov.br/Ftimeseriesen).
a t t r a c te d  to  B raz il b y  th e  p o s s ib ility  o f  e x p lo i t in g  n ic h e s  th a t  th e  d o m e s tic  b a n k s  
t r a d i t io n a l ly  d id  n o t  w a n t  to  p u r s u e — su c h  as sm a ll  a n d  m e d iu m - s iz e d  e n te r ­
p r is e s  (S M E s ) , m o r tg a g e s ,  a n d  s o m e  lo n g - te r m  in v e s tm e n t  f in a n c in g — in  th e  
h o p e s  t h a t  th e y  w o u ld  h a v e  a d v a n ta g e s  s te m m in g  f ro m  th e i r  a lleg ed  h ig h e r  e ffi­
c ie n c y  a n d  c o m p e tit iv e n e ss . D o m e s t ic  p r iv a te  b a n k s , h o w ev er, p ro v e d  to  h a v e  a  
s ig n if ic a n t  c o m p e tit iv e  a d v a n ta g e  in  tre a su ry  o p e ra t io n s ,  te c h n o lo g y , a n d  access 
to  p r iv ile g e d  c u s to m e rs . B ecau se  o f  th e se  h id d e n  b a rrie rs  to  e n try , so m e  im p o r ­
t a n t  fo re ig n  b a n k s  le f t  th e  B raz ilian  m a rk e t  a f te r  th e  A rg e n tin e  crisis . M o reo v er, 
e v en  th o u g h  th e  fo re ig n  b a n k  sh a re  o f  assets in c re a sed , th is  w as b as ica lly  d u e  to  
th e  a c q u is i t io n  o f  b a n k s  w i th  h ig h  lo a n  le v e ra g e .32 O v e ra l l ,  th e  fo re ig n  b a n k s  
t e n d e d  to  m im ic  t h e i r  d o m e s t ic  c o u n te r p a r t s  in  m a k in g  l im i te d  a m o u n ts  o f  
s h o r t - te rm  lo an s , w h ile  e a rn in g  h ig h  p ro f its  b y  h o ld in g  g o v e rn m e n t secu rities .
T h e  p u b lic  b a n k s  c o n t in u e  to  p la y  a  v ita l  ro le  in  B razil, c o n tr a r y  to  e x p e c ta ­
t io n s .  B o th  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  a n d  th o s e  s u p p o r t i n g  th e  r e fo rm s  in  t h e  1 9 9 0 s  
b e lie v e d  th e  c h a n g e s  w o u ld  r e v o lu tio n iz e  th e  c re d i t  m a rk e t .  I n  p a r tic u la r ,  th e y  
e x p e c te d  th e  e n tr y  o f  fo re ig n  b a n k s  t o  e x p a n d  c re d i t  s ig n if ic a n tly  a n d  b r o a d e n  
access fo r  th o s e  n o rm a l ly  e x c lu d ed , su c h  as S M E s a n d  p o o re r  h o u se h o ld s . T h e y  
f u r t h e r  a s s u m e d  t h a t  t h e  p u b l ic  b a n k in g  s e c to r  w o u ld  c o n t in u e  to  s h r in k  
b e c a u s e  i t  w as  less c o m p e t i t iv e  t h a n  p r iv a te ,  e s p e c ia l ly  f o re ig n ,  b a n k s .  T h e  
re su lts  t u r n e d  o u t  d if f e re n tly  t h a n  a n t ic ip a te d ,  h o w e v e r , a n d  th e  p u b l ic  b a n k s  
c o n tin u e  to  p la y  a  k e y  ro le .
A t  lea s t tw o  fa c to rs  c a n  b e  s in g le d  o u t  to  e x p la in  th is  u n e x p e c te d  tr e n d .  F irs t, 
th e  r e m a in in g  p u b l ic  c o m m e rc ia l  b a n k s  w e n t  t h r o u g h  s u b s ta n t ia l  i n te r n a l  
re fo rm s  t h a t  a llo w e d  th e m  to  in c re a se  th e i r  c o m p e tit iv e n e ss  rap id ly , th e re b y  lev -
32. See Carvalho, Studart, and Alves (2002).
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F ig u re  8 -3 . Brazil: Directed versus Free Credit, 1996—2004
Percent
Source: Central Bank of Brazil website (www.bcb.gov.br/Ftimeseriesen).
e lin g  th e  p la y in g  f ie ld  b e tw e e n  th e m  a n d  th e i r  p r iv a te  c o u n te r p a r t s .33 S e c o n d , 
m a c ro e c o n o m ic  c o n d it io n s  s ti ll  m a k e  s h o r t - te r m  o p e ra t io n s  (p a r t ic u la r ly  tre a s ­
u r y  o p e ra t io n s ,  b u t  a lso  c re d it)  h ig h ly  p ro f i ta b le .  P r iv a te  f in a n c ia l  in s t i tu t io n s  
n e v e r  h a d  th e  a p p ro p r ia te  in c e n tiv e s  to  m o v e  in to  r isk ie r  m a rk e ts , w h ic h  c re a te d  
a  p r o te c te d  n ic h e  fo r  th e  sp e c ia liz ed  p u b l ic  b a n k s . P u b lic  b a n k s  c o n t in u e  to  b e  
th e  p r in c ip a l  in te r m e d ia r ie s  o f  lo n g - te r m  f in a n c in g  in  t h e  c o u n tr y :  C E F  
f in a n c e s  m o rtg a g es ; B a n c o  d o  B rasil f in a n c e s  ag rib u s in e ss  in v e s tm e n t  a n d  c ro p s; 
a n d  B N D E S  f in a n c e s  a  v a r ie ty  o f  lo n g - te rm  u n d e r ta k in g s ,  f ro m  in d u s t r ia l  a n d  
in f ra s tru c tu re  in v e s tm e n t  to  S M E  p ro g ra m s  a n d  so c ia l p ro je c ts .
P u b lic  in te rv e n t io n  in  th e  B ra z ilia n  c re d it  sy s te m  h as  w o rk e d  in  tw o  in te r r e ­
la te d  w ays. O n  th e  o n e  h a n d ,  th e  p u b lic  b a n k s  th em se lv es  m a d e  lo an s  to  v a r io u s  
c o n s t itu e n c ie s  t h a t  th e y  w e re  a ss ig n e d  to  f in a n c e . O n  th e  o th e r  h a n d ,  th e  p r iv a te  
b a n k s  w e re  a lso  e x p e c te d  to  se rv e  c e r ta in  n a t io n a l  o r  so c ia l  g o a ls . W h i le  th e s e  
a m o u n ts  w e re  in it ia l ly  la rg e , d i r e c te d  c re d i t  h a s  c o n s is te n t ly  fa llen , a l th o u g h  i t  
w as o n ly  re c e n tly  re p la c e d  b y  “free” c re d it.  T h e  re q u ir e m e n t  t h a t  th e  p r iv a te  sec­
to r  a llo c a te  p a r t  o f  i ts  f u n d in g  to  sp e c if ic  s e c to rs  is n o w  l im i te d  to  ru ra l  c re d i t  
a n d  re p re se n ts  a  v e ry  sm a ll sh a re  o f  to ta l  lo an s . M o s t  se lec tiv e  c re d it  is p ro v id e d  
t h r o u g h  th e  t r a n s f e r  o f  sp e c ia l  fu n d s ,  e i th e r  d i r e c t ly  t h r o u g h  th e  m a in  p u b l ic  
b a n k s  o r  i n te r m e d ia te d  b y  p r iv a te  i n s t i t u t io n s .34 A s s h o w n  in  f ig u re  8 - 3 ,  free
33. For an analysis o f the competitiveness of Banco do Brasil, see John Barham, “Lean, Mean 
Banking Machine,” Latin Finance, March 2003, pp. 59-61; Fitch Ratings (2004).
34. Morais (2005, pp. 23-24).
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F ig u re  8 -4 . Brazil: Growth Rates of Investment, Bank Loans, and BNDES Credit, 
1992-2004
BNDES; bank loans (percent) Investment (percent)
Sources; ECLAC website (www.eclac.cl) for investment; Central Bank of Brazil website 
(www.bcb.gov.br/itimeseriesen) for bank loans and BNDES credit.
c r e d i t  s u p p la n te d  d i r e c te d  c r e d i t  in  2 0 0 0 ,  w h i le  th e  t o ta l  c o m b in e d  c r e d i t  
d e c l in e d  u n t i l  m id -2 0 0 3 .
B N D E S  h a s  p la y e d  a n  e s p e c ia l ly  p iv o ta l  ro le  in  d i r e c te d  c r e d i t  s in c e  its  
fo u n d in g  in  1 9 5 1 . I t  c u r re n t ly  p ro v id e s  a ro u n d  6 0  p e rc e n t  o f  th e  c o u n tr y ’s lo n g ­
te r m  fin a n c e , a c c o rd in g  to  th e  b a n k ’s p re s id e n t .35 T h e  a m o u n ts  in v o lv e d  a re  v e ry  
la rg e  in  a b s o lu te  t e rm s .  B N D E S  le n t  n e a r ly  $ 1 4  b i l l io n  in  2 0 0 4 ,  w h ic h  is fa r  
m o re  t h a n  th e  In te r -A m e r ic a n  D e v e lo p m e n t  B a n k  le n t  in  a ll o f  L a t in  A m e ric a  
a n d  a p p r o a c h e s  t h e  a m o u n t  t h a t  t h e  W o r ld  B a n k  le n t  in  th e  e n t i r e  w o r ld .  
B N D E S  fo cu ses o n  p r io r i ty  se c to rs  (c u rre n tly  d e f in e d  to  in c lu d e  in f ra s tru c tu re ,  
in d u s tr ia l  c o m p e tit iv e n e ss , e x p o rts , te c h n o lo g y , a n d  s u p p o r t  fo r  S M E s), p ro v id ­
in g  a b o u t  h a l f  o f  its  c re d i t  d ire c tly  a n d  th e  re s t  th r o u g h  s e c o n d - t ie r  o p e ra t io n s .  
T h e  v a s t  m a jo r i ty  (9 4  p e r c e n t  in  2 0 0 4 )  g o e s  to  th e  p r iv a te  s e c to r , in c lu d in g  
s o m e  f o re ig n  f irm s . B N D E S  is f u n d e d  b y  g o v e r n m e n t  so u rc e s  a n d  le n d s  a t  a  
h e av ily  su b s id iz e d  ra te , th u s  lo w e r in g  co sts  fo r  b o rro w e rs  a n d  g iv in g  th o se  w ith  
access a n  im p o r ta n t  c o m p e tit iv e  a d v a n ta g e .36
F ig u re  8 -4  i l lu s t r a te s  th e  re la tiv e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  B N D E S  in  th e  in v e s tm e n t  
p ro c ess  b y  p lo t t in g  th e  re la tio n s h ip  b e tw e e n  in v e s tm e n t,  to ta l  b a n k  c re d it  to  th e
35. Alana Gandra, “Chief o f BNDES Bank Guarantees H ot Economy for Brazil in Coming 
Months.” Brazzil Magazine, July 11, 2005 (availableatwww.BrazzilMag.com).
36. On BNDES, see Teixeira Torres Filho (2005); von Mettenheim (2005, chap. 6).
p r iv a te  sec to r, a n d  B N D E S  c re d it .  A l th o u g h  in v e s tm e n t  a n d  to ta l  c r e d i t  m o v e  
in  a  fa ir ly  s y n c h ro n iz e d  p a t te rn ,  a n  e sp ec ia lly  c lose  l in k  is f o u n d  b e tw e e n  in v e s t­
m e n t  a n d  B N D E S  c re d i t .37
Capital Markets and International Finance
C a p ita l  m a rk e ts  in  B raz il a re  s till  sh a llo w  a n d  u n d e rd e v e lo p e d  b y  in te r n a t io n a l  
s ta n d a r d s ,  b u t  t h e y  h a v e  g r o w n  ra p id ly  s in c e  th e  su c c e ss fu l s ta b i l iz a t io n  p r o ­
g ra m  in  1 9 9 4 . M o re o v e r, th e y  h a v e  g o o d  p o te n t ia l  to  b e c o m e  a  m o re  im p o r ta n t  
so u rc e  o f  in v e s tm e n t  f in a n c e . L o o k in g  fo rw a rd  to  th is  p ro s p e c t ,  Jo sé  L u is  O s o ­
rio , c h a irm a n  o f  B raz il’s se c u ritie s  c o m m is s io n , m a d e  th e  fo l lo w in g  s ta te m e n t  in  
2 0 0 2 :  “T o d a y  th e r e  a re  o n ly  tw o  w ay s t h a t  a  B ra z ilia n  c a n  b e c o m e  a  b ig  b u s i ­
n e ssm a n . H e  c a n  b e  b o r n  r ic h , o r  h e  c a n  g a in  access to  B N D E S  f in a n c in g . W e  
w a n t  to  c rea te  a  t h i r d  w ay — th r o u g h  th e  c a p ita l  m a rk e ts .”38
A  re e x a m in a tio n  o f  tab le s  8 -3  a n d  8 -4  sh o w s b o th  th e  a d v a n ta g e s  a n d  d is a d ­
v a n ta g e s  t h a t  th e  m a r k e ts  face . S to c k  m a r k e t  c a p i ta l iz a t io n  is  fa ir ly  sm a ll  as a  
sh a re  o f  G D P , a l th o u g h  i t  is la rg e  in  a b so lu te  te rm s . N e w  issu es h a v e  fa llen  o f f  
s in ce  1 9 9 9 ; i t  re m a in s  to  b e  se e n  w h e th e r  th e  u p sw in g  in  2 0 0 4  w ill b e  su s ta in e d . 
L iq u id i ty  h as  a lso  fa llen  off. O n e  o f  th e  p ro b le m s  w as th e  e r ra t ic  p e r fo rm a n c e  o f  
th e  s e c o n d a ry  m a rk e ts  t h r o u g h o u t  th e  1 9 9 0 s , w h ile  th e  p r im a r y  m a rk e ts  sh ra n k  
th r o u g h  th e  d e l is t in g  o f  a  n u m b e r  o f  c o m p a n ie s . T h e  re a so n s  w e re  in te r r e la te d  
a n d  s te m m e d  f ro m  th e  lo ss  o f  c o m p e t it iv e n e s s  o f  d o m e s tic  c a p i ta l  m a rk e ts  in  
th e  p ro cess  o f  f in a n c ia l  o p e n in g , w h ic h  in  t u r n  re su l te d  f ro m  th e  in it ia l  sh a llo w ­
n ess o f  th e  m a rk e ts , h ig h  v o la tility , a n d  th e  h ig h  c o s t o f  is su in g  se c u ritie s  d o m e s ­
tic a lly  v is-à-v is th e  in te r n a t io n a l  m a rk e ts . A t  th e  sa m e  tim e , th e  m a rk e ts ’ p o te n ­
t ia l  is d e m o n s tr a te d  b y  a  n u m b e r  o f  d if fe re n t  in s t r u m e n ts ,  b o th  re la tin g  to  th e  
i n te r m e d ia t io n  o f  re so u rc e s  a n d  r isk  m a n a g e m e n t  in s t r u m e n ts ,  su c h  as d e r iv a ­
tiv e  c o n tra c ts .
B o n d  m a rk e ts  h a v e  a  d if fe re n t  se t o f  p ro b le m s . B o n d s  o u ts ta n d in g  a re  la rg e r 
th a n  th e  c a p ita l iz a tio n  o f  th e  s to c k  m a rk e t,  b u t  th e  la rg e  m a jo r i ty  o f  n e w  issues 
a n d  a m o u n ts  o u t s t a n d in g  c o r re s p o n d s  to  th e  f e d e ra l  a n d  s ta te  g o v e r n m e n ts .  
( P u b l ic  e n te rp r is e s  a re  u s u a l ly  c la s s if ie d  w i th  th e  p r iv a te  c o r p o r a t io n s .)  O n ly  
a b o u t  o n e -s ix th  o f  b o n d s  o u t s ta n d in g  h a v e  b e e n  issu e d  b y  p r iv a te  n o n f in a n c ia l  
c o rp o ra t io n s ,  a n d  th e  sh a re  h a s  s h r u n k  s in c e  s ta b iliz a tio n . C ro w d in g  o u t  b y  th e  
g o v e r n m e n t  h a s  h a d  c le a r  n e g a tiv e  im p l ic a t io n s  fo r  p r iv a te  s e c to r  in v e s tm e n t  
a n d  g ro w th . T h e  n u m b e r  a n d  v o lu m e  o f  n e w  issues h a s  fa llen  in  th e  b o n d  m a r ­
k e t  j u s t  as i t  h a s  in  th e  s to c k  m a r k e t— a lth o u g h ,  a g a in ,  a  t e n ta t iv e  re c o v e ry  
b e g a n  in  2 0 0 4 .
In  a d d it io n  to  m a c ro e c o n o m ic  v o la tility , p o o r  in s t i tu t io n a l  c o n d it io n s  h a v e  
s lo w e d  th e  g ro w th  o f  B raz il’s c a p ita l  m a rk e ts . C h a p te r  3  d isc u sse d  B ra z il’s re la -
37. The discrepancy in 2002 was a result o f market instability during the presidential election 
of that year. BNDES tried to be supportive o f growth, despite the fall in investment.
38. Armijo and Ness (2002, p. 18).
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t iv e ly  lo w  sc o re s  o n  c o m m o n ly  u s e d  m e a su re s  o f  in s t i t u t io n s ,  e sp e c ia l ly  w i th  
re sp e c t  to  ru le  o f  la w  a n d  c o n tro l  o f  c o r ru p t io n .  P in h e iro  a n d  C a b ra l  fo c u s  o n  
th e  p ro b le m s  th a t  a  w e a k  ju d ic ia r y  h a s  in  e n fo rc in g  th e  r u le  o f  law . U s in g  th e  
v a r ia t io n  in  th e  size  o f  f in a n c ia l  m a rk e ts  a c ro ss  B ra z ilia n  s ta te s ,  th e y  f in d  th a t  
th e  e n f o rc e m e n t  o f  e x is tin g  ru le s  is p o s i t iv e ly  r e la te d  t o  t h e  v o lu m e  o f  c re d it ,  
ev en  a f te r  th e y  ta k e  in to  a c c o u n t  th e  size o f  s ta te  G D P .39 A rm ijo  a n d  N e ss  d o c u ­
m e n t  p r o b le m s  w i t h  c o r p o r a te  g o v e rn a n c e  a n d  lo o k  a t  a c to r s  p u s h in g  fo r  
im p r o v e m e n ts ,  a l th o u g h ,  as t h e y  p o i n t  o u t ,  th e  m e a n in g  o f  th e  t e r m  is c o n ­
te s te d . T h e y  c ite  tw o  re a so n s  t h a t  r e fo rm  h as  ta k e n  p lac e . F irs t ,  th e  p e r c e p tio n  
th a t  a  c o u n tr y  h a s  g o o d  c o rp o ra te  g o v e rn a n c e  m a y  in c re a se  fo re ig n  in v e s tm e n t.  
S e c o n d ,  t r a d i t io n a l  f a m i ly - o w n e d  f irm s , w h ic h  fe a r  lo ss  o f  c o n t r o l  t h r o u g h  
g re a te r  r ig h ts  fo r  m in o r i ty  sh a re h o ld e rs  a n d  g re a te r  t ra n sp a re n c y , a re  n o n e th e le s s  
u s in g  a  v e rs io n  o f  c o r p o ra te  g o v e rn a n c e  to  d e fe n d  th e i r  o w n  in te re s ts .  I n s t i tu ­
t io n a l  in v e s to rs  h a v e  y e t  to  p la y  a  m a jo r  ro le  in  p r o m o tin g  c o rp o ra te  g o v e rn a n c e  
in  B raz il.40
T h e  a p p ro v a l  in  2 0 0 1  o f  t h e  n e w  c o m p a n y  law , w h ic h  a m e n d e d  th e  c o m ­
p a n y  a n d  s e c u r i t ie s  law s o f  1 9 7 6 ,  w a s  a s ig n i f ic a n t  a d v a n c e  in  im p r o v in g  th e  
le g a l e n v i r o n m e n t  in  B ra z il. T h e  la w  m o d e r n iz e d  th e  f r a m e w o r k  fo r  p u b l ic ly  
h e ld  c o m p a n ie s  b y  a u g m e n t in g  m in o r i t y  s h a r e h o ld e r s ’ r ig h ts  a n d  im p r o v in g  
c o rp o ra te  g o v e rn a n c e , a c c o u n ta b ili ty , a n d  tra n sp a re n c y . I t  a lso  c re a te d  a n  in d e ­
p e n d e n t  re g u la to ry  b o d y  to  su p e rv ise  c a p ita l  m a rk e t  a c tiv itie s . F ina lly , i t  d e f in e d  
ille g a l a c t iv i t ie s  w i th  re s p e c t  to  th e  s to c k  m a r k e t ,  s e t t in g  se v e re  p e n a l t ie s  fo r  
w r o n g d o e r s .41 A n o th e r  i m p o r t a n t  m e a su re  w as  to  c re a te  in c e n tiv e s  fo r  c o m p l i ­
a n c e  w i th  th e  n e w  la w  a n d  th e  a d o p t io n  o f  b e s t  p ra c t ic e s .  T h i s  w a s  d o n e  
th r o u g h  th e  i n a u g u r a t io n  o f  t h e  Novo Mercado, b a se d  o n  th e  G e r m a n  Neuer 
Markt e x p e rien c e . T h e  n e w  m a rk e t  is a  l is tin g  s e g m e n t d e s ig n e d  fo r  th e  t r a d in g  
o f  sh a re s  is su e d  b y  c o m p a n ie s  t h a t  v o lu n ta r i ly  a g ree  to  a d o p t  c o r p o ra te  g o v e r­
n a n c e  p ra c tic e s  a n d  d isc lo su re  re q u ire m e n ts  b e y o n d  th o se  s t ip u la te d  in  B ra z ilia n  
leg is la tio n .42
39. Pinheiro and Cabral (2001).
40. Armijo and Ness (2002, 2004).
41. A detailed description o f the law can be found in the central bank’s newsletter (Focus, May 
10, 2001).
42. To take part in the Novo Mercado, a company should follow good practices o f corporate 
governance, such as (i) prohibiting the issue of nonvoting shares; (ii) holding public share offerings 
through mechanisms that favor capital dispersion and broad retail access; (iii) maintaining a mini­
mum free float equivalent to 25 percent of capital; (iv) extending to all shareholders the same con­
ditions provided to majority shareholders in the transfer o f the controlling stake in the firm (so- 
called tag along rights); (v) establishing a single one-year term for the entire board o f directors; (vi) 
using international accounting standards to prepare annual financial statements; (vii) improving 
quarterly financial statements through the use o f consolidated financial statements and special 
audit review; (viii) accepting the obligation to hold a tender offer by economic value criteria should 
a decision be taken to delist from the Novo Mercado; and (ix) adhering to disclosure rules on the 
negotiation o f assets issued by the company in the name o f the controlling shareholders or the 
company management (Focus, May 10, 2001).
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Sources: ECLAC website (www.eclac.cl) for investment; BIS website (www.bis.org) for bonds; 
Standard and Poor’s (2000, 2005) for stock market capitalization.
D e s p i te  th e  c o m p l ic a t io n s  o f  m a c r o e c o n o m ic  in s t a b i l i t y  a n d  p o o r  g o v e r ­
n a n c e  t h a t  h in d e r e d  c a p i ta l  m a r k e t  d e v e lo p m e n t ,  a  r e la t io n s h ip  d o e s  se e m  to  
e x is t  a m o n g  e q u it ie s ,  p r iv a te  b o n d s ,  a n d  in v e s tm e n t .  A s s h o w n  in  f ig u re  8 -5 ,  
b o th  b o n d s  a n d  s to c k  m a rk e t  c a p ita l iz a tio n  a p p e a r  to  le a d  in v e s tm e n t  b y  a  year. 
T h e  im p l ic a t io n  is t h a t  th e  fa ir ly  la rg e  a m o u n ts  in v o lv e d  m a k e  i t  n e c e ssa ry  fo r  
f irm s  to  e n su re  f in a n c in g  b e fo re  u n d e r ta k in g  a  p ro je c t.  T h is  s i tu a t io n  c o n tra s ts  
w i th  b a n k  c re d i t  ( in c lu d in g  th a t  o f  B N D E S ) ,  w h e re  n o  lag  w as fo u n d . P e rh a p s  
b a n k  f in a n c e  c a n  b e  t a k e n  m o r e  f o r  g r a n te d ,  th u s  e l im in a t in g  th e  la g  w i th  
re sp e c t to  in v e s tm e n t.
T h e  la rg e s t  p r iv a te  f i rm s  t h a t  p a r t i c ip a te  in  th e  d o m e s t ic  c a p i ta l  m a rk e ts ,  
to g e th e r  w ith  th e  fe d e ra l g o v e rn m e n t  a n d  p u b l ic  se c to r  e n te rp r is e s , a re  a lso  ab le  
to  ra ise  m o n e y  in te rn a tio n a lly .  S y n d ic a te d  b a n k  lo an s , fo re ig n  a n d  in te rn a t io n a l  
b o n d  issues, a n d  e q u ity  o ffe r in g s  v ia  g lo b a l o r  A m e r ic a n  d e p o s i to ry  re c e ip ts  a re  
a ll p a r t  o f  th e  m e n u  f ro m  w h ic h  a sm a ll p r iv ile g e d  g r o u p  c a n  c h o o se . A lth o u g h  
B raz il h a s  a  s h o r te r  h is to r y  in  th e s e  m a rk e ts  th a n  so m e  L a t in  A m e r ic a n  c o u n ­
t r ie s ,  e sp e c ia l ly  M e x ic o , i t  h a s  b e c o m e  a  m a jo r  p la y e r . O v e r  t h i r t y  B ra z i l ia n  
f irm s , fo r  e x am p le , a re  c u r re n t ly  l is te d  o n  th e  N e w  Y ork  S to c k  E x c h a n g e , m o re  
t h a n  a n y  o th e r  L a t in  A m e r ic a n  c o u n try .  T h e y  in c lu d e  m a jo r  p r iv a te  f i rm s  in  
b a n k in g , u til i tie s , te le c o m m u n ic a t io n s ,  a n d  in d u s try , b u t  so m e  o f  th e  s ta te  firm s 
h a v e  a lso  l is te d  a  p o r t io n  o f  th e i r  sh a res , in c lu d in g  P e tro b ra s , T e leb ra s , a n d  so m e  
o f  th e  re g io n a l u til i tie s  c o m p a n ie s . O th e r s  a re  lis te d  in  E u ro p e , m o s t  n o ta b ly  in
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F ig u re  8 -6 . Brazil: Growth Rates of Investment and International Finance, 
1991-2003
Percent
Sources: ECLAC website (www.eclac.cl) for investment; BIS website (www.bis.org), Standard 
and Poor’s (2000, 2005), IMF (unpublished) for international finance.
S p a in . T h e s e  B ra z ilia n  f irm s  h a v e  n o t  le f t  B o v e sp a , b u t  r a th e r  h a v e  m o r e  t h a n  
o n e  lis tin g .43
P riv a te  f irm s  in  B razil a re  im p o r ta n t  re c ip ie n ts  o f  in te r n a t io n a l  lo an s , i n  th e  
five  y ea rs  f ro m  2 0 0 0  to  2 0 0 4 ,  th e y  a c c o u n te d  fo r  n e a r ly  6 0  p e r c e n t  o f  a ll su c h  
lo a n s  to  B raz il, re c e iv in g  a n  a m o u n t  e q u a l  to  6 .9  p e rc e n t  o f  G D P . B y  c o n tr a s t ,  
th e  in te rn a t io n a l  b o n d  m a rk e ts  a re  m a in ly  th e  p u rv ie w  o f  th e  p u b l ic  se c to r  a n d  
th e  b a n k s . O n ly  17  p e rc e n t  o f  to ta l  b o n d  issues (2 .4  p e rc e n t  o f  G D P )  w ere  m a d e  
b y  p r iv a te  B ra z ilia n  c o m p a n ie s  (n a m e ly , A m b e v , C V R D , T e le m a r , a n d  V o ra n -  
t im ) . W i th  re sp ec t to  fo re ig n  in v e s tm e n t o n  th e  B o vespa , c u m u la tiv e  n e t  in v es t­
m e n t  f ro m  1 9 9 5  to  2 0 0 4  a m o u n te d  to  o n ly  $ 5 .5  b ill io n ; th is  w as 1 .7  p e rc e n t  o f  
2 0 0 4  m a rk e t  c a p ita liz a tio n  a n d  0 .8  p e rc e n t  o f  G D P .44 A  B ra z ilia n  f in a n c ia l  e x p e r t
43. See websites o f the New York Stock Exchange (www.nyse.com) and Bovespa 
(www. bovespa.com.br).
44. Figures on loans and bonds were calculated from data on the BIS website. For international 
bonds, see www.bis.org/statistics/qcsv/anxl2.csv; for international bank loans, see www.bis.org/sta- 
tistics/hcsv/panx9a.csv. Individual company information was calculated from Latin Finance (2003 
issues). Total bond issues that could be identified amounted to $15.2 billion, of which $7.0 billion 
was issued by the federal government or public sector firms and $8.2 billion by the private sector 
($6.5 billion by banks and $1.8 billion by nonfinancial corporations). Data on foreign investment 
on the Brazilian stock exchange are from the CVM website: www.cvm.gov.br/ingl/public/ 
Base_Financiera_English/Bovespa.xls.
c la im s th a t  fo re ig n  p o r t fo l io  in v es to rs  p la y  a  m u c h  la rg e r ro le  in  B raz ilian  f irm s . 
H e  c a lc u la te s  t h a t  in  1 9 9 9 , fo re ig n  in v e s to rs  in  th e  lo c a l s to c k  m a r k e t  h e ld  15 
p e rc e n t  o f  th e  sh ares in  lis te d  c o m p a n ie s .45 T h is  w o u ld  im p ly  fo re ig n  in v e s tm e n t 
e q u iv a le n t to  over 5 p e rc e n t  o f  G D P ;  m o re  resea rch  is c learly  n e e d e d .
W h e n  w e  c o m p a re  in v e s tm e n t  t re n d s  w i th  fo re ig n  so u rc es  o f  f in a n c e  fo r  th e  
p r iv a te  sec to r, as s h o w n  in  f ig u re  8 -6 , th e  re la tio n s h ip  is n o t  a t  a ll c lo se . W h ile  
fo re ig n  c a p ita l  m a y  h a v e  b e e n  a  p re c u rs o r  o f  in v e s tm e n t  s p e n d in g  in  B raz il— as 
s u g g e s te d  w i th  re s p e c t  to  lo c a l c a p i ta l  m a r k e t  f in a n c e — th e  w e a k  r e la t io n s h ip  
b e tw e e n  th e  tw o  v a r ia b le s  i n  B ra z il c o n tr a s t s  w i th  th e  m u c h  s t r o n g e r  o n e  in  
M e x ic o  (c o m p a re  f ig u re s  7 -6  a n d  8 -6 ).
Access to Credit for Small Firms
B razil h a s  th e  sa m e  p ro b le m s  as o th e r  L a tin  A m e r ic a n  c o u n tr ie s  in  te rm s  o f  l im ­
i te d  access to  c r e d i t  b y  sm a ll  f i rm s . W e  h a v e  a lre a d y  d e s c r ib e d  h o w  access is a  
m a jo r  issue  in  b o th  C h ile  a n d  M e x ico . A n  im p o r ta n t  d iffe re n c e  in  th e  B ra z ilia n  
case  is th e  ro le  p la y e d  b y  p u b l ic  s e c to r  b a n k s . In  M e x ic o , N a f in  o p e ra te s  a lm o s t 
ex c lu siv e ly  th r o u g h  s e c o n d - t ie r  p ro cesses . T h e  N a t io n a l  D e v e lo p m e n t  C o r p o r a ­
t io n  (C o r fo )  d o e s  th e  sa m e  in  C h i le ,  a l th o u g h  i t  h a s  p a r tn e r e d  w i th  B a n c o E s-  
t a d o  in  several p ro g ra m s  to  h e lp  S M E s . B a n c o E s ta d o  i ts e l f  is p r o m in e n t  in  th e  
s m a ll  lo a n  s e g m e n t ,  b u t  i t  o n ly  a c c o u n ts  f o r  a b o u t  11 p e r c e n t  o f  th e  o v e ra ll  
m a rk e t .  I n  B ra z il, th e  p u b l ic  b a n k s ,  in c lu d in g  b o th  c o m m e rc ia l  a n d  d e v e lo p ­
m e n t  b a n k s , p la y  a  m u c h  la rg e r  ro le  a n d  h a v e  ta rg e te d  S M E s as a  p r io r ity . W h ile  
so m e  ev id e n ce  su g g ests  th e y  h a v e  h a d  a  p o s itiv e  im p a c t,  th e  p a u c i ty  o f  in f o r m a ­
t io n  m ak e s  d ra w in g  c o n c lu s io n s  e x tre m e ly  d iff ic u lt.
T ab le  8 -1 1  p ro v id e s  e s tim a te s  o f  lo a n s  to  m ic ro  a n d  sm a ll  e n te rp r is e s  b y  th e  
m a in  p u b lic  a n d  p r iv a te  c o m m e rc ia l  b a n k s  a n d  B N D E S . T h e  ta b le  r e p o r ts  th a t  
s lig h tly  o v er 2 0  p e rc e n t  o f  to ta l  lo an s  b y  v a lu e  w e n t  to  sm a ll  a n d  m ic ro  f irm s  in  
2 0 0 3 .  T h e  la rg e s t sh a re  w as  b y  th e  p u b l ic  c o m m e rc ia l  b a n k s  (3 2  p e rc e n t) ;  th e  
p r iv a te  b a n k s  d e v o te d  a  m u c h  sm a lle r  sh a re  to  th e se  f irm s  (1 4  p e rc e n t) .  B N D E S  
(2 4  p e rc e n t)  is l i s te d  s e p a ra te ly  s in c e  a  la rg e  p o r t io n  o f  i ts  lo a n s  is  c h a n n e le d  
th r o u g h  th e  o th e r  in s t i tu t io n s ,  w h ic h  im p lie s  so m e  d e g re e  o f  d o u b le  c o u n tin g .  
T o  b e  m e a n in g fu l , th e s e  lo a n  sh a res  m u s t  b e  c o m p a re d  w ith  o th e r  c h a ra c te ris tic s  
o f  t h e  f i rm s . T h e  u s u a l  c o m p a r is o n  is w i th  sa les , b u t  size  c a te g o r ie s  a re  n o t  
d e f in e d  in  th is  w a y  in  B razil. W e  th e re fo re  u se  v o lu m e  o f  sa laries p a id  as th e  b e s t 
p roxy . B y  th is  m e a su re , m ic ro  e n te rp r is e s  a c c o u n t  fo r  10  p e rc e n t  o f  sa laries a n d  
sm a ll  f i rm s  fo r  16  p e r c e n t .  T h e  c o m b in e d  to ta l  o f  2 6  p e r c e n t  is o n ly  s l ig h tly  
la rg e r  t h a n  th e  s h a re  o f  c r e d i t  re c e iv e d  b y  m ic r o  a n d  sm a ll  f i rm s . I n  t e r m s  o f  
e m p lo y m e n t ,  th e  d if fe re n c e  is m u c h  g re a te r: m ic ro  f irm s  e m p lo y  3 6  p e rc e n t  o f  
th e  to ta l  w o rk fo rc e , a n d  sm a ll f i rm s  a c c o u n t  fo r  a n o th e r  21  p e rc e n t .46
45. Ness (2000a), cited in Armijo and Ness (2002).
46. Data on salaries and employment are from Sebrae (2005, tables 6 and 7).
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T a b le  8 -1 1 . Brazil: Credit to Micro and Small Enterprises, 2003 
M illions o f  reais and percent
Loans to micro Share of micro
Institution Total loans and small firms and small firms
Banco do Brasil 29,900 9,800 32.8
CEF 3,439 3,301 95.6
Nossa Caixa 1,088 782 71.8
Total public 34,427 13,883 40.3
Total private1 108,243 14,775 13.6
Subtotal 142,670 28,658 20.1
BNDES 39,836 9,585 24.1
Totalb 182,506 38,243 21.0
Sources: Morais (2005, p. 46); BNDES website (www.bndes.gov.br) for BNDES data.
a. Bradesco, Itati, Unibanco, ABN Amro, HSBC.
b. Includes some double counting.
T ab le  8 -1 2 . Brazil: Loan Portfolios of Public and Private Banks, 2003
Percent
Commercial banks Development Credit
Size of load Government Private Foreign banks cooperatives
Less than  U.S.$ 15,000 15.1 15.1 16.0 7.5 17.5
U .S.$15,000-30 ,000 41.3 21.4 26.5 6.9 61.7
U .S.$30,000-300 ,000 16.3 12.4 10.1 5.7 17.3
U .S.$300,000-15 ,000 ,000  16.9 33.2 34.6 15.9 3.5
M ore than U .S.$15,000,000 10.4 17.9 12.8 64.0 0.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Financial Stability Report (November 2004, p. 59). 
a. Converted into dollars at exchange rate of 3.33.
A  s e c o n d  ty p e  o f  in f o r m a t io n  th a t  is p o te n t ia l ly  re le v a n t fo r  s tu d y in g  access 
to  c r e d i t  i n  B ra z il is th e  a l lo c a t io n  o f  c r e d i t  b y  size  o f  lo a n .  M o s t  a n a ly s ts  
a ssu m e — fo r  la c k  o f  b e t te r  in fo r m a t io n — th a t  sm a ll  lo a n s  a re  m o re  o r  less e q u iv ­
a le n t  to  lo a n s  fo r  sm a ll  f i rm s  o r  in d iv id u a ls .47 T a b le  8 -1 2  p ro v id e s  in f o r m a t io n  
o n  size o f  lo a n  a n d  o w n e rs h ip  c h a ra c te r is tic s  o f  f in a n c ia l  in s t i tu t io n s  fo r  B razil 
in  2 0 0 3 .  D if f e re n t  o w n e rs h ip  ty p es  h a v e  v e ry  d if fe re n t  le n d in g  p a tte rn s .  C r e d it  
c o o p e ra tiv e s  a n d  g o v e rn m e n t-o w n e d  c o m m e rc ia l  b a n k s  sp ec ia lize  in  sm a ll lo an s : 
7 9  p e rc e n t  o f  th e  lo a n  p o r t fo l io  o f  th e  fo rm e r  is c o m p o s e d  o f  lo a n s  o f  less th a n  
$ 3 0 ,0 0 0 ,  w h i le  5 6  p e r c e n t  o f  th e  l a t t e r  is in  th is  c a te g o ry . B o th  p r iv a te  a n d  
fo re ig n - o w n e d  c o m m e rc ia l  b a n k s  c o n c e n tr a te  o n  th e  v e ry  b r o a d  $ 3 0 0 ,0 0 0  to  
$ 1 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0  s e g m e n t. D e v e lo p m e n t  b a n k s , a m o n g  w h ic h  B N D E S  a c c o u n ts  fo r  
a b o u t  8 0  p e rc e n t,  h a v e  a  h e a v y  c o n c e n tr a t io n  in  th e  la rg e s t lo a n  ca teg o ry . A b o u t
47- Kumar (2005, pp. 187-88) questions this assumption, saying that many small loans in 
Brazil go to middle-class consumers and mid-sized firms.
6 4  p e r c e n t  o f  t h e i r  lo a n s  a re  fo r  m o re  th a n  $ 1 5  m il l io n ,  b u t  B N D E S  is a lso  a 
la rg e  su p p lie r  o f  lo a n s  to  S M E s , as w e  d iscu ss below .
A  th ir d  c o m p a r is o n  is w i th  o u r  o th e r  tw o  case  s tu d ie s , a l th o u g h  w e  c a n  o n ly  
m a k e  v e ry  ro u g h  e s tim a te s  g iv en  th e  d if fe re n t  ty p es  o f  d a ta  in v o lv e d . T h e  avail­
a b le ,  a lb e i t  v e ry  p a r t i a l ,  e v id e n c e  su g g e s ts  t h a t  th e  s h a re  o f  m ic r o  a n d  sm a ll  
f i rm s  w i th  so m e  access  to  b a n k  c re d i t  w a s  fa ir ly  s im ila r  in  B ra z il a n d  M e x ic o . 
F o r  B razil, d a ta  fo r  S ao  P a u lo  in d ic a te  th a t  19  p e rc e n t  o f  sm a ll  a n d  m ic ro  f irm s  
h av e  access to  b a n k  lo a n s  (9  p e rc e n t  f ro m  p u b l ic  b a n k s  a n d  10 p e rc e n t  f ro m  p r i ­
v a te  b a n k s ) .48 I n  M e x ic o ,  th e  c e n t r a l  b a n k  su rv e y  r e p o r t s  t h a t  18  p e r c e n t  o f  
s m a ll  f i rm s  h a v e  a cc ess  to  b a n k  lo a n s .49 T h e  f ig u re  fo r  C h i le  is  m u c h  h ig h e r ,  
h o w e v e r, a t  4 4  p e r c e n t .50 A n  i m p o r t a n t  le s so n , to  w h ic h  w e  r e tu r n  in  th e  c o n ­
c lu s io n ,  is t h a t  th e  sh a re  o f  e x is tin g  c r e d i t  g o in g  to  S M E s  n e e d s  to  r ise  a t  th e  
sa m e  t im e  th a t  o v e ra ll c re d i t  is in c re a sed .
W e  n o w  t u r n  to  th e  so u rc e s  a n d  in s t r u m e n t s  t h r o u g h  w h ic h  c r e d i t  is  p r o ­
v id e d  to  sm a ll  f i rm s  in  B ra z il .  A s in d ic a te d  a b o v e , th e  p u b l ic  b a n k s  a re  
e x tr e m e ly  i m p o r t a n t ,  b u t  t h e  p r iv a te  b a n k s  a n d  o th e r  b a n k  a n d  n o n b a n k  
so u rc e s  a lso  p a r t i c ip a te .  T h e  la rg e s t  s o u rc e s  o f  S M E  f in a n c e  a re  B N D E S  a n d  
B a n c o  d o  B rasil (see ta b le  8 -1 0 ) ,  b u t  m u c h  o f  th e  f u n d in g  fo r  th e  la t te r  c o m e s  
f ro m  th e  fo rm er, so  w e  b e g in  th e re .
B N D E S  c a n n o t  ta k e  d ep o sits . I t  receives its  fu n d in g  f ro m  v a rio u s  g o v e rn m e n t 
a n d  in te r n a t io n a l  so u rc e s , a n d  i t  a llo c a te s  i ts  s m a lle r  lo a n s  ( th o s e  u n d e r  a b o u t  
$ 3 .5  m ill io n )  th r o u g h  s e c o n d -t ie r  o p e ra t io n s .51 T h is  o b v io u s ly  in c lu d e s  lo an s  fo r  
S M E s. In  2 0 0 4 , o ver $ 4  b ill io n  o f  th e  $ 1 4  b ill io n  B N D E S  b u d g e t  w e n t  to  S M E s, 
w i th  $ 3  b i l l io n  g o in g  to  m ic ro  a n d  sm a ll  f i rm s  a n d  th e  r e m a in d e r  to  m e d iu m ­
sized  c o m p a n ie s . T h e  lea d  f in an c ia l ag en ts  w e re  B a n co  d o  B rasil a n d  B radesco , th e  
la rg e s t  p r iv a te  b a n k ,  e a c h  o f  w h ic h  w as re s p o n s ib le  fo r  a b o u t  $ 6 5 0  m il l io n .  
D o z e n s  o f  o th e r  b a n k s  a n d  f in a n c ia l  i n s t i tu t io n s ,  in c lu d in g  fo re ig n  f irm s , a lso  
serve as f in an c ia l ag en ts . T h e  a g en ts  are  c h a rg e d  w ith  e v a lu a tin g  p ro p o sa ls  a n d  d is ­
t r ib u t in g  reso u rces as th e y  t h in k  best, s ince  th e y  are  c loser to  th e  fin a l u se rs o f  th e  
sm a ll lo a n s  th a n  is B N D E S  itself. T h e  m a in  sec to rs  s u p p o r te d  are  in d u s try , a g r i­
c u ltu re  a n d  ra n c h in g , serv ices, in fra s tru c tu re , a n d  trad in g .
B N D E S  a lso  s u p p o r ts  S M E s  in  m a n y  o th e r  w ay s. I t  h a s  its  o w n  d ire c t  c re d it  
l in e s , as w e ll as a  g u a ra n te e  p r o g r a m  c re a te d  b y  C o n g re s s  in  1 9 9 7 , w h ic h  p r o ­
te c ts  f in a n c ia l  in s t i tu t io n s  f ro m  th e  h ig h e r  c re d it  r isk  in v o lv e d  in  S M E  lo an s . I t  
ru n s  a  p ro g ra m  to  p ro m o te  n e w  sm a ll c o m p a n ie s  a n d  u n d e rw r ite s  m ic ro f in a n c e  
in s t i t u t io n s .  I n  2 0 0 3 ,  th e  b a n k  l a u n c h e d  th e  B N D E S  c a rd ,  w h ic h  p ro v id e s  
S M E s w i th  a  p re a p p ro v e d  c re d it  l in e  o f  u p  to  5 0 ,0 0 0  reais ( a b o u t  $ 1 7 ,0 0 0 )  w i th
48. Sebrae (2004, p. 50). These data are surely an overestimation for the country as a whole, so 
they can be considered an upper limit on access. Data are for 2003.
49. Bank of Mexico website (www.banxico.org.mx); see also chapter 7. Again these data are an 
upper limit since the definition o f small firms has a high cutoff. Data are for 2003.
50. Román (2003, p. 30); see also chapter 6. Data are for 2000.
51. Information in the next two paragraphs is from the BNDES website (www.bndes.gov.br).
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te rm s  o f  u p  to  tw o  years. T h e  ca rd s  a re  is su e d  th r o u g h  f in a n c ia l  in s t i tu t io n s .  B y 
th e  e n d  o f  2 0 0 4 ,  2 5 ,0 0 0  c a rd s  h a d  b e e n  issu e d ; n o t  su rp r is in g ly  g iv e n  th e  lo w  
ce ilin g , m o s t  o f  th e  c a rd s  h a v e  g o n e  to  m ic ro  e n te rp r ise s .
A  s u b s ta n t ia l  p a r t  o f  B N D E S  f u n d s  fo r  m ic r o ,  sm a ll ,  a n d  m e d iu m - s iz e d  
e n te rp r is e s  is m a n a g e d  b y  B a n c o  d o  B ras il, th e  la rg e s t b a n k  in  L a t in  A m e ric a , 
w h ic h  a lso  uses its o w n  fu n d s  fo r  th e se  p u rp o se s . T h e  m a in  se c to r  s u p p o r te d  b y  
B a n c o  d o  B ras il is a g r ic u ltu re ,  in c lu d in g  b o th  la rg e -sc a le  o p e ra t io n s  a n d  sm a ll  
ru ra l  h o ld in g s .  T h e  b a n k  a lso  h as  sev e ra l w o r k in g  c a p ita l  lin e s  fo r  sm a ll i n d u s ­
t r ia l  a n d  se rv ice s  c o m p a n ie s .  F o r  e x a m p le , B B  G ir o  R a p id o  p ro v id e s  w o r k in g  
c a p ita l  fo r  6 6 0 ,0 0 0  c o m p a n ie s  w i th  a n n u a l  sa les u p  to  a b o u t  $ 1 .5  m il l io n ,  w h ile  
t h e  n e w e r  B B  G ir o  A u to m a t ic o  se rv es  f i rm s  w i th  sa les u p  to  $ 1 5 0 ,0 0 0 .  A d d i ­
t io n a l  f in a n c in g  is p ro v id e d  fo r  fo re ig n  tra d e  tra n s a c tio n s  fo r  S M E s , a n d  a  n e w  
p ro g ra m  h a s  b e e n  d e v e lo p e d  to  h e lp  sm a ll f i rm s  b e g in  to  sell a b ro a d .52
D e s p ite  th e ir  c u r re n t ly  sm a lle r  ro le  w i th  re sp e c t to  S M E s , th e  m a jo r  n a tio n a l  
a n d  fo re ig n  p r iv a te  b a n k s  a re  a lso  b e g in n in g  to  m o v e  in to  th is  a rea . Several re a ­
so n s  seem  to  b e  b e h in d  th e i r  n e w  in te re s t:  th e  b a n k s  c an  c h a rg e  h ig h e r  in te re s t  
r a te s  a n d  sp re a d s  o n  lo a n s  to  sm a ll  f irm s ; sm a lle r  f i rm s  t e n d  to  b e  lo y a l c lie n ts  
a n d  to  be  o p e n  to  th e  p u rc h a se  o f  o th e r  f in a n c ia l  p ro d u c ts ;  th e  lo w  level o f  b a n k  
access a m o n g  sm a ll  f i rm s  p ro v id e s  a  m a rk e t  to  b e  e x p lo ite d ; a n d  lo a n s  t o  sm a ll 
f irm s  c a n  re su lt  in  a c c o u n ts  f ro m  th e  f irm s ’ e m p lo y e es . I n  a d d it io n ,  n e w  c re d i t  
s c o r in g  te c h n iq u e s , b e t te r  c re d i t  b u re a u s , a n d  in c re a se d  u se  o f  th e  I n te r n e t  h av e  
m a d e  i t  m o re  e c o n o m ic a l  to  se rv ice  sm a lle r  c lie n ts . A m o n g  th e  b a n k s  th a t  h av e  
e s ta b lish e d  sp ec ia l a r ra n g e m e n ts  to  a t t r a c t  sm a ll  f irm s  a re  th e  lo ca l g ia n ts  B ra d e -  
sco , I ta u ,  a n d  U n ib a n c o ,  as w e ll as B a n k B o s to n , S a n ta n d e r , a n d  H S B C .53
I n  a d d it io n  to  th e  c o m m e rc ia l  a n d  d e v e lo p m e n t  b a n k s , o th e r  f in a n c ia l  in s t i ­
tu t io n s  t h a t  a re  im p o r ta n t  fo r  S M E s in  B raz il in c lu d e  c re d i t  c o o p e ra tiv e s , leas­
in g  c o m p a n ie s , a n d  fa c to r in g  f irm s— a lth o u g h  th e  la t te r  a re  d e s ig n a te d  as n o n f i -  
n a n c ia l  b y  B ra z ilia n  law . T h e  1 ,0 0 0  c r e d i t  c o o p e ra tiv e s  a re  g r o u p e d  in to  th re e  
la rg e  n e tw o rk s  a n d  p ro v id e  m o s tly  sm a ll  lo a n s  to  th e i r  o n e  m il l io n  o r  so  m e m ­
bers . C r e d i t  c o o p e ra tiv e  a re  n o w  a llo w e d  to  o w n  b a n k s . T h e  lea s in g  c o m p a n ie s  
a re  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  la r g e r  th a n  th e  c o o p e ra t iv e s  in  t e rm s  o f  a sse ts , r e p re s e n t in g  
3 .3  p e rc e n t  o f  to ta l  f in a n c ia l  sy s te m  asse ts v e rsu s o n ly  0 .7 5  p e rc e n t  fo r  c o o p e ra ­
tives. F a c to r in g  is o u ts id e  th e  sy s tem , b u t  th e  7 0 0  c o m p a n ie s  w e re  e s t im a te d  to  
h a v e  a  p o r tfo lio  o f  a b o u t  $1  b i ll io n  a n d  to  h a n d le  d ea ls  re p re s e n tin g  2 .3  p e rc e n t  
o f  G D P , m u c h  o f  i t  s e rv in g  s m a lle r  f i rm s  t h a t  h a v e  d i f f ic u l ty  o b ta in in g  b a n k  
f in a n c e . L easin g , b y  c o n tra s t ,  te n d s  to  b e  a sso c ia te d  w i th  la rg e r  f irm s  (fo r  te c h ­
n o lo g y  p u rp o se s )  a n d  m id d le -  o r  u p p e r-c la s s  in d iv id u a ls  ( fo r  a u to m o b i le s ) .54
52. Banco do Brasil website (www.bb.com.br).
53. Based on interviews with bankers as reported in Morais (2004). Banks vary substantially in 
how they define small firms and how they approach the challenge of responding to their needs. 
Some emphasize small and medium-sized firms, while others focus on micro and small businesses. 
One common approach is to set up special units to deal with smaller clients.
54. Kumar (2005, chap. 4).
Conclusions
T h e  B ra z ilia n  f in a n c ia l  sy s te m  c o n t in u e s  to  b e  b a n k - b a s e d  a n d  d o m in a t e d  b y  
p u b l ic  f in a n c ia l  in s t i t u t io n s ,  d e s p i te  th e  la rg e  size  o f  i ts  c a p i ta l  m a rk e ts .  T h is  
s t r u c tu r e  r e p re s e n ts  th e  in h e r i t a n c e  o f  th e  im p o r t - s u b s t i t u t i o n  p o lic ie s  o f  th e  
e a r ly  p o s tw a r  y ea rs  a n d  th e  m a c ro e c o n o m ic  u n c e r ta in t ie s  o f  th e  1 9 8 0 s , w h ic h  
m a d e  th e  p r iv a te  b a n k s  v e ry  c o n se rv a tiv e  in  te rm s  o f  se e k in g  a lte rn a tiv e  m e c h a ­
n ism s  o f  in te r m e d ia t io n  a n d  e x p a n d in g  th e  m a tu r i ty  o f  th e i r  o p e ra t io n s .  A t  th e  
sa m e  tim e , th e  c a p ita l  m a rk e ts  w e re  l im ite d  to  e q u ity  a n d  s h o r t - te r m  b o n d s  a n d  
n o te s  issu e d  b y  a  sm a ll  n u m b e r  o f  c o m p a n ie s , m o s t  o f  w h ic h  w e re  g o v e rn m e n t  
o w n e d . I n s t i tu t io n a l  in v e s to rs  w e re  d o m in a te d  b y  p e n s io n  fu n d s  a sso c ia te d  w ith  
p u b l ic  e n te rp r is e s ,  in s u r a n c e  c o m p a n ie s ,  a n d  in v e s tm e n t  fu n d s  d e a l in g  a lm o s t  
e x c lu s iv e ly  w i th  s h o r t - t e r m  s e c u r i t ie s ,  p a r t i c u la r ly  in f la t io n - in d e x e d  p u b l ic  
b o n d s .
In  th e  19 9 0 s  B razil’s f in a n c ia l  sy s tem  fa ce d  m a n y  ch a llen g es, p o se d  b y  c h an g es  
in  re g u la t io n ,  e x te r n a l  o p e n in g ,  a n d  a  m a c r o e c o n o m ic  e n v i r o n m e n t  t h a t  w as 
su b s ta n tia lly  d if fe re n t  f ro m  th a t  o f  th e  p re v io u s  d e ca d e . A  b a n k  re fo rm  w as in t r o ­
d u c e d  in  1 9 8 8 , w h ic h  p e r m i t te d  th e  fo rm a l c o n s o l id a t io n  o f  e x is tin g  f in a n c ia l  
i n s t i t u t io n s  in to  u n iv e r s a l  b a n k s .  T h e  p ro c e s s  o f  p r iv a t iz a t io n  in i t i a t e d  in  th e  
1 9 9 0 s  c h a n g e d  th e  s tru c tu re  o f  th e  p e n s io n  fu n d s  (a  s ig n if ic a n t n u m b e r  o f  w h ic h  
b e c a m e  p r iv a te  e n tit ie s ) ,  w h ile  c re a tin g  p ro f i ta b le  o p p o r tu n it ie s  fo r  d e a lin g  w ith  
s to c k s  a n d  c o rp o ra te  b o n d s . T h e  rise  o f  e x te rn a l p o r tfo lio  flow s in to  th e  e c o n o m y  
gave  a n  a d d it io n a l  b o o s t  to  c a p ita l m ark e ts . F inally , th e  a c h ie v e m e n t o f  p r ic e  s ta ­
b i li ty  in  1 9 9 4  c h a n g e d  b o th  th e  o p e ra t in g  e n v iro n m e n t  fo r  b a n k s  a n d  th e  p o r t f o ­
lio  a llo c a tio n  s tra te g y  o f  in s t i tu t io n a l  in v es to rs . F in a n c ia l  o p e n in g  a n d  in c re a sed  
c o m p e t i t io n  a c c e le ra te d  th e  c o n s o l id a t io n  p ro c e ss  o f  f in a n c ia l  in s t i tu t io n s ,  th e  
in t r o d u c t io n  o f  te c h n o lo g ic a l  im p ro v e m e n ts ,  th e  r is in g  im p o r ta n c e  o f  i n s t i t u ­
t io n a l  in v es to rs , th e  g ro w th  o f  se cu ritie s  a n d  d e riv a tiv es m a rk e ts , a n d  th e  c o n so li­
d a t io n  a n d  in te rn a t io n a l iz a t io n  o f  th e  f in a n c ia l b u sin ess .
I n  1 9 9 4 - 9 5 ,  th e  n e a r-c r is is  in  th e  b a n k in g  se c to r  h e ig h te n e d  th e  d e m a n d  fo r 
g re a te r  s ta b ility . T h is  re s u l te d  in  im p o r ta n t  c h a n g e s  in  re g u la t io n  a n d  s u p e rv i­
s io n , p a r tic u la r ly  re la te d  to  th e  in it ia tiv e s  e n c o m p a s se d  b y  th e  B asel A c co rd . T h e  
p ro c ess  o f  r e s t r u c tu r in g  th e  p r iv a te  b a n k in g  sec to r, w h ic h  b e g a n  in  1 9 9 5 , g e n e r ­
a te d  s ig n if ic a n t c h a n g e s  in  th e  p a t t e rn  o f  o w n e rsh ip  in  th e  sec to r, in c lu d in g  a n  
in c re a se  in  fo re ig n  p a r t ic ip a t io n  a n d  a  f u r th e r  c o n s o l id a t io n  w i th in  la rg e  f in a n ­
c ia l c o n g lo m e ra te s . I n  1 9 9 7 , a  d e e p  re fo rm  o f  th e  p u b l ic  b a n k in g  s e c to r  w as in i ­
t ia te d ,  le a d in g  to  th e  p r iv a t iz a t io n  o r  r e s t r u c tu r in g  o f  m o s t  o f  th e  s ta te  b a n k s  
a n d  f in a n c ia l in s t i tu t io n s .
In c re a s in g  m a c r o e c o n o m ic  a n d  m a r k e t  u n c e r ta in t ie s  in  1 9 9 7 —9 8  t r ig g e re d  
s ig n i f ic a n t  c h a n g e s  in  th e  s t ra te g ie s  o f  f in a n c ia l  i n s t i t u t io n s .  T h e  g ro w in g  
d o m e s tic  p u b l ic  d e b t  a n d  th e  h ig h  in te re s t  r a te  p o lic y  a g a in  le d  p r iv a te  in s t i tu ­
t io n s  to  g e a r  t h e i r  p o r t f o l io  a l lo c a t io n  to w a rd  s h o r t - t e r m  p u b l ic  a sse ts . A t  th e
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s a m e  t im e ,  th e  r e d u c e d  access o f  B ra z il ia n  f i rm s  to  i n te r n a t io n a l  m a rk e ts  
r e n e w e d  th e  s e a rc h  fo r  a l te rn a t iv e  m e c h a n is m s  to  f in a n c e  e c o n o m ic  a c tiv ity , 
th e re b y  re in fo rc in g  th e  d o m e s tic  b o n d  m a rk e ts  to  so m e  e x te n t.
A s o f  th e  m id - 2 0 0 0 s ,  th e  B ra z ilia n  f in a n c ia l  sy s te m  is p r o f i ta b le  a n d  s ta b le , 
b u t  i t  s t i ll  d o e s  n o t  fu l f i l l  i ts  m a in  f u n c t io n — n a m e ly , to  p ro v id e  a d e q u a te  
re so u rce s  fo r  th e  p ro d u c tiv e  s e c to r  so  as to  s u p p o r t  th e  e f fo r t  to  r e tu r n  to  a  h ig h -  
g ro w th  p a th .  A  la rg e  p a r t  o f  t h e  p ro b le m  d e r iv e d  f ro m  th e  series  o f  sh o c k s  th a t  
h i t  th e  e c o n o m y : th e  c u r re n c y  c ris is  in  1 9 9 9 ; th e  e n e rg y  c ris is  in  2 0 0 1 ,  ex ac er­
b a te d  b y  th e  e c o n o m ic  a n d  p o l i t ic a l  p r o b le m s  in  n e ig h b o r in g  A r g e n t in a ;  a n d  
th e  in s ta b i l i ty  a r o u n d  th e  p re s id e n tia l  e le c tio n s  in  2 0 0 2 .  N e v e r th e le ss , d if f ic u l­
tie s  a lso  re m a in  in h e r e n t  in  th e  f in a n c ia l  sy s tem  i ts e lf  a n d  its  re la tio n s h ip  to  th e  
m a c ro e c o n o m ic  c o n te x t  in  B razil.
E x p a n d in g  th e  f in a n c ia l  s e c to r  a n d  t r a n s f o r m in g  i t  in to  a  m o r e  f u n c t io n a l  
i n s t r u m e n t  fo r  s u s ta in e d  e c o n o m ic  d e v e lo p m e n t  c o n t in u e s  to  b e  o n e  o f  th e  
g re a te s t  c h a l le n g e s  fa c in g  p o lic y m a k e r s  in  B ra z il. W i t h  r e g a rd  t o  th e  b a n k in g  
se c to r, a  k e y  e n d e a v o r  is to  re d u c e  sp re a d s  in  o rd e r  to  in c re a se  th e  d e m a n d  fo r  
c re d it .  T h e  c e n tra l  b a n k  se t o u t  a n  a g e n d a  in  th is  a rea  in  1 9 9 9 . I t  in c lu d e s  sev­
e ra l m ea su re s  to  in c re a se  c o m p e t i t io n  a m o n g  b a n k s  (b y  in tr o d u c in g  m o re  t r a n s ­
p a r e n c y  a n d  f le x ib i l i ty  fo r  b a n k  a c c o u n t  h o ld e r s ) ,  r e d u c e  th e  ta x  b u r d e n  o n  
lo a n s ,  a n d  lo w e r c o m p u ls o r y  re se rv e  leve ls . I n  2 0 0 4 ,  th e  g o v e r n m e n t  d e f in e d  
ru le s  fo r  s im p li f ie d  b a n k  a c c o u n ts  a n d  fo r  lo w e r  in te r e s t  ra te s  o n  lo a n s  w h e n  
p a y m e n ts  a re  w i th h e ld  f ro m  w ag es . T h e s e  c h a n g e s  p e r  se  a re  a m o n g  th e  m a in  
fa c to rs  re sp o n s ib le  fo r  th e  c o u n tr y ’s r e c e n t  c r e d i t  e x p a n s io n , b u t  th e i r  e ffe c t o n  
b a n k  sp re ad s  h a s  b e e n  l im ite d . A t  th e  sa m e  t im e , in te re s t  ra te s  re m a in  h ig h , a n d  
th e y  w ill o n ly  c o m e  d o w n  w h e n  in f la t io n  h a s  b e e n  b r o u g h t  u n d e r  c o n tro l .
I n  th e  a rea  o f  lo n g - te rm  f in a n c in g , p a r t ic u la r ly  th e  c a p ita l  m a rk e ts , th e  g o v ­
e r n m e n t  a g e n d a  h a s  b e e n  c e n te re d  o n  in s t i tu t io n a l  issues, s u c h  as re fo rm in g  th e  
b a n k r u p tc y  law s a n d  s t r e n g th e n in g  p r o p e r ty  r ig h ts . T h e  e ffec ts  o f  s u c h  m ic ro -  
e c o n o m ic  re fo rm s  are  lo n g  t e r m , h o w ev er, a n d  d e v e lo p in g  c a p ita l  m a rk e ts  tak es 
m o re  th a n  a n  a d e q u a te  in s t i tu t io n a l  se ttin g . O th e r  re q u ire m e n ts  in c lu d e  m a c ro -  
e c o n o m ic  s ta b ility , a c tiv e  s e c o n d a ry  m a rk e ts , a n d  th e  p ro s p e c t  o f  s t ro n g  p ro f its .  
A n o th e r  fa c to r  is th e  p re se n c e  a  su ff ic ie n t g ro u p  o f  a c to rs  to  p a r t ic ip a te — firm s  
t h a t  w a n t  to  se e k  re so u rc e s  a n d  a re  a b le  to  m e e t  th e  n e c e ssa ry  p re re q u is i te s ,  as 
w e ll as in s t i tu t io n a l  a n d  o th e r  in v es to rs .
I n  th e  m e a n t im e ,  th e  r is in g  d e m a n d  fo r  lo n g - te r m  f in a n c in g  h a s  in c re a s e d  
th e  b u r d e n  o n  th e  p u b l ic  b a n k s .  B N D E S ,  in  p a r t ic u la r ,  h a s  t h e  c a p a c i ty  to  
e x p a n d  lo a n s  b a se d  o n  th e  e x is tin g  f u n d in g  m e c h a n ism s , b u t  th is  c a p a c ity  w ill 
b e  se r io u s ly  c h a l le n g e d  i f  g ro w th  is s u s ta in e d  a n d  th e  d e m a n d  fo r  in v e s tm e n t  
f in a n c in g  rise s  a c c o rd in g ly . U n d e r  th o s e  c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,  th e  p u b l ic  b a n k s  w ill 
n e e d  to  f in d  in n o v a t iv e  w ay s to  lev e rag e  th e i r  f in a n c in g  c a p a c ity , p r o b a b ly  b y  
t a p p in g  p r iv a te  m a rk e ts  fo r  c o f in a n c in g , p ro je c t  f in a n c in g , se c u ri t iz a tio n , a n d  so 
o n . T h is  sc e n a r io  m a y  p re s e n t  a  w in d o w  o f  o p p o r tu n i ty  fo r  th e  g o v e rn m e n t  to
m o v e  f r o m  d i r e c t  r e s o u rc e  a l lo c a t io n  to w a r d  th e  g re a te r  c h a l le n g e  o f  m a r k e t  
e n h a n c e m e n t  a n d  m a rk e t  d e v e lo p m e n t.
A n o th e r  se r io u s  c h a lle n g e  fa c in g  B razil is f in a n c e  fo r  S M E s . A u th o r i t ie s  w ill 
n e e d  to  c o n s id e r  b o th  a  m e d iu m - te r m  a n d  a  lo n g - te r m  s tr a te g y  fo r  a d d re s s in g  
th is  issue. T h e  m e d iu m - te r m  s tra te g y  in v o lv es d e s ig n in g  r is k -m it ig a t in g  p o lic ies  
(su c h  as im p ro v in g  th e  q u a l i ty  a n d  t r a n s p a re n c y  o f  S M E  a c c o u n t in g  in f o r m a ­
t io n ,  e x p a n d in g  th e  u se  o f  c r e d i t  b u re a u s ,  a n d  t r a in in g  S M E  a d m in is t r a to r s  in  
a c c o u n t  a n d  f in a n c ia l d isc lo su re  m e th o d s ) ,  e s ta b lish in g  ta x  a n d  o th e r  in c e n tiv e s  
to  in c rease  th e  p a r t ic ip a t io n  o f  S M E s in  th e  fo rm a l eco n o m y , b u ild in g  c o lla te ra l-  
s u b s t i tu t io n  m e c h a n ism s  (su ch  as c re d it  g u a ra n te e  sch em es), a n d  s u p p o r t in g  v e n ­
tu re  c a p ita l  fo r  e lig ib le  f irm s . T h e  lo n g - te rm  s tra te g y  s h o u ld  in c lu d e  p o lic ie s  to  
re d u c e  m a c ro e c o n o m ic  in s ta b il ity  so  as to  c rea te  a  m o re  s ta b le  b u s in e ss  e n v iro n ­
m e n t  fo r  S M E s; in s t i tu t io n  b u i ld in g  a n d  m a rk e tin g  e n h a n c e m e n ts  to  fo s te r  th e  
d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  f in a n c ia l  m a rk e ts  in  g e n e ra l, as w e ll as f in a n c ia l  in te rm e d ia r ie s  
sp e c ia liz ed  in  g r a n tin g  c re d it  to  S M E s; a n d  th e  in t r o d u c t io n  o f  m a rk e ts  sp ec ia l­
ized  in  d e a lin g  w i th  sm a lle r  f irm s . T h e  d e v e lo p m e n t o f  a n  a p p ro p r ia te  re g u la to ry  
fra m e w o rk , c lear a n d  t ra n s p a re n t  ru les  o f  th e  g a m e , a n d  a d e q u a te  su p e rv is io n  is a  
s in e  q u a  n o n  fo r a n y  m a rk e t  to  f lo u rish , b u t  i t  is n o t  su ffic ie n t.
A ll o f  th e se  p o lic ie s  to  in c re a se  f in a n c e  a n d  p ro v id e  g re a te r  access a re  m e a n t  
to  s t im u la te  th e  p r iv a te  se c to r, n o t  s u b s t i tu te  fo r  it. T h e  p r o p e r  ro le  fo r  p u b l ic  
p o l ic y  m u s t  c o n t in u o u s ly  b e  a d d re s s e d , so  t h a t  g o v e r n m e n t  i n te r v e n t io n  d o e s  
n o t  d isp la c e  th e  m a rk e t  a n d  sca rce  fiscal re so u rce s  a re  u se d  in  th e  m o s t  so c ia lly  
e f f ic ie n t  w ay. A  lo n g - te r m  w a y  to  d e a l  w i th  th e s e  p r o b le m s  is to  in t r o d u c e  
m a rk e t- e n h a n c in g  p o lic ies , t h a t  is, p o lic ies  th a t  a re  m e a n t  to  im p ro v e  th e  c o n d i­
t io n s  fo r  f in a n c e  a n d  to  in c re ase  th e  size a n d  d e p th  o f  f in a n c ia l  m ark e ts .
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A  P o l ic y  A g e n d a  
f o r  t h e  F i n a n c i a l  S e c to r
T h is  b o o k  h as  a n a ly ze d  th e  d o m e s tic  f in a n c ia l sy s te m  in  L a t in  A m e ric a  a n d  
h o w  i t  h a s  c h a n g e d  s in c e  th e  e a rly  19 9 0 s . E x p a n d in g  f in a n c e  is o n e  o f  th e  
m a jo r  c h a lle n g e s  f a c in g  g o v e r n m e n ts  o f  d e v e lo p in g  c o u n tr i e s ,  as t h e y  t r y  to  
s p e e d  u p  e c o n o m ic  g ro w th  a n d  re d u c e  p o v e r ty  to  im p ro v e  th e  w e lfa re  o f  th e i r  
c itiz e n s . A  la rg e  b o d y  o f  l i te ra tu re  n o w  p ro v id e s  e v id e n c e  t h a t  access to  f in a n c e , 
th r o u g h  d o m e s tic  b a n k in g  sy s tem s a n d  lo ca l c a p ita l  m a rk e ts , is a n  e sse n tia l  e le ­
m e n t  fo r  p r o m o tin g  g ro w th . O u r  e v id e n c e  in d ic a te s  t h a t  th e  re la t io n s h ip  r u n s  
in  th e  o th e r  d i r e c tio n  as w e ll, b u t  f in a n c e  a n d  g ro w th  a re  c le a rly  in te r tw in e d .  A  
s m a lle r  b o d y  o f  re se a rc h  su g g e s ts  t h a t  th e r e  is a lso  a  p o s i t iv e  r e la t io n s h ip  
b e tw e e n  f in a n c e  a n d  p o v e r ty  r e d u c t io n .  F in a n c ia l  s ta b i l i ty  p lay s  a n  i m p o r t a n t  
ro le  in  b o th  re la tio n s h ip s ,  s in c e  f in a n c ia l  c rises  a re  h ig h ly  d a m a g in g  to  g ro w th  
p ro s p e c ts ,  a n d  th e y  a re  p a r t ic u la r ly  h a r m f u l  to  th e  m o s t  v u ln e r a b le  g r o u p s  in  
society .
W e  fo c u s  o n  th e  d o m e s tic  f in a n c ia l  sec to r, b u t  w e  m a k e  i t  c le a r  th r o u g h o u t  
th e  b o o k  t h a t  i t  is n e c e s s a ry  to  ta k e  a c c o u n t  o f  th e  m u l t i p le  l in k s  b e tw e e n  
d o m e s t i c  a n d  i n te r n a t io n a l  f in a n c e .  F ir s t ,  in c re a s e d  f in a n c ia l  l ib e r a l iz a t io n  
a llo w s  a  g re a te r  v o lu m e  o f  f o r e ig n  p o r t f o l io  i n v e s tm e n t  to  e n te r  d e v e lo p in g  
e c o n o m ie s ,  t h r o u g h  b o th  d o m e s t ic  b a n k in g  sy s te m s  a n d  c a p i ta l  m a rk e ts .  S ec ­
o n d ,  fo re ig n  b a n k s  a n d  c a p ita l  m a rk e ts  p ro v id e  a n  a l te rn a tiv e  so u rc e  o f  f in a n c e  
fo r  so m e  b o rro w e rs  f ro m  d e v e lo p in g  c o u n tr ie s ,  e sp ec ia lly  g o v e rn m e n ts  a n d  la rg e  
c o rp o ra t io n s .  T h ir d ,  fo re ig n  o w n e rsh ip  o f  b a n k s  a n d  o th e r  f in a n c ia l  in s t i tu t io n s
in  d e v e lo p in g  c o u n tr ie s  h a s  in c re a s e d  s u b s ta n tia lly . F o u r th ,  in te r n a t io n a l  ru le s  
a n d  r e g u la t io n s  a re  h a v in g  a  g r o w in g  im p a c t  o n  th e  o p e r a t io n  of d o m e s t ic  
f in a n c ia l  sy s tem s. O n e  o f  th e  c ru c ia l  ta sk s  o f  o u r  an a ly sis  is to  assess th e s e  re la ­
t io n s h ip s  a n d  su g g e st w ay s to  ta k e  a d v a n ta g e  o f  th e  p o s it iv e  a sp ec ts  o f  f in a n c ia l 
g lo b a liz a tio n  w h ile  a v o id in g  th e  n e g a tiv e  o n es.
I n  a d d i t io n  to  d o m e s t ic - in te r n a t io n a l  l in k s ,  w e  a lso  h ig h l ig h t  c o n n e c t io n s  
b e tw e e n  th e  p u b l ic  a n d  p r iv a te  s e c to rs .  W e  a g re e  w i th  t h e  g e n e ra l  t h r u s t  o f  
f in a n c ia l  l ib e ra liz a tio n . T h e  e c o n o m ie s  o f  L a tin  A m e ric a , a n d  m o s t  o th e r  d e v e l­
o p in g  c o u n tr ie s , h a v e  b e c o m e  fa r  to o  c o m p le x  fo r  g o v e rn m e n ts  to  m ic ro m a n a g e  
th e i r  f in a n c ia l  sy s tem s, b u t  th is  d o e s  n o t  m e a n  th a t  g o v e rn m e n ts  n o  lo n g e r  h av e  
a n y  ro le  to  p lay . W h ile  p a r t ic u la r  c irc u m s ta n c e s  v a ry  f ro m  c o u n t r y  to  c o u n try ,  
w e  c a n  su g g e s t a  m in im a l  l is t  o f  r e q u ir e d  g o v e rn m e n t  fu n c tio n s .  G o v e rn m e n ts  
n e e d  to  p ro v id e  a  s ta b le  m a c r o e c o n o m ic  e n v i r o n m e n t ;  t h e y  m u s t  p r o v id e  a  
s t ro n g  in s t i tu t io n a l  f ra m e w o rk , in c lu d in g  p ru d e n t ia l  re g u la tio n  a n d  su p e rv is io n ; 
a n d  th e y  s h o u ld  e n g a g e  in  m a r k e t- e n h a n c in g  p o lic ie s  to  d e a l w i th  p ro b le m s  o f  
m is s in g  o r  in c o m p le te  f in a n c ia l  m a rk e ts .  W e  d is c u s s  th e  p re c is e  m e a n in g s  o f  
th e se  v a r io u s  ro les  m o re  fu l ly  below .
T h is  c o n c lu d in g  c h a p te r  h a s  tw o  g oals . O n e  is to  su m m a r iz e  th e  m a in  f in d ­
in g s  o f  th e  b o o k . T h e  s u m m a ry  is d iv id e d  in to  th re e  p a r ts .  T h e  f irs t  tw o  rev iew  
L a t in  A m e ric a ’s la g g in g  b e h a v io r  w i th  re sp e c t  to  b a n k in g  a n d  c a p i ta l  m a rk e ts . 
T h e  th i r d  c o m p a re s  th e  c o u n tr y  e x p e rien c e s  w e  h a v e  p re se n te d — th e  th re e  L a tin  
A m e r ic a n  case  s tu d ie s  a n d  s o m e  o f  th e  m a te r ia l  o n  E a s t  A s ia . W e  w a n t  to  
e x p la in  th e  re a so n s  fo r  L a t in  A m e r ic a s  d i s a p p o in t in g  p e r fo rm a n c e ,  b u t  w e  a re  
a lso  in te re s te d  in  id e n t i fy in g  le sso n s  f ro m  th e  successes o f  th e  d if fe re n t  c o u n tr ie s  
a n d  th e  p ro b le m s  th e y  h a v e  e n c o u n te r e d .  T h e  o th e r  g o a l is to  o u t l in e  a  se t  o f  
p o l ic y  r e c o m m e n d a t io n s ,  b a s e d  o n  th e  re s u lts  o f  o u r  re s e a rc h . T h e y  a re  o rg a ­
n iz e d  a c c o rd in g  to  five  p o lic y  areas: m a c ro e c o n o m ic  e n v iro n m e n t ,  in s t i tu t io n a l  
d e v e lo p m e n t ,  r e g io n a l  a n d  in te r n a t io n a l  c o n te x t ,  f in a n c e  fo r  in v e s tm e n t ,  a n d  
access to  f in a n c e  fo r  sm a ll f irm s .
Banks and Capital Markets since 1990
B a n k s  a n d  c a p ita l  m a rk e ts  a re  th e  m a in  c o m p o n e n ts  o f  d o m e s tic  f in a n c ia l  sys­
te m s  in  L a t in  A m e ric a . T h e y  sh a re  a  n u m b e r  o f  fe a tu re s , e sp e c ia lly  th e  c o n te x t  
in  w h ic h  th e y  o p e ra te .  T h e  m a in  c o n te x tu a l  fa c to rs  in  w h ic h  w e  are  in te re s te d  
in c lu d e  m a c r o e c o n o m ic s ,  i n s t i t u t io n s ,  a n d  i n te r n a t io n a l  f in a n c ia l  l in k a g e s .  
N o n e th e le s s ,  b a n k s  a n d  m a rk e ts  a re  a lso  d i f f e r e n t  e n o u g h  in  t h e i r  o p e r a t io n s  
a n d  th e i r  p re re q u is ite s  t h a t  w e  n e e d  to  d iscu ss  th e m  sep a ra te ly . W e  c o n c e n tr a te  
f i r s t  o n  L a tin  A m e ric a  a n d  th e n  b r in g  in  o u r  an a ly sis  o f  E a s t A s ia  w h e n  w e  c o m ­
p a re  o u r  c o u n try - le v e l f in d in g s  o n  a n  in tr a -  a n d  in te r re g io n a l  basis.
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The Weakness o f Latin American Banks
F in a n c ia l  l ib e r a l iz a t io n  b e g a n  in  C h i le  in  t h e  1 9 7 0 s  a n d  w a s  w id e ly  a d o p te d  
th r o u g h o u t  th e  re g io n  in  th e  1 9 8 0 s  a n d  1 9 9 0 s . G o v e rn m e n t  c o n tro l  o f  in te re s t  
ra te s ,  h ig h  re se rv e  r e q u ir e m e n ts ,  a n d  d i r e c te d  c r e d i t  a re  la rg e ly — th o u g h  n o t  
c o m p le te ly — a  t h in g  o f  th e  p a s t .  T h e s e  c h a n g e s  t r a n s f o r m e d  th e  o p e r a t io n  o f  
L a tin  A m e ric a ’s b a n k in g  sy s tem s, e s ta b lish in g  n e w  ru le s  fo r  th e ir  o p e ra t io n , n e w  
o w n e rs h ip  p a t te rn s ,  a n d  n e w  ro les  fo r  g o v e rn m e n ts .  S o m e  o f  th e  c h a n g e s  w e re  
in h e r e n t  in  th e  l ib e ra l iz a t io n  p ro c ess  itse lf, w h ile  o th e rs  s te m m e d  f ro m  th e  crises 
t h a t  f re q u e n tly  fo llo w e d  lib e ra liz a tio n .
W e  d e f in e d  f in a n c ia l  l ib e ra liz a tio n  as th e  d e re g u la t io n  o f  th e  d o m e s tic  f in a n ­
c ia l sec to r. O u r  m a in  h y p o th e s is ,  w h ic h  w as s u p p o r te d  b y  v a r io u s  ty p es  o f  ev i­
d e n c e ,  s u g g e s te d  t h a t  w h e th e r  l ib e r a l iz a t io n  r e s u l te d  in  c r is is  w as  d e te r m in e d  
m a in ly  b y  th e  p o lic ie s  th a t  a c c o m p a n ie d  it. W e  fo c u se d  o n  th re e  k in d s  o f  p o l i ­
c ies. F irs t  w as m a c ro e c o n o m ic  p o licy . F a r  to o  m a n y  c o u n tr ie s  i n s t i tu te d  f in a n ­
c ia l l ib e r a l iz a t io n  u n d e r  v e ry  a d v e rse  m a c r o e c o n o m ic  c o n d i t io n s :  lo w  a n d  
v o la tile  g ro w th ; h ig h  in f la t io n  a n d  s ig n if ic a n t  b u d g e t  d e fic its ; a n d  e x ch a n g e  ra te  
re g im e s  th a t  le d  to  t r a d e  d e f ic its ,  la rg e  c a p ita l  in f lo w s , a n d  in c re a s e d  f in a n c ia l  
frag ility . A  s e c o n d  p o l ic y  t h a t  o f te n  a c c o m p a n ie d  re fo rm s  w a s  c a p ita l  a c c o u n t  
o p e n in g  b e fo re  d o m e s tic  b a n k in g  sy s te m s w e re  s t ro n g  e n o u g h  to  d e a l w i th  th e  
n e w  ch a llen g e s  a r is in g  f ro m  in te rn a t io n a l  in te g ra t io n . T h is  in c re a se d  v u ln e ra b il­
i ty  a n d  c re a te d  c h a n n e ls  fo r  c o n ta g io n . A  th i r d  p o licy , w h o se  a b se n ce  f re q u e n t ly  
c o n t r ib u te d  to  c rises , w as  a d e q u a te  p r u d e n t ia l  r e g u la tio n  a n d  su p e rv is io n . T h e  
te n d e n c y  a m o n g  th e  cases s tu d ie d  w a s  to  im p le m e n t  m in im a l  r e g u la t io n  a f te r  
th e  in i t ia l  l ib e ra l iz a t io n , w h ic h  o f te n  r e su lte d  in  le n d in g  b o o m s , la c k  o f  p ro p e r  
risk  m a n a g e m e n t,  a n d  ev er la rg e r  v o lu m e s  o f  n o n p e r fo r m in g  lo an s .
S u c c ess fu l p o lic ie s  w i th  re s p e c t  to  m a c r o e c o n o m ic  p e r fo r m a n c e ,  c a p ita l  
a c c o u n t  m a n a g e m e n t,  a n d  re g u la tio n  a n d  su p e rv is io n  d e p e n d e d  o n  th e  ex is ten ce  
o f  s t r o n g  in s t i tu t io n s .  W i t h o u t  g o o d  in s t i tu t io n s  in  p la c e , g o o d  p o lic ie s  c o u ld  
n o t  be  c a r r ie d  o u t ,  a n d  crises w e re  lik e ly  to  b e  th e  o u tc o m e . B y  in s t i tu t io n s ,  w e  
re fe r  th r o u g h o u t  th e  b o o k  to  th e  b r o a d  d e f in i t io n  o f  th e  te rm :  th e  fo rm a l  a n d  
in fo rm a l ru les  th a t  sh a p e  th e  b e h a v io r  o f  in d iv id u a ls  a n d  o rg a n iz a tio n s  b y  re d u c ­
in g  u n c e r ta in ty . In s t i tu t io n s  in  th e  m o re  c o n c re te  sense— su c h  as c a p a b le  f in a n c e  
m in is tr ie s  a n d  c e n tra l  b a n k s , to g e th e r  w i th  s t r o n g  re g u la to ry  a g en c ie s  a n d  w e ll- 
p a id  a n d  sk illed  su p e rv iso rs— w ere  a lso  essen tia l fo r  g o o d  p e rfo rm a n c e .
O n e  o f  o u r  m a jo r  f in d in g s  w as th e  t r e m e n d o u s  c o s t o f  f in a n c ia l  c rises. A n a ­
ly s ts  u s u a l ly  fo c u s  o n  th e  f isc a l c o s ts ,  b u t  c r ise s  a lso  r e s u l t  in  lo s t  G D P , h ig h  
in te re s t  ra te s , a n d  fa ll in g  asse t p rice s . W h ile  i t  is d if f ic u lt  to  s u m  th e se  a m o u n ts ,  
th e  fiscal c o s t  a n d  lo s t  G D P  in  th e  f irs t  y e a r a lo n e  av era g ed  n e a r ly  4 0  p e rc e n t  o f  
G D P  a c ro ss  th e  c o u n tr i e s  w e  s tu d ie d .  M o re o v e r ,  th e s e  c o s ts  l in g e r  fo r  a  v e ry  
lo n g  tim e . O u r  ev id e n ce , fo r  e x am p le , su g g ests  t h a t  i t  m a y  ta k e  a t  lea s t a  d e c a d e
fo r  c o u n tr ie s  to  r e tu r n  to  th e  c r e d i t - to - G D P  ra tio s  th a t  p re v a ile d  in  th e  p rec ris is  
p e r io d .
P a r t ia l ly  b e ca u se  o f  th e  l in g e r in g  effec ts  o f  c rises , th e  d o m e s tic  f in a n c ia l  sys­
te m s  in  L a tin  A m e ric a  a re  n o t  w o rk in g  w e ll to d ay . W ith  th e  e x c e p tio n  o f  C h ile , 
m o s t  s t a n d a r d  in d ic a to r s  a re  w e a k  in  c o m p a r is o n  w i th  o th e r  e m e rg in g  m a rk e t  
c o u n tr ie s ,  to  say  n o th in g  o f  in d u s tr ia l  e c o n o m ie s . F o r  e x am p le , th e  av erag e  ra tio  
o f  c r e d i t  to  G D P  in  L a t in  A m e ric a  w as o n ly  4 1  p e rc e n t  in  2 0 0 3 ,  w h ile  i t  w as 9 6  
p e rc e n t  in  E a s t A s ia  a n d  9 4  p e rc e n t  in  th e  G - 7  c o u n tr ie s . A  m u c h  sm a lle r  sh a re  
o f  a v a ilab le  c re d i t  g o e s  to  th e  p r iv a te  s e c to r  in  L a t in  A m e ric a  t h a n  in  E a s t A sia  
( ju s t  o v e r 5 0  p e rc e n t  v e rsu s  8 5  p e rc e n t,  re sp ec tiv e ly ), a n d  n o n p e r fo r m in g  lo an s  
a n d  f in a n c ia l  in e f f ic ie n c y  a re  h ig h . M a rg in s  b e tw e e n  ac tiv e  a n d  p assiv e  in te re s t  
r a te s  a re  th e r e f o r e  h ig h  to  c o v e r  th e  c o s t  o f  th e s e  in e f f ic ie n c ie s ,  w h ic h  l im its  
d e m a n d  fo r  c r e d i t  w h i le  s ti ll  p r o v id in g  th e  h ig h  r e tu r n s  t h a t  m a k e  b a n k in g  a  
lu c ra tiv e  b u sin ess .
M a n y  e x p e rts  a rg u e  in  re c e n t  l i te ra tu re  t h a t  th e  m a in  re a so n  fo r  th e  p o o r  p e r ­
fo rm a n c e  is th e  c o n t in u in g  p re se n c e  o f  s ta te -c o n tro l le d  b a n k s , e v en  a f te r  l ib e ra l­
iz a tio n . W h ile  w e  f o u n d  e v id e n c e  th a t  s u p p o r ts  th is  a rg u m e n t  in  m a n y  cases, w e  
a lso  f o u n d  e x c e p tio n s— m o s t  n o ta b ly  w h e re  s t ro n g  in s t i tu t io n s  a re  p re se n t .  R eg ­
u l a t io n  a n d  s u p e r v is io n  a re  v e ry  im p o r t a n t ,  b u t  so  a re  c o n t r o l  o f  c o r r u p t io n ,  
s t r o n g  ju d ic ia r ie s , t ra n sp a re n c y , a n d  g e n e ra l s u p p o r t  fo r  th e  ru le  o f  law . T y p e  o f  
o w n e r s h ip  b e c o m e s  less i m p o r t a n t  w h e n  p u b l ic  s e c to r  b a n k s  a re  t r e a te d  th e  
sa m e  as th e i r  p r iv a te  s e c to r  c o u n te rp a r ts ,  w i th o u t  r e g u la to ry  fo rb e a ra n c e . L ik e ­
w ise , i f  th e  in s t i tu t io n a l  c o n te x t  is w e ak , e v en  fo re ig n  b a n k s  w ill b e  h o b b le d .
I n  a d d i t io n  to  b a n k  p e r fo rm a n c e , w e  h a v e  a lso  a d d re ss e d  tw o  e c o n o m y w id e  
p ro b le m s  th a t  re su lt  f ro m  th e  in c e n tiv e  s t ru c tu re  t h a t  b a n k s  face  in  L a t in  A m e r­
ica: th e  la c k  o f  lo n g - te rm  f in a n c e  fo r  in v e s tm e n t,  w h ic h  c o n s tra in s  g ro w th , a n d  
th e  la c k  o f  a cc ess  to  a n y  k i n d  o f  f in a n c e  fo r  s m a lle r  e n te r p r is e s .  T h e  tw o  a re  
c lo se ly  re la te d . T h e  lo n g - te r m  f in a n c e  p ro b le m  is ty p ic a l o f  e c o n o m ie s  t h a t  a re  
h e av ily  re lia n t  o n  c o m m e rc ia l  b a n k s , w h ic h  n o rm a l ly  re s tr ic t  th em se lv es  to  p r o ­
v id in g  s h o r t - t e r m  lo a n s  as a  m e a n s  o f  c o n t r o l l in g  c r e d i t  r isk .  I t  a lso  e n a b le s  
th e m  to  m o n i to r  th e i r  c lie n ts  m o re  closely. A t  th e  sa m e  t im e , h o w ev er, i t  m e a n s  
t h a t  f i rm s  m u s t  f in a n c e  l o n g - te r m  p ro je c ts  b y  ro l l in g  o v e r  s h o r t - t e r m  c r e d i t ,  
u s in g  re ta in e d  e a rn in g s , o r  e n te r in g  th e  c a p ita l  m a rk e ts  i f  th e y  c a n  o b ta in  access. 
T h is  p ro b le m  le d  d e v e lo p m e n t  b a n k s  in  b o th  L a t in  A m e r ic a  a n d  E a s t  A s ia  to  
p ro v id e  lo n g - te rm  c re d i t  in  th e  e a r ly  p o s tw a r  years. A s a  re s u lt  o f  p o o r  m a n a g e ­
m e n t ,  h o w e v e r , m o s t  o f  th o s e  b a n k s  h a v e  s in c e  b e e n  c lo s e d  o r  t u r n e d  i n to  
s e c o n d - t i e r  i n s t i t u t io n s .  B ra z il  is  th e  m a in  e x a m p le  in  L a t in  A m e r ic a  w h e re  
d e v e lo p m e n t b a n k s  c o n t in u e  to  p la y  a n  im p o r ta n t  ro le  in  th e  f in a n c ia l  sec to r.
T h e  p r o b le m  o f  access fo r  sm a ll  a n d  m e d iu m -s iz e d  f irm s  is th e  o th e r  c h a l­
len g e  th a t  w e  h ig h lig h t  w i th  re sp e c t to  th e  re g io n ’s f in a n c ia l sy s tem s. L arg e  f irm s 
a re  n o t  f in a n c ia lly  c o n s tra in e d . R e se a rc h  sh o w s th a t  th e y  m o v e  f ro m  o n e  ty p e  o f  
f in a n c e  to  a n o th e r ,  d e p e n d in g  o n  th e  s ta te  o f  g lo b a l  m a rk e ts .  W h e n  access to
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in te r n a t io n a l  f in a n c e  is l im i te d ,  th e y  m o v e  in to  d o m e s tic  m a rk e ts — in c lu d in g  
c re d it  m a rk e ts— th e re b y  d isp la c in g  sm a lle r  f irm s  f ro m  th e  la tte r . S m a ll f irm s , by  
c o n tr a s t ,  d o  n o t  h a v e  access to  e i th e r  in te r n a t io n a l  f in a n c e  o r  d o m e s tic  c a p ita l  
m a r k e ts .  T h e  (v e ry ) p a r t i a l  e x c e p tio n  m a y  b e  a  fe w  m e d iu m - s iz e d  f i rm s  in  
d o m e s tic  s to c k  m a rk e ts . T h is  m e a n s  t h a t  sm a ll f irm s  a re  l im ite d  to  b a n k  c re d it,  
r e ta in e d  e a rn in g s , fa m ily  re so u rce s , a n d  su p p lie r s ’ c re d it.  G iv e n  th is  p a n o ra m a ,  
th e  g a p  b e tw e e n  la rg e  a n d  s m a ll  f i rm s  c o n t in u e s  to  w id e n .  T h e  r e a s o n s  t h a t  
b a n k s  a re  r e lu c ta n t  to  f in a n c e  sm a ll  f i rm s  a re  w e ll  k n o w n — n a m e ly , la c k  o f  
in f o r m a t io n  a n d  h ig h  t r a n s a c t io n  co sts. P u b l ic  s e c to r  b a n k s  in  so m e  c o u n tr ie s  
h a v e  h e lp e d  to  ta c k le  b o th  p ro b le m s  t h r o u g h  f ir s t-  a n d ,  esp ec ia lly , s e c o n d - t ie r  
o p e r a t io n s .  N o n e th e le s s ,  su rv e y  e v id e n c e  d e m o n s tr a te s  t h a t  sm a ll  f i rm s  c o n ­
t in u e  to  la c k  c r e d i t ,  w h ic h  p r e v e n ts  th e i r  g r o w th  a n d  h in d e r s  e m p lo y m e n t  
e x p a n s io n .
The Underdevelopment of Latin American Capital Markets
F in a n c ia l  l ib e r a l iz a t io n  fo c u s e d  m a in ly  o n  th e  b a n k in g  s e c to r ,  b u t  s p i l lo v e r  
e ffec ts a lso  h e lp e d  th e  c a p ita l  m a rk e ts  s in ce  lib e ra l iz a t io n  s ig n a le d  th a t  a  c o u n tr y  
w is h e d  to  a t t r a c t  p r iv a te  fu n d s ,  b o th  d o m e s t ic  a n d  fo re ig n . T h e  p r iv a t iz a t io n  
p ro c ess  w as im p o r ta n t  as w ell. N e w ly  p r iv a tiz e d  e n te rp r is e s  n o  lo n g e r  h a d  access 
to  g o v e r n m e n t  f u n d in g ,  so  th e y  b e g a n  to  se e k  p r iv a te  so u rc e s  t h a t  in c lu d e d  
d o m e s t ic  c a p i ta l  m a rk e ts .  A t  th e  s a m e  t im e ,  n e w ly  p r iv a t iz e d  p e n s io n  f u n d s  
n e e d e d  asse ts to  m a tc h  th e  m a tu r i ty  o f  th e ir  l ia b ilitie s  a n d  th u s  b e c a m e  a so u rc e  
o f  d e m a n d  in  th o se  cases w h e re  th e y  w e re  n o t  re s tr ic te d  to  h o ld in g  g o v e rn m e n t 
d e b t .  O v e r  t im e , r e fo rm s  t o o k  p la c e  in  th e  f in a n c ia l  s e c to r  i t s e l f  as r e g u la t io n  
a n d  s u p e r v is io n  w e re  m o d e r n iz e d ,  c o r p o ra te  g o v e rn a n c e  w a s  im p r o v e d ,  a n d  
tra n s p a re n c y  w as in c reased .
N o n e th e le s s ,  th e s e  c h a n g e s  h a v e  h a d  a  l im i te d  im p a c t ,  a n d  L a t in  A m e r ic a n  
e c o n o m ie s  r e m a in  b a n k  b a se d . O n ly  a  sm a ll  n u m b e r  o f  c o u n tr ie s  h a v e  a c tiv e  
s to c k  a n d  b o n d  m a rk e ts . A m o n g  th e  sev en  la rg e s t e c o n o m ie s , th e  av erag e  ra tio  
o f  b o n d s  o u ts ta n d in g  to  G D P  w as 3 7  p e rc e n t  in  2 0 0 3 , w h ile  s to c k  m a rk e t  c a p i­
ta l iz a tio n  av era g ed  3 4  p e rc e n t.  T h is  c o m p a re d  w ith  6 0  p e rc e n t  a n d  8 0  p e rc e n t, 
re sp ec tiv e ly , in  E a s t A sia , a n d  141 p e r c e n t  a n d  1 0 0  p e r c e n t  a m o n g  G - 7  c o u n ­
t r ie s .  C h i le  a n d  B ra z il  a re  th e  le a d e rs  in  L a t in  A m e r ic a  w i th  r e s p e c t  to  b o th  
b o n d s  a n d  e q u itie s , b u t  th e ir  m a rk e ts  a re  m u c h  sm a lle r  th a n  th o s e  o f  th e ir  A s ia n  
c o u n te r p a r t s .  A s w i th  th e  b a n k in g  s e c to r , m o s t  o f  th e  L a t in  A m e r ic a n  b o n d  
m a r k e ts  c o n s is t  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  is su e s ; o n ly  2 2  p e r c e n t  o f  b o n d s  o u t s t a n d in g  
w e re  is su e d  b y  th e  p r iv a te  se c to r  in  L a tin  A m e ric a , c o m p a re d  w i th  6 3  p e rc e n t  in  
E a s t A sia .
B o n d s  o u t s t a n d in g  a n d  s to c k  m a rk e t  c a p i ta l iz a t io n  b o th  in c re a s e d  s u b s ta n ­
tia lly  a f te r  1 9 9 0  in  L a tin  A m e ric a , b u t  th e y  p e a k e d  la te  in  th e  d e ca d e . T h e  n u m ­
b e r  o f  f i rm s  l is te d  o n  lo c a l  s to c k  m a r k e ts  d e c l in e d  s ig n if ic a n tly ,  th e re fo re ,  as 
d e l is t in g  e x c e e d e d  n e w  e n tr a n ts .  D e l is t in g  o c c u r re d  fo r  tw o  m a in  re a so n s : th e
re lu c ta n c e  o f  f irm s  to  p ro v id e  th e  in f o r m a t io n  re q u ire d  b y  n e w  c o rp o ra te  g o v e r­
n a n c e  s ta n d a rd s , a n d  th e  p re fe re n c e  o f  n e w  fo re ig n  o w n e rs  to  lis t in  th e i r  h o m e  
m a rk e ts . T h e  p ro c ess  e x a c e rb a te d  a lre a d y  e x is tin g  p ro b le m s  o f  i l l iq u id i ty  in  th e  
m a rk e ts , w h ic h , in  tu r n ,  m a d e  in v es to rs  m o re  h e s i ta n t  to  p a r tic ip a te .
I n  assess in g  w h e th e r  c a p ita l  m a rk e ts  w ill f lo u r is h  in  th e  fu tu re ,  w e  f o u n d  s u p ­
p o r t  f o r  se v e ra l h y p o th e s e s  t h a t  h a v e  m u c h  in  c o m m o n  w i th  o u r  a n a ly s is  o f  
b a n k s . F irs t ,  p o o r  m a c r o e c o n o m ic  p e r fo rm a n c e  ( th a t  is, lo w  sa v in g s  ra te s , lo w  
a n d  v o la t i le  g ro w th  ra te s , a n d  h ig h  in f la t io n )  m a d e  in v e s to rs  in  L a t in  A m e ric a  
r e lu c ta n t  to  p u t  m o n e y  i n to  d o m e s t ic  c a p i ta l  m a r k e ts .  S e c o n d ,  s t r u c tu r a l  
r e fo rm s  (su c h  as f in a n c ia l  l ib e r a l iz a t io n ,  p r iv a t iz a t io n ,  a n d  p e n s io n  re fo rm )  
h e lp e d  p r o m o te  c a p ita l  m a rk e ts , b u t  m a n y  w e re  c a r r ie d  o u t  in  w ay s th a t  u n d e r ­
m in e d  th e  in te n t io n s  o f  th e ir  s u p p o r te r s .  T h e  cases in  w h ic h  f in a n c ia l l ib e ra liza ­
t io n  r e s u l te d  in  c r is e s  w e re  d r a m a t ic  e x a m p le s . T h i r d ,  g e n e ra l ly  lo w - q u a l i ty  
in s t i tu t io n s ,  b o th  a t  th e  so c ie ta l leve l ( ru le  o f  law  a n d  a d e q u a te  ju d ic ia l  sy s tem s 
to  e n fo rc e  i t)  a n d  th e  m a r k e t  lev e l (g o o d  c o rp o ra te  g o v e rn a n c e ) ,  h in d e r e d  th e  
d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  s to c k  a n d  b o n d  m a rk e ts .  F o u r th ,  th e  a v a i la b i l i ty  o f  i n t e r n a ­
t io n a l  f in a n c ia l  o p p o r tu n i t i e s  f r e q u e n t ly  d im in i s h e d  th e  u r g e n c y  w i th  w h ic h  
g o v e rn m e n t  a n d  p r iv a te  s e c to r  a c to rs  p u r s u e d  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  c a p ita l  m a r ­
k e ts . I n  a d d it io n ,  th e  d e lis tin g s  n o te d  a b o v e  h a v e  h a d  n e g a tiv e  im p l ic a t io n s  fo r  
th e  a lre a d y  lo w  levels o f  l iq u id i ty  in  L a tin  A m e r ic a n  m a rk e ts .
O u r  d is c u s s io n  o f  b a n k s  id e n t i f ie d  tw o  p ro b le m s  th a t  t h e i r  w e a k n e ss  p o se s  
fo r  e c o n o m ic  g ro w th  in  L a tin  A m e ric a : la c k  o f  lo n g - te rm  f in a n c e  fo r  in v e s tm e n t  
a n d  la c k  o f  access to  f in a n c e  fo r  sm a ll f irm s . T h e  c a p ita l  m a rk e ts  p re s e n t  s im ila r  
in s ta n c e s  o f  m a rk e t  fa ilu re . A l th o u g h  th e  s to c k  a n d  b o n d  m a rk e ts , b y  d e f in i t io n ,  
p ro v id e  l o n g - te r m  f in a n c e ,  th e  in d ic a to r s  ty p ic a l ly  u s e d  to  m e a s u re  t h e i r  size  
fo c u s  o n  m a r k e t  c a p i t a l iz a t io n  a n d  b o n d s  o u t s t a n d in g ,  r a th e r  t h a n  o n  n e w  
issu es  t h a t  p ro v id e  in v e s tm e n t  f in a n c in g .  (F o r  la c k  o f  a l te rn a t iv e  d a ta ,  w e  u se  
th e se  m ea su re s  as w e ll.)  I n  a ll d e v e lo p in g  c o u n tr ie s , e sp ec ia lly  in  L a tin  A m e ric a , 
n e w  issu es o n  s to c k  m a rk e ts  h a v e  la rg e ly  d r i e d  u p  s in c e  th e  la te  1 9 9 0 s . B o n d  
m a rk e ts  h av e  b e e n  m o re  a c tiv e , b u t  m o s t  n e w  issues h a v e  b e e n  fo r  g o v e rn m e n t  
b o rro w e rs . W h ile  so m e  c h a n g e s  a re  b e g in n in g  to  o c cu r , m o s t  n o ta b ly  in  C h i le  
a n d  M e x ic o , p r iv a te  s e c to r  is su e s  r e m a in  a  s m a ll  m in o r i t y  t h r o u g h o u t  th e  
re g io n . A ccess, o f  c o u rse ,  is m o re  r e s t r ic te d  in  th e  c a p ita l  m a rk e ts  t h a n  in  th e  
b a n k in g  sy s tem . O n ly  a  fe w  p r iv a te  f irm s , to g e th e r  w i th  g o v e rn m e n ts  a n d  s ta te -  
o w n e d  e n te rp r is e s , a re  la rg e  e n o u g h  to  p a r tic ip a te .
Explaining Latin Americas Poor Performance
T h e  d iag n o ses  fe a tu re d  in  th e  l i te r a tu re  to  e x p la in  p o o r  p e r fo rm a n c e  e m p h a s iz e  
in e ff ic ie n t p u b lic  se c to r  b a n k s , o v e rly  b u rd e n s o m e  re g u la tio n  o f  b o th  b a n k s  a n d  
cap ita l m ark e ts , a n d  th e  l im ita t io n s  th a t  sm a ll e c o n o m ies  p o se  fo r  c a p ita l m a rk e t  
d e v e lo p m e n t. T h e s e  a rg u m e n ts  c e r ta in ly  hav e  m e rit. W e  a rg u e , how ever, th a t  th e y  
n e e d  to  b e  e x p a n d e d  to  in c lu d e  th e  c o n te x t  in  w h ic h  f in an c ia l system s o p e ra te .
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f i n a n c e  a n d  c o n t e x t u a l  f a c t o r s . T h r e e  c o n te x tu a l  fa c to rs  a re  e sp e ­
c ia lly  i m p o r t a n t  fo r  f in a n c e :  th e  m a c r o e c o n o m ic  f ra m e w o rk , th e  i n s t i tu t io n a l  
e n v ir o n m e n t ,  a n d  th e  i n te r n a t io n a l  s e t t in g .  T h e  case  s tu d y  m a te r ia ls  w e  h a v e  
u se d  in  th e  b o o k  p ro v id e  th e  b asis  fo r  e x p lo r in g  th is  a r g u m e n t  a n d  se a rc h in g  fo r  
le sso n s  t h a t  c a n  b e  u se fu l fo r  L a t in  A m e r ic a  in  th e  fu tu re .  T a b le  9 -1  p re s e n ts  a  
c o m p a r is o n  o f  six  c o u n tr ie s ,  th re e  in  L a tin  A m e ric a  (C h ile , B razil, a n d  M e x ico ) 
a n d  th r e e  in  E a s t  A s ia  (K o re a , S in g a p o re ,  a n d  T h a i l a n d ) .  A s in d ic a te d  p r e v i ­
o u sly , th e  th re e  L a t in  A m e r ic a n  e x a m p le s  re p re s e n t  th e  b e s t - f u n c t io n in g  f in a n ­
c ia l sy s tem s in  th e  re g io n . T h e  th r e e  f ro m  A sia  in c lu d e  a  ra n g e : o n e  o f  th e  b e s t 
a n d  tw o  th a t  h av e  h a d  p ro b le m s  in  r e c e n t  y ears.
T h e  ta b le  is d iv id e d  in to  th re e  se c tio n s : lev e l o f  f in a n c ia l  d e v e lo p m e n t ,  th e  
th re e  c o n te x tu a l  fa c to rs  ju s t  m e n t io n e d ,  a n d  in c o m e  d a ta  as a  c o n tro l  fac to r. A ll 
o f  t h e  in d ic a to r s  a re  h ig h ly  s im p li f ie d  r e p re s e n ta t io n s .  F o r  f in a n c ia l  d e v e lo p ­
m e n t ,  th e y  a re  th e  v o lu m e  o f  to ta l  f in a n c e  a n d  f in a n c e  p ro v id e d  to  th e  p r iv a te  
sec to r. T o  re p re s e n t  th e  m a c ro e c o n o m ic  c o n te x t ,  w e  u se  sav in g s , in f la t io n ,  a n d  
g r o w th  ra te s ;  fo r  in s t i t u t io n s ,  w e  u se  th e  W o r ld  B a n k  in d ic a to r s  d is c u s s e d  in  
c h a p te r  3 ; a n d  fo r  th e  i n te r n a t io n a l  e n v ir o n m e n t ,  w e  u se  th e  r a t io  o f  i n te r n a ­
t io n a l  f in a n c e  to  d o m e s t ic  f in a n c e .  T h e  c o n t r o l  fa c to rs  a re  a g g re g a te  a n d  p e r  
c a p i t a  G D P , w h ic h  a re  o f te n  a r g u e d  to  b e  s t r o n g ly  c o r re la te d  w i th  f in a n c ia l  
s tru c tu re .
T h r e e  o v e ra ll p o in ts  c a n  b e  e x tra c te d  f ro m  th e  ta b le . F irs t ,  th e  c o u n tr ie s  fall 
i n to  th r e e  g r o u p s  w i th  r e s p e c t  to  v o lu m e  o f  f in a n c e :  S in g a p o re ,  w i th  t o ta l  
f in a n c e  o v e r  3 0 0  p e r c e n t  o f  G D P ;  C h i le ,  K o re a , a n d  T h a i la n d ,  w i th  b e tw e e n  
2 0 0  a n d  3 0 0  p e rc e n t;  a n d  B raz il a n d  M e x ic o , w i th  less t h a n  2 0 0  p e rc e n t .  T h e  
s a m e  g r o u p in g s  h o ld  w i th  r e s p e c t  to  f in a n c e  to  th e  p r iv a te  s e c to r , a l t h o u g h  
B raz il a n d  M e x ico  a re  e v en  f u r th e r  b e h in d .  S e c o n d , w h ile  tw o  o f  th e  th re e  L a tin  
A m e r ic a n  c o u n tr ie s  p e r f o r m  p o o r ly  in  c o m p a r is o n  w i th  t h e i r  A s ia n  c o u n te r ­
p a r ts ,  th is  is n o t  a  s im p le  case  o f  E a s t A s ia  o u tp e r f o r m in g  L a tin  A m e ric a . N o r  is 
i t  a  case o f  r ic h e r  c o u n tr ie s  o r  la rg e r  e c o n o m ie s  e n jo y in g  g re a te r  f in a n c ia l  d ev e l­
o p m e n t  th a n  p o o re r ,  s m a lle r  o n e s . T h i r d ,  th e  c o n te x tu a l  v a r ia b le s  a re  c lo se ly  
c o rre la te d  w i th  f in a n c ia l  d e v e lo p m e n t. T h e  c o u n tr ie s  w i th  th e  s tro n g e s t  m a c ro -  
e c o n o m ic  a n d  in s t i tu t io n a l  sc o re s  a lso  re g is te r  th e  b e s t  f in a n c ia l  p e r fo rm a n c e .  
T h e  in te r n a t io n a l  v a r ia b le  su g g ests  t h a t  in te r n a t io n a l  f in a n c e  p ro v id e d  a  p o ss i­
b le  a l te rn a t iv e  to  d o m e s t ic  f in a n c e  in  th e  c ases o f  L a t in  A m e r ic a ;  i t  w a s  a lso  
im p o r ta n t  fo r  S in g a p o re , as a n  in te rn a t io n a l  f in a n c ia l c en ter.
I n  a d d it io n  to  e x a m in in g  ov era ll p a tte rn s  in  ta b le  9 -1 , w e  p ro v id e  a b r i e f  lo o k  
a t  th e  s ix  cases. S in g a p o re ,  a  sm a ll  e c o n o m y  w i th  a  h ig h  p e r  c a p i ta  in c o m e ,  is 
in te re s t in g  fo r o u r  p u rp o se s  m a in ly  in so fa r  as i t  p ro v id es  a n  e x e m p la ry  case. I t  is 
p o s s ib le  f o r  a  c o u n t r y  to  d o  e v e r y th in g  w e ll. H ig h  g ro w th ,  h ig h  sa v in g s , lo w  
in f la t io n , s tro n g  in s t i tu t io n s ,  a n d  a n  o p e n  e c o n o m y  d o m in a te d  b y  fo re ig n  b a n k s  
a re  a s s o c ia te d  w i th  a  d e e p  f in a n c ia l  s e c to r , w h ic h ,  in  t u r n ,  s u p p o r t s  m o re  
g ro w th , m o re  savings, a n d  so o n . W h ile  S in g a p o re  h as f lu id  access to  in te rn a t io n a l
Table 9-1. Latin  America and East Asia: Determinants o f  F inancial Depth, 2 0 0 3
Country
Domestic financial system Contextual factors Control variables
Total Loan2 Bondsc Equityd Macroe Institution/ International6 GDPh Per capita GDP
Singapore 364 141 64 159 5.2 2.05 50 93 21,941
294 112 23 159 0.5
46.7
Chile 240 64 57 119 4.6 1.39 36 82 5,196
209 62 28 119 2.8
27.3
Korea 227 99 74 54 5.4 0.73 13 586 12,232
204 95 55 54 3.6
31.9
Thailand 214 91 40 83 3.5 0.19 18 141 2,276
180 79 18 83 1.8
32.0
Brazil 155 46 61 48 2.4 -0 .0 8 26 620 3,510
88 29 11 48 14.7
21.5
Mexico 86 42 24 20 2.8 0.06 56 592 5,792
39 16 3 20 4.5
18.2
Sources: Table 5-2 for loans; table 5-3 for bonds; table 5-4 for equity; table 3-7 for institutions; table 5-6 for international; World Bank, World Development Indicators 
(online) for macro, GDP, and per capita GDP.
a. Sum of credit, bonds, and equity; first line is total finance, second line is finance to private sector.
b. Claims outstanding by deposit money banks as share of GDP.
c. Bonds outstanding as share of GDP.
d. Market capitalization as share of GDP.
e. First line is average GDP growth rate, 1994—2003; second line is consumer price change, 2003; third line is gross domestic savings as percent of GDP, 2003.
f. World Bank indicators of governance, 2002.
g. Ratio of total international finance (loans, bonds, and equity) to total domestic finance (loans, bonds, and equity).
h. Gross domestic product in billions of constant 2000 dollars.
i. Per capita gross domestic product in constant 2000 dollars.
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f in a n c ia l  m a rk e ts ,  th e  g o v e r n m e n t  s ti ll  p r o m o te s  lo c a l c a p ita l  m a rk e ts .  S in g a ­
p o r e ’s p o l i t ic a l  sy s te m , h o w e v e r , p ro v id e s  l i t t l e  sp a c e  f o r  c o n te s t a t i o n  a n d  
a c c o u n ta b ili ty .  In d e e d ,  its  sc o re  o n  t h a t  fa c to r  in  th e  W o r ld  B a n k ’s g o v e rn a n c e  
in d e x  is n eg a tiv e .
K o re a , a  la rg e  e c o n o m y  w i th  h ig h  p e r  c a p i t a  in c o m e ,  a n d  T h a i l a n d ,  a  
m e d iu m - s iz e d  e c o n o m y  w i th  m id - le v e l  in c o m e , a re  e x a m p le s  o f  m o re  p a r t ia l  
success . A  su p e rf ic ia l le sso n  f ro m  th ese  cases is t h a t  i f  m a c ro e c o n o m ic  p e r fo rm ­
a n c e  is s t r o n g  e n o u g h , in s t i tu t io n s  b e c o m e  less im p o r ta n t .  I n  b o th  cases (e sp e ­
c ia lly  T h a i la n d ) ,  in s t i tu t io n s  leave m u c h  to  be  d e s ired , b u t  th is  d id  n o t  seem  to  
h i n d e r  f in a n c ia l  d e v e lo p m e n t  o v e ra ll. N o n e th e le s s ,  w h i le  b a n k s  p ro v id e  la rg e  
a m o u n ts  o f  f in a n c e  in  b o th  c o u n tr ie s ,  c a p ita l  m a rk e ts  a re  less d e v e lo p e d  th a n  in  
o th e r  cases p re s e n te d  in  th e  ta b le , w i th  o n ly  a ro u n d  h a lf  o f  to ta l  f in a n c e  c o m in g  
f ro m  th e  m a rk e ts . I n s t i tu t io n a l  d e fic ie n c ie s  m a y  w ell b e  a  d ra g  in  th is  re sp ec t.
I t  is C h ile ,  h o w ev er, t h a t  o ffers th e  m o s t  im p o r ta n t  lesso n s fo r  L a t in  A m e ric a . 
F irs t ,  i t  is p a r t  o f  th e  r e g io n  a n d  so  sh a re s  a  n u m b e r  o f  c h a ra c te r is tic s  w i th  its  
n e ig h b o r s  t h a t  th e  A s ia n  c o u n tr ie s  d o  n o t .  S e c o n d , i t  is a  sm a ll  e c o n o m y  w i th  
o n ly  a  m id -le v e l p e r  c a p ita  in c o m e . T h ir d ,  C h ile  h a s  n o t  a lw ays h a d  a  g o o d  p e r­
fo rm a n c e  o n  th e  v a r io u s  in d ic a to rs  w e  a re  s tu d y in g . R a th e r , i t  m a d e  v e ry  s ig n ifi­
c a n t  im p ro v e m e n ts  in  b o th  its  m a c ro e c o n o m ic  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  its in s t i tu t io n s  
o v e r  th e  la s t  tw o  d e c a d e s .  T h e s e  h a v e  e n a b le d  th e  c o u n t r y  to  s u p p o r t  c a p i ta l  
m a r k e ts  t h a t  a re  la rg e  in  c o m p a r is o n  to  i ts  b a n k  c la im s , w h ic h  is u n u s u a l  in  
e m e rg in g  m a rk e t  e c o n o m ie s . M o re o v e r , th e  a v a ila b ili ty  o f  in te r n a t io n a l  f in a n c e  
h a s  n o t  s to o d  in  th e  w a y  o f  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  d o m e s t ic  c a p i ta l  m a rk e ts .  
F ina lly , g iv en  its  la c k  o f  fiscal d e fic its , th e  b o n d  m a rk e t  h a s  sp a c e  fo r  p r iv a te  sec ­
to r  in it ia tiv e , r a th e r  t h a n  se rv in g  m ere ly  to  f in a n c e  g o v e rn m e n t sh o rtfa lls . L a t in  
A m e r ic a n  c o u n tr ie s  w o u ld  d o  w e ll to  s tu d y  th e  s te p s  ta k e n  b y  th e  C h i le a n  gov­
e r n m e n t  a n d  th e  f in a n c ia l s e c to r  to  ach iev e  su c h  a  s t ro n g  p e rfo rm a n c e .
B raz il a n d  M e x ic o , th e  tw o  la rg e s t e c o n o m ie s  in  L a tin  A m e ric a , a re  th e  lag ­
g a rd s  a m o n g  th e  six  in  all a sp e c ts  u n d e r  c o n s id e ra t io n .  T h e y  h a v e  th e  sm a lle s t  
f in a n c ia l  se c to rs , m a tc h e d  b y  h ig h e r  in f la t io n , lo w e r g ro w th , a n d  lo w e r sav in g s 
t h a n  th e  o th e r  fo u r , a n d  th e y  a lso  h a v e  lo w e r -q u a l i ty  in s t i tu t io n s .  A t  th e  sa m e  
t im e ,  th e  tw o  c o u n tr ie s  d is p la y  s ig n i f ic a n t  d if fe re n c e s .  M o s t  i m p o r t a n t  is th e  
fa c t t h a t  B raz il’s c a p ita l  m a rk e ts  a re  n e a r ly  as la rg e  as th o se  o f  K o re a  a n d  T h a i ­
la n d . T h e  v a s t m a jo r i ty  o f  b o n d s  o u ts ta n d in g  c o n s is t  o f  g o v e rn m e n t  d e b t,  h o w ­
ever, as th e  p r iv a te  se c to r  is c ro w d e d  o u t .  B o th  c o u n tr ie s  n e e d  to  c o n s id e r  w ay s 
to  im p ro v e  m a c ro e c o n o m ic  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  s t r e n g th e n  th e i r  in s t i tu t io n s .  In  
a d d it io n ,  in te r n a t io n a l  o p t io n s  fo r  o b ta in in g  f in a n c e  m a y  b e  h in d e r in g  d o m e s ­
t ic  f in a n c ia l  m a rk e t  p e r fo rm a n c e , e sp e c ia lly  in  M e x ic o  w i th  its  c lo se  p r o x im ity  
to  th e  U n i te d  S ta tes.
L O N G -T E R M  f i n a n c e . H a v in g  id e n t i f ie d  p o te n t ia l  so u rc e s  o f  le s so n s  fo r  
L a t in  A m e ric a  in  te rm s  o f  f in a n c e  in  g e n e ra l, w e  n o w  tu r n  to  o u r  tw o  p a r tic u la r  
c o n c e rn s : lo n g - te rm  f in a n c e  a n d  access fo r  sm a ll f irm s . T ab le  9 -2  p ro v id e s  re le -
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Singapore 32.5 15.9 182 M edium /high 12.8 M edium
Chile 23.0 41.7 147 Low 31.1 M edium
Korea 32.2 n.a. 109 High n.a. High
Thailand 27.9 76.1 101 M edium 43.9 Low/medium
Brazil 20.7 63.8 59 High 30.0 High
Mexico 19.5 87.6 23 Low 64.7 M edium /high
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators (online) for investment ratio; tables 5-3 and 5-4 
for capital markets; World Bank website (info.worldbank.org/governance/wbes) for scores on credit con­
straints; authors’ estimations, based on country materials, for government activities.
n.a. Not available.
a. Gross domestic capital formation as share of GDP, average of 1995—2003-
b. Percentage of all firms who report lack of long-term finance as “major or moderate obstacle” in 
business environment.
c. Market capitalization and private sector domestic bonds outstanding as share of GDP.
d. Government support programs for investment financing.
e. Percentage of small firms who report financing as “major obstacle” in business environment.
f. Government support programs for SMEs.
v a n t  d a ta . T h e  f irs t  c o lu m n  p re se n ts  th e  ra tio  o f  in v e s tm e n t  to  G D P . T h e  s e c o n d  
sh o w s su rv ey  d a ta  o n  th e  e x te n t  to  w h ic h  lac k  o f  lo n g - te rm  f in a n c e  is a  m a jo r  o r  
m o d e r a te  o b s ta c le  to  b u s in e s s  o p e r a t io n s  a n d  g ro w th .  T h e  t h i r d  a n d  f o u r th  
in d ic a te  tw o  w ay s to  sa tis fy  th e  n e e d  fo r  lo n g - te rm  fin a n c e : c a p ita l  m a rk e ts  a n d  
g o v e r n m e n t  p ro g ra m s . T h e  f i f th  c o lu m n  tu r n s  to  S M E  c re d i t ,  a lso  p r e s e n t in g  
su rv e y  d a ta  a b o u t  w h e th e r  la c k  o f  f in a n c e  is a  m a jo r  o b s ta c le  to  th e  o p e ra t io n s  
o f  sm a ll f irm s . T h e  f in a l c o lu m n  e s tim a te s  g o v e rn m e n t  e ffo r ts  in  th is  area .
T h e  W o r ld  B u sin e ss  E n v ir o n m e n t  S u rv ey  (W B E S ) p ro v id e s  a  so u rc e  o f  d a ta  
o n  w h e th e r  lo n g - te r m  f in a n c e  is a  “m a jo r  o r  m o d e ra te  p r o b le m ” in  in d iv id u a l  
c o u n tr ie s .  A  la rg e  m a jo r i ty  o f  f i rm s  in  B ra z il (6 4  p e r c e n t) ,  T h a i l a n d  (7 6  p e r ­
c e n t) ,  a n d  M e x ico  (8 8  p e rc e n t)  sa id  i t  w as. V e ry  fe w  f irm s  in  S in g a p o re  a g ree d  
(1 6  p e rc e n t) .  C h ile  fe ll in  th e  m id d le  (4 2  p e rc e n t) .  C o m p a r in g  th e s e  re sp o n se s  
to  th e  a v a ilab ility  o f  lo n g - te rm  f in a n c e  f ro m  th e  d o m e s tic  b o n d  a n d  s to c k  m a r ­
k e ts  y ie ld s  in te re s t in g  re su lts . I n  S in g a p o re , w h ic h  h as  th e  m o s t  f in a n c e  av a ilab le  
t h r o u g h  b o n d s  a n d  e q u i ty  (n e a r ly  2 0 0  p e r c e n t  o f  G D P ) ,  fe w  f irm s  c o m p la in  
a b o u t  f in a n c e . I n  M e x ic o  a n d  B raz il, b y  c o n tr a s t ,  w h e re  c a p ita l  m a r k e t  f in a n c e  
is s c a rc e  (b e tw e e n  2 0  a n d  6 0  p e r c e n t  o f  G D P ) ,  e n tr e p r e n e u r s  p r e d ic ta b ly  see  
g re a t  d iff ic u ltie s . C h ile  lies in  th e  m id d le ,  as w o u ld  b e  e x p e c te d . T h e  su rp r ise  is 
t h a t  lo n g - te r m  f in a n c e  is a lso  c i t e d  as a n  o b s ta c le  in  T h a i l a n d ,  d e s p i te  w h a t  
a p p e a rs  to  b e  a n  a m p le  su p p ly . (K o re a  is n o t  in c lu d e d  in  th e  survey .)
I n  th e  face  o f  a  p e rc e iv e d  m a r k e t  fa ilu re ,  s o m e  g o v e r n m e n ts  h a v e  t r i e d  to  
s u p p le m e n t  p r iv a te  s e c to r  f in a n c e  th r o u g h  lo n g - te r m  lo a n s  f ro m  p u b l ic  s e c to r  
d e v e lo p m e n t  b a n k s . B ra z il’s N a t io n a l  B a n k  fo r  E c o n o m ic  a n d  S o c ia l D e v e lo p ­
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m e n t  ( B N D E S )  is th e  m o s t  p r o m in e n t  e x a m p le .  T h e  b a n k  c u r r e n t ly  le n d s  
n e a r ly  $ 1 4  b i l l io n  a  y ea r, w h ic h  is n e a r ly  15 p e r c e n t  o f  B ra z i l’s a n n u a l  g ro ss  
d o m e s tic  i n v e s tm e n t .1 T h e  v a s t  m a jo r i ty  o f  th e  fu n d s  g o  to  th e  p r iv a te  se c to r, 
in c lu d in g  f o re ig n  f irm s ;  p r io r i t y  a rea s  in c lu d e  in f r a s t r u c tu r e ,  b a s ic  in p u ts ,  
e x p o r ts ,  n a t io n a l  te c h n o lo g y  d e v e lo p m e n t ,  a n d  S M E s . T h e  su rv e y  d a ta ,  h o w ­
ever, su g g e st t h a t  th e  B N D E S  lo a n s  a re  n o t  su f f ic ie n t to  m e e t  th e  d e m a n d ,  a n d  
in v e s tm e n t  ra te s  a re  e x tre m e ly  lo w  d e sp ite  th e  a v a ilab ility  o f  f in a n c e .2
K o re a  a lso  h a s  p o w e r f u l  p u b l ic  s e c to r  b a n k s .  K o re a  D e v e lo p m e n t  B a n k  
(K D B )  is th e  la rg e s t  a n d ,  l ik e  B N D E S ,  sp e c ia liz e s  in  lo n g - te r m  f in a n c e  fo r  
in v e s tm e n t  p u rp o se s . T h e  b ig g es t sh a re  o f  i ts  lo a n s  goes to  th e  in d u s tr ia l  sec to r, 
fo llo w e d  b y  gas, e lec tric ity , a n d  w a te r  a n d  th e n  b y  t r a n s p o r ta t io n  a n d  c o m m u n i­
c a t io n s .  I n  2 0 0 3 ,  lo a n s  to ta le d  a r o u n d  $ 1 0  b i l l io n  (6  p e r c e n t  o f  th e  c o u n t r y ’s 
in v e s tm e n t  t h a t  y e a r) . T h e  E x p o r t - I m p o r t  B a n k  c o m p le m e n ts  K D B  b y  f in a n c ­
in g  e x p o r ts ;  i t  l e n t  n e a r ly  $ 8  b i l l io n  in  2 0 0 3 .  U n f o r tu n a te ly ,  K o re a  is n o t  
i n c lu d e d  in  t h e  W B E S , so  w e  d o  n o t  k n o w  th e  o p in io n  o f  K o re a n  e n t r e p r e ­
n e u r s .  N o n e th e le s s ,  K o re a  h a s  lo n g  h a d  a  h ig h  in v e s tm e n t  r a te ,  a n d  so m e  
e x p e rts  a rg u e  t h a t  g o v e rn m e n t  f in a n c e  h as  b e e n  a  s ig n if ic a n t fa c to r .3
S in g a p o re  a n d  T h a i l a n d  fo c u s  m o re  o n  p u b l ic - p r iv a te  p a r tn e r s h ip s  to  s u p ­
p o r t  in v e s tm e n t,  b u t  th e y  d o  so  in  ra th e r  o p a q u e  w ays. S in g a p o re ’s g o v e rn m e n t  
a c c o u n ts  fo r  a  la rg e  sh a re  o f  th e  c o u n tr y ’s v e ry  h ig h  in v e s tm e n t  ra te , o p e r a t in g  
th r o u g h  th e  G o v e rn m e n t  I n v e s tm e n t  C o r p o r a t io n  a n d  T em asek , w h ic h  to g e th e r  
m a n a g e  assets r e p re se n tin g  m o re  th a n  1 5 0  p e rc e n t  o f  G D P . M u c h  o f  th is  in v e s t­
m e n t ,  h o w ev er, is c a r r ie d  o u t  overseas. O n e  o f  th e  so u rc es  o f  fu n d s  is th e  C e n ­
t ra l  P r o v id e n t  F u n d ,  th e  g o v e r n m e n t- c o n t r o l le d  p e n s io n  sy s te m , w h o s e  a sse ts 
a re  a b o u t  6 5  p e r c e n t  o f  G D P .4 T h a i la n d  h a s  a  n u m b e r  o f  s o -c a l le d  sp e c ia liz e d  
f in a n c ia l  in s t i tu t io n s .  T h e  j o in t  p u b l ic -p r iv a te  I n d u s t r ia l  F in a n c e  C o r p o r a t io n  
o f  T h a i la n d  ( IF C T )  a p p e a rs  to  h av e  b e e n  m o s t  a n a lo g o u s  to  B N D E S  a n d  K D B , 
a l th o u g h  o n  a  m u c h  s m a lle r  sca le . I ts  lo a n  b o o k ,  as o f  e a r ly  2 0 0 3 ,  w as n e a r ly  
$ 4  b ill io n , a l th o u g h  a n n u a l  flow s w e re  m u c h  low er. I n  2 0 0 4 ,  I F T C  m e rg e d  w ith  
th e  T h a i  M i l i t a r y  B a n k  a n d  D B S - T h a i  D a n u  B a n k , a  s u b s id ia r y  o f  t h e  la rg e  
S in g a p o re  b a n k . I t  is n o t  y e t c le a r w h a t  th e  ro le  o f  th e  n e w  in s t i tu t io n  w ill b e .5
U n lik e  th e  o th e r  cases, C h i le  a n d  M e x ico  re ly  m a in ly  o n  th e  p r iv a te  se c to r  to  
f in a n c e  b u s in e ss  in v e s tm e n t  to d ay , a l th o u g h  b o th  h a d  p r o m in e n t  d e v e lo p m e n t  
b a n k s  t h a t  p la y e d  a n  i m p o r t a n t  ro le  in  th e  in d u s t r ia l iz a t io n  o f  t h e  tw o  c o u n ­
1. See chapter 8. The BNDES annual disbursements are more than the W orld Bank lends 
annually on a worldwide basis through the IBRD window.
2. See discussion of Brazil in chapter 8.
3. O n finance in Korea, see Hahm (1999); Fitch Ratings (2002a); IMF (2003c); Ahn and Cha
(2004). O n the development banks in particular, see KDB (2003); KEXIM (2003).
4. O n Singapore’s financial system, see Montes and Giap (1999); Hew (2002); IMF (2004e); 
Fitch (2002b).
5. On finance in Thailand, see Vajragupta and Vichyanond (1999); Vichyanond (2002); IMF 
(2004f); Warr (2004); Fitch Ratings (2005).
t r ie s .  N o w  th o s e  tw o  in s t i t u t io n s — th e  N a t io n a l  D e v e lo p m e n t  C o r p o r a t i o n  
( C o r fo )  a n d  N a c io n a l  F in a n c ie ra  (N a f in ) ,  re sp e c tiv e ly — h a v e  b e c o m e  se c o n d -  
t ie r  b a n k s  th a t  p r im a r i ly  serve  S M E s . H a v in g  m o v e d  aw ay  f ro m  p u b lic  f u n d in g  
o f  in v e s tm e n t ,  C h i le a n  g o v e r n m e n ts  h a v e  s o u g h t  to  p r o v id e  in c e n t iv e s  to  
e n la rg e  b o th  th e  b a n k in g  s e c to r  a n d  th e  c a p ita l  m a rk e ts .  T h e  d a ta  in  ta b le  9 -2  
o n  th e  in v e s tm e n t  r a t io  a n d  th e  a v a i la b ili ty  o f  lo n g - te r m  f in a n c e  re f le c t  th e i r  
success re la tiv e  to  n e ig h b o r in g  c o u n tr ie s — a lth o u g h  m u c h  r e m a in s  to  b e  d o n e .6 
M e x ic o  s ti ll  h a s  a  d e v e lo p m e n t  b a n k in g  se c to r , b u t  m o s t  o f  i t  is b e in g  p h a s e d  
o u t  o r  t u r n e d  to w a rd  so c ia l g o a ls . A t  th e  s a m e  tim e , th e  p r iv a te  s e c to r  h a s  n o t  
s te p p e d  in  to  fill th e  g a p  in  te rm s  o f  in v e s tm e n t  f in a n c e . B a n k  c re d i t  to  f irm s  is 
v e ry  l im i te d  a n d  a lm o s t  e x c lu s iv e ly  fo r  w o rk in g  c a p ita l ,  w h i le  th e  c a p ita l  m a r ­
k e ts  re m a in  v e ry  sm a ll d e sp ite  re c e n t  e x p a n s io n . T h e s e  p ro b le m s  a re  re fle c te d  in  
b o th  th e  lo w  in v e s tm e n t  ra te s  a n d  th e  fa c t t h a t  e n tr e p re n e u r s  s ig n a l t h a t  lo n g ­
te rm  f in a n c e  is a  m o re  se r io u s  p ro b le m  th a n  in  o u r  o th e r  cases.7
In  s u m m a ry , ta b le  9 - 2  su g g e s ts  t h a t  la c k  o f  lo n g - te r m  f in a n c e  is a  s e r io u s  
c o n s t r a in t  o n  in v e s tm e n t  a n d  g ro w th  in  m o s t  o f  th e  c o u n tr ie s  w e  are  fo llo w in g  
in  th is  c h a p te r .  T h e  c o u n t r i e s  w i th  la rg e  c a p i ta l  m a rk e ts ,  w h ic h  sp e c ia liz e  in  
lo n g - te rm  f in a n c e  fo r  a  l im ite d  s e c to r  o f  th e  c o rp o ra te  p o p u la t io n ,  c o m p la in  less 
a b o u t  th is  p r o b le m  a n d  h a v e  h ig h e r  in v e s tm e n t  ra te s . T h is  in c lu d e s  S in g a p o re  
a n d  C h ile . C h ile  re lies ex c lu siv e ly  o n  p r iv a te  se c to r  f in a n c e , b u t  S in g a p o re  c o m ­
p le m e n ts  its  c a p ita l  m a rk e ts  w i th  a  d ire c t  g o v e rn m e n t  ro le  in  in v e s tm e n t.  B razil 
a n d  K o re a  h a v e  la rg e  p u b l ic  b a n k s  w h o s e  m is s io n  is to  p r o v id e  l o n g - te r m  
f in a n c e .  W h i le  B ra z i l’s b a n k  is la rg e r  t h a n  K o re a ’s, i t  h a s  n o t  h a d  th e  sa m e  
im p a c t  in  te rm s  o f  in c re a s in g  th e  in v e s tm e n t  ra te . M e x ic o  is in  th e  w o rs t  p o s i­
t io n ,  s in ce  i t  h a s  n e i th e r  s t ro n g  c a p ita l  m a rk e ts  n o r  a n  a c tiv e  d e v e lo p m e n t  b a n k . 
B u s in e sse s  n o te  th e  la c k  o f  f in a n c e ,  w h ic h  is c o r re la te d  w i th  lo w  in v e s tm e n t .  
T h a i la n d ’s s i tu a t io n  is u n u s u a l  s in c e  i t  h a s  h a d  a  re la tiv e ly  h ig h  in v e s tm e n t  ra te , 
b u t  th e re  a re  se rio u s  c o m p la in ts  a b o u t  th e  la c k  o f  f in a n c e . T h is  a p p a re n t  a n o m ­
a ly  m a y  h a v e  to  d o  w i th  th e  a f te r m a th  o f  th e  c o u n tr y ’s 1 9 9 7  c ris is  ( th e  su rv e y  
w as ta k e n  in  2 0 0 0 ) .
a c c e s s  f o r  SM E s. SME credit displays both similarities and differences 
with respect to the country responses on long-term credit. That is, in Singapore, 
owners o f small and medium-sized firms indicate little difficulty with access to 
finance (less than 13 percent report it is a major problem), while in Mexico they 
report a great deal o f trouble (nearly 65 percent see it as a major constraint). The 
other three countries fall in between; again no information is available for Korea. 
While private sector institutions have expressed some interest in expanding SME 
finance in recent years— as a result o f both the higher margins in that area and 
the migration o f larger firms to the capital markets and international finance—  
they have yet to make much o f a dent in the existing demand. Governments have
6. See discussion of Chile in chapter 6.
7. See discussion of Mexico in chapter 7.
272 Policy Recommendations fo r  a Stronger F inancial System
A  Policy Agenda fo r  the F inancial Sector 273
th u s  id e n tif ie d  th is  p ro b le m  as a n o th e r  case  o f  m a rk e t  fa ilu re  a n d  h av e  g iv en  its 
r e so lu tio n  ev en  h ig h e r  p r io r ity  th a n  in c re a s in g  f in a n c e  fo r  in v e s tm e n t.
T w o  m a in  a p p ro a c h e s  h a v e  b e e n  fo llo w e d , w i th  th e  c o u n tr ie s  d iv id e d  a lo n g  
r e g io n a l  lin e s . B raz il, C h ile ,  a n d  M e x ic o  h a v e  c o m e  to  re ly  h e a v ily  o n  s e c o n d -  
t ie r  b a n k in g  o p e r a t io n s ,  w i th  s o m e  s u p p o r t  f r o m  p u b l ic  s e c to r  c o m m e rc ia l  
b a n k s  in  th e  f irs t  tw o  cases. T h e  k e y  c o n c e p t  is p a r tn e rs h ip s  b e tw e e n  th e  p u b lic  
a n d  p r iv a te  se c to rs , w i th  th e  fo rm e r  h e lp in g  to  b u i ld  m a rk e ts  fo r  a n  u n d e rse rv e d  
p a r t  o f  th e  p o p u la t io n .
A s d isc u sse d  earlie r, th e  p ro v is io n  o f  f in a n c e  fo r  S M E s is o n e  o f  th e  p r io r it ie s  
o f  B ra z il’s B N D E S . S o m e , b u t  n o t  a ll, o f  th is  le n d in g  is d o n e  th r o u g h  s e c o n d -  
t ie r  o p e r a t io n s  w i th  th e  g o v e r n m e n t- o w n e d  B a n c o  d o  B ras il, th e  la rg e s t  c o m ­
m e rc ia l  b a n k  in  th e  c o u n tr y ,  a n d  w i th  v a r io u s  p r iv a te  i n s t i t u t io n s .  B a n c o  d o  
B ra s il  d o e s  s o m e  o f  i ts  o w n  l e n d in g  in  a d d i t i o n  to  p a r t i c ip a t in g  in  B N D E S  
ac tiv itie s . In  b o th  cases, lin e s  o f  c re d i t  fo r  w o rk in g  c a p ita l  a n d  in v e s tm e n t  g o o d s  
a re  p r o v id e d  to g e th e r  w i th  g u a r a n te e s ,  t e c h n ic a l  a s s is ta n c e ,  a n d  in n o v a t iv e  
a p p ro a c h e s  t o  S M E  f in a n c e  t h r o u g h  th e  u se  o f  c r e d i t  c a rd s . B e tw e e n  th e  tw o , 
so m e  $ 5  b i ll io n  w as  p ro v id e d  in  2 0 0 3 .8
T h e  m a in  g o v e rn m e n t  a g e n t  fo r  S M E s in  M e x ic o  is N a f in ,  th e  fo rm e r  d ev e l­
o p m e n t  b a n k , w h ic h  n o w  ta rg e ts  sm a ll f irm s  as o n e  o f  its  p r in c ip a l  a c tiv itie s . ( I t 
a lso  ac ts  as th e  g o v e rn m e n t’s fiscal a g e n t  a n d  m ak e s  d ire c t  lo a n s  to  p u b lic  se c to r  
f irm s .)  N a f in  p ro v id e d  lo a n  a n d  g u a ra n te e  d is b u r s e m e n ts  o f  a r o u n d  $8 b i l l io n  
in  2 0 0 3 ,  a lm o s t  a ll o f  w h ic h  w as c h a n n e le d  th r o u g h  s e c o n d - t ie r  o p e ra t io n s ;  its  
f in a n c ia l  s u p p o r t  p r o g r a m s  th u s  r e a c h e d  9 0 ,0 0 0  c o m p a n ie s  a n d  its  t e c h n ic a l  
a s s is ta n c e  e f fo r ts  a n o th e r  2 5 0 ,0 0 0 .  O n e  o f  its  m o s t  su c c ess fu l te c h n iq u e s  is a n  
I n te r n e t- b a s e d  n e tw o r k  o f  p r iv a te  f i rm s  t h a t  a re  in te re s te d  in  p ro v id in g  fa c to r ­
in g  serv ices to  S M E s .9
C h i le  h a s  e s ta b l is h e d  a  p a r tn e r s h ip  b e tw e e n  i ts  f o r m e r  d e v e lo p m e n t  b a n k , 
C o r fo ,  a n d  th e  s ta te -o w n e d  c o m m e rc ia l  b a n k , B a n c o E s ta d o , to  s u p p o r t  S M E s . 
W o r k in g  to g e th e r ,  th e y  h a v e  d e s ig n e d  a su c c e ss fu l p r o g r a m  (F o g a p e )  to  o ffse t 
tra n s a c t io n  co sts  fo r  p r iv a te  se c to r  b a n k s  t h a t  a re  w il lin g  to  f in a n c e  S M E s . T h e y  
a lso  en g ag e  in  d i re c t  le n d in g  to  sm a ll f irm s  a n d  p ro v id e  g u a ra n te e s  so  su c h  f irm s  
c a n  b o r ro w  f ro m  p r iv a te  b a n k s . T h e  a m o u n ts  in v o lv e d  are  m u c h  sm a lle r  t h a n  in  
B ra z il  a n d  M e x ic o , w i t h  o n ly  a r o u n d  $ 3 0 0  m i l l io n  a  y e a r  f r o m  C o r f o  a n d  
F o g a p e  c o m b in e d  in  2 0 0 3 .  H o w e v e r , B a n c o E s ta d o  le n d s  a n o th e r  $ 2 —3 b i ll io n  
a n n u a l ly  t o  sm a ll  f i rm s . I f  th is  a m o u n t  is in c lu d e d ,  t h e n  th e  p u b l ic  s e c to r  in  
C h ile  p ro v id e s  fa r  m o re  o n  a  p e r  c a p ita  b asis th a n  d o  B razil a n d  M e x ic o , b u t  i t  is 
d o n e  o n  c o m m e rc ia l  te rm s .10
K o re a  a n d  T h a i la n d ,  b y  c o n tra s t ,  h a v e  s ta te -o w n e d  b a n k s  t h a t  p ro v id e  d ire c t  
f in an ce  to  S M E s. In  K orea, th e  In d u s tr ia l B a n k  o f  K orea  (IB K ) fulfills th is fu n c tio n ,
8. See discussion of Brazil in chapter 8.
9. See discussion of Mexico in chapter 7.
10. See discussion o f Chile in chapter 6.
w h ile  T h a i l a n d  h a s  a n  i n s t i t u t i o n  sp e c if ic a l ly  c a l le d  th e  S M E  B a n k . K o re a ’s 
In d u s t r ia l  B a n k  is th e  le a d in g  so u rc e  o f  f in a n c e  fo r  sm a ll  f i rm s  in  t h a t  c o u n tr y  
a n d  d e v o te s  85  p e rc e n t  o f  its  $ 3 5  b i ll io n  lo a n  b o o k  to  S M E s; so m e  $ 4  b i ll io n  in  
n e w  lo a n s  w e re  d is b u r s e d  in  2 0 0 3 .  I n  a d d i t io n  to  t r a d i t io n a l  ty p e s  o f  le n d in g ,  
IB K  h as  in tr o d u c e d  a  fa c to r in g  sy s te m  s im ila r  to  th a t  a t  N a f in ,  a n d  i t  h a s  h e lp e d  
sm a lle r  f irm s e n te r  th e  in te r n a t io n a l  b o n d  m a rk e t  th r o u g h  a n  issue jo in t ly  g u a r­
a n te e d  w i th  J a p a n ’s B a n k  fo r  I n t e r n a t io n a l  C o o p e r a t io n .  I t  a lso  e n g a g e s  in  
v e n tu re - ty p e  f in a n c in g  fo r  a  se lec t g ro u p  o f  S M E s .11 T h a i la n d ’s S M E  B a n k  c a r ­
r ie s  o u t  s im ila r  a c t iv i t ie s ,  b u t  o n  a  s m a lle r  a n d  less s o p h i s t i c a te d  lev e l. T o ta l  
lo a n s  in  2 0 0 3  w e re  a r o u n d  $ 6 8 0  m il l io n ,  in v o lv in g  6 ,0 0 0  sm a ll  a n d  m e d iu m ­
siz ed  f irm s .12
A s th e  h ig h e s t- in c o m e  c o u n tr y  o f  th e  six , S in g a p o re ’s e f fo r ts  w i th  re sp e c t to  
S M E s  a re  h e av ily  fo c u se d  o n  fo s te r in g  e n tr e p re n e u r s h ip  a n d  in n o v a t io n .  S o m e  
p r o g r a m s  a re  d i r e c t ly  a d m in i s te r e d  b y  g o v e r n m e n t  a g e n c ie s , s u c h  as th e  E c o ­
n o m ic  D e v e lo p m e n t  B o a rd , a n d  o th e rs  a re  c a r r ie d  o u t  in  c o n ju n c t io n  w i th  p r i ­
v a te  in s t i tu t io n s  a n d  in d iv id u a l  “a n g e ls .” M a n y  p ro g ra m s  are  g e a re d  fo r  te c h n o l ­
o g y  s ta r t-u p s ,  b u t  o p p o r tu n i t i e s  a re  a lso  a v a ilab le  fo r  f i rm s  in  m o re  t r a d i t io n a l  
s e c to rs .  I n s t r u m e n t s  in c lu d e  f ix e d -  a n d  v a r ia b le - r a te  lo a n s ,  in s u r a n c e ,  e q u i ty  
in v e s tm e n ts , tax  in c e n tiv e s , te c h n ic a l  a ss is tan ce  th r o u g h  h i r in g  e x te rn a l e x p e rts , 
a n d  s u p p o r t  fo r  d e v e lo p in g  overseas m a rk e ts .13
T h e  p ro b le m s  o f  S M E s  in  g e n e ra l, a n d  th e ir  f in a n c ia l n e ed s  in  p a r tic u la r ,  a re  
a  h ig h  p r io r i t y  t h r o u g h o u t  th e  d e v e lo p in g  w o r ld  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e i r  p o t e n t i a l  
im p a c t  o n  p o v e r ty  r e d u c t io n  a n d  e m p lo y m e n t  g e n e ra t io n .  U n f o r tu n a te ly ,  i t  is 
h a r d  to  e v a lu a te  th e  tw o  ty p e s  o f  e x p e r ie n c e s  t h a t  w e  h a v e  r e v ie w e d — d ir e c t  
le n d in g  b y  g o v e r n m e n t  b a n k s  in  E a s t  A s ia  v e rsu s  s e c o n d - t ie r  f in a n c e  in  L a t in  
A m e ric a — b ecau se  o f  la c k  o f  c o m p a ra b le  in fo rm a t io n .  I t  is a lso  u n c le a r  w h e th e r  
su ccessfu l ex p erien ces  c a n  b e  re p lic a te d , b u t  th e  a rea  calls o u t  fo r  m o re  c o m p a r ­
a tiv e  resea rch . W e  n e e d  to  id e n t i fy  b e s t p ra c tic e s  b y  b o th  p u b l ic  a n d  p r iv a te  sec ­
to r  in s t i tu t io n s ,  a n d  th e  p re re q u is ite s  fo r  th e ir  im p le m e n ta t io n ,  as a  f irs t  s te p  to  
p ro v id in g  s o lu t io n s .14
Toward a Policy Agenda on Finance
L a t in  A m e r ic a n  g o v e rn m e n ts  g e n e ra lly  a g ree  t h a t  p o lic y  in i t ia t iv e s  n e e d  to  be  
u n d e r ta k e n  in  th e  a re a  o f  f in a n c e .  T h o s e  w h o  re g a rd  f in a n c e  as a n  i m p o r t a n t  
d e te r m in a n t  o f  g r o w th  a re  e a g e r  to  d e e p e n  a n d  im p ro v e  th e  s e c to r ’s p e r fo r m -
11. Industrial Bank o f Korea (2003) and website (www.kiupbank.co.kr). Nugent and Yhee 
(2002) offer a useful analysis of SME financing in Korea.
12. SME Bank (2003) and website (www.smebank.co.th).
13. See website o f Action Community for Entrepreneurship (www.ace.org.sg).
14. Interesting work on SMEs, finance, and poverty has been reported recently by the World 
Bank. See, for example, Berger and Udell (2004); Beck and others (2004); Cull and others (2004); 
Honohan (2004, 2005).
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an ce . E v e n  th o se  w h o  b e liev e  th a t  f in a n c e  is b a s ica lly  a  re sp o n se  to  g ro w th  re a l­
ize  t h a t  th e  p r o p e r  f in a n c ia l  i n f r a s t r u c tu r e  m u s t  b e  in  p la c e  fo r  a  s m o o th  
re sp o n se  to  o ccu r. T h e  issu e  o f  w h a t  s h o u ld  b e  d o n e , h o w ev er, is n o t  c le a r-c u t. 
M o re o v e r, th e  d if fe re n t  c h a ra c te ris tic s  acro ss  c o u n tr ie s  c o m p lic a te  th e  p o lic y  d is ­
c u s s io n  e n o rm o u s ly .  I n i t i a l  c o n d i t i o n s  a re  o b v io u s ly  c e n t r a l  to  p o l ic y  c h o ic e .  
T h e s e  v a ry  w id e ly , as w e  h av e  s h o w n  th r o u g h o u t  th e  b o o k , w h ic h  im p lie s  t h a t  a 
o n e -s ize -fits -a ll s o lu t io n  is n o t  a p p ro p r ia te .
O u r  a im  in  th e se  f in a l pag es is to  su g g e st a  se t o f  m id - le v e l p o lic y  r e c o m m e n ­
d a t io n s .  W e  id e n t i f y  a re a s  t h a t  r e q u ir e  r e fo r m  a n d  s u g g e s t  s o m e  g e n e ra l  
a p p ro a c h e s , b a se d  o n  b e s t p ra c t ic e s  f o u n d  in  o u r  re sea rc h . A l ig n in g  th e m  w ith  
sp e c if ic  p o lic y  in s t r u m e n ts  m u s t  b e  th e  ta s k  o f  p u b l ic  a n d  p r iv a te  s e c to r  a c to rs  
in  e ac h  in d iv id u a l  c o u n try . W e  a rg u e  t h a t  five a rea s c o n s t i tu te  th e  c e n tra l  co re  o f  
a  p o lic y  a g e n d a  to  p ro m o te  a  ro b u s t  f in a n c ia l  sy s te m  t h a t  w ill  p r o m o te  g ro w th  
a n d  e q u ity . T h e y  in c lu d e  g o o d  m a c r o e c o n o m ic  m a n a g e m e n t ,  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  
s tro n g  in s t i tu t io n s ,  c a u tio u s  in te g ra t io n  in to  th e  in te r n a t io n a l  e c o n o m y , s u p p o r t  
fo r  a  lo n g - te r m  s e g m e n t  o f  t h e  f in a n c ia l  m a r k e ts ,  a n d  a  m a jo r  t h r u s t  to w a rd  
e x p a n d in g  f in a n c e  fo r  sm a ll f irm s .
Macroeconomic Management
A f irs t  p o lic y  a rea  t h a t  w e  h a v e  id e n t i f ie d  as c ru c ia l  fo r  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  b o th  
b a n k s  a n d  c a p ita l  m a rk e ts  is s o u n d  m a c ro e c o n o m ic  m a n a g e m e n t.  I t  is v ir tu a l ly  
im p o s s ib le  to  fo s te r  h e a l th y  b a n k s  a n d  e sp e c ia lly  r o b u s t  c a p ita l  m a rk e ts  in  th e  
m id s t  o f  h ig h  in f la t io n  a n d  v o la t i le  g ro w th .  B ra z il in  th e  la te  1 9 8 0 s  a n d  e a r ly  
1 9 9 0 s  sh o w s th a t  b a n k s  c a n  a d ju s t  so  as to  b e  h ig h ly  p ro f i ta b le  u n d e r  su c h  c ir ­
c u m s ta n c e s , b u t  th e y  w ill d o  so  th r o u g h  sp e c u la tiv e  a c tiv itie s  r a th e r  th a n  le n d ­
in g  to  s u p p o r t  p r iv a te  se c to r  in v e s tm e n t  o r  c o n s u m p tio n .  A rg e n t in a  p ro v id e s  a  
d i f fe re n t  k in d  o f  e x a m p le , in  w h ic h  a  s tro n g  re g u la to ry  e n v ir o n m e n t  p ro v e d  n o  
m a tc h  fo r  se r io u s  m a c ro e c o n o m ic  fa ilu re . B o n d  m a rk e ts  a re  m u c h  m o re  frag ile  
t h a n  b a n k s . U n d e r  p o o r  m a c ro e c o n o m ic  c o n d it io n s  th e y  w ill— a t  b e s t— p ro v id e  
f in a n c e  f o r  g o v e r n m e n ts ,  w h i le  c o r p o r a te  is su e s  d w in d le  a n d  s to c k  m a rk e ts  
r e m a in  th in  a n d  v o la tile .
M a n y  a sp e c ts  o f  m a c r o e c o n o m ic  p o lic y  a re  im p o r t a n t ,  a n d  th e y  a re  c lo se ly  
in te r r e la te d  a m o n g  th e m se lv e s  a n d  w i th  f in a n c e .  S ta b le  g ro w th ,  lo w  in f la t io n ,  
f isca l d is c ip l in e ,  a n d  h ig h  sa v in g s  a re  a ll e s s e n t ia l  c o m p o n e n ts  o f  a n  e n v i r o n ­
m e n t  in  w h ic h  f in a n c ia l  m a rk e ts  c a n  f lo u r is h . O f  th e s e  e le m e n ts ,  L a t in  A m e r i­
c a n  c o u n t r i e s  h a v e  m a d e  th e  m o s t  p ro g re s s  in  c o n t r o l l in g  in f la t io n .  B ra z il’s 
Plano Real w as th e  f in a l s te p  th a t  r e tu r n e d  th e  re g io n  to  s in g le -d ig i t  levels in  th e  
m id - 1 9 9 0 s .  I n  m a n y  cases, th e s e  in f la t io n  g a in s  w e re  p u r c h a s e d  th r o u g h  f ix ed  
e x c h a n g e  ra te s  t h a t  u l t im a te ly  f e d  i n to  f in a n c ia l  c rises . N o w  a  n e w  a p p r o a c h  
se e m s to  h a v e  t a k e n  h o ld ,  in v o lv in g  f le x ib le  e x c h a n g e  ra te s  a n d  th e  slo w , b u t  
steady , u se  o f  m o n e ta ry  a n d  fiscal p o lic y  to  b r in g  in f la t io n  d o w n  f u r th e r  in  th o se  
cases w h e re  i t  is necessary . C h ile ,  t h r o u g h o u t  th e  1 9 9 0 s , w as a n  e x a m p le  o f  th is
k in d  o f  a p p r o a c h ,  in  c o n t r a s t  to  th e  A rg e n t in e ,  M e x ic a n , o r  B ra z il ia n  s ty le  o f  
s ta b i l iz a t io n .  T h e s e  h a r d - w o n  g a in s  m u s t  b e  p r o t e c te d  a n d ,  in  s o m e  cases, 
e x te n d e d , b u t  w i th in  a c o n te x t  o f  s u b s ta n tia l  e x ch a n g e  ra te  flex ib ility .
A  k e y  a sp e c t o f  s ta b i l iz a t io n  m u s t  b e  fiscal d is c ip l in e ,  d e s p i te  p o l i t ic a l  p re s ­
su re s  to  th e  c o n tr a ry .  F isc a l d is c ip l in e  is i m p o r t a n t  b e c a u s e  d e f ic i ts  m u s t  b e  
f in a n c e d — w h e th e r  th r o u g h  p r in t in g  m o n ey , is su in g  d o m e s tic  b o n d s ,  o r  ta p p in g  
th e  in te r n a t io n a l  m a rk e ts .  E a c h  m e c h a n is m  h a s  i ts  c o s ts  fo r  f in a n c ia l  d e v e lo p ­
m e n t .  I n f la t io n  a n d  th e  r e s u l t in g  u n c e r t a in ty  a re  o n e  c o s t ,  t o g e th e r  w i th  th e  
n e e d  to  c o m p e n sa te  w i th  t ig h t  m o n e ta ry  p o lic y  a n d  h ig h  in te re s t  ra tes . C ro w d ­
in g  o u t  in  loca l b o n d  m a rk e ts  is a n o th e r , as c a n  b e  se e n  in  m a n y  L a tin  A m e r ic a n  
c o u n tr ie s  w h e re  th e  la rg e  m a jo r i ty  o f  b o n d s  c o n s is t  o f  g o v e rn m e n t  d e b t.  F inally , 
c a re le ss  u se  o f  i n te r n a t io n a l  f in a n c e ,  w i th  m is m a tc h e s  o f  v a r io u s  k in d s ,  h a s  
p ro v e d  to  b e  a  p o w e r fu l  e le m e n t  u n d e r ly in g  f in a n c ia l  cris is . W h ile  fiscal d e fic its  
d e c l in e d  s h a rp ly  in  th e  e a r ly  1 9 9 0 s ,  th e y  h a v e  b e e n  c re e p in g  u p  a g a in ,  w h ic h  
c o n s t i tu te s  a n  o b v io u s  a re a  o f  c o n c e r n  t h r o u g h o u t  th e  re g io n .  T h e y  m u s t  b e  
c o n tro l le d ,  b u t  th e  ta rg e t  leve l o f  d e f ic it  (o r  su rp lu s)  h a s  to  b e  d e c id e d  a c c o rd in g  
to  p o lit ic a l  a n d  economic c irc u m s ta n c e s  in  in d iv id u a l  c o u n tr ie s .
G ro w th , sav in g s, a n d  f in a n c e  a re  a n  in te r r e la te d  t r ia d  in  th e  m a c ro e c o n o m ic  
sp h e re . E c o n o m e tr ic  e v id e n c e  su g g ests  t h a t  f in a n c e  is th e  in d e p e n d e n t  v a r ia b le  
in  th e  re la tio n s h ip  w i th  g ro w th , b u t  th e  la t te r  w ill a lw ays g e n e ra te  s o m e  ty p e  o f  
f in a n c e  w h e n  necessa ry . T h e  q u e s t io n  is h o w  s ta b le  a n d  ro b u s t  th e  f in a n c e  w ill 
b e . T h e  s i t u a t io n  in  M e x ic o  s in c e  1 9 9 5  is a n  i n te r e s t in g  e x a m p le .  D e s p i te  a  
c o n t in u o u s  d e c l in e  in  b a n k  le n d in g  a n d  m in u s c u le  d o m e s t ic  c a p i ta l  m a rk e ts ,  
g r o w th  a n d  in v e s tm e n t  w e re  b u o y a n t  in  th e  s e c o n d  p a r t  o f  th e  d e c a d e , s u p ­
p o r te d  b y  in te r n a t io n a l  f in a n c e  fo r  la rg e  f irm s  a n d  n o n b a n k  f in a n c e  fo r  S M E s . 
W h ile  th e  s te ep  fa ll in  M e x ic o ’s g ro w th  ra te  in  th e  e a r ly  2 0 0 0 s  w as m a in ly  d u e  
to  th e  d r o p  in  U .S .  e c o n o m ic  g ro w th ,  th e  la c k  o f  f in a n c e  fo r  th e  m a jo r i ty  o f  
f i r m s  m e a n t  t h a t  t h e  d o m e s t ic  e c o n o m y  w a s  n o t  a b le  to  b u f f e r  t h e  e x te r n a l  
s lo w d o w n .
S a v in g s  a re  a lso  p r im a r i ly  a  r e s u l t  o f  th e  g ro w th  p ro c e s s ,  a l th o u g h  ta x  a n d  
o th e r  p o l ic y  m e a su re s  c a n  h a v e  a  p o s i t iv e  e f fe c t o n  s a v in g  p r o p e n s i t ie s .  S o m e  
p o r t io n  o f  av a ilab le  sav in g s w ill th e n  b e  recy c led  th r o u g h  th e  d o m e s tic  f in a n c ia l 
sy s te m . T h e  d e e p  f in a n c ia l  sy s te m s  in  E a s t  A s ia  a re  c le a r ly  a  r e f le c t io n  o f  th e  
h ig h  sav ings ra te s  in  th a t  re g io n . T h e  s i tu a t io n  in  L a tin  A m e r ic a  is w e a k e r  th a n  
th a t  in  A sia  fo r  tw o  m a in  reaso n s: th e  sav in g s ra te s  a re  lo w e r p e r  se, a n d  sk e w e d  
in c o m e  d is t r ib u t io n  a n d  m a c ro e c o n o m ic  in s ta b il i ty  c re a te  in c e n tiv e s  fo r  c a p ita l  
f l ig h t,  m o v in g  e x is tin g  sav in g s  o u t  o f  th e  c o u n tr y  r a th e r  th a n  c h a n n e lin g  th e m  
in to  d o m e s tic  c a p i ta l  m a rk e ts  to  f in a n c e  in v e s tm e n t.  E a c h  in d iv id u a l  c o u n t r y  
n e e d s  to  d e s ig n  in s t r u m e n t s  a n d  in c e n t iv e s  to  h e lp  c h a n n e l  sa v in g s  i n to  th e  
f in a n c ia l  sy s te m  a n d  in to  p ro d u c tiv e  use , b u t  th is  m u s t  ta k e  p la c e  w i th in  a  c o n ­
te x t  o f  s ta b le  g ro w th .
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Institutional Development
I n s t i tu t io n  b u i ld in g  c o n s t itu te s  a  s e c o n d  p o lic y  a rea  th a t  is c ru c ia l  fo r  s t r e n g th ­
e n in g  th e  f in a n c ia l  sec to r. P o litic a l s ta b il i ty  is a  p re re q u is i te  fo r  a n y  p ro g ra m  to  
d e v e lo p  s o c ie ty w id e  o r  s e c to r - sp e c if ic  in s t i tu t io n s .  I n  p a r t ic u la r ,  c o n t in u i ty  o f  
p o l i t i c a l - e c o n o m ic  a p p r o a c h  is a  s in e  q u a  n o n .  T o o  o f te n  in  th e  p a s t ,  L a t in  
A m e r ic a  h a s  g o n e  t h r o u g h  la rg e  p e n d u la r  sw in g s  in  p o lic y  o r i e n ta t io n ,  w h ic h  
h as  th e  e ffec t o f  u n d e r m in in g  a n y  k in d  o f  in s t i tu t io n  b u ild in g . O n e  o f  th e  m o s t  
p o s itiv e  a sp ec ts  o f  r e c e n t  y ears is th e  in c re a se d  te n d e n c y  to w a rd  e c o n o m ic  p o lic y  
c o n t in u i ty ,  e v e n  w h e n  g o v e r n m e n ts  o f  d i f f e r e n t  p o l i t ic a l  p e r s u a s io n s  re p la c e  
e a c h  o th e r . G o v e rn m e n ts  a n d  th e  p r iv a te  s e c to r  a lik e  a re  c o m in g  to  rea lize  th a t  
in s t i tu t io n s  ta k e  a  lo n g  t im e  to  c rea te , b u t  c a n  b e  d e s tro y e d  v e ry  rap id ly .
G iv e n  a n  a p p ro p r ia te  p o lit ic a l c o n te x t, in s t i tu t io n  b u ild in g  m u s t  ta k e  p lace  in  
tw o  d is t in c t  areas. T h e  f irs t  is th e  a rea  w e  h a v e  e m p h a s iz e d  in  th e  b o o k : th e  ru les  
a n d  n o rm s  th a t  g o v e rn  so c ie ta l in te ra c t io n s  b y  c o n tro l l in g  u n c e r ta in ty . W e  h av e  
fo c u se d  o n  tw o  ty p es  o f  ru les  a n d  n o rm s , b o th  o f  w h ic h  a re  e ssen tia l fo r  fo s te r in g  
f in a n c ia l  d e v e lo p m e n t. A t  th e  so c ie ta l level, th e  W o r ld  B a n k  h as  h e lp e d  to  d e f in e  
a n d  m e a su re  a  se t  o f  g o v e rn a n c e  in s t i tu t io n s .  O f  th e i r  six  e le m e n ts , w e  w o rk e d  
w i th  fo u r :  g o v e rn m e n t  e ffec tiv en ess, re g u la to ry  q u a lity , ru le  o f  law , a n d  c o n tro l  
o f  c o r ru p t io n . W e  fo u n d  a  s tro n g  re la tio n s h ip  b e tw e e n  th ese  in d ic a to rs  a n d  b o th  
b a n k  p e r fo r m a n c e  a n d  c a p i ta l  m a r k e t  size , w h ic h  su g g e s ts  a  f r u i t f u l— i f  d i f f i ­
c u lt— area  w h e re  g o v e rn m e n ts  s h o u ld  t r y  to  m a k e  p ro g ress in  th e  n e a r  fu tu re . A t 
th e  f in a n c ia l  s e c to r  lev e l, a  m o re  sp e c if ic  s e t o f  i n s t i tu t io n s  is im p o r ta n t .  B o th  
c o rp o ra te  g o v e rn an c e  in  f irm s  th a t  a re  p o te n t ia l  b o rro w e rs  a n d  g o v e rn a n c e  o f  th e  
f in a n c ia l  s e c to r  i t s e l f  m u s t  be  s t r e n g th e n e d .  E x a m p le s  t h a t  w e  a n d  o th e r s  h a v e  
f o u n d  to  b e  re la te d  to  c a p ita l m a rk e t  d e v e lo p m e n t in c lu d e  d isc lo su re  o f  f in a n c ia l 
in fo rm a t io n , g e n e ra l tran sp a re n cy , c o n tr a c t  e n fo rc e m e n t, p r o te c t io n  o f  m in o r i ty  
sh a re h o ld e rs ,  b a n s  o n  in s id e r  t r a d in g ,  a n d  s im p le  a n d  e x p e d i t io u s  b a n k r u p tc y  
p ro c e d u re s . T h e s e  p ra c tic e s  h av e  a  s tro n g  im p a c t  o n  w h e th e r  b a n k e rs  a re  w illin g  
to  m a k e  lo a n s  a n d  in v e s to rs  a re  w il l in g  to  p u t  m o n e y  in to  c a p ita l  m a rk e ts . T h e  
re la tio n s h ip  is e sp ec ia lly  im p o r ta n t  w i th  re sp ec t to  f in a n c e  fo r  th e  p r iv a te  sec to r. 
G o v e rn m e n ts  m a y  b e  a b le  to  g e t re so u rces fo r  th em se lv es  th r o u g h  v a r io u s  m ea n s , 
b u t  p r iv a te  se c to r  f in a n c e  is m u c h  m o re  fragile.
A  s e c o n d  a rea  fo r  d e v e lo p in g  in s t i tu t io n s  is m o re  c o n c re te , in v o lv in g  sp ec ia l­
iz e d  a g e n ts  a n d  m a rk e ts . W i th  re sp e c t to  b a n k in g , p e rh a p s  th e  m o s t  im p o r ta n t  
is th e  re g u la to ry  a n d  su p e rv iso ry  sy s te m . O p in io n s  d if fe r  o n  th e  b e s t ty p e  o f  reg ­
u la t io n  a n d  su p e rv is io n  fo r  b o th  b a n k s  a n d  c a p ita l  m a rk e ts . T h e  p re v a ilin g  v iew  
is t h a t  a  s t r o n g  g o v e r n m e n t  ro le  is e s s e n tia l ,  b u t  a  fe w  e x p e r ts  h a v e  r e c e n t ly  
b e g u n  to  a rg u e  t h a t  p r iv a te  s e c to r  m o n i to r in g  is p re fe ra b le . O u r  v ie w  is t h a t  i t  
w o u ld  b e  a  m is ta k e  t o  re ly  e x c lu s iv e ly  o n  th e  la t te r ,  g iv e n  th e  p r o b le m s  o f  
m a c ro e c o n o m ic  sh o c k s , c o n ta g io n ,  a n d  p ro c y c lic a li ty  t h a t  c h a ra c te r iz e  to d a y s  
o p e n  e co n o m ies . N o n e th e le s s , a c tiv itie s  su c h  as in c re a s in g  in fo rm a t io n  d isc lo su re
and transparency and introducing external ratings and audits can be useful sup­
plements to government regulation and supervision. Government-based super­
vision and private monitoring should be viewed not as substitutes, but as com­
plements. Important attributes of supervisors must include high skill levels, pay 
scales that prevent them from being bribed or hired away, and adequate train­
ing. Training can usefully be carried out in connection with regulatory agencies 
of industrial countries, which is especially important when foreign banks con­
trol the dominant share of local markets (as in Mexico). Information sharing 
and perhaps joint supervision are additional topics that need much more atten­
tion than they have received to date.
With respect to capital markets, the key requirements include fostering the 
development of new actors and strengthening market infrastructure. On the 
demand side, we have described the importance of institutional investors, 
including pension funds and insurance companies. At the same time, we found 
a degree of contradiction between institutional investors and the liquidity that is 
necessary to attract other participants to the stock and bond markets. One 
answer is to promote another kind of institutional investor— mutual funds—  
that tends to specialize in short- to medium-term investments because of client 
requirements. On the supply side, a central issue is attracting enough firms to 
list on local exchanges. Among others, two interrelated problems need govern­
ment attention. On the one hand, strong corporate governance must be pro­
moted if markets are to flourish. On the other hand, some firms are unwilling to 
engage in the disclosure and transparency that are the essence of corporate gov­
ernance. Convincing them that it is in their long-run interest to do so is an 
ongoing task of financial authorities in all emerging market economies.
International and Regional Context
While the international context in which Latin American banks and capital 
markets operate is clearly important to their performance, policy in this area is 
complicated. Some experts emphasize the need to reform the international 
financial architecture. Developing countries do not have much leverage, how­
ever. Moreover, the interests of developing countries do not always coincide, 
which hinders the creation of alliances that could increase their influence. For 
example, the richer countries are more concerned with access to private flows, 
whereas the poorer ones are more interested in aid. Those with access to private 
capital are concerned about measures to enhance the stability of international 
debt instruments; those who rely on public sector flows tend to be more inter­
ested in conditions for debt relief.
Given this panorama, we recommend that Latin American countries devote 
their main efforts to decreasing their own vulnerability, yet without abandoning 
the discussion of international financial policy.15 In large measure, this means
15. Williamson (2005) has recently suggested some interesting ideas for a policy agenda that 
emphasizes both the creditor and debtor sides.
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pursuing sound macroeconomic policy, as discussed earlier. For example, higher 
savings rates and lower fiscal deficits both decrease the need for external finance. 
Similarly, conservative debt management strategies can help countries avoid 
being caught out when conditions change in international financial markets. 
Within the context of sound macroeconomic management, judicious use of 
controls on capital inflows may help to prevent capital surges from undermining 
domestic stability. Maturity, currency, and interest rate mismatches should be 
avoided when engaging in international transactions. Finally, decreasing a coun­
try’s international vulnerability is a strong reason for developing local capital 
markets.
A  powerful argument against the last point involves the relatively small size 
of most Latin American economies, with the exception of Brazil and Mexico. 
Small market size does indeed affect the ability of local capital markets to pro­
vide for the financial needs of governments and large firms. Some World Bank 
economists, among others, have recently argued that because of size constraints, 
the best approach is to push forward with international financial integration and 
forget about local markets. We do not believe this recommendation is helpful 
except, perhaps, for the largest borrowers. Medium-sized firms will not be able 
to tap international markets, but they could participate locally. In addition, local 
markets could supplement international offerings by larger borrowers. We sug­
gest that governments continue their efforts to expand domestic markets 
through market-enhancing policies, such as promoting improved corporate gov­
ernance and expanding the types of actors who can participate. The latter might 
include the introduction of equity markets for new or small firms, as has been 
done in Brazil, Chile, and Korea.
An alternative that the World Bank rejects, but that we think deserves more 
exploration, is the creation of regional capital markets. East Asian governments 
have taken the lead in this area and have already set up some relevant institu­
tions. For example, a small regional bond market has been established, and cen­
tral banks have negotiated swaps. On the private sector side, banks have begun 
investing across borders, increasing the demand for regionally based brokerages, 
investment banks, and other such institutions. Latin American countries would 
do well to follow the results with care to see what can be accomplished. Within 
Latin America itself, harmonization of macroeconomic policies is a first step, 
but others could be taken as well. Regional and subregional development banks 
should take a leading role in these activities.
Long-Term Finance for Investment
The lack of long-term finance for investment is one of two market failures that 
we highlight in the book. The lack of such finance is arguably one cause of the 
low investment ratios found in Latin America, although some approaches have 
been more successful than others in addressing the problem. For example, Brazil 
has large amounts of long-term finance available through BNDES, yet it has
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one of the lowest investment rates in the region. Chile, by contrast, offers no 
long-term government finance, but it has promoted capital markets with greater 
success as measured by investment ratios. Mexico has little finance o f either 
kind, relying instead on nonbank and international finance together with 
retained earnings. Again, however, the investment ratio is very low. Market- 
enhancing policies could play a useful role in stimulating the development of 
both public and private institutions.
Three forms of market enhancement offer the potential to increase long-term 
finance. A  first approach centers on banks, since they are the single largest 
source of finance in the region— despite the poor performance in recent years. 
The maturities of bank loans that are to be used for investment need to be 
extended. One possibility would be to establish carefully designed guarantees 
from national or regional public sector banks. Another would be to encourage a 
system for the securitization of long-term loans for investment, along the lines 
of the mortgage market in a number of countries. While the U.S. system is the 
best known, Chile has long securitized its mortgage debt, and Mexico and Brazil 
have also begun to use this approach. In the U.S. case, the institutions involved 
are quasi-public, but regional development banks could play this role, as could 
private firms with sufficient resources. This would allow banks to make long­
term loans, but then get them off their books so as to continue making new 
finance available.16
A  second approach is to promote capital markets in countries where the mar­
ket is large enough to support them. Brazil and Mexico are clearly candidates, 
and the Chilean markets are already active in a relatively small economy. A  key 
factor is fiscal restraint, so that available funds are not monopolized by the pub­
lic sector. Based on our review of various experiences, we identify three addi­
tional requirements: namely, good corporate governance, the presence of institu­
tional investors, and sufficient liquidity in the secondary markets to give 
investors confidence. While some conflict may arise between the second and 
third items, it is most likely to occur with pension funds and insurance compa­
nies, given their long time horizons. Other institutional investors, such as 
mutual funds, are more active traders. As mentioned above, the possibility of 
regional capital markets should also be explored as a way to resolve the size 
problem.
A  third approach involves a direct government role in providing long-term 
finance. The negative experience with government development banks in many 
countries has frequently led to the closure of these banks or their conversion 
into second-tier institutions. It is worth studying the relatively successful cases, 
however, to see if any mechanisms could be adapted to other locations. Korea’s
16. Securitization is easier for mortgages than for investment loans because of the standardiza­
tion of the underlying assets and the ability to repossess in case of default. Greater institutional cre­
ativity would be required for investment loans.
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KDB is a case in point, as is Brazils BNDES, although the issue of why BNDES 
has been unable to raise investment rates needs to be thoroughly explored. A  
number of regional and subregional development banks have also played a posi­
tive role in financing investment. The Inter-American Development Bank, the 
Andean Development Corporation, and the Central American Bank for Eco­
nomic Integration are all important examples within Latin America. The World 
Bank provides an example on a global scale. These regional and global institu­
tions could also usefully be examined for lessons on how well-managed develop­
ment banks can contribute to long-term finance for investment. The poor expe­
rience with public sector banks in the past should not be grounds for automatic 
elimination of this option.
Access to Finance for Small Firms
The other market failure that we have been following is the lack of finance for 
small firms. The two most important reasons that SMEs have difficulties 
obtaining finance are lack of information about the firms (because of poor 
record-keeping or insufficient history) and high bank transaction costs (the unit 
administrative costs of making small loans are much higher than for large ones). 
The challenge, then, is to design instruments to deal with these problems. The 
solution must take into account some important differences between two types 
of small firms, since they may require different solutions to their financing 
problems. Small firms in traditional sectors can be supported by existing institu­
tions (banks and nonbank intermediaries), but high-tech start-ups may need 
finance more akin to venture capital in developed countries. Again, market- 
enhancing policies are required.
The countries we have studied have tried four approaches to increase finance 
for small firms, with differing degrees of success. Governments in other coun­
tries can gain useful insights from their successes and failures. The first approach 
is the traditional way o f providing finance to small firms: direct loans from 
government-owned commercial or development banks. These experiences have 
generally been quite negative, in terms of both managing the banks and getting 
the money to the intended recipients. Nonetheless, some relatively successful 
cases are worth reviewing, such as Chile’s BancoEstado, Brazil’s BNDES and 
Banco do Brasil, and Costa Rica’s public banks. Several banks in East Asia, such 
as Korea’s Industrial Bank, may also offer some useful experiences. After suffer­
ing serious problems in the past, these institutions have restructured operations 
and improved internal bank management. Tough regulation, which put the 
public banks on the same level playing field as their private competitors, has also 
been essential in turning around performance and making the banks potentially 
useful instruments for supplying finance to SMEs.
The second approach involves second-tier banks. These have been much 
more common than direct lending in recent years in Latin America. These are
government-owned institutions that provide funds to (usually private) commer­
cial banks to on-lend to small and medium-sized firms. Two of the most success­
ful instruments used by second-tier banks have been guarantees for loans that 
private banks make to small firms and subsidies for transaction costs. Chile’s 
BancoEstado, in collaboration with Corfo, has used both methods with fairly 
good results. Mexico’s Nafin has a large program that offers guarantees to banks 
for the loans they make to small and medium-sized firms. Brazil’s BNDES also 
does much of its lending to SMEs via second-tier operations with both public 
and private commercial banks, which are responsible for the analysis and 
approval of both credits and guarantees. BNDES officials argue that the latter 
are closer to the customers and thus can make better-informed decisions than 
the large development banks themselves.
Third, new institutions and techniques to support lending are being intro­
duced in Latin America. Credit bureaus have lowered the information costs for 
SME lending, while credit scoring has lowered transaction costs. Leasing and 
factoring have also become important sources of finance for small firms. Leasing 
enables them to obtain equipment without having to make a large initial outlay, 
while factoring makes it possible for them to get access to funds before they are 
paid for the products they produce. Indeed, factoring has become the technique 
o f preference at Mexico’s Nafin, where a second-tier arrangement has been 
devised to link large purchasers and private factoring firms with small subcon­
tractors. Likewise, studies show that a substantial amount of investment by 
small firms in Chile is carried out through factoring and leasing. In Brazil, both 
BNDES and Banco do Brasil have introduced credit cards for SMEs, which pro­
vide preapproved medium-term credit for working capital and investment, and 
BNDES administers a lending and technical assistance program for SME 
exporters. New actors have also appeared to support SMEs. In Mexico, the 
absence of lending from commercial banks led to the formation of a group of 
nonbank institutions (sofoles). Since they cannot take deposits, the sofoles get 
money from the banks and the capital markets. They have lent mainly for con­
sumer and housing purposes, but they have also made loans to SMEs. A  mark of 
their success is the fact that several have been purchased by the large banks.
Finally, a select group of small firms needs large amounts of money to under­
take substantial investments in high-technology areas. Such firms have gained 
access to venture capital funds in developed countries and in some Asian coun­
tries. Taiwan has perhaps the most developed set of venture capital firms, but 
Korea and Singapore are also moving in this direction. Mexico has incipient 
venture capital firms (Sincas, a type of mutual fund), although they have not yet 
taken off, while the latest capital market reform in Chile contains provisions to 
stimulate venture capital. This is clearly an area for future activity, probably 
though a partnership between public and private sectors. It may also involve a 
special stock exchange for new firms so as to provide an exit for venture partners
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and an ongoing source of finance for the firms at a later stage. A  study o f the 
Asian experiences would be a useful first step.
Final Com m ents
To close our analysis of Latin America’s financial systems at both the regional 
and national levels, a few simple messages are worth emphasizing. First, finance 
is an important determinant of growth and welfare. It thus merits receiving the 
highest priority on the policy agenda of the region. Second, the financial sys­
tems in most Latin American countries work poorly, including both the bank­
ing systems and the capital markets. They are not providing either the support 
needed for higher growth or the access required to expand opportunities to less 
privileged groups in society. Most Latin American governments have declared 
growth with equity to be their overarching goal; finance is a key instrument—  
one that can assist them or undermine them. Third, changes must be made. 
Financial liberalization resolved some problems, but it created many others. It is 
now time to push forward with a new reform agenda that will address existing 
deficiencies. We have put forward one set of proposals; others have made their 
own suggestions. Ultimately, individual governments and private sector actors 
in each country must choose broad strategies and select specific policies that will 
work in their particular case. Even with a clear and coherent agenda, however, 
strengthening the region’s financial systems will be a long-term process full of 
difficulties. It is urgent to start now.
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